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vThe Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy
research and educational organization established in Wash-
ington, D.C., in 1968. Its staff investigates the social, economic, and gov-
ernance problems confronting the nation and evaluates the public and
private means to alleviate them. The Institute disseminates its research
findings through publications, its web site, the media, seminars, and
forums.
Through work that ranges from broad conceptual studies to adminis-
trative and technical assistance, Institute researchers contribute to the stock
of knowledge available to guide decisionmaking in the public interest.
Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of officers or
trustees of the Institute, advisory groups, or any organizations that
provide financial support to the Institute.
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative
(LGI), as a regional program of the Open Society Institute–
Budapest (OSI), is an international development and grant-giving
organization dedicated to the support of good governance in the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent
States (NIS). LGI seeks to fulfill its mission through the initiation of
research and support of development and operational activities in the
fields of decentralization, public policy formation, and the reform of
public administration.
With projects running in countries covering the region between the
Czech Republic and Mongolia, LGI seeks to achieve its objectives through
various types of activities. LGI supports regional networks of institutions
and professionals engaged in policy analysis, reform-oriented training,
and advocacy. It is involved in policy research and disseminates compar-
ative and regionally applicable policy studies tackling local government
issues. LGI delivers technical assistance and provides professional guid-
ance to Soros national foundations. LGI supports policy centers and
think tanks in the region, publishes books, studies, and discussion papers
dealing with the issues of decentralization public policy and lessons
learned from the process of transition. They are used for development of
curricula and organization of training programs.
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Foreword to the
Second Edition
Whether in poor countries or highly industrialized settings,development of public policy institutions is a gradual, incre-
mental process, and improvements can often be reversed quickly if the
momentum is not sustained. Better advice on policy options and imple-
mentation strategies is needed by governments around the globe. Since
the publication of the first edition of Managing Think Tanks by LGI and
the Urban Institute in 2002, think tanks have continued to provide pol-
icy analysis and recommendations to governments. Much of the advice
provided is highly technical, requiring sophisticated databases, analytic
capacity, and the ability to understand and apply economic and institu-
tional theories. Think tanks recognize that their advice must be both
professionally sound and saleable to a wide range of stakeholders includ-
ing governments. With increasing evidence of public policy design and
implementation failures in Europe and the United States at all levels of
government, it is probably an understatement to say that even more
practical advice is needed—as well as insights that influence govern-
ments to actually listen to and adopt the right advice.
Policy think tanks cannot themselves govern, they can only advise.
To provide better and more adoptable advice, think tanks themselves
need practical advice on how to increase their institutional capacity. In
this second edition, Struyk again provides a practical how-to guide on
managing, developing, and operating think tanks. He distinguishes three
stages of think tank development. When a think tank has fewer than 10
full-time researchers, it typically has a low level of activity and few spon-
sors. Moving to the second stage, think tanks increase staff, have more
sponsors and clients, and engage in more specialized research and
educational activities. The third stage is the most advanced. In OECD
countries, there are a host of third stage think tanks, such as the
Brookings Institution (U.S.A.) and the Institute for Economic Research
(Germany).
The book is targeted at staff in the first two stages of development,
as well as their supporters, such as bilateral and multilateral donors.
Among the practical skills that can be learned from this book are how to
motivate staff to be productive, control the quality of products, under-
stand how to compete for government contracts, determine overhead
rates that will satisfy auditors, communicate results, and generate infor-
mation useful for senior management. Despite the passage of four years
since the first edition, there is still little  practical literature on how to
manage think tanks. Though think tanks in the FSU/CEE region have
functions that overlap with those of NGOs, consultancy firms, and foun-
dations, they have distinct missions, staff structures, and clientele. Think
tanks need their own practical management guides, and this book
continues to fill that gap.
The entire printing of the first edition of Managing Think Tanks has
been distributed, and the list of back orders is growing. LGI is proud to
respond to that demand and to publish an expanded second edition in
conjunction with the Urban Institute.
George M. Guess
Research Director, LGI (2004–)
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Foreword to the
First Edition
After a decade of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, theclimate surrounding public-sector reforms has become increas-
ingly more complex and interconnected. Decisionmakers must balance
legislative, organizational, and management changes in their countries
with the demand for rational, effective reforms. Public policy design
requires a choice of professional alternatives during the policy process
that takes into consideration the multiple actors invariably involved as
well as the institutional and financial consequences that are critical to its
success.
In order to meet this outstanding demand, advisory and consulting
organizations must improve their professional services. Domestic think
tanks and policy institutes are regularly involved in policy formulation.
Typically, as the scope of their size and activities has increased, their
organization and management has been influenced by this growth,
whether a detriment or benefit to the organization in question. Beyond
professional development, institutional and leadership issues have
become essential to their successful evolution.
In a well-run organization, such management responsibilities as
motivation, quality control, cooperation with boards, and external com-
munication are normal elements of day-to-day operations. This book
give a comprehensive review of these and other internal management
tasks such as creating team leaders, calculating indirect costs, and
launching new consulting initiatives. Numerous examples are provided
to prove the credibility of such ideas for readers in Central and Eastern
European countries.
Policy institutes and think tanks were always in the focus of the
Open Society Institute’s Local Government and Public Service Reform
Initiative (LGI). Grants and institutional support to professional net-
works and advice and training for policymakers recently was supple-
mented with a major program on policy institute development. LGI’s
public policy initiative is targeted on the effective organization of pro-
fessional advisory activities. The public policy centers that participate in
LGI’s program for policy centers receive organizational development
training, are advised on proposal writing for the European Union, and
have launched joint policy projects. They have also received considerable
and valuable experience through mentorship schemes that connect
think tanks from the region with their counterparts from Western
Europe. LGI’s newly published guidebook—Writing Effective Policy
Papers—is aimed to improve the professional quality of their work.
This publication on managing think tanks fits perfectly into this
rubric where management and policy intersect. Ray Struyk, a leading
expert on policy development in Central and Eastern Europe, provides
practical advice for well-established policy institutes gleaned from his
experiences in the region. We hope that this joint publication with the
Urban Institute will help our future cooperation in other research and
development projects.
Gábor Péteri
Research Director, LGI (2000–2004)
x FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION
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Preface
My primary inspiration for writing this book was my experiencewith the Institute for Urban Economics (IUE), a think tank
created in Moscow in 1995. IUE’s six founders were all members of my
staff, which was engaged on a large technical cooperation project in
Russia. As the resident advisor for the Urban Institute—an accom-
plished think tank located in Washington, D.C.—I worked very closely
with IUE’s management over the next three years to help establish 
the IUE on a strong footing. During this period I searched for written
materials on the management of think tanks. I found that there were
none.
From 1990 to today I have visited and worked with more than 15 think
tanks in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(EE-CIS). Sometimes the collaboration was intense. Often a discussion
would turn to particular management challenges, such as how to estab-
lish an overhead rate that would be defensible to donor auditors. I wanted
to be able to do more than simply provide on-the-spot advice. But, again,
I have been frustrated by the lack of written guidance available.
This demand for—and lack of—management information provided
strong motivation for writing a book about good practices in these areas.
I decided that the book would be more useful and convincing if I could
document actual management patterns with more systematic infor-
mation about current practices among young think tanks, including
examples of good practices. To this end, as time permitted during 2000
and 2001, I undertook a series of surveys on specific aspects of think
tank management. Most of these involved face-to-face interviews, but
one was conducted with a questionnaire via e-mail. This information,
plus data on the practices used by exemplary for-profit businesses, non-
profit organizations, and think tanks, forms the basis for the guidelines
reported.
I have spent the majority of my working life at think tanks—first at
the National Bureau of Economic Research and then at the Urban
Institute. I have had the chance to observe the management practices at
these organizations and to gather information from 10 other Western
think tanks in a survey for a project some years ago. These data con-
vinced me that many Western think tanks were effectively managed in
most areas but also that a good share could benefit from improved prac-
tices in some aspect of their administrative practices.
This book is directed particularly to younger and smaller think tanks
throughout the world, and it may be of the greatest value to those in
transitional and emerging economies. Nevertheless, I am convinced that
even well-established think tanks in industrialized nations can profit
from some of the lessons advanced. This book may also help the foun-
dations and bilateral and multilateral aid agencies that work with think
tanks everywhere. Sponsors of research and technical assistance projects
too often undervalue the productivity of small investments in institu-
tional development. The guidance presented here can alert sponsors to
limitations in the management of some of the institutions with whom
they work. The information also provides a basis for addressing the
problems.
The second edition contains three new chapters, additions made in
response to suggestions from think tank leaders with whom I have
worked and to needs I have observed in working with various policy
research organizations. Several other chapters have been revised and
expanded. With the exception of materials in the new chapters, I have
not gathered new material or updated the information on the manage-
ment practices of individual think tanks in Eastern Europe and the CIS
that appeared in the first edition. Doubtlessly, leaders of these organiza-
tions strengthened their practices over time. The reader is encouraged to
think of the case information presented as abstract examples rather than
the actual (current) practices of the named institutions.
I want to thank several people and organizations whose help was
pivotal in the preparation of the book. The first vote of gratitude goes to
those from some 20-odd think tanks who participated in several surveys
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on current practices conducted for the book. I benefited enormously
from extended discussions on management topics with colleagues at
several think tanks, both as part of the formal interviews of the surveys
and in other contexts. My greatest debt is to the team at the Institute for
Urban Economics—especially its president, Nadezhda B. Kosareva—for
sharing the details of several good management practices at the IUE. I
am grateful that these think tanks agreed to permit me to publish these
materials.
At the Urban Institute, Institute President Robert D. Reischauer was
enthusiastic about this project and offered moral support. Staff from
several administrative departments contributed lessons and useful mate-
rials. A special thanks goes to Kathleen Courrier for good ideas. The
Urban Institute supported the writing of this book from its unrestricted
funds.
Finally, I thank the following for giving permission to use materials
from a copyrighted document: the Urban Institute for Harold Liebovitz
and Laura Wherry, “Research to Practice: Evaluating Assessing the New
Federalism Dissemination Activities,” Assessing the New Federalism
Discussion Paper 04-02.
Raymond J. Struyk
May 2006
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1
Why Pay Attention
to Management?
Many directors of think tanks focus squarely on the tasks necessaryto fulfill the primary objectives of a private public-policy research
organization: expanding the number of policy options considered to
address a nation’s problems, providing hard facts and analysis to small
political parties and advocacy nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
to empower smaller players in the political process, and informing the
public on key issues of the day. They enjoy the interplay of the policy
development process and the challenge of directing good researchers.
By and large, think tanks are making a significant contribution to the
policy process.1
The great majority of think-tank directors come from academic
backgrounds—most have Ph.D.s and spend a significant part of their
careers at universities or research institutes; a substantial share have served
in their national government at senior levels. It is little wonder then that
they do not have an abiding interest in management questions.
If this sounds like you or the director of a think tank your organization
supports, then be aware that one ignores management issues at one’s peril.
Consider the following.
• The institute director trusts his senior people to conduct high-quality
research and control the quality of their team’s work, so there are
no procedures in place to routinely review the quality of products
being issued. A report on a high-visibility and urgent problem is sent
to the Ministry of Finance with significant flaws in the statistical
analysis. These flaws are discovered by an analyst from another
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organization after the report has been widely distributed. The think
tank loses significant credibility with the government and other
clients.
• The think tank has adopted informal procedures for determining
staff salaries. In practice, management tends to worry about pay
increases when they suspect that someone may be looking for
another job. Often they outbid potential new employers to retain
key staff members. The result is widespread unhappiness among
the staff because they believe that no one is really monitoring the
quantity and quality of work they do. There is little feedback. The
only way to get a raise is to threaten to leave. Low staff morale saps
productivity, and several staff actually leave to join other think
tanks or commercial firms where they believe their work will be
better appreciated.
• There is no law requiring an annual audit in the think tank’s home
country, and the director saves money by not having one done. He
trusts his accountant to establish the overhead rate for the organiza-
tion. The think tank has won a very large contract with a major multi-
lateral donor, and the donor requires an audit to verify the overhead
rates before the contract is awarded. The auditors discover that the
overhead rates are not justified, and question a number of other
financial practices. The donor decides to engage another contractor
to do the work.
These are real-world examples, and they are frighteningly common.
But there is a more fundamental reason for senior managers at think tanks
to make time to address basic administration and financial management
tasks: their organizations will work more efficiently. Dynamic, charismatic
leadership cannot offset flawed administrative systems.
Leaders of some think tanks recognize the need for improvement. In
autumn 1999, the World Bank’s Global Development Network (GDN)
administered an online survey to think tanks about their needs for assis-
tance and the services that GDN might provide. One question asked, “How
valuable would the following training activities be for your organization?”
Respondents were to score the value of each type of training on a scale
from one to seven, with seven indicating the greatest value. The 104 think
tanks that responded2 gave an average rating of 5.73 for training directed
to “issues related to the management of policy institutes.” The same orga-
nizations gave a rating of 5.13 to training on “technical issues, qualitative
methods, and statistics.” This pattern was highly consistent across regions.3
In short, think-tank directors consider improving their organizations’
management at least as important as strengthening their analytic capacity.
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
These findings are consistent with the author’s work with think tanks
outside of industrialized countries.
This book provides guidance for addressing potential problem areas,
and as such it fills a yawning void. To be sure, in the past the donor
community has worked on institutional development with think tanks,
particularly in transitional and developing economies. These efforts have
tended to focus on two needs of young institutions. First, donors have
provided equipment to support research operations, particularly com-
puters, fax machines, and copiers. More recently, there has been help with
Internet access and home pages. Second, donors have organized work-
shops typically addressing the needs of start-up NGOs more generally.
Workshops on the basics of financial management, corporate governance,
fundraising, interaction with the media, and policy advocacy have reached
a large number of NGOs.4 These programs provide critical skills to new,
comparatively simple operations.
But established think tanks require more sophisticated and more tai-
lored advice. Think-tank leaders seeking guidance and “how to” materials
often turn to books and materials written for nonprofit organizations, but
the fit is not good.5 Think tanks have a different mission, staff structure,
and clientele from NGOs.
WHO SHOULD READ THIS BOOK?
Leaders of think tanks constitute one primary audience for this book. The
number of think tanks, both in and outside highly industrialized countries,
has continued to expand impressively during the 1990s, building on a
surge in the previous decade. One survey shows that there are now over
1,200 think tanks in the United States, up by several hundred from the
1980s. Freedom House (1999) estimates that there are 250 such organi-
zations in Eastern Europe alone.
A recent survey of over 800 think tanks around the world reveals that
62 percent of responding institutions in the former Soviet bloc were
founded in the 1990s. In Africa, the corresponding figure is 38 percent;
an equal share was created in the previous decade.6
The figures for all regions doubtless understate the share of all organi-
zations founded in the 1990s, because of the difficulties in identifying new
organizations so they could be included in the survey. Even so, the overall
picture is of an expanding population. At the same time, many longer-
established think tanks are expanding and maturing as the value of their
analysis and participation in the policy process are more widely recognized
by the donor community and by national governments, parliaments, and
other participants in the policy arena.
WHY PAY ATTENTION TO MANAGEMENT? 
Thus, a significant number of think tanks around the world have or
will soon reach what might be termed the “second stage of development.”
Students of think tanks often use the criterion of 10 full-time researchers
consistently employed as an indicator of a think tank’s reaching this stage
of development. “Second-stage” institutes are at the point where they
move from a low, often highly variable level of operations and a small
number of sponsors to a higher level of activity—a larger staff, more
projects, greater specialization in staff assignments, and more opportu-
nities in the policy process and for educating the public on current policy
issues.7 Those in the third stage of development are established, major think
tanks in the West, such as the United States’ Brookings Institution and
the Urban Institute and Germany’s Institute fuer Wirtschaft Forschung
(Institute for Economic Research).
As think tanks reach the second stage of development, they must alter
their management and financial systems—and probably the way they
reach targeted audiences—to be efficient and effective. Managing the
transition to a higher level of activity is difficult at best. An excellent
policy analyst cannot make up for a primitive financial system that does
not permit the institution to control costs or establish a credible over-
head rate.8
Think tanks at the first and second stages of development are one
target audience for this book. But there is a second target audience:
foundations and other supporters of think tanks, such as bilateral and
multilateral donors—for example, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the World Bank. These sponsors are interested in
strengthening the management and capacity of think tanks so that
they will become a sustained resource in the country and field in which
they operate. Sponsors are also interested in think tanks’ management
because well-managed think tanks operate more efficiently and are
less subject to corruption. At the same time, few project managers at
donor organizations have significant experience with think tanks and
are often unsure of how to work with them to improve their management.
The chapters in this book provide the necessary guidance in several
key areas.
CONCRETE EXAMPLES ARE BEST
In working with think tanks over the years, the author has learned that
the best way to communicate an idea is with a specific, relevant, real-world
example. Each chapter includes such examples, using information obtained
from interviews with tank leaders and materials obtained during visits to
think tanks.
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
The guidance presented here is drawn from four sources: knowledge
the author has gained in working at think tanks for 30 years, his con-
siderable experience in studying and mentoring think tanks during the
past 15 years, in-depth interviews on management issues with leaders
of 10 leading Western think tanks and more than 30 think tanks in tran-
sitional economies (see table 1-1 for a partial list), and a close study of
superior management practices recommended for nonprofit and for-profit
organizations in the same management areas.
WHY PAY ATTENTION TO MANAGEMENT? 
Table 1-1 Think Tanks Interviewed, by Country
Think tank Country
Think tanks in the United States and Western Europe
American Enterprise Institute United States
Brookings Institution United States
Center for European Policy Studies Belgium
Center for Strategic and International Studies United States
Council on Foreign Relations United States
The Heritage Foundation United States
The Hoover Institution United States
Institute for International Economics United States
Stockholm International Peace Institute Sweden
The Urban Institute United States
Think tanks in Eastern European–Commonwealth of Independent States countries
Center for the Study of Democracy Bulgaria
Institute for Market Economy Bulgaria
Center for Political Studies and Comparative Analysis Romania
Institute for Urban Economics Russia
Institute for the Economy in Transition Russia
Expert Institute of the Russian Union Russia
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise Czech Republic
Center for Social and Economic Research Poland
Crakow Real Estate Institute Poland
Gdansk Institute for Market Economics Poland
Metropolitan Research Institute Hungary
TARKI-Social Research Institute Hungary
International Center for Policy Studies Ukraine
Viitorul Foundation Moldova
Center for Policy Studies–CEPOS Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Institute of Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economics Institute of Banja Luka Bosnia and Herzegovina
Center for Security Studies Bosnia and Herzegovina
Think tanks interviewed for the research underpinning this book
included groups in the United States, Western Europe, and the transitional
countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States. The author came to know numerous think tanks in the transitional
economies during the course of interviews done for an earlier book on
the performance of think tanks in policy development in Bulgaria,
Hungary, Armenia, and Russia.9 Leaders of several think tanks from Asia
have indicated to the author that the managerial challenges they face are
similar to those confronting think tanks in countries with transitional
economies. In other words, the current practices of the think tanks
interviewed for this book correspond broadly to those of think tanks
in other parts of the world. This would certainly cover “first-stage” and
“second-stage” think tanks in all countries, including the United States
and Western Europe.
It will be useful to have some general context on the situation for
the think tanks in Eastern Europe when reviewing their practices and
experiences. Several important points are listed in box 1-1.
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
The remaining chapters address 11 important management areas that
deserve the attention of think tank leaders:
• motivating staff to be productive and encouraging valuable staff
to remain with the organization (essential elements include staff
assessment, training, and compensation);
• organizing highly relevant training;
• controlling the quality of the product presented to clients, particularly
through a peer review process;
• communicating effectively the results of research to policymakers
and the general public;
• working successfully with the board of trustees or board of directors—
getting the best advice from the board on strategic issues without
having board members too involved in management questions;
• developing new products and services and identifying new clients
and other opportunities;
• understanding how to compete for government contracts;
• determining an overhead rate that is accurate and will withstand
the scrutiny of outside auditors;
• generating information essential for senior managers on the orga-
nization’s activities, broadly defined;
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• The policy development tradition inherited from the old regimes was a
closed process, the range of alternatives considered in addressing most
problems was decidedly narrow, and there was little analytic rigor; program
evaluation was essentially nonexistent. In the years just before the transi-
tion, policy analysts in some countries, such as Russia and Hungary, were
stimulated by senior policymakers’ interest in a more open and pluralistic
policy process. Policy analysis in the Western sense is still somewhat novel
in parts of the region, both for practitioners and for public-policy decision-
makers. Think tanks are heavily involved in the policy formulation process
in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and
Moldova, but less so in other CIS countries.
• Western—particularly American—foundations were instrumental in encour-
aging the creation of a number of think tanks and had a broad influence on
the private policy-analysis industry. The American think-tank model, charac-
terized by very strong independence, has generally served as the standard.
Nevertheless, there are examples in the region of think tanks aligned with
political parties or unions of industrialists along the “European model.”
There is also some concern about think tanks’ impartiality: A significant
share of think tanks have good political connections, and a number of their
leaders have held very senior government positions. While this facilitates
think tanks’ policy development efforts, it raises questions about whether
their positions are truly disinterested.
• Most think tanks are at the first stage of development, although a 
significant share—perhaps 30 to 35 percent—are in the second stage.
Entities in the first stage have a very small permanent research staff
(one or two persons), a much larger number of part-time consultants,
unstable funding, and primitive financial and administrative systems.
The second stage is associated with a larger permanent research staff
(5 to 10, at minimum), relatively stable funding, more sophisticated
operating systems, and greater staff specialization (e.g., a public relations
officer on staff). While most second-stage think tanks evolved from
first-stage organizations, a modest number started as larger operations
thanks to generous government or donor start-up support.
• National and local governments in Eastern Europe and the CIS have been
poor customers for think tanks. Comparatively more contracting has been
done in Hungary and Russia, but the volume is still modest. Local philan-
thropic support is very modest. The current legal and tax environment is
broadly adequate, but think tanks generally enjoy no special privileges
compared to parallel commercial organizations in the region.
• The donor community has not placed a priority on the institutional devel-
opment of think tanks. Actually, donors have used think tanks to pursue
agendas of their particular interest. Partly as a consequence of weak donor
leadership, administrative practices in many think tanks are weak.
Box 1-1 Key Points on Think Tanks in Eastern Europe 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States
• structuring the research staff—when and why to employ teams of
researchers or individual senior researchers supported by a research
assistant or two; and
• creating strong team leaders—the key middle managers at think tanks
who direct projects and have the most interaction with policymakers.
Each chapter contains a discussion of principles of good practice and
provides examples—both positive and negative—of what organizations
actually do. Examples of particularly strong practices are highlighted.
Appendices contain templates for strong practices, such as a staff assess-
ment form. References to other discussions of the issue at hand are also
provided.
Discussions are designed to stimulate the thinking about a management
area. While specific examples of how some organizations deal with each
area are provided, these examples need not be adopted en bloc. Each orga-
nization will likely want to adjust for the particular conditions it faces or
for the environment in which it operates. Labor code provisions may affect
procedures adopted in the personnel area, and ideas for generating
innovations depend heavily on the roster of potential types of clients. In
short, the essays in this volume are guides, not recipes.
N O T E S
(Complete references are at the end of this book.)
1. See, for example, Johnson (2000), Langsford and Brownsey (1992),
McGann (1999), Rich (2001), Smith (1991), Stone, Denham, and Garnett (1998),
Struyk (1999), and Telgarsky and Ueno (1996).
2. In addition, 98 private firms and government organizations completed
the survey, but the figures in the text are only for think tanks. The questionnaire
was directed to 512 research units throughout the world. The response rate was
about the same in all regions.
3. A summary of the findings was published at http://www.gdnet.org/
survey2.htm. The results given in the text are based on tabulations prepared by
the Urban Institute using a data file provided by the World Bank. Overall, the
survey paid very little attention to management issues.
4. An example of a financial management course of this type is the one devel-
oped by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) for think tanks
and business trade associations. The course covers the basic elements of bud-
geting, accounting, and control, but it does not deal with the more sophisti-
cated issues described later in this book. For details, see “Financial Management
Handbook” (CIPE 1998). Some intensive courses for NGOs are now being
offered. For example, the Institute for Development Policy and Management at
the University of Manchester offers a five-week course, “Managing NGOs.”
Judging from the published course outline, it would deal with some of the
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fundamental management issues confronting think tanks, but not in the most
useful way. For example, the standard NGO does not need an overhead rate
structure or a quality control mechanism of the type needed by think tanks.
This particular course is geared to British NGOs, so it would be of limited use
to think tanks elsewhere.
5. Thoughtful observers of Western foundations’ work with think tanks
believe that foundations have generally underinvested in institutional develop-
ment. Quigley (1997) makes this point emphatically about foundations and other
donors working in Eastern Europe.
6. For details, see McGann (1999).
7. A comprehensive 1997 survey of think tanks in Eastern Europe found that
about 30 percent of think tanks included met this criterion. The McGann survey
cited above asked a simple question about all employees, whether full- or part-
time, researchers or support staff. These figures are not used here. The survey
is reported in Freedom House (1999). Among CIS countries, only Belarus and
Ukraine are covered by the directory.
8. In the United States today there is also pressure for improved management
of NGOs in general. See Light (2000).
9. A general presentation of the findings on the Western think tanks is in
Struyk (1993). Most of the think tanks from Eastern Europe and the Common-
wealth of Independent States listed in table 1-1 were interviewed for an earlier
study of think tanks’ success in developing public policy; information on these
organizations is reported in Struyk (1993).
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
Motivating Staff for
Higher Productivity
and Increased Retention
2
Staff quality is a key determinant of success for all service organiza-tions, but for think tanks it is fundamental. Senior researchers and
policy analysts provide ideas about which problems facing their countries
an institute can profitably address, direct the analysis on the problems,
and proffer policy responses to meet them. They are also an institute’s
representatives for convincing policy elites that the course of action the
institute proposes will be effective and efficient. As in other service orga-
nizations, staff compensation accounts for two-thirds or more of think
tanks’ costs.
It is not surprising, then, that “motivating staff” ranked first in a 2001
Urban Institute survey of what think tanks in nine countries in Eastern
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States most want
addressed in a training session.1 This rating is consistent with comments
from leaders of other think tanks in the region about management issues
they would like to be able to confront with greater assurance. Obviously,
staff motivation problems can adversely affect an organization’s opera-
tions, as they are associated with lower productivity and expensive high
staff turnover.
In fact, the energy, zeal, and dedication that staff at think tanks bring to
their work are the result of personnel management policies and actions.
Beyond the personal relations established between the head of the institute
or other members of senior management and individual staff members,
other important factors include compensation, working conditions,
nonmonetary rewards for good work, and the staff assessment system in
place, with prominence going to the quality of feedback on performance.
Raymond J. Struyk
 
Strengths in one area can be offset by weaknesses elsewhere. In analyzing
factors such as staff turnover, morale, and productivity, it is essential to go
beyond the compensation or performance assessment system and look
at the whole array of an organization’s interactions with staff.
Despite the importance of staff motivation and satisfaction to the
successful operation of think tanks in both industrialized nations and tran-
sitional economies, little guidance is available on the topic.2 But think
tanks and the donors that support them should have a keen interest in
staff motivation, given the role that high-caliber, well-motivated staff play
in ensuring strong institute performance. This chapter provides think tanks
and their sponsors with a perspective on professional (research/policy)
staff motivation. It begins by examining the practices generally recom-
mended in human resources management literature, particularly the lit-
erature for private organizations (including NGOs). This examination is
an essential road map for think tanks designing their own systems. It then
contrasts these practices with those that six think tanks in the former
Soviet bloc use to motivate their staffs.
The author finds that the sample think tanks have addressed the
multiple issues of staff motivation with considerable imagination. There
are numerous differences, however, from accepted “good practices” used
in the West in this field. Indeed, only one of the think tanks reviewed has
practices consistent with those generally accepted in “third-stage” orga-
nizations. To some extent the differences may result from what might be
termed cultural differences (i.e., a somewhat different perspective among
Eastern European organizations on how staff will respond to various mea-
sures and a preference for a comparatively informal management style).
Probably more important, personnel practices have emerged more from
think-tank managers’ intuition than from exposure to accepted practices.
At the outset, it is worth noting one key difference between NGO staff,
including think tanks, and staff in government agencies or for-profit firms
that fundamentally affects how these different types of organizations
may approach motivation and productivity. The spirit of this difference
is captured in the following expansive statement from Letts, Ryan, and
Grossman (1999):
[Nonprofit-sector staff] are deeply committed to the social causes
their organizations address and are inspired by the possibility of
“making a difference.” Thanks to this asset, the human resources
challenge is different from that of most for-profits. Their biggest
challenge is not to attract motivated people—they will seek out non-
profit opportunities—but to channel their energy so it advances
the organization’s mission and goals. (107–8)
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GOOD PRACTICES
This section includes an outline of strong practices distilled from the
literature on motivating staff. Some points have been interpreted to
make them more applicable to think tanks, based on the author’s expe-
rience in working closely with a dozen think tanks over the years.
Setting Expectations
Researchers perform well when they fully understand what is expected
from them. Supervisors should set these expectations and be certain that
they have been well understood by the staff member on two occasions:
when an analyst joins the organization and at the time of the annual
performance review. This section discusses the first opportunity; staff
appraisal is discussed later.
Before a supervisor can effectively communicate performance expec-
tations, she must define these clearly for herself. In the case of a new staff
member, the time to do so is when the position and the qualifications
for it are being defined. The first section of appendix A includes the form
used at the Urban Institute to define a new position and the qualifications
candidates are required to have to fill the position. Thoughtfully complet-
ing two parts of the form provides the material to formally set expectations.
The first is the brief summary of job responsibilities and the second is
required candidate qualifications section. The former describes the
kinds of tasks for which the analyst will be initially responsible; and the
latter, through the relative emphasis placed on certain types of education,
skills, and experience, augments the task description.
Based on these materials, interactions with the new analyst, and the
specific tasks the analyst will perform in his or her first few months at the
institute, the supervisor can define her expectations for the analyst’s per-
formance. These can be fairly summary in nature—a few bullet points.
They should be in writing and should definitely be discussed with the
analyst to be certain that there is a common understanding of their
meaning. The analyst’s performance is the basis for considering rewards.
Rewards
Theories on motivation can be divided into two groups: motivational
structures that rely heavily on external rewards and reinforcements, and
those that rely on factors internal to the position.3 While personnel pro-
grams founded on either theory can be applied to any job, the nature of
policy research suggests that it is more appropriate for think tanks to
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emphasize factors intrinsic to the job. In general, under this approach
staff are given more, rather than less, responsibility in the organization,
and the job is made more intrinsically motivating.
A number of personnel specialists argue that motivational factors are
intrinsic to the job.4 What kinds of stimulation are appropriate in think
tanks? Note that successful policy analysts need to execute three tasks
well: to be strong researchers; to be good managers of research, if they are
to rise above the research assistant level; and to be good promoters of the
policy recommendations, both in written presentations and, especially,
in person. The following is a list of aspects of a policy analyst’s job that
could be considered sources of motivation.
1. Achievement. Analysts want to feel that they are producing high-
quality policy research and that they are having a demonstrable impact on
the policy process. The level of resources available (computer, Internet
connection, research assistance, help from a public relations specialist, etc.)
and working conditions at the institute are important for helping analysts
pursue their goals.
2. Recognition of achievement. Recognition of analysts’ efforts is greater
if the institution permits analysts to put out papers and publications
under their own names (rather than simply the name of the institution)
and if the institutions provide more opportunities for analysts to partic-
ipate in meetings and discussions with policymakers. Beyond this, orga-
nizations can recognize specific achievements through awards of various
types.5 At think tanks this could include an allocation of work time (not
to a billable project) to complete a book or prepare a paper for publication
in a journal, time and travel funds to attend a conference of particular
interest, in-house ceremonies recognizing a specific achievement, or a
bonus payment.
3. Interesting work content. The more interesting the topic to the ana-
lysts, defined in part by the subject’s policy relevance in the country at
the time, the greater the analysts’ motivation.
4. Opportunity for growth or advancement. In many think tanks, career
ladders are short, often with only three levels of analyst positions defined.
Indeed, in many smaller think tanks there is no explicit hierarchy, and
promotion is at best ambiguous (appendix A includes position descrip-
tions for a six-level research ladder from a “third-stage” think tank). Where
a career ladder is defined, promotions can be a powerful stimulus. Where
one is absent, management must clearly define increases in responsibility
and level of work without necessarily changing the job title—for example,
by naming an analyst as the principal investigator on a project, providing
a research assistant for lower-level tasks, or permitting the analyst more
freedom in meeting with clients and policymakers.6
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Staff can also be kept challenged by giving them high-priority or
high-visibility assignments from time to time and by occasionally shifting
the focus of their work. Other ideas include adding a senior analyst to the
institute’s board of directors (management team) or permitting a senior
analyst to attend the board of trustees’ meetings and mix with the trustees.
Also critical is providing research staff with training opportunities—both
those for specific skill enhancement (e.g., an econometrics workshop) and
those for deepening knowledge on a policy topic (e.g., an international
conference on alternative pension-program structures).
5. Competitive salary. Without question, salary is a key consideration
for all staff, as the level of payment substantially determines analysts’
quality of life away from work and represents the value of their work
to the organization. Compensation is usually defined as base pay plus
rewards, particularly bonuses, which can be paid either annually or
episodically to mark special achievements during the course of the year.
Organizations operating under tight budgets often turn to bonuses as
part of annual compensation to avoid building the higher payment into
the base salary.
Of the factors just listed, the first four are primarily intrinsic to job
satisfaction; the fifth (salary) is extrinsic. Clearly, think tanks must employ
both kinds of stimulation. A structure for compensation and nonmonetary
rewards must be crafted carefully within the organization to maintain
equity and to remain within the available budget.
Experts in human resource management of both for-profit and non-
profit organizations generally feel that adequate base pay is essential to
retaining staff and for basic motivation. But other kinds of rewards, such
as those indicated above, are more important in motivating staff to higher
levels of achievement. For example, Letts and colleagues (1999) state that
good pay “is more a protection against dissatisfaction than a source of
motivation for the long term. Pay cannot substitute for the satisfaction of
producing results” (123).7 A case study of a program to reduce staff
turnover implemented by Fleet Boston Financial documents the very high
impact of nonfinancial rewards complemented by reasonable pay increases
(Nalbantian and Szostak 2004).
Similarly, explicit pay-for-performance schemes do not get good marks
generally in government organizations, have seldom been adopted in non-
profits (Liner et al. 2001, 15–16), and often are of questionable value even
at for-profit firms (Kerr 2003). A severe limitation is the difficulty in
defining goals and achievements precisely.8 For example, if a senior policy
analyst’s recommendations for a new program are not accepted by the
parliament, how does the evaluator sort out the roles of the myriad actors
involved? Researchers working under an incentive system to maximize
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their income will be motivated to produce work of just-acceptable quality
to the client. On occasion the work can be expected to be below the stan-
dard of acceptability. Over time, such loose standards could impair the
think tank’s reputation and cause it to lose clients. Other often-noted prob-
lems have been that employees perceive a weak link between performance
and pay increments, a lack of integrity in the ratings, and inequities in the
resulting pay patterns. In short, these systems seem to have frequently sent
more negative than positive signals to staff (Perry 1991). Nevertheless,
many companies have improved staff performance by implementing
such systems (McAdams and Hawk 1994).
There are numerous rewards that think tanks can provide to staff—
cash bonuses, time to write articles for professional journals, recognition
events, participation in key meetings with policy clients, promotions in
the research or administrative hierarchy, training opportunities, and
others. For rewards of this type to have their intended effect, they must be
• awarded consistently to staff with the same achievements,
• easily identified by the staff as related to specific achievements (which
requires a short time between the event and the award), and
• large enough to be meaningful.9
Performance Evaluation
Staff assessment is a subject of some controversy among personnel spe-
cialists. A strong appraisal system is one used primarily as the basis for
discussion between the supervisor and the employee on the employee’s
record of achievement, the suitability of the employee’s goals for the
future, and a plan for how the supervisor and organization can help the
employee achieve the new goals. As Glen (1990, 2) says,
It is hoped that data are gathered by systematic observations,
not only to accurately measure current performance, but also to
reinforce strengths, identify deficiencies, and feed back necessary
information of changes in future performance. The purpose is to
measure progress, differentiate between levels of performance,
pinpoint training needs, validate rewards, and identify promotable
employees.
Better systems get substantial employee input on setting goals and
description of accomplishments (Lee 1996; Wilson 1994). These assess-
ments are used to inform the salary review process but do not drive it.
Stated differently, salary adjustments and other rewards should not be in
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conflict with assessments, but rewards should not be based exclusively
on assessments.10 Mechanistic “score sheets” that are used to determine
salaries generally cause more staff problems than they address.11
A comparatively new wrinkle in assessments is the rating of the per-
formance of teams rather than individuals (Heneman 2001, chapter 8).
(Appendix A describes the excellent staff assessment system used by a
third-stage think tank.) For think tanks with teams executing large projects,
such team ratings may be somewhat useful. Individual assessments,
however, will clearly remain the rule.
An array of rating systems and procedures is available to think tanks,
but describing them is beyond the scope of this chapter.12 The essential
point is that the assessment is critical for generating information on which
to base rewards and to develop a program to assist staff with professional
development. Increased professional development in turn raises achieve-
ment and job satisfaction—and motivation.
Training
Staff training consists of both formal training events and on-the-job
training (OJT). The importance of OJT is hard to overestimate, although
at most firms and think tanks it is organized haphazardly and therefore
fails to realize its potential (Bowsher 1998; Rothwell and Kazanas 1994).
The focus here is on formal training because it is more closely related to
staff rewards.
Broadly, management can use staff training in two ways. In principle,
training needs are identified through analysis of organizational needs and
personal assessments. In the first, staff skills are improved so employees are
better able to do the particular jobs assigned to them, closing a “perfor-
mance gap.” This kind of training can also prepare staff for higher-level
assignments in the future or help them take on a different assignment
at a similar level of responsibility. This training is usually driven by the
organization’s future business strategy (explicit or implicit) and the
corresponding staff requirements (Bowsher 1998; Ban, Faerman, and
Riccucci 1992). In personal assessments–based training, the training is
geared more to increasing the human capital of the staff member; the
training increases the employee’s skills, but the new skills may be only
generally applicable to current or future assignments at the think tank.
For example, at a think tank that does modest work on banking policy, an
employee might take a course on sophisticated bank-risk management.
This would be helpful as broad background for the current and expected
assignments, but might be more prized by the employee as deepening his
human capital. Most third-stage think tanks (and other organizations)
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understandably emphasize the first type of training. The second type is
more often used as a reward for particularly valued employees.
To create and maintain a training program, the organization must
make adequate provision for training expenses in its annual budget and
develop a training plan.13 For think tanks, the presence of an annual
training budget will usually signal that there is explicit provision for train-
ing as an overhead expense item.14 Development of the training program
can be relatively formal or informal, but the literature indicates that one
should definitely be present (e.g., Rothwell and Kazanas 1994). For train-
ing to contribute materially to the success of the institution, it should
also be directly related to the think tank’s implicit or explicit business
strategy—including using training to reward some staff for both motiva-
tional and staff-retention purposes.15 The Institute for Urban Economics
(Moscow) invested heavily in training in financial analysis for its staff
because it understood that it could have a comparative advantage in several
topical areas if staff had these skills. At the same time, the core competence
in financial analysis gave management more flexibility in assigning staff
to an array of projects.
A challenge to think tanks in most transitional and developing
economies is integrating training opportunities offered by donors, often
held at international venues, into the think tanks’ training programs. This
can be difficult, because the opportunities are offered on short notice and
are sometimes not on the highest-priority topics. But their low cost and
coverage of topics not addressed by local education programs makes them
attractive nonetheless. The next chapter discusses staff training in depth.
PRACTICES AT SECOND-STAGE THINK TANKS
This section covers the same three interlocking topics as the previous
section—compensation and rewards, staff assessment, and training—
for six think tanks in the former Soviet bloc. It begins by outlining how
these think tanks were selected and then describes how they handle these
key aspects of staffing.
The general criteria for inclusion of a think tank were that it have
a minimum of 10 full-time researchers and that it have been operating
at about this level for the past five years (i.e., sufficient time to address
personnel questions of an organization of this size).16 The six think tanks
included in the sample come from two groups. Three are those with which
the author has had long-standing working relations; they were selected
because each had interesting elements in its personnel system. The other
three are institutes that were among those interviewed by an Urban
Institute team in 1997 for a prior study of think tanks in the region. Based
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on information obtained then and recommendations from the first
three think tanks, they were invited to participate. All information in this
section refers to practices in place around 2000.
The institutes and the number of full-time researchers in 2000 are
shown in table 2-1. (Note the abbreviations for each, as they are used
below.) Three Russian think tanks are included, in part because a greater
share of Russian organizations have comparatively large full-time research
staff (Struyk 1999). Of course, in no way can the think tanks discussed
here be considered a representative sample. Half-day interviews were
conducted with principals and/or staff directors at each of the sample
institutes in March and April 2001.
The author relied on a review of the relevant personnel management
literature and the practices of several U.S. think tanks to identify practices
viewed as having a positive effect on staff motivation and productivity, and
used these materials in developing the interview guide. The guide covered
staff compensation systems (both base pay and monetary rewards), staff
reward systems, staff structure and criteria for promotion, and the use of
training programs.17
Environment
Four factors, shown in the first rows of table 2-2, provide a sense of the
work environment. Broadly, the included think tanks are quite similar
in this area: they rate their office environment and computer support as
at least competitive with similar organizations, authors of reports are listed
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Table 2-1 Six Think Tanks and Their Staff Size in 2000
Number of 
Year full-time 
Institute Location founded research staff
Metropolitan Research Institute (MRI) Budapest 1990 11
Social Research Institute (TARKI) Budapest 1985a 31
Center for Study of Democracy (CSD) Sofia 1990 20
Institute for Urban Economics (IUE) Moscow 1995 38
Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET) Moscow 1990 53
Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Moscow 1991 10b
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Expert)
a TARKI shifted its main operations to a for-profit basis in 1997, although it also retains its
nonprofit component.
b Includes the president, executive director, and eight team leaders. All other research staff are
contracted for individual projects.
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on title pages, and staff are encouraged to publish. These are all positive
factors. On the other hand, only three organizations have formal classi-
fication systems for researchers, meaning that positions are not explicitly
defined at the other three think tanks. Since promotions can be used to
reward staff, the lack of career ladders denies management one reward
option.
Staff turnover is often used as an indicator of staff satisfaction with
working conditions, including salary, but the figures on turnover need
to be interpreted with caution since many factors may be at work. The
general picture among the six groups studied here is that staff turnover
is very low for senior researchers; indeed, there was no turnover among
senior analysts at any of the six think tanks. But turnover is more variable
at the junior level, with the percentage of middle and junior staff leaving
and being replaced ranging from 0 to 30 percent. Respondents attributed
the higher turnover rates among junior staff to a combination of young
people returning to universities for further education and/or leaving to
change the type of work they are doing. A modest share of total turnover
at this level was associated with poor performance.
Respondents were asked for their views about the general produc-
tivity of the staff—an indicator of management’s satisfaction with the
researchers. It also provides an indication of the overall environment in
the organization: the more frustrated management is with productivity,
presumably the greater the pressure on the staff for improvement. While
the responses were broadly positive in all cases, room for improvement
was noted by four of the six respondents. Principal complaints had to
do with analysts “overresearching” issues, the inability of staff to meet
deadlines—critical when the work is for “real-time” policy develop-
ment, and analysts’ lack of creativity in approaching their work. “Lack
of creativity” means that staff were good at providing technical assis-
tance to clients on familiar topics or using familiar methods but were
reluctant to address new topics or pioneer new methods. All these
productivity problems concern personal predilections and habits of
staff members and may prove resistant to change. The solution likely
rests in steady control of researchers’ work and in mentoring by think
tank leaders.
Staff Assessments
Despite the centrality of formal assessments in providing staff with
feedback on their performance and offering a forum in which to discuss
employees’ future development, only three of the six institutes have
any sort of formal assessment (table 2-3). Respondents at institutes
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without a formal assessment process—CSD, Experts, and IET—stated
that their organizations are small and that feedback to staff is more or
less continuous, making a formal process unnecessary.18 These positions
were maintained even when questions were asked about possible prob-
lems with supervisors who wanted to avoid the potential conflict of giving
negative reviews. Two organizations making this statement each have
over 20 researchers.
At two of the three institutes with formal assessments—MRI and
TARKI—the assessment consists of a discussion between one or two
members of senior management and the researcher. There is no for-
mal staff input into the discussion (e.g., a written statement of accom-
plishments during the year), nor does the supervisor prepare a written
statement.
Only the Institute for Urban Economics (IUE) has a full staff assess-
ment system in place. The process is initiated by the staff member, who
completes a written statement about his or her accomplishments during
the year, changes in responsibilities and capabilities, goals for the coming
year, and suggestions for how the supervisor could help the employee
achieve them. The evaluator—the department leader—completes a com-
plementary assessment form. The two documents form the basis for the
discussion with the employee. The interview covers, among other things,
the supervisor’s views about what training the analyst needs to be more
productive or to advance in the organization. After all interviews are com-
pleted, a special assessment committee reviews the assessments and the
related recommendations for salary increases. Department leaders are
invited when their staff is discussed. Institute management gives high
marks to the assessment process as a tool for communicating with staff
on performance and future development. IUE’s process parallels those
of third-stage think tanks.
All three institutions employing assessment systems use the assessments
to inform decisions about payment increases during the annual consid-
eration of staff compensation. Only IUE, however, uses the results of
the assessments as a primary input for determining who should receive
noncash rewards, such as support to attend international conferences
(see below).
Compensation and Rewards
A consistent theme across responses was the importance of compensa-
tion for staff retention and motivation. Most institutes studied see the
business community as their primary competitor for staff. While they
cannot compete directly on compensation, they try to construct a package
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of compensation, rewards, interesting work, and quality of environment
that can meet this challenge.
Compensation
Three institutes—TARKI, Expert, and IET—have compensation programs
that provide strong possibilities for very good pay (box 2-1). The main
device is for project managers in effect to negotiate fixed-priced contracts
with other staff for tasks on a project-by-project basis. Analysts can then
increase their earnings by working beyond the normal standards. IET
occasionally adds project-specific bonuses. On the other hand, TARKI has
a particularly attractive incentive scheme for its team leaders: net profits
on projects are divided according to a formula between the team leader
and the organization. Similarly, team leaders at the Expert Institute can
design project execution to their financial advantage, as they control
decisions on staffing and negotiate contracts with the consultants who
work on the project.
The Metropolitan Research Institute (MRI) recently implemented a
compensation scheme involving a strong incentive for staff to generate
sufficient work to make at least 75 percent of their time billable to proj-
ects (rather than overhead functions) over each six-month period. But
MRI still retains a traditional annual process for determining full-time-
equivalent salaries. The new system can add or subtract funds from this
amount, depending on performance.
CSD has a remarkably flexible system for determining salaries. In
effect, management can increase an analyst’s compensation at any time,
depending on various factors. But bonuses and incentive payments are
rare. On the other hand, IUE has the most traditional salary determination
system among the included institutes. It follows an annual review process,
under which an individual’s salary is determined primarily by a combi-
nation of market conditions, changes in the cost of living, increases in the
staff member’s productivity (broadly defined), and success in marketing.
As noted, a committee reviews recommended increases across depart-
ments to ensure consistency and equity.
In short, the six think tanks demonstrate significant diversity in their
compensation strategies. Most embody some sort of incentive payment,
consistent with the view of the salary’s key role in staff retention and moti-
vation. Some incentive payment plans are designed in part to promote
marketing and work acquisition. But these plans also may also create some
negative incentives. Staffers at IET and TARKI working on fixed-price con-
tracts have a strong incentive to do the minimum required to fulfill the
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Institution System
MRI
TARKI
CSD
IUE
Box 2-1 Compensation System for Researchers 
at Sample Think Tanks
All staff. Beginning in 2001, employees receive 75 percent 
of base pay on a monthly basis. Twice yearly, management
assesses the share of time charged to billable projects. If the
share is greater than 75 percent over the whole period, then
the person receives the other 25 percent of base pay. Staff 
can bill any number of hours (beyond 40) and receive extra
pay for the additional hours worked. But at least 75 percent 
of time charged must be billable. Researchers are divided 
into two project teams, each directed by a managing director.
Individual compensation depends significantly on the
performance of the whole team.
Project directors or team leaders. Total compensation consists
of base salary and bonuses. The bonuses can be substantial—
as large or even larger than the base salary. The bonus is 
determined by the net profit on projects carried out by the 
project director. Project directors generally negotiate contracts
and are responsible for fulfillment. The net profit is split between
the organization and the project director based on a formula
known to all parties.
Senior and junior researchers. These employees also have 
the opportunity for payment beyond the base salary. Project
directors negotiate with junior staff for blocks of time within
which specified tasks are to be done (e.g., two months to 
conduct a particular analysis). In effect, staff members are
given fixed-price contracts. Staff members are able to take
commitments for more-than-nominal full-time work and
thereby raise their total compensation.
All staff.a Monthly base salary plus the 13th month’s payment.
Payment rates are changed during the year as needed, in light
of both inflation and the need for merit increases (i.e., there is
a constant salary review process).
All staff. Salaries are set through an annual salary-setting
process associated with a comprehensive staff assessment
process.
(continued)
implicit contract. Team leaders at TARKI and Expert have clear incentives
to press clients for a maximum price and to minimize the effort in pro-
ducing the deliverables contracted for—all to maximize profits and their
net pay. Obviously, there is a challenge to senior management to limit
such behavior, because clients might not be interested in future contracts
if they face a high price for a modest product.
Similarly, the team incentive at MRI to generate enough work for all
team members to bill at least 75 percent of their time to contracts could
penalize those team members who are not engaged in marketing, if the
manager and senior staffers who have the marketing responsibility per-
form poorly. Failure to reach the goal, and the resulting income reduction,
would probably erode the morale of staff who see marketing function as
outside their control.
The extremely flexible system used by CSD has some clear advantages
but also some significant potential limitations. The lack of a regular across-
the-board review of payments opens the door to wider-than-desirable
variation in payment for staff with similar assignments and skills. Staff
may see evidence of favoritism or arbitrariness. To prevent this, each pay
adjustment would need to entail a thoughtful review—a seemingly
burdensome task for any organization.
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Institution System
Box 2-1 (Continued )
All staff.b Compensation is based on three components: a small
base salary; principal income, from participation in specific
projects, is determined as a fixed-price contract between the
project leader and the employee; and bonuses on contracts
where funds are available at the end of the contract and the
quality of work warrants, as determined by the project leader.
Team leaders. Payment has two parts: a small monthly salary
and payment for directing projects. The team leaders control
staffing and execution of the project, including determining the
pay for all staff. Team leaders’ compensation for a project is
agreed upon with the executive director.
IET
Expert
a Excludes the board of directors—president, executive director, and director of research—
and the staff in the survey research unit. The latter can receive bonuses largely based on
the volume of overtime committed to projects.
b Excludes senior management.
Rewards
Perhaps because of compensation’s central role in the personnel strategies
of most of the six institutions, nonmonetary rewards do not play a very
large role. All the think tanks, at some level, help staff prepare publications,
attend conferences, and participate in training. But with a few exceptions
these activities are not viewed explicitly as rewards; rather, allocation tends
to go to the most suitable person. Sometimes, for example, support for
writing a paper is given to someone without project coverage for the
moment. Some examples of the use of rewards follow.
TARKI awards an annual in-house research fellowship, which provides
support for several months of work, on a competitive basis. The fellowship
is viewed by both senior management and researchers as an extremely
valuable award. An important factor in management’s selection of the
winning project is the work’s likely utility to the overall development of
the organization. Past performance is a secondary consideration.
IUE, Expert, and IET use international conferences and training events
to reward productive staff, although the set of staff who can participate
is limited to those with strong English skills. They also make promotions
up the research ladder a reward for past work and improved capabilities.
IUE goes further, occasionally rewarding its most productive team leaders
by adding them to the IUE council that decides on the future direction
of the institute’s work and use of discretionary resources. It also rewards
certain staff by permitting them to participate in the annual meeting of
its board of trustees; a few are asked to make presentations to the board.
All the think tanks reviewed recognize staff achievements in some way.
Most often they do so through an announcement at an institute seminar,
working session, or party for a new publication, successful conference,
winning of a big contract, or successful policy outcome. IET makes some
of these announcements in the bulletin it publishes. At IUE, management
and department directors annually select the best analyst in each group
(e.g., expert, senior expert) and announce the award at an end-of-year
staff gathering.
Retreats
Most think tanks studied also have staff retreats designed to build team
spirit; sometimes the events have an explicit work element, but sometimes
they are purely social. For example, the whole MRI staff and their families
go to a recreational area for a weekend in the summer. Similarly, inter-
ested IUE staff and their families visit a suburban Moscow rest house for
a weekend a couple of times a year during the winter; most staff participate.
The Expert Institute reports similar events. These events are primarily
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recreational for all three organizations. On the other hand, at CSD
members of a department go on a Friday-Saturday retreat together once
or twice a year to relax and take stock of their work and future directions.
IUE has an annual retreat for its “council” (i.e., a special management body
to review the work program and to plan for the future). All these events
are subsidized by the think tanks to varying degrees. All the think tanks
reporting such events see them as important for building morale.
Training
The importance assigned to training varies widely among the six institutes.
CSD, Expert, and TARKI management teams do not assign training a
high priority, and a correspondingly small share of staff participates in
training outside the organization in a given year. But Expert and TARKI
have substantial in-house training programs (see below). Training
expenses are estimated as under 1 percent of total institute costs. These
institutions rely on hiring well-trained staff who have the requisite skills.
Senior researchers at TARKI and CSD teach at some of each country’s most
prestigious universities, so there is a general feeling that they are keeping
abreast of developments in their disciplines.
The other three institutes assign greater importance to staff training,
and about half the research staff participate in conferences or formal
training events during a year (table 2-4). IUE, for example, spends the
equivalent of 3 to 4 percent of its turnover on training, including external
and internal funding. Nevertheless, divergent practices among these three
organizations are evident. IUE and IET come the closest to having a fully
defined training plan. In IUE’s case, a comprehensive picture of training
needs is a product of the staff assessment process and forms the basis for
training activities, although a formal plan is not prepared. International
opportunities sometimes meet these needs and sometimes supplement the
other training; as noted, international travel is often allocated as a reward
for staff who will use the training in their work.
Abundant international training activities are available to IET, and a
plan for the use of these resources is prepared about twice a year. At both
IUE and IET, much of the structured training is accomplished through
staff participation in international conferences or explicit training activ-
ities. These are funded either as an element in contracts or grants awarded
to the organizations or by discrete offers from international sponsors for
particular events. IUE also sends staff to local (Russian) training events,
and has on occasion contracted with an expert organization for specific
training when an existing course could not be identified (e.g., training in
the financial aspects of project analysis).
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With respect to in-house training events, four institutes—TARKI, IUE,
Expert, and IET—conduct a program of seminars on substantive and
methodological topics. In all four cases, staff, especially junior and mid-
level staff, are strongly encouraged to attend. MRI has monthly staff
seminars at which results of ongoing projects are reviewed; these seminars
also convey information on technical topics and inform the staff about
the range of work going on at the institute.
SUMMARY
How do the personnel practices of these six second-stage think tanks com-
pare with practices generally accepted among third-stage organizations?
The record is patchy overall. The following items summarize the situation.
• Staff assessments are a weak point. Only three of the six organizations
have an annual review process in place. In only one of these is there
written input by both the staff member and the evaluator; impor-
tantly, the results of this process feed into training and salary
adjustment decisions.
• Compensation structures are diverse, with a surprisingly high
number of incentive schemes. Three of the schemes are directed at
increasing potential staff payments, while one focuses on generating
projects to pay for staff time. One think tank has an extremely flexible
approach to salary administration. The incentive plans are little used
in the West, and the degree of flexibility in the fifth scheme would
draw criticism for possible inequities and abuses. Only one compen-
sation scheme is consistent with normal Western practice.
• Rewards are underused compared to what could be done and what
the personnel management literature recommends. Five of the six
think tanks studied explicitly use rewards. While international travel
is the most frequent form of reward, other forms are also employed.
• Training is viewed as an integral element in staff development in
third-stage think tanks, so the low priority assigned to training
by three of the think tanks studied here is unexpected. Two of the
other think tanks have substantial training programs, but the allo-
cation of resources appears rather ad hoc. Only one think tank
integrates discussion of its training needs into the staff assessment
process.
Does the fact that the staff practices of the six think tanks differ in many
respects from those generally accepted in third-stage organizations mean
that these organizations should revise their personnel management? The
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leaders of these think tanks generally believe that most of their practices are
well suited to their specific organization—its structure, size, and particular
operating style. A premium is placed on informality and an atmosphere
of democratic collegiality. This attitude, the perceived unequal compe-
tition with businesses for their better staff, and the generally low priority
assigned to addressing administrative issues may be the principal factors
producing the personnel practices observed. Moreover, the think tanks
studied are producing high-quality work and succeeding in having it
used in the policy process (Struyk 1999).
Nevertheless, the success of the less-developed personnel systems at five
of these organizations appears heavily dependent on the particular per-
sonalities and styles of key managers. Most think tanks, especially young
ones, are very much creatures of their founders. There is a real possibility
of a turbulent transition when new leadership eventually comes to these
think tanks if staff motivation continues to depend on this type of per-
sonalized operating style. These think tanks could adopt the practices
common to third-stage organizations without disturbing their essential
operating styles.
In short, adoption of more structured personnel practices is likely
to yield both short-run and longer-term gains. The short-term benefits
are in the perceived equity in treatment among researchers below the
team-leader level, and this can certainly influence productivity and
retention. The longer-term gain is in a smoother transition when top
leadership changes.
N O T E S
1. The think tanks, one in each of nine countries in the region, are members
of the Transition Policy Network (TPN), as is the Urban Institute. For more on
TPN, see http://www.urban.org/tpn. There are no known systematic surveys of
think tanks that identify areas of administration and financial management that
respondents believe need strengthening.
2. Exceptions are some of the essays in Struyk, Ueno, and Suzuki (1993).
3. For an overview of these theories, see Rabin and others (1985, 154–56).
4. See Heneman (2001, 167), Herzberg (1987, 112–13), and Heskett
(1987, 121).
5. See Bowsher (1998) and Wilson (1994).
6. A number of generic examples of this type are provided in Herzberg (1987).
7. See also Herzberg (1987); Heskett (1987); and Wilson (1994, 83). Heskett’s
support on this point is especially interesting because he is writing about person-
nel motivation for for-profit firms in the service industry.
8. See McAdams and Hawk (1994, 33) and Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden
(1999, 382).
9. See Wilson (1994, 47–50).
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10. This is the system used by several Western think tanks known to the
author. In addition, a number of well-managed corporations use the same pro-
cedure, including the General Electric Corporation (Glen 1990, 3). Lee (1996) and
Ledford (1995), among others, also strongly support separating assessments
from the formal salary adjustment process.
11. Fox (1991), Rabin and others (1985, 183–84), and Wilson (1994, ch. 9) also
list problems with the assessment process. Lee (1996) reports that 60 percent of
218 corporations surveyed reported using a narrative evaluation with an overall
numeric score; the second most frequently used system was numeric scoring.
12. Alternatives are discussed in Rabin and others (1985, 184–94) and in
chapter 7 of Heneman (2001).
13. In the corporate world, the rule of thumb is for training expenditures to
equal about 5 percent of payroll (Bowsher 1998, 76).
14. Chapter 9 contains an extended discussion on overhead rates.
15. See Ban and coauthors. (1992, 410 ff.) and Bowsher (1998, ch. 2).
16. Interviews on personnel practices were conducted with two smaller
think tanks in the region, and the results confirmed that these practices are very
unstructured.
17. Comprehensive treatments of these topics include Bowsher (1998),
Dibble (1999), Heneman (2001), Letts and colleagues (1999), and Rabin and
others (1985).
18. CSD uses its department-level staff retreats at a rest house for this purpose,
as described below.
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Organizing Staff
Training
3
Training for think tank staff was touched on briefly in chapter 2 inthe context of broader personnel policies and practices. This
chapter expands substantially on that discussion to consider develop-
ment and implementation of a routine program of staff training.
Most think tanks experience significant staff turnover, particularly at
the junior researcher level and among support staff, as people leave and
are replaced and, in some cases, as the institution expands. Consequently,
a great deal of time is devoted to providing on-the-job training to new staff,
that is, training where one worker explains to another the institution’s poli-
cies on such items as formatting documents, archiving statistical analyses,
working with clients, and using the information technology (IT) system.
Beyond these routine functions, there are training events that expand
the staff’s human capital, events that are particularly important for less
experienced researchers. Many new researchers do not have a strong
grounding in policy analysis or in program monitoring and evaluation—
skills that are very likely to be needed at most think tanks. It is certainly
possible for support staff and researchers to gain competence gradually
through mentoring from their peers, but this practice can be inefficient:
colleagues do not always have time to explain carefully, not all colleagues
can answer the questions posed, and the explanations almost certainly
will not be as thorough as they could be. Hence, think tanks need to
have an ongoing program of in-house staff training.
This chapter presents a program of training for support staff and policy
researchers. The program does not cover the development of research
skills, such as econometrics and survey sample design. Research skills,
Raymond J. Struyk
 
typically think tanks’ strength, are often conveyed through in-house
seminars on ongoing research projects, supplemented with formal uni-
versity courses. Rather, the focus here is on training to make each staff
member an efficient worker at the institution and on policy research
skills unlikely to be taught at universities.1
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section outlines a com-
prehensive staff training program for a think tank at the second or third
stage of development in a transitional or developing country. The program
is based on the author’s observations of training needs and staff training
at several think tanks.2 Following this is a discussion of how to organize
a training program. Appendices B and C at the end of the book contain
examples of outlines or basic workshop presentations for some of the
courses discussed in the text.
A COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM
A think tank’s training needs can be divided into two groups: those for
large parts of the staff and those specific to individual positions or staff
members. As noted in chapter 2, person- or job-specific training require-
ments are often best identified through an annual performance assessment
system. This chapter focuses on training that will benefit significant groups
of the staff.
Clearly, not all training events are suitable for all staff. The most obvious
division is between the analysts and support staff. But even here one can
readily identify exceptions to the rule. A translator on staff may improve
his or her performance by attending a workshop on program evaluation
to learn the concepts and the vocabulary and then employing these new
skills when translating project reports. Nevertheless, distinct groups
with comparatively homogeneous training needs can be identified and
the training events defined for them.
Box 3-1 lists separately generic types of training for analysts and support
staff. For analysts there are three types: general orientation, human capital
building, and tools for the researcher. For support staff there are two:
general orientation and tools for support staff.
General orientation. Two areas should be covered in the orientation for
analysts—the organization’s primary tasks and, for lack of a better phrase,
how to be a successful consultant. The orientation for the first area should
be designed to acquaint new researchers with the operating style of the
organization and to introduce favored work patterns. Think tanks have
a wide range of primary activities, so their orientations will be equally
diverse. At a think tank that strongly emphasizes econometric research,
the orientation of new researchers may focus on the importance of high-
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quality analysis, the approach to judging data quality, the way projects are
organized and the need for teamwork in executing projects, and the places
to find help with computing, statistical, econometric, and other issues.
On the other hand, at a think tank that predominantly conducts and
evaluates technical assistance projects to improve the performance of
local governments, the orientation will concentrate on good practices in
working with local officials and nongovernmental organizations. Broad
topics could include the following:
• understanding municipalities’ incentives for participating in pilot
projects
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For Analysts
General orientation
• Primary activity of the organization, organization of work, advice on how to
be effective
• Guidance on how to work at a think tank—for example, working on 
multiple projects simultaneously, working within budget constraints
• Goals and philosophy, work style, work rules, and so on
Human capital building
• Public policy analysis, including effective writing for policy recommendations
• Program evaluation
• Financial analysis of investment projects—for example, communal services,
roads, mass transit, housing
Tools for the researcher
• Basic software—the in-house computer system, e-mail, archiving, report
formats
• Making presentations, including preparing PowerPoint presentations
• Statistical packages (e.g., SPSS, SAS), Excel, Microsoft Project, and so on
For Support Staff
General orientation
• Goals and philosophy, work style, work rules, and so on
• Rules for document handling, company formats, processing travel
expenses, and so on
Tools for support staff
• The institution’s text editor program
• Basic software—the in-house computer system, e-mail, archiving, report
formats
Box 3-1 Types of Think Tank Staff Training
• approaching an administration
• working with local officials
• building trust in a relationship
• understanding “demand-driven” technical assistance
The workshop presentation in appendix B is for such an organization.
The second area of orientation, how to be a consultant, is quite generic.
Many analysts employed for the first time by think tanks have never
worked on projects with a hard budget constraint—that is, the analyst
has so many days to complete a task and should not charge more
hours than this. Also extremely useful is an open discussion of ways to
organize one’s work and to measure progress. So, too, is information
on what to do if it appears that the time allocated will not be sufficient
to accomplish the task. Equally important is advice on meeting the
demands of working on multiple projects (possibly for multiple super-
visors) at the same time—and what to do if there are conflicts in the
demands placed on the analyst. Another topic deserving discussion is
the importance of completing time sheets daily so project costs are
properly tracked.3
Orientation is equally important for support staff. An agenda for a
session for support staff is shown in box 3-2. Topics include information
on the goals and philosophy of the institution, guidance on how to com-
plete a host of practical tasks, and resources available to the staff.
Surprisingly few think tanks have the kind of orientation programs
just outlined. The result is that new staff waste a large amount of time
“learning by doing,” when they could be contributing to projects.
Human capital building. Most junior and mid-level researchers arrive
at think tanks with basic or stronger quantitative analysis skills and sig-
nificant knowledge of one sector of the economy. So, for example, a typ-
ical new researcher could have a higher education in economics and three
years of experience in the transportation sector. During those three years
the researcher mastered information on the sector’s legal and policy
environment and analyzed secondary data on trends in ridership, costs,
and revenues for different transportation modes. But the researcher lacks
competence in policy analysis and program evaluation techniques. This
situation is typical in most transitional and developing economies because
of the structure and content of higher education systems. But to be strong
performers at think tanks, analysts should be competent in those areas.
Moreover, depending on the composition of the institution’s work pro-
gram, new researchers may need other training. For example, if a think
tank works consistently on analyzing the economic efficiency of alternative
investments—for example, in water and sewerage facilities, district heat
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
plants, or transportation improvements—the staff will need to be able to
perform financial analysis of investment projects. The specific mix of
training appropriate for a think tank depends on its work mix.
Because of the importance of policy analysis and program evaluation
to nearly all think tanks, some additional detail is in order about them.
Box 3-3 outlines topics included in a policy analysis course recently taught
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Introduction
• Definition of a think tank
• Mission, main directions of activities
Staff Documentation
• Labor book
• Contents of the labor agreement; consistency with national laws
Office Documents
• Formats for different types of documents—letters, reports, activity reports
for sponsors
• Maintenance and format of address and contact lists
Participation in Staff Education Program
• Responsibilities for reminding designated staff to attend, including 
monitoring travel schedules
Introduction to the Library
• Ordering institute publications for distribution
• Arranging for a large number of publication copies for big events
• Using the library and the automated card catalogue
• Getting to know the library collection, including periodicals
Documentation for Domestic Business Trips
• Travel advances
• Expense reports
• Importance of billing trips to the correct projects
Documentation for International Travel
• Visa arrangements—letters of invitation, rules of different embassies
• Travel advances
• Expense reports
Computer Network and Office Equipment
• Introduction to the computer network, including protocols for backing up
• Copy machine operations (operations, paper to use, etc.)
• Scanner operations
• CD-ROM recording
• Telephone system
Box 3-2 Orientation for Institute Support Staff
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Subsidies. Different forms of subsidies; strengths and weaknesses of each;
illustration of various principles (e.g., consumer primacy).
Targeting. Strengths and weaknesses of alternative structures; examples.
Incentives. Identification of and accounting for incentives to stakeholders as a
key determinant of success in policy and program design; stakeholder analysis.
Basic policy analysis process. Expansion of the topics already discussed, so
the students are exposed to immediately useful material before the more
didactic presentation on policy analysis; definition of the problem and
weighting policy options against well-defined criteria.
Efficiency in the production of goods and services. Presentation of the basic
economic concept, with emphasis on the proper role of government as set-
ting the right environment (e.g., enforceable contracts) for most production
but with a highly minimized actual production role; introduction of contract-
ing out as an alternative to direct government delivery of services; discus-
sion of arguments concerning the virtue of competition, and so on.
Program monitoring. Rationale for program monitoring; examples of when
monitoring information has been useful to program management; introduc-
tion of modified log frame for deciding what information should be collected
and what reports should be produced for whom.
Data assessment techniques. Quality control in data assembly (may be
thought of as a subtopic under program monitoring or program implementa-
tion evaluation); explanation that local officials often do not review statistical
tables for obvious errors that simple logical checks would identify.
Program implementation evaluation. Types of questions that can be
addressed with process evaluation and why the answers are important for
good program management; examples of good practices; class exercises for
defining such evaluations.
Policy recommendation writing. Strengthening of ability to analyze problems
and clearly present recommendations; opportunity to practice writing and
critical thinking skills; analyses of case studies requiring participants to use
concepts from previous workshops.
Source: Morse and others (2002).
Box 3-3 Policy Analysis Course Objectives: Policy Principles 
and Skills
to municipal officials in Russia and then, in a somewhat modified form,
to staff at the Russian think tank that team-taught the municipal course
with a Western think tank. The topics were selected based on the specific
needs identified in Russia, but the broad topics are probably appropriate
for any policy analysis course. Noteworthy is that fully one-quarter of the
course was devoted to teaching students to write short, effective policy
recommendations. Having poorly conceived and written recommenda-
tions has been identified as a frequent problem for think tanks.4 An
extended course outline is presented in appendix C.
In most countries outside North America and Western Europe, program
evaluation is still in its infancy. Indeed, even routine program monitoring
is often very weak. Think tanks in transitional and developing countries
could take the lead in promoting program evaluation and in executing
such studies. But to do so they would need to have staff who understand
evaluations’ value to decisionmakers, who can engage senior program
administrators in a dialogue to define the key issues to be addressed, and
who can organize an evaluation project effectively. Table 3-1 contains the
outline of a comprehensive program evaluation course that a think tank
could offer its research staff. While a large portion of the topics relates to
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Table 3-1 Outline for Program Evaluation Course
Block Part Topic
1 1 Introduction to evaluation
2 1 Determination of what is to be evaluated
2 Possible evaluator roles
3 Definition of indicators for an evaluation
3 1 Process or implementation evaluation
2 Performance measurement
4 1 Strategies for impact evaluation
2 Impact evaluation with experimental designs
3 Impact evaluation with quasi-experimental designs
5 1 Efficiency evaluation (cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness evaluation)
6 1 Overview of data collection methods
2 Collection of data from agency records
3 Design and conduct of surveys
4 Use of focus groups
5 Management of field data collection
7 1 Appropriate use of statistics
2 Use of regression models to estimate program effects
8 1 Writing the report and presenting the results
Source: Struyk (2001).
data collection and analysis techniques, the key elements are in blocks 2
through 5, which are devoted to ensuring that the evaluation is address-
ing the questions of greatest interest to stakeholders and defining the
appropriate structure for the inquiry.
Tools for the researcher and support staff. “Tools” training generally
increases staff productivity rather than providing competence in whole
new areas, such as program evaluation or sophisticated desktop publishing.
Box 3-1 lists examples of such training for both researchers and support
staff. Importantly, the list for researchers includes presentation skills, with
the use of PowerPoint featured. This training module should also contain
good practices on structuring the presentation and delivery techniques.
Also note that training in the statistical package used by the think tank
is listed here. Limited formal training in this software affords new staff
an impressive head start in their early work with the package.
For the support staff, the “tools” training examples in box 3-1 are aimed
at helping staff gain proficiency with the computer system and with often-
used software, particularly the text editor used by the institution.
The items listed in the table are only suggestions: each think tank will
know best what kinds of training should be offered, depending on its
work program and the formal training of its staff.
A comprehensive training program. This chapter has discussed a large
number and broad range of training activities. What might a think tank’s
annual training program contain? An example is given in table 3-2 and
figure 3-1 for the Institute for Urban Economics (IUE) in Moscow. Recall
that this is a list of regular training offerings at the institution, and it
therefore excludes additional training, which could include training and
study visits sponsored by international organizations as well as courses
sponsored by the think tank.
The program outlined in the table and figure contains offerings
from most categories discussed above and summarized in box 3-1. There
are separate orientation events for the research staff and support staff.
There are also training events in both policy analysis and program
evaluation for the research staff, each consisting of multiple sessions.
An interesting addition is a seminar on gender sensitivity. Note that
in addition to these formal training events, IUE holds seminars on
individual projects.
ORGANIZING THE TRAINING
Presenting a training program of the type just described requires attention
to several organizational issues. Four more important ones are discussed
in this section, ranging from funding training to determining which staff
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members should receive each type of training. While this list may look
formidable, organizing such a training program actually takes compar-
atively little time.
Funding training. Most organizations include an allowance for staff
training when determining the size and composition of the overhead
rate. This, then, is a reliable source of funding—one whose value for the
year is usually known at the beginning of the year. (Of course, the funds
actually available will depend on the think tank’s success in meeting its
planned fund-raising goals for the year. But most institutions can forecast
the likely range of funds raised with some confidence.) Typically, overhead
funding forms the core training resources.
A second source of support is training events included within projects.
Project resources can be used at least two ways. First, many think tanks
work collaboratively on projects with outside advisers, often from North
America or Western Europe, who contribute special expertise to a project.
Advisers knowledgeable about public analysis and program evaluation
can be asked to give seminars in these areas. In addition to the one-time
benefit to staff from such seminars, the materials distributed can serve as
the basis for future similar presentations by institution staff. Second,
project funds can be used to support staff attendance at training events
directly related to project execution. Those attending such training can
then become the trainers on this topic at their own think tanks. While
training events of the kind just outlined are often on topics too narrow
to be generally useful for “human capital building,” some can form the
basis for more general workshops.
Finally, staff can contribute some of their own time in attending the
training events, rather than charging the time to project or overhead
accounts. Many think tanks hold short training events over the lunch hour,
where staff can eat lunch and participate in the training at the same time.
Some institutions also schedule training near the end of the day, so that
most of the training takes place after normal working hours. This “cost
sharing” is generally a good idea. But care must be taken not to under-
mine staff morale by imposing this condition too often or at times when
the opportunity cost is especially high, such as during holiday seasons.
Identifying training needs. A consistent theme of this presentation has
been that the training needs of think tanks will vary substantially depend-
ing on their size, their level of staff turnover, and the main directions of
their work. No standard training program suits all think tanks. The dis-
cussion in the first part of this chapter outlined some general ideas for a
training program, but they likely should be adapted to each think tank.
The actual training program adopted will depend on the organiza-
tion’s training resources, the needs identified, and the number of peo-
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ple to be trained in a given period. The last factor clearly influences the
cost of a training event per staff person trained and how often certain
training events should be offered. Small think tanks could explore
pooling their resources with similar organizations to conduct some of
the more commonly needed human capital–building workshops. But
potential cooperators may resist because of concerns about strengthening
competitors.
Holding a special meeting every year or two of senior management
and team leaders is often an effective way to define broad training needs.
The meeting will be more productive if participants are advised about the
meeting’s purpose and are given an illustrative list of possible training
topics in advance to stimulate thinking. The training agenda can be kept
within feasible bounds by using the expected value of the annual train-
ing budget and the cost of typical events as inputs to the deliberations.
During such discussions, some participants tend to confuse the training
needs of individual staff members with the needs of the staff overall; a
clear separation needs to be maintained.
Deciding who should do the training. Using the think tank’s own staff
members as trainers is far and away the preferred option because these
people will know the particular interests of the staff, it is easy to schedule
their training times, they are likely to cost less than an outside expert, and
they will be available for follow-up questions. Of course, when no staff
member has the necessary expertise, then an outside expert should be
recruited. But even then, think tank management should designate before
this training event someone on staff to do the training in the future. The
designated analyst can then pay particular attention at the workshop and,
if necessary, ask the presenter about supplemental readings and the like.
If no expert on the topic can be identified locally, then think tank man-
agement will need to do one of the following things:
• Be opportunistic and ask a visiting foreign expert to conduct 
the workshop. If necessary, the expert could be paid extra for
this task.
• Identify a relevant short course being offered elsewhere and send
the staffer designated to be the teacher to take the course.
It is also wise for an institution to have multiple presenters available
to teach a course. This provides more flexibility in offering the course and
protects the training program from collapsing when a teacher departs. A
comparatively easy way to train an additional teacher is to assign an inter-
ested analyst to be the understudy or backup teacher for a course. That
person can then be especially attentive during the next course offering,
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or, if he or she has already participated in the course, he or she can teach
a segment under the guidance of the primary teacher.
Selecting participants. As a general policy, most training events should
be open to interested staff. Limitations may be imposed by the size of the
training room, the number of computers available for an IT class, or other
logistical constraints. If participating staff are charging their time to an
overhead training account, then think tank management will likely want
to control attendance. But for lunch-hour training events, where staff
are participating on their own time, a general policy of open attendance
is preferred.
Participation in certain courses by selected staff should be required. If
management believes that the material taught in a course will substantially
increase the capability and productivity of staff receiving the training,
then mandating participation is certainly warranted. It is important,
however, to announce the training schedule far enough in advance to
make it easy for staff to participate and if necessary shift the date—for
example, if the dates for a major national conference on a high-priority
topic are announced after the training is scheduled and they conflict
with those for the training.
Senior managers meeting with the team leaders should decide which
staff definitely need the training. These staff members can then be informed
that their participation is mandatory. For some training activities outlined
above, however, whole categories of staff should participate; they can be
identified and notified by the personnel officer. Also, the task of tracking
attendance is often given to the personnel office, and the staff member’s
participation in various events becomes an item in the annual performance
assessment.
FINAL POINTS
Staff training is an often neglected source of improved productivity at think
tanks. Far from a luxury, investment in training is a rational economic
decision for boosting staff efficiency. But it is more than this. Staff who
are acquiring new knowledge and skills are more satisfied with their jobs,
which improves morale and staff retention. Organizations with reputations
for good training have an edge in recruiting staff as well.
This chapter outlines elements of a comprehensive training program
for researchers and support staff at think tanks. While each think tank will
have its own needs, the ideas presented should help think tank leaders
jump-start the process of organizing a program. If a program is thought-
fully organized to maximize the use of in-house resources, it can be
implemented at very modest cost.
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N O T E S
1. Even in Western countries, students graduating with advanced degrees in
the social sciences typically have poor policy analysis skills. While universities
often have a public policy program, social science students do not take these
courses. So, these new researchers can also benefit from a short course in public
policy.
2. No literature on this topic was located. Citations to the general training
literature are in chapter 2, as is a review of the training practices of a sample of
think tanks.
3. The discussion in chapter 9 on determining overhead rates stresses this
point.
4. This was documented as the situation in the Eastern Europe–CIS region
in Struyk (1999), chapter 4.
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Ensuring Good Advice:
Quality Control
4
Perceptions about the high quality of a think tank’s work are criticalfor maintaining the credibility of the organization’s reports and
recommendations, and perhaps for its very survival. Because many clients
of policy research organizations are not in a position to judge the quality
of a particular product independently, a strong reputation is fundamental
to attracting work.
Therefore, most third-stage private, independent public policy research
organizations—think tanks—in the West pay scrupulous attention to
quality control. Hiring and retaining highly capable staff members is the
best method of ensuring high-quality work.1 But even if recruitment is
successful, some oversight is mandatory.
A peer review process is a critical element in the overall quality control
regime, and virtually all third-stage think tanks with more than a handful
of staff have such a process in place.2 The standards used in a peer review
process—explicit or implicit—are a good proxy for quality: the analysis
should be factually correct, logically consistent, methodologically sound,
grounded in current and historical literature, objective, and written in a
way that will be useful to the primary audience. At some think tanks, such
as the Urban Institute, the reviewer is held jointly responsible with the
author for significant problems discovered after a report is disseminated.
In a few think tanks, such as Abt Associates, the names of reviewers appear
on the title page along with that of the author.3
This chapter provides concrete advice on how to organize the peer
review process appropriate for first- and second-stage think tanks. It
begins with an outline of the elements of a standard peer review system
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in third-stage think tanks. Next the chapter gives an overview of a survey
of think tanks in the Eastern Europe–CIS region regarding their peer
review practices and draws conclusions about the adequacy of the cov-
erage and procedures. In the final section it recommends what developing
think tanks should do for quality control.
THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
The following describes a model peer review process, most elements of
which are present at third-stage think tanks in the United States and
presumably at think tanks in other countries as well.
The peer review process is formal in the sense that it is mandatory
and that there is a written policy statement concerning it. The statement
indicates
• the range of products subject to review;
• the person responsible for designating reviewers for different
products;
• the criteria to be used in the reviews—usually, high-quality methods
of analysis, conclusions based on the analysis, clear and effective
presentation, and ensuring that the product corresponds to what was
required under a contract or grant agreement;
• the form in which comments are to be provided (e.g., written, oral,
in a particular format);
• the process for resolving possible disputes between the reviewer
and the author(s); and
• the extent of the responsibility of the reviewer for any problems
later identified with the product.
Typically there is a form for each product that records the name of
the reviewer and that the reviewer signs to accept responsibility for
the review.
In reality, many institutions have peer review programs that differ
from that just outlined. Many are simply less formal: team leaders are
held accountable for having products reviewed, and no explicit records
are kept. Another difference is that organizations may in effect exempt
products by the most senior staff from the process. Some think tanks
may use in-house review seminars in place of product reviews as the
method of exercising quality control. Such seminars can be very valu-
able for guiding the project, but they may not safeguard the quality of
the final product.
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CURRENT PRACTICES OF SECOND-STAGE THINK TANKS
The information presented below was obtained from a survey sent to
15 think tanks, 10 of which responded, in Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. The think tanks targeted for the
survey were generally organizations with at least 10 full-time and part-time
analysts. All have been in operation for at least five years. The author
visited all but one of the think tanks included in the final sample. While
the sample is fairly broad in its geographic coverage, neither the initial
nor the final sample should be considered statistically representative.
Table 4-1 lists the names and locations of the think tanks that responded.
The 10 think tanks are from seven countries. The table also gives two
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Table 4-1 Participating Organizations: Staff and Report Volume in 2000
Organization Number of Number of Number of reports 
(name/ full-time part-time produced 
abbreviation) Location research staff research staff per year
Gdansk Institute for Poland 35 7 60
Market Economy
(Gdansk)
Institute for Urban Russia 38 5 80
Economics (IUE)
International Center Ukraine 25 10 30
for Policy
Studies (ICPS)
Center for the Study Bulgaria 23 30 40
of Democracy
(CSD)
Institute for Market Bulgaria 9 25 32
Economy (IME)
Metropolitan Hungary 10 2 10
Research
Institute (MRI)
Social Research Hungary 8 25 80
Institute (TARKI)
Viitorul Foundation Moldova 14 12 2
(Viitorul)
Center for Policy Romania 2 8 14
Studies and
Comparative
Analysis (CPSCA)
Crakow Real Estate Poland — 2 10
Institute (CREI)
— = not available
indicators of the group’s size as of 2000—the number of full- and part-
time research/policy staff, and the number of reports completed that year.
In this and other tables the think tanks are arrayed from large to small,
to facilitate the identification of differences in practices associated with
size. Six of the larger organizations produced 30 or more reports in 2000,
while none of the other four think tanks produced more than 14 reports.
Two think tanks—CPSCA and CREI—were quite small, with two and
zero full-time research staff, respectively.
A questionnaire was e-mailed to a principal at each organization,
along with a letter explaining the purpose of the survey and requesting
that he or she participate in the project by completing and returning the
questionnaire. The questionnaire covered the topics discussed above.
Wherever possible, precoded responses were given as an option to make
completion of the form easier and to foster comparability. The contents
of the questionnaire were based on the practices at the Urban Institute
and other third-stage think tanks with which the author is familiar.
The review of practices of the respondent think tanks in about 2000 is
divided into three areas: process, coverage, and responsibility. Practices of
these organizations may have changed since the survey. Nonetheless, they
provide an idea of first- and second-stage think tank conditions.
The Review Process
The principal elements in the peer review process include the presence
of a formal policy, the appointment and payment of a reviewer, the prepa-
ration of written comments, and the existence of methods for resolving
conflicts between a reviewer and an author. A final question is whether
in-house seminars are used as an element in the review process.
Nine of the 10 think tanks included here have a policy that research
products should be peer-reviewed (table 4-2). The exception is Hungary’s
MRI, which indicated that the need for a review procedure is recognized,
but that the organization does not have the capacity to introduce one.
Interestingly, only the largest four of the nine think tanks with a review
policy have a written policy statement governing the review process.
While the absence of written guidelines does not necessarily make the
review process less reliable, it does leave the door open for different inter-
pretations of what is required, particularly within larger organizations.
Where there are no written guidelines, senior management should pay
close attention to the process.
A written review is mandated by seven of the nine think tanks that
require a peer review. Only two of the smaller think tanks do not have
this policy. The obvious advantages of the written review are that there
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
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is less chance of misunderstanding and the comments are formally
on record.
There is significant variation among respondents in who is respon-
sible for appointing the reviewer. In four cases, the team leader or an
individual researcher makes the choice. Senior management generally
seems to oversee the process, however. For example, at IME, where an
individual researcher nominates the reviewer, the nomination is subject
to approval by management. In most cases, management appears to be
aware of the reviewer being selected, even if management does not
explicitly approve each choice.
There is considerable variation in the use of outside versus internal
reviewers and in payments for reviews. ICPS uses external reviewers for
nearly all projects, and it pays for the reviews. But IUE, CSD, CPSCA,
and CREI rely on internal reviews exclusively; among these, only IUE
has an account to which reviewers can charge their time. The other
think tanks are between these poles, with outside reviewers employed
for particularly important projects or when no one on staff has the
necessary expertise.
The underlying theme in the responses concerning settlement of
disputes between reviewers and authors is that it is seldom necessary
for a third party to become involved. The author and the reviewer
typically discuss the comments and come to an agreement about the
changes that should be made. As the respondent for TARKI put it,
“We do not want to assess, but rather to improve.” In the rare instances
when there is disagreement on a principal point, the research director
or other senior management participates in the resolution. At IUE, the
issue is discussed at the weekly meeting of team leaders chaired by the
institute’s president.
In principle, in-house seminars can also be an integral part of the qual-
ity control process. Such seminars can provide additional points during
a research project for managers to make critical comments beyond the
end-of-project peer review. Seminars may actually take the place of a peer
review. Among the 10 think tanks that responded, 6 hold in-house sem-
inars on ongoing projects (table 4-3, last two columns). Of these, five use
the seminars in addition to peer reviews. One, MRI, uses seminars as its
only review vehicle. Only at ICPS are in-house presentations a rule. At
IUE, for example, for about half of all projects researchers present findings
at a seminar attended by project staff, department directors, and the man-
agement team. At ICPS, the seminars are generally given around the
midterm of the project, and outside analysts are invited to participate. At
both organizations, and at TARKI as well, more than one presentation
may be made for the most important projects.
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Coverage
Table 4-4 lists seven types of products that could be subject to review. The
list is expansive in its coverage and includes some types that often are not
subject to review even in third-stage think tanks, such as papers being sub-
mitted by staff to scientific journals and articles for the popular press.
Reports to clients, the practice for the most important category in terms
of a think tank’s reputation, are covered in the first column of the table.
Most respondents indicated that their answer for this category also applied
to the organization’s own publications—a class of product not separately
asked about in the questionnaire. Seven of the nine think tanks with a
policy of reviewing products subject all the documents in this category
to review, with some small exceptions. The other two, CSD and Viitorul,
indicated that some of these products are not subject to review but did
not elaborate. In short, coverage in this category is strong, far stronger
than for any other product.
Books intended for publication are often targeted for peer review. Five
of the eight think tanks with staff preparing books require such reviews.
The others believe that the publisher will impose quality control.
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Table 4-3 Responsibility and the Role of Seminars
Seminars used Complement 
Form Form Joint as review or substitute for 
Organization used?a signed?b responsibility?c forum? peer review?
Gdansk No No No Occasionally Complement
IUE Yes Yes Yes Most Complement
ICPS No No No Always Complement
CSD No No No No NA
IME Yes Yes No No NA
MRI NA NA NA Occasionally Substitute
TARKI No No Yes Yes Complement
Viitorul Yes Yes Yes No NA
CPSCA No No No No NA
CREI No No Yes Occasionally Complement
NA = not applicable
a Question asked: Does the institute have a form that indicates that a paper was reviewed and by
whom?
b Question asked: Does the reviewer sign it [the form] indicating that s/he has completed the
review?
c Question asked: Authors, of course, have primary responsibility for the contents of their reports.
With respect to the reviewer, does the institute also hold the reviewer responsible if a poor-quality
product is delivered to a client or published?
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Few respondent think tanks routinely review papers being submitted
to scientific journals (three of nine—IUE, CSD, and CPSCA) or articles for
the popular press (three of nine—IUE, ICPS, and CPSCA). The respon-
dents are somewhat more vigilant about reviewing conference presenta-
tions (four of nine) and documents to be distributed at conferences (five
of nine). Perhaps surprisingly, only four of nine think tanks have a clear
policy of reviewing materials to be distributed at press conferences. Three
more review documents for some press conferences, and the other two
never or almost never subject such documents to reviews.
Responsibility
Some think tank managers believe that making the reviewer, as well as
the author, responsible for the final product gives the reviewer a strong
additional incentive to do a careful, thorough job. It is useful to distin-
guish between two aspects of the communication of responsibility to
the reviewer for the final product. One is the formal assignment of
shared responsibility for the quality of the final product (assuming that
the reviewer’s comments are fully reflected in the final version of the
product). The other is informal and concerns the way responsibility is
impressed upon the reviewer. In other words, are there external signals
to the reviewer that he or she has some responsibility for the quality of
the final product—signals in addition to being formally told of such a
responsibility?
The questionnaire asked directly whether it was the think tank’s policy
to hold the reviewer responsible with the author for the quality of the
final product. Only four of the nine think tanks that have a policy to peer
review products answered affirmatively (table 4-3).
With respect to signals or indicators of the reviewer’s responsibilities,
respondents were asked whether the think tank used a form that records
the specifics of the review assignment, the title of the document, the author,
and the identity of the reviewer, and whether the reviewer signed the form.
Three organizations—IUE, IME, and Viitorul—use a standard form and
ask the reviewer to sign it. They are also among the four organizations
that hold the reviewer jointly responsible with the author for the quality
of the final product (table 4-3).
Summary
Quality control is generally taken seriously by the think tanks studied,
as indicated by the fact that 9 of the 10 included in the analysis have
a policy of peer review for certain documents. The review process is
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widely understood to be the improvement of the product, not just the
delivery of a critique. Seven of the nine think tanks with a policy for peer
review require reviewers to prepare written comments on the documents
they read. Four of the largest think tanks in the sample have a written
policy statement in place.
Nevertheless, some organizations in the sample could clearly do better.
One obvious suggestion for the think tank that does not have a review
policy in place is to adopt the necessary policy and procedures. In addition,
the two think tanks that are not obtaining written comments should do
so, since such comments create a record of the reviewer’s criticisms,
which management can use to decide whether to release a document.
Seven of the nine think tanks with a peer review policy require that all
reports to clients and their own publications be subject to a review. These
are the critical classes of products generated by think tanks. The other two
organizations require peer reviews for some of these documents. For
other types of products—such as conference presentations and handouts
at conferences, articles for the popular press, and books—review practices
are much more variable. Overall, the incidence of these reviews is about
half of that for reports to clients.
These think tanks have concentrated peer reviews on client reports and
on their publications. This is certainly understandable, given the impor-
tance of these products for a think tank’s reputation. But their reputations
can also be damaged by poor presentations at conferences, inaccurate
materials distributed to the press, poorly written newspaper and magazine
articles, and misleading books written by their staff. Many of the think
tanks seem to be relying on others (e.g., publishers and the media) to
exercise quality control for some products. This may be a mistake: no one
has a stronger incentive to ensure the strong quality of its output than
the think tank itself.
A REALISTIC PROGRAM
There is no question that proper quality control is critical. But each public
policy research institute should determine the resources it can and should
devote to quality control. Factors to consider in deciding on an institu-
tional review policy include the following:
• the competency and experience of the staff—the more seasoned
the staff and the greater their skills, the lower the need for detailed
monitoring;
• the mix of staff in terms of experience and skills—the more variation,
the greater the need for explicit monitoring;
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• the expected sophistication of a particular product and its anticipated
distribution and visibility; and
• the extent of the organization’s experience with each analyst and with
various products: for example, management may have read several
reports of a new senior analyst and have confidence in his or her
writing skills but know nothing about this person’s abilities as a
public speaker or author of press releases.
Consider the example of a very small think tank, composed of three
or four senior staffers who have worked together for years with a
record for producing high-quality work. The think tank could have a
policy of comparatively little peer review. But even among such a small
group, one team member might be a weak public presenter and need
to rehearse presentations for critical review. Person-specific policies are
difficult to implement because of staff sensitivities, so a general policy
of reviewing presentations could be in order in this case. But even here
two arguments might be made for adopting a more comprehensive policy
now. First, adopting this policy implicitly assumes that the composition
of the staff will not change. If, however, there is a nontrivial chance that
staff will be added or replaced over the next couple of years, then this
partial review policy could be a mistake. If staff change is foreseeable,
then a more comprehensive review policy will be necessary. Second, even
very senior people produce a poor product occasionally, usually when
they are overcommitted. A comprehensive review policy guards against
such problems. One highly visible quality problem can weaken a think
tank for years.
Clearly, larger and more diverse think tanks have a greater need for
comprehensive peer review, and a general policy is practically always the
preferred solution.
A peer review process has two principal components—the process itself
and its coverage (i.e., which products and which analysts are subject to
review). Recommendations on both scores are provided below.
The Process
Of the various components of the review process outlined at the begin-
ning of the chapter, the four elements listed in box 4-1 are particularly
important: the system should be governed by a written statement;
reviews should be written; a standard form should be used to record the
key information about the review and should be signed by the reviewer;
and the reviewer should be held explicitly responsible with the author
for the final product.
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Coverage
Which products and which staff members are subject to review may be
the most contentious issue in the peer review process; recommendations
appear in table 4-5. Overall, the author recommends broad coverage—
nearly all products except journal articles and books being published
externally should be reviewed. The rationale for this position is clear:
the cost of peer reviews is modest compared with that of the damage to
a think tank’s reputation from publishing erroneous or otherwise
flawed analyses or recommendations. All staff should be subject to the
peer review process.
One additional point: it is useful to distinguish between a technical
review of analysis and methodology, on the one hand, and the policy
recommendations advanced in a document, on the other. Various staff
will be able to execute the technical review, but it is a good idea for
the most senior staff to review policy recommendations, especially on
major issues.
A think tank’s reputation is its principal asset. One of management’s
foremost tasks is to safeguard it.
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1. The review policy should be formalized in a written statement that covers all
aspects of the process, including a description of which products are sub-
ject to review. (A serviceable policy statement is included in appendix D.) 
A written statement clarifies what is required and eliminates misunder-
standings about the process.
2. Reviews should be written. This reduces communication problems between
the reviewer and the author, provides a clear record that management can
consult in assessing a product, and provides an enduring record of the
review.
3. There should be a standard review form. The form should record the iden-
tity of the product, the author, and the reviewer. It should also include at
least a summary of the reviewer’s comments. The form should be signed
by the reviewer to reinforce the reviewer’s responsibility. (An example is
included in appendix D.)
4. The reviewer should be jointly accountable with the author. The reviewer
and the author should share responsibility for the quality of the final prod-
uct, assuming that the reviewer’s comments are duly taken into account.
This should be stated in the review policy and on the standard form, so it is
very clear to the reviewer and to the author.
Box 4-1 Key Points in the Recommended Review Process
N O T E S
Dessislava Petkov provided valuable comments on the draft of this chapter.
1. See chapter 2 for a discussion of good practices for staff motivation and
retention at think tanks.
2. Some think tanks also consult their clients about their performance; in
some instances, a think tank’s principal sponsor will invest in a comprehensive
assessment of the organization’s contribution. A survey of 10 leading think tanks
(eight in the United States and two in Europe) in the early 1990s reported that six
had had an external evaluation in the past decade and three others had under-
taken substantial, intense self-evaluations. Only two of the nine evaluations
involved a survey of the institutions’ clients, and these evaluations were viewed
as highly productive (Struyk 1993, 51–52).
3. There is little literature on the practices of think tanks in Western countries.
Kingsley (1993) gives some guidance on how think tanks organize the product
review process.
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Table 4-5 Recommended Coverage of the Review Process
General review status Type of product Comments
Very high priority
High priority
Lower priority
Reports to clients
Institute publications
Conference presentations
Conference handouts
Articles for the popular 
press
Press releases and 
documents for press 
conferences
Articles submitted to 
scientific journals
Books for publication 
by an outside press
Very few exceptions—
examples of exceptions 
might be report working 
drafts going to clients.
At a minimum PowerPoint 
presentations should be 
reviewed; less experienced 
presenters should be 
subject to “dry-run” reviews.
Subject to review unless 
underlying research has 
already been reviewed. Still, 
products that will have high 
visibility should be reviewed.
May want to review the 
submissions of less senior 
staff to help them establish 
their reputations for good 
work.
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Communicating Results
5
Effective communication of results to the right audiences is just asimportant to a think tank’s success as producing high-quality
research and policy analysis. There is little point to conducting fine policy
analysis if it only collects dust on the analyst’s shelf. A cottage industry has
grown up around analysis of the link between research and policy devel-
opment, and the outpouring of advice on how to conceptualize the effec-
tive dissemination of research results never stops.1 The sheer volume of
writing attests to the difficulty that most researchers and think tanks
have in getting the results of their work used. After reviewing numerous
reports and interviewing research contractors, Saywell and Cotton
(1999, 43) state,
It is a truism to say that research cannot be used unless it is available
to those who might best use it, at the time they need it, in a format
they can use and with findings that are comprehensible and adapt-
able to local circumstances. . . . [D]issemination of research, as
practiced by UK based research contractors . . . fail[s] to meet these
fundamental criteria.
Rather than try to summarize the voluminous literature on research
dissemination to the policy and other communities, this chapter gives
practical guidelines on how to establish an effective communication
program. This discussion purposefully employs the term communica-
tion rather than dissemination. Dissemination indicates a process for
distributing a product after it is developed. Here, communication
denotes a process that starts at the initiation of a research project with
Raymond J. Struyk
 
the identification of policy clients for the results, defines products to meet
the needs of the various audiences identified, and then updates this plan
as needed as the research project evolves.
This discussion is organized in five parts. The first section reviews
several principles about the nature of policy formulation that help guide
the development of a concrete communications strategy. The second
section takes a leaf from marketing literature to describe seven steps
for developing a communication plan for a specific product. Each step
is adjusted for the peculiarities of communicating in the public policy
arena. The third section offers pointers on how to make the seven steps
more effective. The fourth section outlines and compares the current
practices of several highly developed think tanks in Eastern Europe and
the Commonwealth of Independent States; less complete information
is presented for a group of African think tanks. The last section briefly
discusses how the communications function can be organized within a
think tank.
PRINCIPLES FOR COMMUNICATION
Bardach (1984); Stone, Maxwell, and Keating (2001); Greenberg, Linksz,
and Mandell (2003, 48–58); and many others have argued that the context
in which research is produced fundamentally affects the utility of the results
to policymakers—if the issue under study is a “hot” topic, the work may
be influential, even if it is not packaged terribly well. On the other hand,
great research, ably presented, may receive no attention if the policy
question it addresses is not prominent on the agenda of the government
or legislature.
Political scientists speak of “windows of opportunity” for policy changes
(Hall 1990; Kingdon 1984). The early days of a new government are often
cited as a moment of opportunity. There are similar windows for the
effective use of research findings in the policy process—that is, when an
issue is prominently on the nation’s agenda and under active consideration
(Garrett and Islam 1998). In reality, there are multiple types and degrees
of opportunity, as illustrated in table 5-1 for national-level policy issues.
The opportunities in the table are differentiated by how prominent the
issue is, whether the issue requires action by the government or legisla-
ture or by a lower-level government agency, and how timely the issue is
(i.e., if it is under active consideration).
The most prominent public policy issues are the purview of senior
government officials and the legislature. Within the legislature, its leaders
constitute the key players. Members of the government and legislative
leaders are assisted by their staffs and by such intermediaries as advocacy
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and individual
experts and knowledgeable lobbyists.2
One of the most famous examples of just-in-time policy recommenda-
tions from a Western think tank features the U.S. Heritage Foundation.
Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980 and immediately
began to assemble his cabinet and consider major policy directions for his
new administration. Within weeks of the election the Heritage Foundation
delivered to the government-in-waiting a several-hundred-page, com-
prehensive, well-argued policy blueprint focusing on early actions the
new government should take. The Foundation’s recommendations, based
on months of prior work, were unusually influential for the new govern-
ment. This action also caught the imagination of the policy community
and redefined the meaning of “timeliness” for the U.S. policy community.
From then on, the entire think tank industry has worked harder on
timeliness and on clarifying its policy recommendations.
Naturally, analyses specifically commissioned from a think tank by a
senior official can be extremely influential. An example of a significant
success for a Russian think tank is given in box 5-1. But it is important
to keep in mind that when work is commissioned in this way, the com-
munications task is dramatically simplified because the audience is
ready-made.
Second-level issues will be dealt with by lower-level government offi-
cials, although the ultimate disposition of a question may require cabinet
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Table 5-1 Types of Policy Issues from a Communications Perspective
Opportunity Target audience
Prominent policy questions under current 
discussion
Policy question that is likely to be prominent 
and to be taken up in the mid-term
Second-tier policy matters, for example, 
those addressing improved administration 
of a program, under active discussion
Second-tier policy matters likely to receive 
attention in the mid-term
Identification of a new, potentially 
prominent policy issue
a Intermediaries include relevant advocacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and
consulting firms working in the area, donor organizations, and individual experts and lobbyists.
Key members of the government
and the legislature and their
staffs; influential intermediariesa
Administration and legislative
branch staff and intermediaries
Key program administrators, interest
groups, intermediaries
Key program administrators,
interest groups, intermediaries
Senior members of government and
legislators with responsibility for
the area, relevant advocacy
NGOs, intermediaries, the public
approval. Implementation of the results of many program evaluations
are at this level. Regulatory changes are also often in this category. One
example of effective research on a second-tier problem is a Russian assess-
ment of the quality of the administration of social assistance programs.
These programs were nearly universally administered through local
government offices in Russia in 2000, sometimes with very precise reg-
ulations from national ministries but often not. The analysis of nine
offices in four cities showed that administrative procedures were generally
underdeveloped in such critical areas as staff training and supervision,
quality control of eligibility and benefit determination, preparation of
management reports, and monitoring program implementation. The
results of this analysis were presented to senior staff at the Ministry of
Labor and Social Welfare, who were motivated to agree to develop a
program to improve the operations of local offices.3
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Housing for Retired Russian Officers
In early October 1997, the highest officials of the Russian government
decided it was imperative to address the shortage of housing for retired
military officers. Already about 150,000 recently retired officers were living
either doubled up with friends or family or in makeshift arrangements.
Another 50,000 officers would be retired as part of the structuring of the
country’s military forces. Neglect had already spawned a new conservative,
military-oriented political party that was gaining national prominence.
Legitimate grievances would fuel the party’s appeal, which would pose a
genuine threat to the country’s liberal reforms in the next election.
First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemstov called up the Institute for
Urban Economics (IUE), a local think tank, to draft a program within 15 days.
Mr. Nemstov had worked with IUE previously testing a consumer subsidy
scheme for retired officers when he was governor of Nizhni Novgoord
Oblast. He and IUE agreed that this scheme would be the basis for the new
program. IUE delivered the draft program on schedule; under it officers
would receive grants covering 80 percent of the purchase price of a unit in
the locality where they reside, with the subsidy paid by the bank acting as
the government’s agent directly to the seller of the unit. Ten days later the
plan for financing the program with minimum public financing was delivered
by the Institute. By the end of October 1997 President Boris Yeltsin had
endorsed the concept. The program was subsequently formally created
through a government resolution and implemented.
Source: Struyk (1999), 1.
Box 5-1 National Priority Issue with Timely Think Tank Input
On making use of policy results on second-tier issues, Platt (1987) points
out the importance of networks, such as professional associations, in
informing administrators and generating a consensus for change. Worth
stressing is that the involved policy communities are typically very well
defined, often a comparatively small group with direct administrative
responsibilities.4
Finally, there is a third class of policy topic—the newly identified
issue. An extremely famous example in the United States was Michael
Harrington’s work publicizing substantial domestic poverty in the 1960s.
Harrington’s compelling description in The Other America made reducing
the incidence of poverty a priority item on the nation’s policy agenda. For
new policy issues the audience may well differ from that for items already
on the policy agenda, and achieving notice may require first engaging the
public’s interest in the issue.
Besides the prominence of the issue, a key dimension defining the rel-
evant communication audience is the issue’s place on the policy agenda—
is it currently under consideration, on the agenda but unlikely to be
considered before next year, or not on the agenda? In other words, is this
the moment of opportunity? If it is a hot topic, then the think tank should
design concise products and work hard to communicate results to the
most senior policymakers and their advisers.
If the policy question is not current, it is still important to communi-
cate analytic findings to relevant audiences for at least two reasons. First,
strong early analysis of an issue can set the terms of the future debate.
Experts in a field, in and out of government, may come to think of the
issue as it is depicted in early analyses. In this regard, a recent analysis by
Andrew Rich (2001) on the influence of U.S. think tanks is insightful.
While think tanks with a conservative perspective are much more active
day to day in the national policy process than their more liberal counter-
parts, Rich does not see conservative organizations as necessarily more
influential. The reason is that the liberal think tanks do more of the basic
analysis and number crunching, while the conservative think tanks offer
greater argumentation but less new information. In effect, the liberal think
tanks are more successful at framing the way the issue will be considered—
an extremely powerful advantage in a policy debate.
Second, it is extremely important to transmit analytic results to the
key intermediaries for a particular topic—whether the advocacy NGOs,
administration and legislative staff members, donor organizations, think
tanks, or experts who will be consulted when the issue gains prominence.
Bardach (1984) refers to these organizations and individuals as “infor-
mation banks” or “storage cabinets.”5 These are the resources that the key
decisionmakers will consult once the issue matures. It is their job to be
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informed, so they will informally catalogue and store quality entries on
a topic to have on hand when the issue does move up the agenda.6
Most think tanks do not differentiate among policy issues along the
lines suggested in table 5-1; they have an undifferentiated communications
strategy. They tend to use the same vehicles to disseminate their findings
regardless of the prominence or timeliness of the issue. Yet the lesson
implicit in both the research literature and prominent successes like
Harrington’s is that the first step in developing a communications strat-
egy for a project is to understand the policy prominence and timeliness
of the issue.
A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS
The vice-president for communications at a major foundation defines
“strategic communication” as
the managed process by which information is produced and
conveyed to achieve specific objectives vital to an organization’s
mission. (Karel 2000)
How does a think tank become a strategic communicator? The devel-
opment and implementation of a communications strategy is a seven-step
process.7 The steps listed in box 5-2 do not need to be followed slavishly
for a good strategy to emerge, but they do structure the process in an
easily understood way.
Step 1: Identify the Target Audience
As summarized in table 5-1, the target audience depends critically on who
has responsibility for addressing the policy question and whether the
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1. Identify the target audience.
2. Determine the communication objective for each audience.
3. Select the communication channels.
4. Design the message.
5. Establish the budget for communications for this project.
6. Decide on the communications mix.
7. Measure the communications results.
Source: Adapted from Kotler (2000), 552.
Box 5-2 The Seven Steps of Effective Communication
issue is currently under consideration or may be later. In identifying the
target audience, be clear about the ultimate target. It is fine to target inter-
mediaries who can carry the message to the ultimate decisionmaker, but
be aware of the distinctive roles of both parties.
Step 2: Determine the Communication Objective 
for Each Audience
The objective of communicating with a particular audience may be a
cognitive, affective, or behavioral response. In other words, the think tank
may want to put an idea or result in the person’s mind, change his or her
attitude toward an issue, or get the person to take an action. The market-
ing literature contains four main “response hierarchy models” that treat
these three results as sequential events, that is, a person’s natural thought
process leads through a standard series of responses: cognitive → affective
→ behavioral.
So, according to the communications model described by Kotler (2000,
555) and reproduced here (table 5-2), in the cognitive stage the goal is to
attract the target person’s attention, get him or her to receive the infor-
mation (pay attention to it), and have the person digest the point intel-
lectually. In the affective state, the information must influence the
person’s attitude toward the issue, at least enough to put it on his or her
agenda, and then stimulate the recipient to form an opinion and an
intention of action. Then, in the behavior stage, the person takes action.
Take the following example. If the research identifies a new, poten-
tially prominent policy issue (e.g., under-servicing of rural infants’
health care needs), one target audience is the broad population with an
interest in improving the conditions identified. But to reach this audience,
it is necessary to use mass media. So, in effect, there are two audiences—
the ultimate (the population) and the proximate (mass media). To
attract the attention of the reporters and editors, results must be highly
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Table 5-2 Three-Stage Model of Communication
Stage Event
Cognitive stage • Exposure
• Reception
• Cognitive response
Affective stage • Attitude
• Intention
Behavior stage • Behavior/action
understandable, expressed in vivid (but accurate) language, and presented
in a concise document that contains hard figures and, if possible, human
interest vignettes from the project’s field work. The think tank could
hold a briefing for the interested press to follow up a press release that is
embargoed until the day after the briefing. The goal is to grab reporters’
attention and hold it long enough to make a convincing case about the
problem’s prominence and then move them to take action—first to
acquire more information and consider writing the story and later to
prepare the story. The objective for the population is cognitive and
affective—acceptance that this is a real problem and a predisposition to
be sympathetic to calls for the government to address it.
On the other hand, for a second-tier policy issue that is likely to receive
attention in the midterm, the objective may be strictly cognitive. The
think tank seeks to get those concerned with the issue—NGOs, staff of
the policy elite—to take note of the good work contained in the report
so it will be referred to when the issue surfaces later.
Step 3: Select the Communication Channels
How to communicate with the target audiences? This is certainly a critical
question in developing a communications strategy for policy research
results. Table 5-3 lists 15 platforms grouped under four headings used in
the marketing community: promotion, public relations, personal “selling,”
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Table 5-3 Communications Platforms for Policy Promotion
Promotion Public relations Personal “selling” Direct marketing
Exhibits at 
conferences
Exhibits at 
professional 
association 
meetings
Source: Adapted from Kotler (2000), table 18.1.
a Includes short research reports, major research reports, and books.
Press kits and press
conferences
Speeches at
conferences and
professional
meetings
Participation in
seminars
Annual reports
Publicationsa
Short “policy
memos”
Newspaper articles
Meetings with
policymakers
Meetings with
intermediaries
Organizing round-
tables with
policymakers
Mailing documents
Posting results on
a web site
E-mailing
announcements
and direct marketing. Which of these platforms or combinations of plat-
forms is suitable for a particular policy research communication task
depends critically on where the policy issue falls in the priority continuum
shown in table 5-1. The following examples of possible mixes illustrate
the possibilities.
For a “hot button” issue—a nationally prominent issue currently
being addressed by the government or parliament—the team developing
the strategy might decide on a combination of the following:
• personal selling—having their most senior people meet with policy-
makers and with intermediaries, such as NGOs and staff of key
policymakers;
• short policy memos to support the visits and to distribute to other
policymakers and intermediaries;
• a research report that complements the memos by providing
technical backup and is posted on the institute’s web site (direct
marketing); and
• presentations by senior staff at conferences and professional meet-
ings where the issue is being discussed (public relations).
Depending on the prominence of the findings, a press conference
might also be appropriate.
A quite different mix may be appropriate for a second-tier issue that
is not yet on the action agenda of any responsible decisionmaker. In this
case, the mix could be the following:
• a research report mailed to those intermediaries particularly inter-
ested in the issue and posted on the web site;
• meetings on a technical level between think tank staff and inter-
mediaries;
• presentations at professional conferences and presentation of
seminars; and
• an article based on the research published in a professional journal.
Seldom will a communications strategy employ a single vehicle.
Rather, the kind of mixes illustrated above will be common.
Step 4: Design the Message
At this stage, the team working to design a dissemination strategy for the
results of a policy research project have defined where the policy issue
falls in the priority continuum shown in table 5-1: they know the results
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of the work (or can project them with some likelihood), they have iden-
tified the target audience, and they have decided which communications
platforms to use to disseminate the findings. In step 4, the team determines
the message to be delivered by defining three separate elements: message
content, message format, and message source. In reviewing the points
below, keep in mind the three common reasons listed in box 5-3 that
intended messages do not get through.
Message content. Content focuses on the principal points the team wants
to make to the selected audience. Remarkably, researchers often find it
difficult to summarize the heart of their findings in a few simple points.
It is true that oversimplification can do a disservice to the richness of the
findings and runs the risk of not fully informing the person receiving
the information. But communication will not be successful if the points
are not clear and straightforward. Sweeping generalities can be avoided
without jeopardizing either objective. How streamlined the message must
be depends on the target audience, message format, and the platform or
vehicle picked (policy memo, TV appearance, scholarly journal, etc.).
Message format. Once the content to be delivered and the platforms
to be employed are identified, then the key issue is how the message
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Keep these pitfalls in mind and consider options that could minimize their
adverse effects when designing the strategy to disseminate specific findings.
1. Selective attention. Key people in the policy community—policymakers,
their staff, researchers at think tanks, advocates at NGOs—receive a huge
volume of memos, reports, newspapers, magazines, and other documents,
plus a high number of phone calls and e-mails. Even a well-crafted
message may not be noticed in this maelstrom.
2. Selective distortion. Recipients will hear what fits into their belief system.
As a result, they often add meanings to the message that are not there
(amplification) and do not notice other components that are there
(leveling). The communicator must then strive for simplicity, clarity,
interest, and repetition to get the main points across.
3. Selective retention. People retain in long-term memory only a small
fraction of the messages that reach them. Effectiveness in delivering the
message is critical to retention. Messages with a positive reception are
much more likely to be recalled later than those that make a negative first
impression. The exception is that an effective negative message that
causes the recipient to rehearse counterarguments is also likely to be
remembered.
Box 5-3 Three Reasons the Intended Audience May Not Receive
the Intended Message
should look or sound. Unfortunately, most think tanks devote their
energy primarily to developing the message content at the expense of
format.
In transitional and developing countries, a solid minority of think tanks
work hard to have attention-getting yet tasteful layout for their policy
memos. They consider the quality of the paper, colors for the banner
and heading, whether quotations should be pulled out of the text and
enlarged, as well as font size, margins, length of the article, and formatting
questions such as whether to use bullets. The layout, including color,
font size, and the headings, help to define how urgent the message being
conveyed is and how the organization wants to be perceived. A more
muted palate, high-quality paper, and moderate font size and language
in the headings send a very different message from brassy colors, cheap
paper, and headings that are clarion calls to action.
Numerous think tanks have developed unique banners and layouts for
each policy memo series so recipients can quickly identify the document
as coming from a particular institute and dealing with a specific topic.
Similarly, different formats are defined for series of reports on a partic-
ular topic or research area. Such customization raises the likelihood that
a recipient heavily engaged on a specific policy question will pick up the
document.
If the organization is trying to attract coverage in the print media, a good
tactic is to begin the story with a brief, actual case in order to personalize
the story for the reader. A story on improving the health system could
begin with one or two paragraphs on how a particular person was poorly
served by the present system—no or poor service, high costs, and so on.
This will make the issue of immediate interest to the reporter and the
reader. The balance of the article can then address the proposed reform.
Message format unquestionably affects how a document—and the
message it conveys—is received. For that reason, think tanks need to
consider presentation issues very carefully.
Message source. The marketing literature points out that a credible
message is based on how the person receiving the information perceives
three aspects of it: expertise, trustworthiness, and likability. Expertise
is the specialized knowledge the person or organization possesses to
back a claim. Trustworthiness is the perception of how honest the infor-
mation source is. Likability, more prominent in in-person meetings and
presentations, describes the source’s attractiveness. Qualities such as
candor, humor, and naturalness make a source more likable.8 The tone
of written documents serves something of the same role. For in-person
communications, the staff member’s skills as a presenter are also extremely
important.
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For written products, the institution’s credibility is often paramount
for implicit claims of expertise and trustworthiness. This is why think
tanks must devote so much attention to controlling the quality of
their output. For researchers who have yet to establish themselves in
a field, the institution’s name and logo on a publication or its affiliation
stated on a conference program is critical. For established researchers,
institutional affiliation is less important, but the combination of a
highly respected researcher and his or her affiliation with a preemi-
nent think tank will most likely receive the policy community’s full
attention.
Whom the organization should select for in-person events should be
carefully considered. Sometimes the researcher who has done the work
is not the most effective presenter. A younger researcher may lack the
credibility that the think tank’s director or department head has estab-
lished. The person may also lack experience in summarizing complex
research findings so a nontechnical policymaker can readily understand
them. Often, a good solution is for a senior person and the researcher to
call on key policymakers together. That way, the senior person lends his
credibility to the researcher’s statements, and the researcher begins
building his own credibility. The researcher can “go solo” for more tech-
nical meetings and seminars, with, for example, intermediaries and staff
of policymakers.
In-person events should be carefully organized. The team designing
the communications strategy should work with senior management to
define the events and determine who should attend each of them.
Clearly, the timing and sequencing of the meetings and seminars can be
important. Key policymakers should be seen early on so they are not miffed
to learn about these new findings secondhand.
Step 5: Establish the Communications Budget
By this point, the communications strategy has defined the target audi-
ence, the platforms to be used, and the message to be delivered. Now the
general ideas must be considered in light of the budget available. Keep in
mind, though, that the final budget available for communicating the
results of a policy research project will result from an iterative process—
defining the strategy, computing its cost, revising the strategy to realize
savings, and so on. As the research project nears completion, the strategy
designed near the start of the project should be revisited in light of the
issue’s current prominence. If the issue has risen sharply in importance,
the institution may decide to devote more resources to communicating
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the results, including more time of the president or others to promote the
position indicated in the findings.
The “available budget” is an elastic concept. In practice, resources
for implementing a communications strategy can usually come from
two separate sources. The first is the line in the project budget for report
writing and dissemination activities. Often, these resources are not
exploited for executing the common strategy to the degree they might.
Too frequently, the researcher writes the report for the client and then
begins to think about a product for wider circulation. In fact, if the com-
munications strategy is defined early in the project, then the researcher
can make the products for the client more useful as products or sources
of products for the communications strategy. For example, if the strategy
calls for a policy memo to be distributed, then the executive summary
of the report to the client could be given more attention than usual and
written and formatted so that with small adjustments it could be used to
communicate with a wider audience. Few clients are unhappy to receive
a report with an exceptionally lucid and well-written executive summary.
Similarly, if funds for publishing the report are available, the report can be
organized and formatted from the beginning with the specific communi-
cations targets in mind.
Beyond the project resources are those of the institution—both
money and in-house staff resources. Some staff resources are charged to
overhead accounts and can be allocated to a communications task with-
out additional funds, though their opportunity cost certainly should be
recognized. If the think tank has a public relations person, how much time
could he or she devote to marketing these results (lining up interviews with
newspaper columnists, coordinating the layout for a policy memo, etc.)?
How much time is the president prepared to spend calling and seeing
senior policymakers? A comprehensive budget should list both dollars and
contributions of in-kind resources.
Step 6: Decide on the Communications Mix
With the budget in hand and the messages and channels defined, the
communications team can begin determining the mix of activities to be
undertaken. The mix finally decided upon will depend on the cost of
each marketing activity and its perceived effectiveness in realizing the
communications objective.
Each think tank should define the cost or “internal price” for each
activity. In making these calculations, consider the costs incurred at each
step. Past experience can inform decisions on how much staff time various
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tasks take, the cost of printing documents, and the like. Some examples
of the cost components of activities follow.
• Meetings with policymakers. Cost of the staff time for the meetings
and in arranging them.
• Roundtable discussion. Cost of staff time to organize the event,
including (a) logistics, such as preparing and distributing invita-
tions, sending reminders, and handling questions; and (b) inviting
key participants. Cost of staff time to participate in the event. Cost
of refreshments served, and, if necessary, renting a place to hold the
event.
• Policy memo. Staff time to write and edit the memo, including
senior management review; time of desktop publications person to
do layout and key changes; printing; and distribution, including staff
time for preparing the mailing list and mailing labels and for stuffing
envelopes.
• Seminar participation. Staff time to prepare the presentation and
participate in the conference, travel costs, and costs of documents
to be distributed.
• Newspaper article. Time of pubic relations staff to identify a reporter
willing to do an interview, researcher time to prepare a customized
write-up with an “angle” likely to appeal to the newspaper, and
time to meet with the reporter and perhaps work further with him
or her later.
With this “price list” developed, the total cost of activities can be
defined. In computing these costs, distinguish between the set-up or
fixed costs and the marginal costs. For example, once the researcher and
communications team have prepared a policy memo, the cost of dis-
tributing it to 50 more people will be very low. In contrast, there are
almost no economies of scale in conducting in-person meetings with
policymakers.
Estimating the effectiveness of each communications platform or
activity in reaching the communication campaign’s objectives will be much
more difficult. To a limited degree, the frequency with which think tanks
in a country actually employ various platforms is a measure of their effec-
tiveness. (Information of this sort is presented in the section on think
tanks’ practices.) But such aggregated information does not indicate
how useful a channel is at reaching different audiences and for issues of
varying degrees of policy prominence. For that reason, the think tank’s
own experience and sense of effectiveness of different activities will
probably be paramount.
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In scrutinizing the total cost of employing various platforms to various
degrees and the effectiveness of each, the team designing the communi-
cations strategy will want to reconsider some of the decisions made in
earlier steps. In particular, steps 3 to 6 in box 5-2 should be reconsidered.
Clearly, senior management and the researcher should be consulted
closely throughout the development of the communication plan and be in
agreement with the final product. This plan helps guide the researchers
in the creation of the products required under the grant or contract fund-
ing the project. It also gives all parties the chance to discover new oppor-
tunities to make presentations at conferences and so on, especially as the
project draws to a close.
As the research findings crystallize near the end of the project, the
strategy should be revisited to make sure it accommodates the actual
findings. Sometimes even well-conceived projects yield weak results.
Sometimes the nation’s policy priorities shift over the research period,
especially if it is longer than six months. Changes such as these require
that the strategy be fine-tuned or, in rare cases, completely rethought.
Step 7: Measure the Communications Results
Organizations that monitor the effectiveness of their past communications
activities will do a much better job designing new ones. They will have
critical information on the effectiveness of various platforms to use in
deciding on the communications mix, as just discussed.
Different monitoring approaches are appropriate for different activities.
The effectiveness of a press conference can be assessed by the resulting
volume of newspaper and TV coverage, with due allowance made for what
other newsworthy events occur on the same day. Another indicator of
success is the number of follow-up radio and TV appearances triggered
by the press conference.
The effectiveness of mailing out or distributing documents (e.g., policy
briefs and reports) can be assessed with a questionnaire distributed by
mail three or four weeks after the initial distribution. The questionnaire is
extremely simple, taking only a minute to fill in. The number in the upper
right hand corner is coded to the name of the respondent to give a sense
of anonymity to the respondent and to save time. Linking the responses
to the position of the respondent (e.g., government official, think tank
staffer, policymaker, assistant to a policymaker, etc.) permits analysis of
how the documents fare with various audiences. The questionnaire itself
could be on a postcard addressed to be returned to the institute with
postage already applied. An example of a survey of recipients is given in
box 5-4, and a mini case study in box 5-5.
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Box 5-4 Sample Mail Questionnaire for Measuring Effectiveness
of Certain Types of Communications Activities
Dear Colleague, #225
About three weeks ago the Policy Institute sent you a Policy Brief, “Assisting
Children of Poor Families,” on the issue of whether the national government
should change the housing allowance program so benefits are targeted to
low-income families. We would greatly appreciate your completing this short
questionnaire and returning it to us. Circle the answers that apply.
Do you remember seeing this document? Y N
If you do not, do not answer the other questions.
Did you skim it? Y N or
read it? Y N
Did you find that the contents (1 = very positive response; 2 = OK; 
3 = negative response)
• Provided you new information on the topic? 1 2 3
• Gave you a new perspective on the topic? 1 2 3
• Was well written and well presented? 1 2 3
The Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., initiated the Straight Talk series of
concise (one-page) policy briefs in 1999 on issues surrounding pension
reform in the United States. Thirty-four briefs were produced and mailed to
some 1,600 persons believed to be actively interested in the subject. The briefs
were written by a senior fellow at the Institute who has a strong reputation in
the policy community on this topic.
One year after the series began the Institute sent a mailing to those
receiving issues of Straight Talk asking if they wanted to continue to receive
the policy briefs. A space was also left on the self-addressed, pre-franked
return postcard for the recipient to offer comments about the series. The
overwhelming majority of those on the list responded with the request to be
retained on the list. In addition, approximately 100 respondents offered
comments—all positive—about the series and the author. A selection of
these comments was later shared as part of the application for funds to
continue the series.
Box 5-5 Checking the Effectiveness of a Policy Brief Series
Similar questionnaires could be sent to participants at roundtable
events and seminars organized by the think tank. By carefully mining the
results of surveys conducted on several reports or policy briefs, the orga-
nization can better decide which formats and layouts reach alternative
audiences.
As promising as the survey approach may be, experience shows that
response rates for such surveys are low. They can be increased somewhat
by giving an incentive to respond, such as remaining on the mailing list
or stating that the updated list will be used as the basis for invitations to
future seminars and roundtable discussions. Still, the poor experience
and the cost of such surveys discourages many think tanks, including
those with sophisticated communications activities, from using them
extensively.
In the age of the Internet, an alternative to mail surveys is to use lists
of visitors to a think tank’s home page. Visitors can be asked about their
satisfaction with the organization’s products—policy briefs, working
papers, and information posted on the web site—and if the visitors are
using the materials in a policy context. The value of responses is much
greater if complementary information is collected in the survey on the
respondent’s current position (policymaker, elected or appointed official,
advocate or service provider, researcher, media member), his particular
topical interests, and similar information. Responses to the various types of
research products can then be cross-tabulated against these attributes.
A comprehensive survey of this sort was undertaken by the Urban
Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism project in 2003 and provided
valuable information. (The dissemination activities and assessment are
described in some detail in appendix E.) The response rate is worth noting.
About 19,000 individuals had signed up specifically to receive notices
and online publications from this project. In response to four rounds of
“mailing” the survey over a one-month period to 15,840 valid e-mail
addresses, 538 users, or 3.4 percent, completed the questionnaire. Low
response rates to mail surveys of this type were already noted. Such low
rates can raise questions about the representativeness and the ultimate
usefulness of the responses.
E-mail distribution list surveys have the defect of including those who
are already known to be at least receiving (if not using) an institute’s
research findings. To better measure the reach and influence of a think
tank’s research communications activities, the think tank would have to
identify and query those active in policy development on a specific issue
about the information sources they rely on. This methodology is more
demanding and much more costly, but it would produce more reliable
results.
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Another idea for senior management to consider is to hire an outsider
to look at the effectiveness of the institute’s communication program.
This person could be someone from the media, public relations, or a
university communications faculty. The outsider could do a simple
review of the communications program or do that plus an effectiveness
survey similar to those outlined above. The simple idea here is that
monitoring one’s own activities may not be very fruitful if the whole
program is weak.
Judging the effectiveness of meetings with policymakers or their
staff is very demanding. The actual decision made by the policy partici-
pant, of course, is the ultimate indicator of success or failure. But the
decisionmakers’ predisposition on an issue and various political con-
siderations often overwhelm even the most forceful and well-articulated
arguments.
All of this said, the public affairs staff could simply talk with counter-
parts at other think tanks about their experiences. While more impres-
sionistic, the information obtained is often valuable. Whatever the method
used to monitor the effectiveness of communications activities, think
tanks need such feedback if they are to avoid wasting scarce resources on
unproductive activities.
TIPS ON MAKING THE PROCESS WORK
The presentation of seven steps may give the false impression that devel-
oping a strong communications program is like baking a tasty cake: follow
the recipe and the result will be satisfying. Not true. Communications is
both science and art. Below are several points of advice that, if followed,
will dramatically enhance the step-by-step process.
Experience Matters
A novice to communications could work sedulously at following that
seven-step process and still have disappointing results. Those charged
with developing a communications strategy for the think tank and
assisting in the structuring of plans for the results of specific policy
research projects will benefit immeasurably from various kinds of
experience. These include learning from other public relations profes-
sionals and workshops, developing relationships with journalists so
the public affairs staff does not have to guess at what journalists want,
trading notes with other nonprofits working in the same area, mentoring,
and staying abreast of communications technology developments.
Senior management needs to encourage their public relations and
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communications staff to engage in these kinds of activities, and not
just sit in the office.
Make Language Clear
The importance of lucid language, or even vivid language where necessary,
was highlighted in the last section. The question is how to achieve such
a clear message. Too often the process entails the public relations person
copyediting the researcher’s product. Nearly as often this step is insuffi-
cient to transform a research report into engaging writing that appeals
to the media or public.
There are two ways to move beyond this situation, and think tanks
should carefully consider engaging in both, at least for high-visibility or
high-priority results. One is to augment the in-house communications
staff by bringing a trained journalist to “translate” the findings into clearer,
more effective format and language.
A second way to address this problem is to improve the quality of the
staff’s writing. Few researchers have a grasp of what effective communi-
cation means. If the researchers are not committed to producing writing
for nonacademic audiences or do not understand what is being asked
of them, the communications activities will be badly impaired. A proven
approach is to have workshops on good writing for the research staff. At
such workshops, the principles of effective writing are presented and the
attendees write short essays following the principles. The instructor pro-
vides feedback to the class on one or two of the essays by way of illustrat-
ing strengths and weaknesses. Sometimes the format varies, with essays
prepared between group meetings.
As strong as the need for better writing, the need for training for TV and
radio appearances is often even greater. In response to questions from
reporters or talk show hosts, researchers tend to give thoughtful but often
long statements embellished with conditionals. Such responses are deadly
in this environment. Short, concise, well-phrased statements are the coin
of the realm. Again, the researcher should clarify the two or three most
important points he or she wants to communicate in advance of the inter-
view. Saying this is easy; remembering to do it only comes with practice.
Coaching sessions—including taping and reviewing mock interviews—
can be extraordinarily productive.
Perhaps the organization’s public relations person could conduct such
writing and speaking classes, but it is often better to bring in someone
from the outside with the relevant workshop experience.
Practice shows that it may be difficult to get some of those who
most need to improve their writing to participate in such classes; in
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such cases senior management needs to encourage participation. More
generally, senior management needs to establish a “culture of effective
communication”—meaning the managers emphasize frequently the
importance of communicating results effectively to the think tank’s various
audiences. Even so, they should be prepared for only a fraction of the
staff showing genuine interest in working with the media or improving
their communications skills.
Who Works for Whom?
An essential understanding for the communications function to be
effective is that the communications staff works for the audience or
readers on behalf of the authors. If they are doing the authors’ bidding,
the communications staff are not doing their jobs. Failure to understand
this is at the heart of many differences between authors and communi-
cators. Again, it is an important task for senior management to convey the
idea that the communications specialists work for the audiences. This is
not the kind of message that is well-promulgated with a directive; rather,
management must on a case-by-case basis back the communications
staff in improving the clarity and forcefulness of the results of policy
research projects.
THINK TANK PRACTICES
What are think tanks in developing and transitional countries doing
already to communicate with policymakers and the public? Unfortunately,
the available information is limited. A quite rich data set exists on the
kinds of dissemination vehicles used—publications, personal contacts,
public media—by think tanks in Eastern Europe, along with indicator
information for a sample of think tanks in Africa. Missing, however, is
information on how these think tanks select communications vehicles
and how the vehicles are matched to the different policy environments
outlined in table 5-1. Nevertheless, the information at hand provides a
broad sense of current practices.
The presentation proceeds in three parts. The first gives the information
on dissemination practices for a sample of think tanks in four countries
in the former Soviet bloc as of 1997: Armenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Russia.9 These practices are of particular interest because the organizations
that use them were highly active in policy development. The second part
presents the information on the practices of a sample of African think
tanks. The third part shifts perspective by reviewing the expressed views
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of think tank clients in Washington, D.C., about their preferred forms of
interaction.
Practices in the Former Soviet Bloc
The survey of 37 think tanks in the four countries noted above yielded
detailed information on how researchers communicate with policymakers,
the types of publications and other documents produced, and think tanks’
work with the media, mainly to educate the public about the issues of
the day.10 Because of the way the questionnaire was structured, no infor-
mation is available on how think tank directors view the comparative
effectiveness of these various vehicles in influencing policy outcomes. That
is, the results do not say if directors think meeting with or telephoning
policymakers is more effective than distributing short, hard-hitting
memoranda in convincing policymakers of a particular position.
Communicating with Policymakers
How do think tanks in the region work with policymakers? Do think tanks
use structured opportunities, such as parliamentary committee hearings
or a formal advisory panel created by a ministry? Or are personal, informal
contacts more important? When asked about how they had access to the
policy process, think tank leaders overwhelmingly signaled that personal
contacts were the basis for their involvement. Practically speaking, only
think tank leaders in Bulgaria and Russia reported that structured
opportunities, such as participating in a parliamentary working group,
figured at all in the advice-giving process.
Publications
Every think tank in the sample spends time writing books, articles,
memoranda, training manuals, and other publications. The allocation of
effort, as measured by time professional staff spent writing publications,
varies substantially. Two-thirds of the organizations allocate 20 percent
or less of professional staff effort to writing publications, with the balance
going to research and consulting, seminars, and, in some cases, training.
Several Russian and Hungarian institutes make such writing a higher pri-
ority, devoting between 21 and 40 percent of staff time to this purpose.
At the extreme, one Armenian and one Bulgarian think tank reported
allocating 50 percent of their staff time to writing publications.
Essentially all think tanks distribute some publications free of charge;
about 37 percent distribute all publications free of charge. Others offer
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some publications by paid order or subscription. Publications are rarely
noted as a significant source of revenue for think tanks in the region.
Targeting Strategy
The strategy and level of effort, but not the influence of these activities on
policy, was recorded in the interviews conducted with think tanks. Some
of the more academic institutes mainly publish books, while organizations
more closely involved in policy practice primarily publish brief policy posi-
tion papers. Many research publications are distributed and read within
the group of think tanks and NGOs interested in the topics covered.
Over 80 percent of the think tanks had a targeting strategy for circu-
lation of their free publications. Some clear patterns emerged:
• Sixty-eight percent sent publications directly to policymakers, who
were targeted by using a mailing list of officials interested in the
topic of the publication, or distributing the publications at seminars
policymakers attend.
• About 75 percent of Hungarian and Russian think tanks in the sam-
ple reported some targeting to policymakers, while only 55 percent
of Bulgarian and 50 percent of Armenian think tanks reported this
approach.
• Several think tanks used a subscription list to target politicians.
• Several think tanks noted that the distribution and targeting of
publications produced with grant monies are governed by conditions
in grant agreements.
One Bulgarian think tank stated its strategy was to hand deliver “concise,
topical materials” to policymakers who had expressed interest in the topic.
Another singled out 30 to 40 key figures to whom it distributed memo-
randa, books, and occasional papers at no cost to the recipient.
Bulletins, Newsletters, Journals, and Policy Position Papers
The think tanks interviewed generally considered short documents the
best type of publication to reach policymakers, given their audience’s time
constraints and the wide range of information sources competing for that
time. Short, specific policy memoranda, analysis or report summaries,
journals, or bulletins were named by about two-thirds of think tanks. The
other preferred method was to publish articles in newspapers and other
periodicals. In the study year, bulletins and newsletters were produced
by 75 percent of the think tanks. Over 90 percent of Bulgaria’s think tanks
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produced a bulletin or newsletter, as did over 60 percent of the think tanks
studied in Russia and Hungary.
About 17 percent of think tanks in the sample, mostly from Hungary,
regularly publish an academic journal. Russia’s Institute of Economic
Transition, for example, makes a priority of publishing a journal up to four
times annually in both English and Russian because it reaches politicians,
economists, and the business sector with an independent analysis and
update of economic and political reform. The journal is also directed to
the public and aims to popularize economic reform ideas and the value
of a “market democracy.”
Books
Russians printed more book titles and distributed larger numbers of
them than did the other countries in the study. Ten of the eleven Russian
institutions published books, and 90 percent of these had print runs
between 1,000 and 50,000 copies, most at the lower end of the range. Over
80 percent of the Bulgarian think tanks published books in the survey year;
together, these nine organizations published 36 titles, of which more
than one-third were printed in runs of 1,000 to 5,000. Seven Hungarian
think tanks produced a total of 34 books, and five of these titles were
printed in runs of at least 1,000 copies.
The efforts of the Russians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians are striking
because none of the think tanks in the sample chose books as the best type
of publication to reach policymakers, and only four (two Bulgarian and
two Russian) institutes chose books as one of the best types of publications
to reach “interested nonexperts.” Books are expensive and slow to produce
and are more in the tradition of the academic-oriented research institutes
than of think tanks active in policy development. Nevertheless, large,
policy-active think tanks were prominent among organizations publish-
ing several book titles with long print runs.
Think tanks have continued to devote resources to publishing books
for various reasons. Simple prestige is one. Another reason is that in some
cases books may be more impressive to policymakers. For example,
EpiCenter in Russia targets books to various regions where it considers
that format significantly influential in forming public opinion. It has also
attracted private sponsors to publish a series of books. One more reason
for publishing books, especially when the topics treated are not a high
policy priority at the moment, is that the longer format permits fuller
development of a position and presentation of the supporting evidence.
Such treatment can frame the discussion of the issue when policymakers
eventually address it.
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Educating the Public
The study measured activity by levels and type of media events reported
by think tank leaders. Nearly all think tanks said that educating the public
on the issues of the day was a main objective and that they used the mass
media in their efforts. Only four organizations, one in each study country,
reported very little press contact or other outreach to the public. The inter-
views do not shed light on why these organizations adopted such a policy,
or indeed whether it was an official policy at all. But the vast majority of
think tanks were actively trying to reach the public (see table 5-4). Events
include press conferences, press releases, work with individual reporters
to get stories published, short public service announcements, and appear-
ances on TV and radio talk shows. Two impressions emerge from the
interview data. The first was that think tanks on average work diligently
to feed stories to the media and participate on TV and radio shows, but
the variance among organizations is very large, for both the number of
events and the type of event favored.
A strikingly lower rate of press activity among the Armenian think tanks
was observed. The reason appeared more a case of limited supply of
media opportunities—both print and electronic—than reticence on the
part of think tanks to participate. Newspapers are few in number and
circulation figures are low. Television is controlled by the government,
except one channel with limited programming, and these stations do
not invite diverse viewpoints.11
A second pattern highlighted was that press conferences are used fairly
infrequently. Only a half-dozen of the think tanks reported holding as
many as eight such events a year. One reason is that the events can be
expensive. If the institution does not have suitable space itself, a forum
must be rented. Frequently, the major media outlets expect to be paid
for carrying programming that would be aired at a press conference of
this type. In some instances, the host organization must also provide
high-quality refreshments to put the press in the right frame of mind.
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Table 5-4 Median Number of Media Events by Think Tanks in 
Eastern Europe, by Country
Type of event Armenia Bulgaria Hungary Russia
Press conferences 2 4 2–3 4
Press release or work with reporters 6 25 30 30
Audio or visual public service announcements 0 1 0 8–10
Appearance on TV or radio program 4 10 15–20 5
Source: Struyk (1999), table 4.3.
Expense aside, holding a press conference usually requires the host insti-
tution to have a substantial story to convey, one complete with hard figures
and a compelling policy conclusion. This substantive deterrent may be
more important than the financial one.
By far the most consistently popular vehicles for the think tanks studied
were press releases or stories in the press and appearances on radio or
TV programs. The median numbers in these categories are certainly
impressive. In both categories, distributions around the medians are wide.
The most active think tanks churned out an impressive volume of articles
and press releases in a year, including the following:
• Economics 2000 (Bulgaria), 45 to 60 articles
• European Information Correspondents Center (Bulgaria), 300+
articles and press releases
• Financial Research, Ltd. (Hungary), 150 to 200 articles and press
releases
• Reforma (Russia), 600+ articles and press releases
The numbers of radio and TV appearances were lower but still indi-
cated a very high level of exposure for the principals of many think tanks.
In considering these figures, keep in mind that, according to informed
local sources, most of these articles and verbal presentations were opin-
ion pieces. In most cases, the results of careful research projects were not
showcased. If original research results were required for every media
appearance, leaders of these institutions would not be able to contribute
to public commentary so often.
An intriguing question is how much work think tanks put into getting
their messages across to the public. One indicator of the level of effort is
the number of staff working on external relations. Each think tank leader
interviewed was asked if the organization had designated someone to
spend at least half their time on public relations and, if so, the number of
full-time-equivalent staff formally involved in these activities. Responses
to the question probably underestimated the resources going to these tasks
because many small organizations cannot afford to designate someone
to specialize in public affairs. When everyone pitches in, expect less pro-
fessionalism in getting the task done and less impact.
Eleven think tanks, about 30 percent of those in the database, had des-
ignated at least a part-time external relations person. Interestingly, 7 of the
11 are Russian. With 2 exceptions, the 11 with a designated external rela-
tions person were among the larger organizations, ranging in size from
12 to 60 full-time professionals. The other 2 had 4 professional staff each.
But more than the size of organization and the volume of media events
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determines success. A scan of the media activity of those with and without
an external relations person suggested that organizations that had taken
this step are more creative. A striking example was in Armenia, where the
Armenian Center for National and International Studies had two external
relations people. Its media program was much more comprehensive and
aggressive than those of the other three think tanks in the country sample.
Such differences may not have resulted solely from staffing, but the very
presence of professional public relations people reflects the importance
the organization’s leadership places on reaching the public.
In summary, in the picture portrayed by think tank leaders, their orga-
nizations were highly active in publishing their results, often in ways tai-
lored to reach the busy policymaker. Similarly, most organizations worked
actively with the media to educate the public on the important issues and
to gain institutional recognition. Yet there were also pervasive questions
about the effectiveness of many media events, where think tank staff were
just playing the role of the bright commentator and not a technical expert.
On the surface, at least, the variance across think tanks in their public
education activities is substantially larger than in their work directly with
policymakers. More broadly, the study noted that the great majority of
think tanks did not appear to have a communications strategy.
Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa
In 1998, Johnson (2000) surveyed and interviewed leaders of 24 leading
think tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa on several topics, including their
communications with policymakers and their interactions with the media.
(Most data are for 1997.) Examining how these researchers communicated
with policymakers, Johnson asked respondents to rate their preference
for a particular way to present their views to policymakers, using a scale
of 1 to 8 to rate each of eight options (the most preferred method is
rated 1). As table 5-5 shows, policy memos and public conferences are
rated higher than formal or informal meetings with policymakers. This
appears to be a distinct difference from the results for the former Soviet
bloc, though the findings of the two studies are not comparable. In any
case, it certainly emphasizes the importance of concise memos in the
policy arena in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Johnson also reports some interesting statistics for interactions with
the media. In particular, he found the following:
• Press releases: 69 percent (11 of 16 respondents) issued press releases
in 1997, with the average being 7.5 press releases and the highest
number being 10.
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• Press conferences: 60 percent (9 of 15) convened press conferences,
with the average number being 4 and the highest number being 6.
In Johnson’s view, the percentage of think tanks issuing press releases
is strikingly low, given the centrality of communicating with the public
a think tank’s mission.
Johnson also found that 60 percent of these institutions had at least
one full-time person assigned to communicate with the media. This is a
distinctly higher rate than the 30 percent for think tanks in the former
Soviet bloc.
CLIENT VIEWS
Washington, D.C., is doubtless the think tank capital of the world, as
the host to well over 100 such organizations. These institutions compete
fiercely with each other for policymakers’ attention. With so many differ-
ent approaches to garnering this attention and so many direct and indirect
policy clients participating, Washington’s policymakers are a knowledge-
able group to ask about their preferences in obtaining information from
think tanks.
Box 5-6 summarizes the findings of a survey conducted in Washington
in 2005 by Jeff Hayes (2005). The respondents were those who had signed
up on think tank e-mail distribution lists for information or attended an
event at a think thank. An impressive 809 people filled in the e-mailed
questionnaires.
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Table 5-5 Methods Used by Think Tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa to
Communicate with Policymakers
Method Scorea
Policy memos 2.1
Public conferences 2.5
Formal meetings (with policymakers) 3.0
Informal conversations (with policymakers) 3.1
Policy issue papers 3.2
Issue briefings 3.6
Parliamentary hearings 4.3
Draft laws and white papers 5.2
Source: Johnson (2000), 469.
a Respondents rated the importance of each method on a scale from 1 to 8, with 1 the most
preferred method.
It almost goes without saying that these results will not necessary apply
outside of Washington. But the findings are broadly consistent with other
information presented in this chapter for a range of locations. Striking
is the important of the perceived quality of a think tank’s scholarship—
suggesting that organizations with reputations for stressing opinion over
evidence-based conclusions will lose out in the struggle for influence.
The preference for panel discussions is notable, as is the preference for
documents long enough to give a full presentation of facts rather than a
very short summary.
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The Quality of a Think Tank’s Scholarship Is Vital
The quality of scholarship contributes most to how individuals view think
tanks—56 percent of respondents said it is most important to their per-
ceptions. Twenty-two percent cited the think tank’s partisan or ideological
agenda, while 18 percent cited the think tank’s impact on public policy.
The Vast Majority Uses the Web or E-Mail to Interact with Think Tanks
Ninety-two percent of respondents say that they interact with think 
tanks through the institutions’ web sites and by receiving e-mail alerts.
Media interviews are also an important source of information, with 
76 percent saying they saw, read about, or heard think tank scholars 
through media interviews.
The web is also the preferred method of interaction with think tanks.
Forty-seven and 44 percent, respectively, said they prefer interacting with
think tanks by visiting web sites or receiving e-mail alerts. Forty percent
would prefer to attend an event hosted or sponsored by a think tank.
Panel Discussions Are Popular
When asked to select two preferred method for in-person contacts with think
tanks, 64 percent said panel discussions were their preferred approach. The
next most popular approaches were lunch and dinner events (39 percent)
and visits from a think tank scholar (25 percent).
When It Comes to Written Materials, Short (But Not Too Short) Is Best
When asked to choose their favorite format for written research studies, 
46 percent of respondents said they preferred policy papers that were 10 to
20 pages long. Thirty-five percent preferred policy briefs that were three to
five pages long, and less than 10 percent selected books, two-page talking
points, or brief emails.
Source: Hayes (2005).
Box 5-6 How Washington Policy Clients See Think Tanks and
Prefer to Receive Policy Information
ORGANIZING THE COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTION
This section briefly considers the who, where, and when of organizing the
communications function within a think tank. Because think tanks differ
so widely in their size, focus, mission, funding, and internal structure, it
is extremely difficult to define a concrete structure that will be of use to
more than a small fraction of all think tanks. Therefore, the following
sets out some general propositions that each think tank can adapt to its
specific situation.
Who and Where
This section addresses the two closely related questions of who should be
involved in developing a communications plan for disseminating findings
from a particular policy research project and where the responsibility for
the development and execution of the overall communications strategy as
well as communications plans should be located within the organization.
For where, the high importance of this function and the fact that
communications plans are needed by all divisions that are conducting
policy research argue strongly for a centralized overall communications
function. In most large Western think tanks, there is a separate office for
communications that typically is responsible for both public relations
and publications. Placing publications and public relations under the
same manager aims to foster coordination between the two types of
activities. The director of this office usually reports directly to the insti-
tute’s president.
In smaller think tanks where such specialization is not possible, the
communications function could be shared by senior management and the
public relations officer, if there is one. This team would usually decide on
the organization’s broad strategy: the level of the institute’s own resources
to devote to communications, the broad priorities in the area, and a gen-
eral plan—that is, which communications platforms are preferred because
they have been found effective in the past. The general strategy may well
be a topic for discussion with the board of trustees. Regardless of the size of
the organization and its “communications department,” someone should
be designated as having primary responsibility for the communications
function.
In developing a communications plan for the findings of a given policy
research project, the public relations officer, the principal researcher, the
director of the division in which the project is located, and a member of
senior management should participate. As team they should go through
the seven steps outlined above. The public relations person can cost out
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different mixes and levels of activities for the team. One should expect
the whole process to take two or three meetings. This may seem like a
large investment but it can ultimately result in major savings in com-
munications costs because the researchers can prepare their reports and
other products for clients knowing how they relate to the products that
will be used in the broader communication of results.
When
The team designing the communications plan should meet near the
beginning of a project. Some sponsors, particularly foundations, require
a dissemination plan as part of a proposal or work plan for a new project.
In such cases, the team should convene to prepare this section of the pro-
posal or work plan. In any case, as sketched above, the seven-step process
should guide the preparation of the plan.
Near the end of the project, the same people should meet again to
review the plan in light of developments that may have occurred while
the research was conducted. If there are significant changes to take into
account, most likely the topic of analysis rising or falling on the country’s
policy agenda, this is the time to adjust the strategy. The likelihood of
adjustments being appropriate increases sharply as the research period
extends beyond six months.
N O T E S
The author thanks Kathleen Courrier, vice president for communications at
the Urban Institute, for excellent comments on a draft of this chapter.
1. On the general process of policy development see, for example, Dolowitz
and Marsh (1996), Feulner (1985), and Kingdon (1984). Specifically for channel-
ing research findings to policymakers, see, for example, Bardach (1984), Corwin
and Louis (1982), Garrett and Islam (1998), Lomas (1993), Rich (2001), Saywell
and Cotton (1999), and Stone, Maxwell, and Keating (2001). For channeling
research findings to program administrators, see, for example, Huberman (1994),
Platt (1987), and Stapleton (1983).
2. Saywell and Cotton (1999) and Lomas (1993) comment on the importance
of such intermediaries in the policy development process. Stone (2000) specifically
addresses the role of think tanks in this process.
3. The results of the office assessments are presented in Richman and Struyk
(2002).
4. Likewise, Huberman (1994) stresses the importance of researchers finding
the right vehicle to reach frontline administrators (or in this case, teachers) to
act upon research findings.
5. Greenberg and colleagues (2003, 47) refer to this information gathering
as “inventory creation.”
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6. This formulation is consistent with the “knowledge utilization school” that
views knowledge as cumulative. Accumulated research findings over an extended
period change decisionmakers’ views of both the causes of problems and the
utility of alternative policy interventions. See, for example, Sundquist (1978).
7. This section draws heavily on Kotler (2000), chapter 18. The presentation
there uses an eight-point sequence that is modified here to better correspond to
the requirements of think tanks.
8. See Kotler (2000), 559.
9. The names of these think tanks are listed in appendix F.
10. This section draws heavily on Struyk (1999).
11. Press freedoms were rated as restricted in the country in the Freedom
House state-of-democracy report at this time. See Karatnycky, Motyl, and Shor
(1997), 45.
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Getting the Most
from Your Board
6
The key managerial actors in think tanks are the board of trustees orboard of directors, the president, a management council if one exists,
and the research team leaders. A board of trustees or directors can be an
extraordinarily valuable asset to a private public-policy research institu-
tion. Unfortunately, this promise is seldom met. Such failures can result
from such factors as ill-defined roles for the boards, mismatch between its
talents and the assignments it receives, and the president’s failure to work
creatively with the board to get the most from members’ participation in
institutional affairs.
In addition, board productivity can be impaired if the responsibilities
for principal managerial decisions are misallocated among the board, the
senior executive, and the management council. Key decisions include
setting the institution’s agenda, setting staff compensation, and deter-
mining how to structure the institution’s research operations. In many
countries the formal distribution of responsibilities is heavily conditioned
by laws that mandate particular organizational structures for nonprofit
organizations. But even in these situations, boards are often free to provide
advice on a range of issues informally, thus improving organizational
effectiveness.
This chapter discusses the structure and potential contributions of
boards of trustees or directors (hereafter referred to simply as boards).
The presentation is addressed to the president or executive director
(hereafter, the president) of think tanks, and outlines methods a presi-
dent can use to work most effectively with and benefit the most from the
institution’s board. The president’s principal objective in such dealings
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should be to have the board spend its time advising on key issues in the
think tank’s development.
The discussion begins with the definition of a board and alternative
governance-management models used by think tanks. Then the major
tasks all boards should execute are outlined and the reasons many boards
waste time and energy during their meetings are explored. The next section
covers ways to focus the board’s work and balance the distribution of
responsibilities between the board and the president. After that, opera-
tional issues concerning the form and content of board meetings are
addressed. The penultimate section discusses the important business of
recruiting new members for the board and the neglected task of orienting
new board members to their tasks. The chapter closes with some ideas
for assessing a board’s effectiveness.
Much of the presentation concerns the interactions of presidents and
the boards of comparatively mature organizations—that is, those 10 or
more years old that have been a “second-stage” think tank for several years
and have low turnover rates for the president and board. The organiza-
tion’s maturity and stability are critical because they bear fundamentally
on how much authority a board will feel it can confidently delegate to the
president. The more mature and stable an institution, the more the board
can concentrate on “big picture” questions and leave management to the
president.
The contents of these guidelines come from three sources: the author’s
experience as a board member,1 interviews with senior leaders of 10 third-
stage think tanks,2 and a review of recent books on enhancing board
productivity.3
FIRST PRINCIPLES
The supreme authority for think tanks is either a board of trustees or a
board of directors—exact terms depend on the law and practice of each
country. (Here board means the governing board, the body with the
ultimate corporate responsibility.) The duties of the board are clearly
stated in the national law governing the formation of nonprofit organi-
zations.4 At their heart, these duties can be reduced to two: maintaining
accountability and safeguarding the public’s trust. Responsibility for
accountability means ensuring that the organization’s resources are
properly spent—not wasted on excessively expensive offices, travel, and
salaries or lost through graft. Think tanks must also maintain the public
trust. In most countries, all nonprofits are accorded certain legal advan-
tages, especially tax advantages, compared with for-profit entities. In
exchange, think tanks are expected to contribute to the public good. For
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instance, think tanks should do work that improves decisionmaking and
educates the public on the principal policy issues of the day. The board’s
task is to ensure the think tank works toward these goals.
Organizational Options
Many think tanks have two kinds of boards: a management board or com-
mittee, and a board of directors or trustees. The management board should
have day-to-day responsibilities for operational issues. The board of direc-
tors or trustees, on the other hand, gets more involved in strategy and has
the ultimate fiduciary responsibility. This is the standard model.
However, there are variations. In some countries, the founders of the
organization constitute the equivalent of a board. In such cases, think tanks
sometimes form an advisory board of thoughtful and prestigious indi-
viduals who provide the kind of guidance that a board typically gives.
Advisory boards do not have fiduciary responsibility, however, so gen-
erally they will not be concerned with the institution’s audit and related
questions. The balance of the discussion assumes that the standard
model is followed.
Dimensions of the Board’s Role
Three aspects of the board’s role can be distinguished: legal, functional, and
symbolic.5 The laws that govern the creation of think tanks mandate boards
to supervise compliance with certain requirements. Some (e.g., the board
meets at least once a year) are fairly routine, but two requirements are
more fundamental: the board is responsible for the organization’s fiscal
integrity and for ensuring that the organization stay true to its mission
(i.e., the purpose for which it was created).
Functional responsibilities of the board vary greatly from think tank
to think tank. Indeed, as discussed below, the greatest problem for boards
is that their primary tasks are not clearly defined. A typical list of respon-
sibilities includes ensuring that the organization is realizing its mission
effectively, hiring the president, evaluating the president’s performance,
understanding the organization’s financial performance, and assisting with
fund-raising. But many boards find themselves ensnared in operational
details, including having to determine what telephone or computing sys-
tem to purchase, or how to establish salary ranges for different positions—
tasks best left to management. Often attention to such details comes
at the expense of time to give advice and determine the institution’s
main directions.
The symbolic dimension of the board’s work is critical. Board members
lend the think tank prestige by associating with it and become part of its
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public image. The list of names on the organization’s letterhead and in
its printed materials tells a story about the organization’s values and
strength.
Board members have a significant advantage over the president and
other staff in representing the organization, by carrying an organization’s
message and expanding its circle of influence. Board members are perceived
as having little to gain from promulgating a think tank’s good name and,
hence, have prima facie credibility. Board members can play this ambas-
sadorial role to advance policy positions or raise funds. A key task for the
institution’s president is to figure out how to motivate board members
to take on these active roles.
COMMON BOARD PROBLEMS
Books on creating effective boards are replete with examples of ineffective-
ness, wasted time, and lost opportunities. The author’s conversations with
think tank presidents about the utility of their institution’s boards have
also exposed some frustration with presidents’ inability to get more from
boards made up of creative, dynamic, and successful individuals.
Certain common practices of the board and the structure of board
meetings can drain its effectiveness. Carver (1997, 9–10) gives some good
examples:
• Time spent on the trivial. Items of trivial scope or importance
receive disproportionate attention.
• Short-term bias. The board concentrates on day-to-day items that
could be handled by the staff rather than issues that may have much
greater consequences for the organization.
• Reactive stance. The board responds to staff initiatives and infor-
mation rather than asserts leadership (e.g., indicating topics for the
meeting’s agenda).
• Reviewing, rehashing, redoing. The boards spends too much time
reviewing what staff has already done; this should be a management
function.
• Leaky accountability. Board members “go around” the president to
assign tasks to staff members, making it hard to hold the president
responsible for results.
• Diffuse authority. The specific responsibilities of the president and
board are not well defined, frustrating accountability.
Because the president drafts the agenda for board meetings and decides
how much background material to provide to members and when to
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distribute it, he or she has the potential to make the board much more
effective. But how to move a board in this direction?
FOCUSING THE BOARD
Consultants who work with boards to increase their effectiveness uni-
versally decry the kinds of problems just listed as a clear waste of board
members’ expertise and experience. Consultants look for ways to promote
the idea of focusing the board’s energy and intellectual resources on the key
tasks of the organization and on long-term planning. In other words, the
board of a think tank should concentrate on how well the organization
is fulfilling its primary missions of conducting high-quality policy
research, influencing policy, and informing policy debates. As to long-run
planning, the critical issues are the country’s emerging policy agenda and
potential sources of support for the institute’s work. The board’s advice
should deal primarily with these matters. Of course, not all board members
are equally qualified to proffer advice on these topics, and the president
must guide discussions skillfully to get the most from the board.
The president and the board should agree on the board’s responsibility
for providing management advice. As needed, the board can request
information and intervene in management issues. Requests for more
information are likely to arise from open discussion of principal issues,
which will be addressed later. But this should be the exception rather
than the rule.
To move a board in this direction, the starting point is to craft a clear
statement of the organization’s mission. Box 6-1 gives an example of such
a statement. It is quite general; once the board accepts it, a set of indicators
to measure the think tank’s performance would have to be added. For
example, indicators related to the “conduct of policy research at a high
professional standard” could include placing a certain number of articles
by staff in refereed journals and having a certain number of books pub-
lished by respected presses.
Convincing the board that its primary task is to work on the big-picture
issues of the think tank’s central missions is only half the battle. The other
half is establishing a clear understanding between the president and the
board about their respective management responsibilities. The following
is an illustrative list of management topics that often siphon attention from
more important issues and should not be a major focus of presidents or
boards (Carver 1997, 75–76).
• Personnel: making decisions about job design, hiring, firing, promo-
tion, discipline.
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• Compensation: dealing with issues involving salary ranges, grades,
adjustments, incentives, benefits (the exception is the president’s
salary, which the board should determine).
• Supply: making decisions about purchasing, bidding authorization,
storage, inventories, salvage.
• Accounting: addressing questions of forecasting, budgeting, depos-
itories, controls, investments, retrenchment.
• Facilities: determining space allocation and requirements, rentals,
upkeep, refurbishment.
• Risk management: dealing with insurance, exposures, protective
maintenance, and disclaimers.
• Reporting: ensuring grant reports, tax reporting, law and regulation
compliance.
• Communications: developing policies affecting telephone systems,
meetings, postings, mail distribution.
• Management methods: dealing with goal-setting, staffing patterns,
team definitions, feedback loops, planning techniques, control
methods, participation levels.
Clearly, if a board wades into many of these areas, it will spend most of
its time immersed—if not drowning—in details. Still, as noted, the board
of a young organization will need to pay more attention to these manage-
rial issues than will the board of a more mature organization with proven
systems in place. Similarly, the longer a board and its president have
worked together, the less time the board needs to spend on such items.
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The Institute for Policy Studies will focus its activities to
• conduct policy research, program evaluations, and pilot projects at a high
professional standard, with the objective of contributing the results of this
work to the development of public policy.
• effectively communicate the results of this work to policymakers and other
interested parties, including nongovernmental organizations, political par-
ties, and the public, in ways designed to influence the development of policy
positively.
• conduct seminars, workshops, and courses to contribute to the professional
development of public officials, teachers, and researchers and analysts in
the area of public policy design, implementation, and training.
Box 6-1 Example of a Board of Directors’s Mission Statement 
for a Think Tank
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Regardless of how much responsibility the board delegates to the pres-
ident and his or her management team for such tasks, the responsibilities
delegated to the president need to stated explicitly. The intent of codified
Executive Limitations is twofold. First, the Limitations prohibit staff prac-
tices that the board regards as unethical or too risky. Second, in organi-
zations where full trust has not been established between the president
and the board, such Limitations give the president additional guidance
on how to execute certain management duties. The board and president
both need to understand who is responsible for what. The board is
responsible for periodically checking that management is complying
with the rules set forth in the Executive Limitations.
Box 6-2 provides an example of two key statements regulating the rela-
tions between the board and the president. The “Delegation to the
President” outlines the president’s powers and responsibilities, and the
“Communication and Support to the Board” informs the president of
his obligations to the board.
The “Delegation to the President” ties the delegation of responsi-
bilities to the board-approved mission statement and the Executive
Limitations. The statement makes it clear that Executive Limitations can
change to shift the allocation of responsibilities between the board and
the president. It protects the president from unreasonable requests for
information from individual board members. It also makes it clear that
the president need only follow decisions of the whole board, not those of
individual members or even committees. The statement is crystal clear
on the president’s operational authority.
The statement on “Communication and Support to the Board”
requires the president to provide certain information to the board. This
includes the information needed to assess the think tank’s progress toward
its primary goals and information on any circumstantial changes that
could affect the organization’s reputation or financial health.
These two statements establish the general rules, but they need to be
supported by guidance from the board on the parameters of the pres-
ident’s vested authority. Box 6-3 gives examples of such statements
for financial, asset, and staff management. For example, the president
has authority to commit the organization to contracts and grants up
to $50,000. Beyond this limit, the president must seek board approval.6
Similarly, the president has wide authority in the personnel area, but
decisions on compensation and promotion must be objective and
defensible.
The critical point is that the statements of Executive Limitations define
the operating domain of the president versus the domain retained by
Delegation to the President
All board authority delegated to the staff is delegated through the president.
Therefore, all authority and accountability of staff—as far as the board is
concerned—is considered the authority and accountability of the president.
As long as the president uses any reasonable interpretation of the board-
approved mission statement for the organization and Executive Limitations
policies, the president is authorized to establish all further policies, make all
decisions, take all actions, establish all practices, and develop all activities.
• The board may change its mission statement and Executive Limitations poli-
cies, thereby shifting the boundary between the board’s and the president’s
domains. By doing so, the board changes the latitude given to the president.
So long as any particular delegation is in place, the board will respect and
support the president’s choices.
• Only decisions of the board acting as a body are binding on the president.
• Decisions or instructions of individual board members, officers, or com-
mittees are not binding on the president, except in rare circumstances
when the board has specifically authorized such exercise of authority.
• In the case of board members or committees requesting information or
assistance without board authorization, the president can refuse such
requests that are disruptive or require—in the president’s judgment—
a material amount of staff time or funds.
Communication and Support to the Board
With respect to providing information and counsel to the board, the president
may not permit the board to be uninformed. Accordingly, he or she may not
• neglect to submit monitoring information required by the board in a
timely, accurate, and understandable fashion.
• let the board be unaware of relevant trends, anticipated negative media
coverage, and material external and internal changes, particularly changes
in assumptions on which previous board policies were based.
• fail to advise the board if, in the president’s opinion, the board is not in
compliance with its own policies.
• fail to marshal for the board as many staff and external points of view,
issues, and options as needed for making fully informed board choices.
• fail to meet with the board as a whole except when (a) fulfilling individual
requests for information or (b) responding to officers or committees duly
charged by the board.
• fail to report an actual or anticipated noncompliance with any policy of the
board in a timely manner.
Source: Author’s edits to material from Carver (1997), chapter 5.
Box 6-2 Examples of a “Delegation to the President” and a
“Communication and Support to the Board” 
Statement Issued by a Board
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Finance Management
With respect to operating in a sound and prudent fiscal manner, the presi-
dent may not jeopardize the long-term financial strength of the institute.
Accordingly, he or she may not
• cause the institute to incur indebtedness other than short-term loans for
routine expenses.
• use advances from the cash reserve fund other than for ordinary operating
expenses.
• use restricted contributions for any purpose other than that required by
the contribution.
• settle payroll and debts in other than a timely manner.
• allow expenditures to deviate materially from board-stated priorities.
• allow the cash reserve fund to fall below 6 percent of operating expenses.
• sign contract or grant agreements with a value exceeding $50,000 without
the explicit approval of the board.
Asset Protection
The president shall not allow assets to be unprotected, inadequately main-
tained, or unnecessarily risked. Accordingly, the president shall not
• fail to insure against theft and casualty losses to at least 80 percent of
replacement value and against liability losses of board members, staff, or
the organization itself in an amount greater than the average for similar
organizations.
• allow uninsured personnel to handle funds.
• subject plant and equipment to improper wear and tear or insufficient
maintenance.
• unnecessarily expose the organization to claims of liability.
• make any purchase or commit the organization to any expenditure of greater
than $25,000. Make any purchase (a) wherein normally prudent protection
has not been given against conflict of interest; (b) over $1,500 without hav-
ing obtained comparative prices and quality.
• fail to protect intellectual property, information, and files from loss or signifi-
cant damage or unauthorized duplication.
• receive, process, or disburse funds under controls that are insufficient to
meet board-appointed auditor standards.
• invest or hold operating capital in insecure investments.
Box 6-3 Examples of Executive Limitations Issued by a Board 
to the President
(continued)
the board. There is no reason for the board to enter the president’s sphere,
especially at the expense of its bigger-picture responsibilities. The
board’s task is to periodically satisfy itself that the rules it has set forth
are being followed. (In the financial and asset protection areas, the annual
audit would probably provide most of the necessary information.)
Naturally, the president can seek the board’s advice on matters squarely
within his or her jurisdiction, and many presidents routinely do so. As
long as such interchanges are infrequent and informal, they can build
support and confidence.
Adoption of a clearly articulated mission statement with corresponding
indicators of accomplishment and Executive Limitations helps focus the
board’s work on strategic issues. (Organization performance indicators are
presented in chapter 10. The president could propose a set of indicators
to the board, and, once a set is agreed upon, provide this information
regularly.) Playing to the board’s strengths this way makes membership
a satisfying experience.
THE BOARD MEETING
Obviously, a think tank’s president must prepare carefully for each meet-
ing of the board. Two critical tasks must be conducted before the meeting
itself: setting the agenda and distributing materials for the meeting to
board members.
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Staff Treatment
The president may not cause or allow conditions that are inhumane, unfair,
or undignified. Accordingly, he or she may not
• discriminate among employees in payment, assignments, or promotion
except for reasons that are clearly job-related and have to do with 
individual performance or qualifications.
• fail to take reasonable steps to protect staff from unsafe or unhealthy 
conditions.
• withhold from staff a due-process grievance procedure, which should be
able to be used without bias.
• fail to acquaint staff with their rights under this policy.
Source: Author’s edits to material from Carver (1997), chapter 5.
Box 6-3 (Continued )
Setting the Agenda
The agenda should drive the board meeting. Consequently, the items on
it should be thoughtfully considered. A few pointers about formulating
the agenda:
• The president usually drafts the agenda, but the chairman of the board
should review it before it is distributed to the rest of the board.
• Discussion at the meeting should be reserved for important points.
Confine points to those that concern the organization’s principal
tasks—both reporting on accomplishments and considering future
activities—and those dealing with the organization’s financial
soundness.
• Whenever possible, information on management matters should
be provided to the board in the materials sent out before the meeting
instead of placed as items on the agenda. A board member can ask
about these “information items,” but they should be clearly rele-
gated to a secondary position.
• The agenda should indicate what action the president wants from the
board on each item—be it information, advice, or a decision.
• Dinner meetings the night before board meetings can create the
dynamic the board needs to do its job. Informal social occasions
are reportedly popular with board members, most likely because
they permit networking (Shultz 2001, 205).
Box 6-4 presents a typical agenda for a meeting of a think tank’s
board of trustees. The first of the three main sections is the report of the
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Call to order
Approve minutes of prior meeting
Executive committee report
• Financial audit results
• Discussion of candidates for board membership
• Report on administrative matters
President’s report
• State of the institution
• Issues on which advice is sought
Presentations by senior researchers
Box 6-4 Typical Agenda for a Meeting of a Think Tank’s 
Board of Directors
executive committee. At this meeting, the initial section includes dis-
cussion of the annual audit report, a topic that must be considered by the
full board as well as by the committee. The committee will also report on
any administrative issues on which the president has sought guidance or
a decision.
The second section is devoted to the president’s report on the insti-
tution’s performance in key areas. The information provided should
cover at least the indicators of performance agreed upon earlier with the
board. The president should also use this opportunity to inform the
board about important developments that may affect the organization’s
financial well-being or influence on policymaking—the so-called “envi-
ronmental scan.”
For example, the election of a new government often has important
implications for a think tank. The think tank may have received important
contracts from a ministry under the prior government, and the change
could diminish the chances of obtaining future work. Equally important,
the changing of the guard may increase or decrease the senior staff’s access
to key decisionmakers. Similarly, whenever a major donor or an important
source of work for the organization, such as the World Bank, announces a
change in its program’s direction, it should be on this part of the meeting
agenda. Other items might include the announcement of a government
austerity program that will likely mean deep cuts in ministry budgets for
research and program evaluation, or a major competitor’s decision to
challenge the think tank on ground where the organization had long
enjoyed a clear advantage.
This information should serve as the basis for discussion about possible
adjustments to the organization’s plans.
This is also the place in the agenda for the president to seek guidance
if necessary on sensitive issues. One such issue is the balance between
“opportunism” around policy or funding opportunities and “keeping to
the core mission.” When is a project too far outside the core work program
and mission? Certainly a number of opportunities for consulting work,
instead of policy research, fall into this category (see chapter 7). Every
think tank struggles from time to time with the issue of maintaining its
independence—both actual and publicly perceived. National elections
often bring this issue to the fore when the organization considers help-
ing one or another political parties.7 But other times, such as when the
organization does a large volume of work for a particular ministry, could
raise questions about whether the staff have become too friendly with
ministry leaders and the organization too dependent on the funding. An
open and frank discussion of these issues can be extremely helpful to the
president.
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The final section of the agenda allows two or three senior researchers
to present timely or important projects to the board. Normally, these
are crisp—no more than 15 minutes—and well-rehearsed presentations
that inform the board of the organization’s ongoing work.8 A good rule
of thumb is to allow as much time for discussion by the board as for the
presentation itself; board members are senior people used to com-
manding attention and expressing their views. The president should
select the presentation topics partly to capture the board’s interest and
partly to give board members information they can use in discussions
with policymakers.
Distributing Materials before the Meeting
Any materials that management sends to the board should be designed
to make the upcoming meeting efficient and productive. Before each
meeting, the board should receive background information on substantive
agenda issues and information on procedural matters of legal or admin-
istrative importance (Charan 1998, 116). The materials should be carefully
selected and concise. Sending out too much or poorly prepared materials
will defeat the purpose of providing information in advance, because busy
board members will not read them (Shultz 2001, chapter 9). Formats and
presentations should be kept simple and inviting.
Box 6-5 is the table of contents for the materials sent to members of
the Urban Institute’s board of trustees before its spring 2001 meeting. No
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1. Agendas for the executive committee meeting and full board meeting
2. Minutes of previous board meeting
3. Financial statements
4. Board membership report
5. Endowment report
6. Funding report
7. Expenditures report
8. Communications report [Urban Institute in the media, publications, etc.]
9. Personnel report
10. Ongoing projects and submitted proposals [annotated list]
11. Information about trustees
12. 2001–2002 meeting schedule
13. Biographies of participating staff
Box 6-5 Materials Sent to Members of the Urban Institute’s 
Board of Trustees before a Meeting
more than about half an hour would be needed to review the materials.
Many of these materials are provided only for the board’s information
and involve topics that will not be discussed at the board meeting unless
a member raises a question. These include, for example, the reports on
personnel and communications and the annotated list of ongoing pro-
jects and outstanding proposals.
Even though these items are not on the agenda, the board needs to have
this background information. Consider the list of ongoing projects. If the
board has delegated to the president the authority to decide which
awards to accept, the list helps the board stay abreast of the institution’s
work. A board member reviewing the list might see a project on a topic
that he had thought was outside the work program as discussed with the
board or a project for a client about whom the member has some con-
cern. The list affords the member the chance to be raise a question.
Using the Board
As stated, the president has enormous discretion about what comes
before the board. The president always has significantly more information
than even the most well-informed board chairman. This advantage can
be used positively or negatively. Think tank presidents are well-advised
to treat their boards as a resource and to be quite open with them. After
all, the individuals on the board were selected so they could contribute
sound advice to the organization, particularly to the president. As Robinson
points out, “The key to a successful relationship between the board and
the executive director is the care with which the director helps the board
be a good partner. In the unique calculus of the nonprofit sector, a stronger
board does not automatically come at the expense of the executive direc-
tor’s authority or autonomy” (2001, 113).
That said, the president should carefully select the topics presented to
the board. As noted earlier, the president needs to be clear whether he or
she is providing information, seeking advice, or seeking a decision on each
item. It is extremely important that the board’s task be made clear before
discussion of any item. Which issues are presented should depend partly
on the board’s capabilities and limitations. Over time, the president will
recognize both and be able to adjust the agenda accordingly.
At the Meeting
The most important part of the meeting—and the biggest block of time—
is devoted to the institution’s performance in its research and policy
endeavors and its plans and strategy for the future. For boards that meet
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once or twice a year, this must be the main topic. For those meeting more
frequently, these two items should still dominate the meeting unless a
dramatic development between the semiannual meetings calls for con-
sultation. At least once a year, the board should evaluate the institution’s
performance, principally in terms of the indicators agreed on with the pres-
ident. It is the president’s task to provide clear information on those indi-
cators for the board’s use.
The president’s report on accomplishments, difficulties, and future
prospects should be designed to elicit board members’ thoughtful com-
mentary and an exchange of views. Not all members are equally equipped
to discuss the “idea industry,” but all were selected because they could
contribute meaningfully to the oversight of the institution. The task of
the president and board chairman is to get the most out of the board.
One important question related to an institution’s strategy for the
future is defining projects to be undertaken over the next year or two.
The experience of the 10 “third-stage” think tanks listed in chapter 1 in
determining their work program offers a good starting point because they
have been in the business a long time and have fine-tuned the process of
setting the research agenda (Struyk 1993, 45–46). Perhaps surprisingly,
the agendas of most of these institutes are defined rather informally.
Typically, the process is guided by senior management, who consult team
leaders or senior researchers on the work they want to do. The president
sometimes adds high-priority projects to the list. Because all these think
tanks depend at least partly on external funding, the agendas are affected
to varying degrees by whether the discussed research topics are likely to
attract funding. The Urban Institute, the only surveyed institution that
obtained the bulk of its funds from government grants and contracts, is
particularly dependent on government research and evaluation interests.
Only three institutions reported taking all their projects to boards of
trustees for approval; another takes the largest projects to the board by
providing members with descriptions of proposed projects. Not surpris-
ingly, two of the three institutions that take all projects to their boards
are those least dependent on raising funds from outside sources. So, the
greater board oversight might be seen as a substitute for meeting a market
test of relevancy and productivity. Note that the boards of all 10 think
tanks very seldom reject a particular project. As suggested above, in the
United States and Europe nearly all boards take a strong interest in the
general direction of a think tank’s work, but intervene rarely in the work
program.
As the previous information indicates, setting the agenda at a typical
think tank is driven mainly by the demand for work on certain topics and
by staff interests, not by guidance from the board. Still, the imprint of the
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president and other senior managers may be greater than this statement
suggests. If senior management is actively implementing a process
designed to foster innovation in the organization’s agenda,9 then manage-
ment’s influence may be significant, albeit expressed in the projects
advanced by specific research teams or senior researchers.
In summary, most think tanks’ decisionmaking authority for the agenda
appears to be sensibly divided between the board and senior management.
The board exerts important influence (and may even have final authority)
on the broad direction of the institution’s program.10 With the general
directions set, the president, or in some cases a management council, has
the authority to make decisions on individual projects. This authority
extends both to projects funded by external grants or contracts and to
the institution’s own resources.
A second topic that demands the board’s full attention is the think tank’s
financial management. The board’s review is usually centered around the
auditor’s annual report.11 After reviewing the audit report and manage-
ment letter, the board will typically be briefed by the auditor in private.
If the audit has identified problems, the board should instruct the pres-
ident, in writing, to make certain improvements by a stated time. Severe
problems with fulfilling the board’s requirements may call for draconian
board responses.
Running the Meeting
Two observations about boards at work that the president should keep
in mind: first, boards work on what is in front of them—no issue is too
great or small; second, boards have no natural braking mechanism, so
they continue to act as they have in the past unless they are nudged off
this track (Robinson 2001, 46). These observations should reinforce the
president’s central role in defining what comes before the board and the
role of the president and board chairman in guiding the board’s discussion
to closure when the principal contributions on a topic have been made.
Here are two pointers for conducting an effective meeting:
• Make sure that all members get a chance to contribute on significant
issues. If some members hang back, the chairman should ask for
their input.
• Put everything on the table. In other words, all information and opin-
ions should be presented at the meeting of the full board. Individual
board members should not be lobbying the president outside the
board meetings; important issues should not be reserved for a board
committee because it is more in sympathy with the position of the
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president or board chairman. In the long run, openness is definitely
the best policy.
A final word of advice for the president. The information provided to
the board at a meeting should meet an important standard: “No surprises.”
No board wants to be caught unawares or embarrassed by the public
disclosure of a problem or accomplishment about which the members
should have known. If a significant problem threatens the think tank, one
of its products is receiving adverse press, or a major award is expected,
the board should know in advance. Otherwise, the members are likely to
resent the president’s decision to withhold the information. Such resent-
ment can sow the seeds of larger problems. So keep the board informed
of significant events—through board meetings or otherwise.
Between Meetings
Communication with board members between board meetings is highly
desirable; members who are reminded of their membership are more
likely to work to the organization’s benefit. These communications need
not be elaborate. Indeed, many think tanks keep in touch by sending each
board member a copy of every new publication. This has a double pur-
pose: it reminds the members of the think tank’s work, and, if the pub-
lication deals with a policy topic of particular interest to a member, it can
better prepare the member to participate in public debates.
In a few cases, think tank presidents send their boards a report on
activities between board meetings. These reports are typically quarterly
letters for think tank boards that meet once or twice a year. Two formats
are common. One is a fairly comprehensive report that may run to five
or more pages—essentially a newsletter. The other is a shorter, more
personal letter signed by the president with a few highlights of activities.
As indicated above, it is imperative that the president inform the board
about major problems or positive developments at the organization
whenever such events occur. In some cases, the president might be well-
advised to seek the counsel of at least the board chairman in dealing
with the change, crisis or windfall.
OPERATIONAL MATTERS
This section covers seven practical questions about the structure and
composition of the board and the recruitment of new members. It
includes discussions of board membership from the perspectives of the
think tank and the person being recruited, how to go about identifying
GETTING THE MOST FROM YOUR BOARD 
and recruiting strong members, and how to introduce new members to
the organization and their duties.
Board Structure
The trend over the past decade is for both corporate and nonprofit boards
to be smaller and to have fewer committees. More work is being done
by the full board, and a smaller full board encourages more open discus-
sion and exchange. While the number of board members varies widely,
eight to ten members is viewed as effective; some boards total only five
or six members, which reportedly promotes exchange among members—
both during and outside the board meetings—as well as between the
board and the president (Charan 1998, 40–41).
The era of nonprofits that have a half-dozen committees for various
purposes seems to be a thing of the past. It is now common for non-
profit boards to have a single committee, either an audit committee that
concerns itself with financial management issues or an executive com-
mittee that deals with these and wider questions.12 An effective executive
committee can ensure that meetings of the full board are preserved for
important issues. For example, the executive committee could be
charged with carefully reviewing the audit report and meeting with the
auditors; the committee could then summarize the results to the full board
and make any necessary recommendations concerning the directions to
be given to the president.
Of course, the board will sometimes need to appoint a committee for
a particular function. One of the most common temporary committees
is that appointed to search for a new president of the think tank.
How Often to Meet
The vast majority of the boards of third-stage think tanks meets twice a
year. There are two reasons for meeting so infrequently. First, because
participation as a board member is voluntary and unpaid and because
think tanks work hard to attract distinguished persons to serve as mem-
bers, only a limited time commitment can be expected. Second, over the
years many of these organizations have developed well-established systems
for ensuring financial control and research quality, so they require com-
paratively little board oversight of operations. The twice-a-year norm
appears a reasonable standard for such organizations.13
For younger institutions, quarterly board meetings may be advisable.
The president and board chair could consider using each meeting to focus
on a different aspect of the think tank’s work and operations. For example,
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two meetings a year could focus on the most important issue, the insti-
tution’s progress toward its goals and future directions; the meeting fol-
lowing the completion of the audit report could concentrate on financial
management; and the fourth meeting could concentrate on other man-
agement issues on which the president wants the board’s input. A regular
agenda item for one of these meetings should be the division of respon-
sibility between the board and the president: do the Executive Limitations
need to be adjusted? When the necessity for comparatively intense board
oversight diminishes, the shift to twice-a-year meetings is appropriate.
Recruiting New Members
Even in the corporate world, boards consistently lack an effective process
for selecting new members (Nadler 2004, 107). Nonprofits suffer a similar
problem.
The charters of most think tanks specify how long board members
can serve and the process for replacing them. It is fairly standard for a
member to be appointed for a three- to five-year term, with the possi-
bility of being reappointed once or twice. Some organizations make it
possible for members to serve even longer by having a separate category
of members, such as “life trustees,” who can serve indefinitely. But usu-
ally these members are in addition to the regularly appointed members
and are less active than regular board members. Members are normally
replaced on a staggered basis so that a core of experienced members is
always available.
A reasonable argument claims that if a board is working effectively, its
composition should not be disturbed. But while the board may be com-
fortable with its current arrangement and work well with the institution’s
management, failing to introduce new members regularly is probably a
mistake. New members may be the most likely to ask searching questions
about performance or to recognize the need for a change in the think tank’s
agenda, or even of its president. The “life trustee” option allows the board
to keep the current members as well as add fresh blood.
Recruiting: What Board Members Want
Most people who serve as members of a think tank’s board do so for some
combination of three reasons. First, they would like to enjoy the com-
pany of their fellow board members. This can be an especially powerful
draw if the institution’s board is populated with prestigious individuals.
Second, members want to feel that they are doing good work, that they
are giving something back to their community through serving without
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compensation.14 Third, board members want to be associated with an
organization that does high-quality work. Highly regarded think tanks
active in the public domain will have an easier job than others in attract-
ing their most desired candidates.
Over time, boards can become more attractive to potential new
members by helping the think tank achieve its primary objectives and by
recruiting excellent new members for the board. Here success breeds
further success. Given the board’s central place in a think tank’s life and
the benefits that board members seek from serving on the board, it is not
surprising that boards typically devote substantial energy to recruiting
new members.
Whom to Recruit
All boards seek to attract individuals with strong reputations in their
respective fields. But what other qualities should these individuals bring?
To begin, there are two simple rules on whom not to recruit.
1. No conflicts of interest. A common mistake among think tanks is to
ask the director or president of another think tank to serve as a board
member. This is counterproductive because think tanks often
compete against each other for funding and having leading roles in
the same policy discussions. Board members have full access to the
think tank’s future development strategy. Giving such information
to a potential competitor is bad business, and it places the board
member in an untenable position.
2. No cronies. Some boards consist largely of friends of the president
or of the board members. This makes for enjoyable board meetings
but poor management. The presence of cronies also creates the
potential for factions to form within the board, complicating the
board’s oversight tasks and impeding productive discourse.
Each candidate for board membership should be an experienced pro-
fessional with a strong reputation for integrity, creativity, and thought-
fulness. Beyond this, at least some members should have substantial
experience in public policy development, social science research and
evaluation, and corporate finance. It is also important to include someone
with a background in working with the media or other form of commu-
nications. Boards far too often lack such experience, so input from this
perspective is absent or naive when new initiatives are discussed. If any
of these skills are missing in the collective board, the board will have dif-
ficulty fulfilling all its responsibilities.
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Board members should also be able to work well in groups and to
be good colleagues: boards are not the place for the enfant terrible. One
reason nearly all boards are responsible for nominating new members is
that current members can vouch for collegiality in the candidates they
nominate.
Finally, think tank leaders should at least consider asking a board can-
didate to make serving on the board one of his or her top three priorities
among board memberships and other tasks beyond his or her regular job.
Many of those best-suited to serve on a board already serve on several.
Inevitably, serving on many boards reduces the attention one person can
give to them collectively. When such a person is recruited to an additional
board, expect some missed board meetings and little attention to the
institution between board meetings. For this reason, asking a potential
board member for service on the board to be a priority can send a strong
signal about the president’s and board chairman’s expectations. Better
for a candidate to decline to participate than to become a member and
contribute little.
Based on studying the regular positions occupied by board members
at think tanks, think tanks tend to adopt one of two models in recruit-
ing board members (see table 6-1). These models are caricatures to some
degree, and many hybrids exist. But the extreme cases are useful for this
illustration.
In the “distinguished person” model, emphasis is on attracting pres-
tigious individuals to enhance the institution’s image. Of course, the key
skills listed above must be present among the overall board. But if the
board is larger (e.g., of more than eight members), it may include members
with broad range of interests and backgrounds, such as industrialists,
financiers, and businesspeople, many with no particular connection to
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Table 6-1 Occupations of Persons Recruited to Two Prototypical 
Boards of Trustees
“Distinguished persons” model “Expert advice” model
• Former ministers, state governors,
senior legislators
• Renowned social-science 
academics
• Captains of industry and finance
• Members of the media
• Leaders of prominent NGOs, 
including public interest groups 
and trade associations
• Former ministers, state governors, senior
legislators
• Members of the media
• Leaders of prominent NGOs, including
public interest groups and trade associa-
tions with interests aligned with those of
the think tank
the policymaking community. Such boards provide a wide range of per-
spectives and advice to the president. At the same time, the diversity of
the members may work against board coherence.
In the “expert advice” model, interests of members are more tightly
aligned with the research and policy interests of the think tank. These
boards are often smaller, to help keep discussions focused and to take
maximum advantage of each member’s input. Such boards are more likely
to be able to give tailored advice to the president on the think tank’s strat-
egy and operations. On the other hand, boards of this type may become
too assertive in giving direction and members may represent a compar-
atively narrow range of backgrounds and experience. Neither model is
generally superior.
Perhaps more important than the model picked are the goals set. The
president and the chairman of the board must determine goals for the
board. They should also understand that, if necessary, over time they
can restructure the board to improve its effectiveness.
One more factor enters into the calculus of member selection: diversity.
Most boards seek to maintain a diverse representation in terms of several
factors, aside from members’ professional backgrounds. Such diversity
gives the board and president a broad range of viewpoints. The following
quotations from CEOs illustrate this point (Shultz 2001, 128):
Any CEO who has ten or eleven people just like him sitting around
the board table will end up essentially talking to himself.
You add water to water, you get water. It might be drinkable,
but it’s not joy juice.
A group of people with the same background, the same expe-
rience, is going to come up with a predictable group of solutions
to problems—not a good idea in the world we live in. Different
points of view yield a wide approach to decisionmaking.
The composition of the board also sends a message to potential sponsors
and clients about the organization’s philosophy and values.
First among the balancing requirements is the political affiliation of
members. Most think tanks strive to be known for producing objective
policy recommendations, and few want to appear aligned with a political
party. One way to signal nonpartisanship is to include members with
various political affiliations on the board. A second factor to balance is
gender composition: given the increasing prominence of women in public
life, their inclusion in boards is essentially mandatory. The third is in the
ethnic or regional representation of members. The specific type of balance
in this case depends on local conditions. For example, boards composed
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exclusively of members from the nation’s capital can give the think tank an
insular image. Where a country has a few dominant ethnic groups, rep-
resenting each group through a board member is usually good policy.
Boards spend substantial time recruiting members. They must first
determine the qualifications needed, as outline above. Then various can-
didates are vetted within the board. Finally, a candidate is selected and
approached.
How to Recruit
Before approaching a candidate for board membership, the board needs
to clearly define the minimum expectations for successful service on the
board. How much time should it take? Does it just involve attending the
board meetings, or is something expected between meetings? The board
member who knows the candidate best is usually asked to make the initial
contact. Robinson (2001, 126–27) provides a good list of questions the
board needs to answer before a board member discusses membership
with a candidate.
• What major issues is the board currently focused on?
• What talents, expertise, qualities, or characteristics is the board
seeking in new members?
• How often does the board meet and for how long?
• Is everyone asked to serve on a committee? How are committee
assignments made?
• What kind of fund-raising is required of board members?
• What is the relationship between the board and the executive
director and between the board and other staff?
• Is an orientation program in place? Are other board education
activities offered?
• Does the board have an annual retreat of any kind?
• Are there changes on the horizon that a new board member should
know about?
Many recruitment conversations stress how little time will be required
of the new board member. This is a mistake for two reasons. It may lead
to unrealistic expectations on the part of the new member, possibly
resulting in a lower level of involvement than required. More important,
it diminishes the real reason for which the person is being recruited: Their
talent and experience would be valuable in helping to shape the institu-
tion’s work and future agenda. In short, apologizing for the inconvenience
of serving usually backfires.
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New Member Orientation
Orientation programs, formal or informal, make it easy for new board
members to make a contribution right away. While many countries have
formal training programs for the directors of nonprofit organizations,
these programs are likely ill-suited for the directors of most think tanks,
for two reasons. First, most such programs are oriented to a wide range
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with which think tanks have
little in common. Think tanks often more closely resemble for-profit
consulting firms or university research centers than the typical NGO that
provides human services (e.g., counseling, training, and various social
services). Second, the kind of people recruited to think tank boards are
unlikely to have the inclination or time to attend such training events.
A simple program organized by the chairman of the board and the think
tank’s president can deliver the necessary information. For orientation
at many think tanks, the new board member is invited to the think tank
for an extended meeting with the president and introductions to key staff
members. When the new member resides in another city, rules of com-
mon courtesy suggest that the president should visit the new member to
provide the orientation, or at least offer to do so.
The orientation should include a summary of the organization’s history,
because the current activities and attitudes of an organization are often
heavily conditioned by its roots and early development.15 Additional
topics to cover include
• goals and objectives;
• the current program of work;
• recent successes in research and the policy process;
• the organization’s communications and dissemination programs;
• recent financial history;
• fund-raising, especially if this has been a problem and year-to-year
swings in financing have been significant, along with the strategy
for dealing with funding problems;
• any other current or impending problems that have been discussed
with the board; and
• the institution’s key staff, highlighting each member’s special
contributions.
Each new member should be given a package of materials about the
organization: its charter and other legal documents are a must, as are
current financial statements, and the strategic plan if one exists. Annual
reports for the past two or three years and examples of the think tank’s
written products should also be included.
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It is often said that board members learn best by asking questions.16
The one-on-one meeting with the president offers significant scope for
questions. But the president should also encourage any new member
who wants to talk with senior staff members—both researchers and
administrators—to go ahead.
No orientation is complete without a discussion of the new board
member’s duties and the kind of role the organization hopes the member
will play. This conversation can be led by the president or the chairman
of the board. In either case, it should be guided by a statement produced
by the board, ideally at the same time that the board discusses specific
candidates to serve on the board. Most duties will be common to all
members, including attendance at board meetings, active participation
in the meetings, and so forth. But there may be particular tasks for some
members. For example, a member with a strong financial background
could be asked to take the lead in monitoring the organization’s finan-
cial condition and controls, presumably mostly by reviewing the annual
external audit of the institution’s finances.
ASSESSING THE BOARD
There is no question about the desirability of a board assessing its work
every few years. A penetrating, realistic look at the board’s activities can
catalyze steps to strengthen its stewardship. But it is a mistake for a board
to begin such a process unless it understands the work involved and fully
intends to complete it. Robinson (2001, 148–49) outlines the following
elements in a self-assessment:
• the commitment of the full board to participate;
• a committee or small group with an assignment to oversee the review
and manage the results;
• a clear timetable that specifies when the self-assessment questionnaire
will be reviewed by the full board, distributed, and returned;
• time set aside during a regular board meeting or for a special meeting
to review the results;
• an action plan that addresses the weaknesses the board perceives in
its role or structure; and
• a way to monitor whether the action plan is being realized.
A number of guides are available to help the boards conduct a self-
assessment.17 In the end, whether the board designs its own process or
follows someone else’s guidelines, questions like those listed in box 6-6
will need to be addressed.
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Short of a full self-assessment, these questions offer a starting point for
the board chairman and the think tank’s president to assess how well the
board is discharging its duties. The board and the president can map out
plans to address any obvious problems. The objective, regardless of whether
the whole board is involved and whether the changes result from con-
sultations between the chairman and the president, is to maximize the
contributions made by the talented people serving as board members.
N O T E S
The author thanks Dessislava Petkov and Kathleen Courrier for useful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1. This experience includes being a member of the board of trustees of the
nonprofit Institute for Urban Economics in Moscow (1995–present), the board
of directors of the for-profit Metropolitan Research Institute in Budapest
(1992–1997), and the board of directors of the for-profit E-A Ratings in
Moscow (1997–2001).
2. These think tanks are listed in chapter 1.
3. These books are Robinson (2001), Shultz (2001), Carver (1997), and
Charan (1998).
4. It is worth noting that in many countries such laws lack a specific orga-
nizational form that would fit think tanks’ activities very well.
5. This section draws on Robinson (2001, 11–12, 29–40).
6. This modest limit is appropriate for recently founded think tanks, but
higher limits will be appropriate as the institution gains experience.
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• Mission: Is the mission statement used to guide decisions? Is it current?
• Board composition and structure: Is the talent the organization needs rep-
resented on the board? Does the committee structure function?
• Board meetings: Do meetings focus on the right issues? Does the board
have the information it needs to make decisions? Is there adequate time
for discussion and debate?
• Board/staff relations: Does the board respect the authority of the executive
director? Is the evaluation of the executive director useful to the board and
to the director?
• Core activities: Does the board evaluate these activities’ effectiveness?
• Finances: Does the board read and understand the financial reports?
• Fund-raising: Does the board understand the plan for resource develop-
ment? Does the board understand its obligation to help raise funds?
Box 6-6 Typical Issues and Questions Addressed in a 
Board Self-Assessment
7. The Urban Institute’s policy is to not work as an institution with any polit-
ical party. Its personnel manual contains the following statement about staff
political activity:
The Institute does not place any restrictions on individual political activity.
In order to preserve its nonpartisan status, however, employees shall not use
staff time or Institute resources in support of any political activity, such as
campaigning or lobbying. Staff are free to engage in activities conducted off
the Institute’s premises, on the employee’s time, that are not associated with
the Urban Institute and which do not imply that the employee is in any way
representing the Urban Institute.
8. Charan (1998, 117) suggests using the following three questions as a guide
in preparing presentations:
1. What are the two or three insights the board should get from this 
presentation?
2. What are the two or three issues on which the presenter might benefit
from the board’s insight?
3. What are the two or three points about which the presenter believes
the board should be fully informed?
9. See chapter 7, “Renewing the Work Program: Creating Innovation.”
10. Even in this sphere, however, it is extremely unusual for individual board
members or the board as a whole to press an initiative on senior management
against its wishes. The board’s power lies more in discouraging a new initiative
about which it has reservations than in creating one.
11. In the absence of an audit, the board or a committee will have to review
the financial statements with great care, and it should appoint a committee to
ensure that basic controls are in place and are being used.
12. Alternatively, some boards appoint a treasurer who is assigned primary
responsibility for financial oversight. A good treasurer can effectively investigate
the reasons for anomalies in the financial reports. On the other hand, with
responsibility assigned to a treasurer, other board members often believe they
are relieved of responsibilities in this area. Moreover, treasurers are not all as
diligent in the performance of their duties as is necessary, but the board has little
way of knowing whether this is the case. For these reasons, keeping responsibility
with the board, either through a committee or as the whole, is desirable (Robinson
2001, 78–80).
13. Where the think tank has a board of management and a separate advisory
board, it may be sufficient for the advisory board to meet annually and to focus on
the accomplishments of the institution or the future direction of the program.
14. These two reasons are noted in Robinson (2001, 22).
15. This paragraph draws on Robinson (2001, 76–77).
16. See, for example, Charan (1998, 85–88).
17. See, for example, Slesinger (1995) and Holland and Blackmon (2000).
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Renewing the Work Program:
Creating Innovation
7
Think tanks, like other organizations, need to renew their agendasfrom time to time for at least three reasons. First, they may have to
shift the direction of their research in order to ensure that their work
remains relevant to their nation’s evolving policy agenda. Second, staff
retention and morale can depend on key members having the chance to
change the focus of their research and policy analysis. Third, and perhaps
most fundamentally, in order to raise funds, organizations must offer to
work on subjects for which there is a demand for new information and
analysis—they must follow the market.
Creating and adopting innovations in a work program is often called
strategic planning. In its most developed form, strategic planning yields
a formal written product; developing the plan involves considering the
relevance of the organization’s mission statement in light of its current
situation and systematically analyzing new work programs for the think
tank. Such significant new directions for an organization’s agenda are
innovations. Importantly, the most successful think tanks make such plan-
ning continuous; each year or so, there may be events for taking stock
and assessing new options—new research topics, alternative clients, and
different activities (e.g., offering new training programs or starting a for-
profit subsidiary to conduct household interviews). The atmosphere at
these think tanks encourages staff to consider innovations.
In other words, strategic planning should not be undertaken only when
a think tank faces severe financial problems. While some pressure for
change can be helpful, the best decisionmaking is seldom done in a crisis
environment. Nor should investment of an institution’s scarce discretionary
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resources be based primarily on the president’s intuition about the pres-
ence of a market for a new line of endeavor. Careful preparatory analysis
is essential to increasing the odds of an innovation’s success.
Preparation of a formal strategic plan can certainly be useful. Neverthe-
less, this chapter concentrates on identifying and assessing new opportu-
nities for a think tank. The reason for this focus is that the requirement of
preparing a formal plan can create a high entry cost to innovation. Better
to spend the limited available resources on generating and assessing
ideas for new products the think tank might offer, new clients for some
types of analysis or evaluation, or new audiences for its policy findings.1
This chapter addresses the task of fostering, developing, and assessing
innovations at think tanks. But it is important to acknowledge that striking
out in a new direction can be a wrenching experience for an organization.
For this reason, the first section of the chapter discusses the kinds of chal-
lenges as well as the rewards that introducing new, radically different
activities can engender. The second section reviews innovations adopted
by four think tanks in Eastern Europe and Russia—how they were iden-
tified, assessed, and launched, and what problems were encountered in the
process. The final section presents lessons distilled from the literature on
encouraging innovations in for-profit and nonprofit organizations.2
CHALLENGES AND REWARDS
Think tanks can undertake a variety of innovations, several of which
are described in the next section. To simplify the present discussion, this
chapter focuses on a specific change: providing consulting services in addi-
tion to conducting foundation-supported research and policy analysis.
In principle, private public-policy research institutes could have any of
four groups of clients: national government agencies, local governments,
donors, and businesses. Contracts with donors and with national govern-
ment agencies often support the type of work think tanks prefer doing:
policy development, including empirical background studies; program
evaluation; implementation of pilot projects; and training of officials in
implementation of a new program or design shifts in an existing program.
Work with local governments tends to be more hands-on. While policy
issues still figure in the mix of assignments, the emphasis is on address-
ing concrete problems to improve the efficiency with which services are
delivered, taxes are raised, budgets are created, or funds are secured to
finance capital investments. Work for business can be extremely diverse.
For example, banks contract for macroeconomic forecasts, staff training,
design of new loan products, loan servicing procedures to support new
loan products, and assessments of potential new markets.
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Challenges and rewards associated with such diversification are listed
below, and each is discussed briefly later in the chapter. It is worth not-
ing at the outset that in the past 15 years or so, many nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) have increased the share of their income from
fee-for-service activities, partly in response to a declining income
from traditional sources and in partly due to a desire to provide a wider
range of services.3
Challenges to think tanks from consulting or other commercial activity
include the following:
• agenda-setting and lack of focus;
• restricted use of data and publications;
• perceived lack of independence;
• conflict of cultures within the think tank;
• restive clients or sponsors; and
• management challenges.
Possible rewards include the following:
• broader base of experience for policy development;
• improved efficiency;
• support for overhead functions; and
• improved visibility and marketing possibilities.
Many think tanks have found it advantageous to set up wholly owned
for-profit subsidiaries for executing projects for the business community.
Typically, the subsidiary has the same overhead structure as the nonprofit
parent organization, and an explicit fee (profit) is added. The subsidiary
frequently is given a different name to avoid confusion among clients
and sponsors about which part of the organization is working on which
projects.
Challenges
Agenda-Setting and Lack of Focus
Consultants, almost by definition, are responding to the perceived needs
of their clients. Very often the consultant is not familiar with a client’s
needs or operations before being contacted. Because clients are setting
their own agendas, the greater the share of a firm’s work based on con-
sulting, the more reactive the firm will be overall and the weaker its abil-
ity to set its own agenda.
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In the United States, for example, major think tanks that receive a
substantial share of their income from U.S. government contracts, such
as MDRC and the Urban Institute, maintain control over a significant
portion of their agenda by obtaining funds from foundations to pursue
topics that may not be on the federal agenda at the moment. The difficulty
this model presents for think tanks in many other parts of the world is that
the volume of funds from foundations may not be sufficient to permit a
critical level of self-determined projects.4
Restricted Use of Data and Publications
In consulting for businesses and, increasingly, in work for donors, there are
sharp restrictions on consultants’ rights to use data assembled or reports
produced during the consultancy for any purpose besides those of direct
interest to the client. Such restrictions correspondingly limit the work of
consulting think tanks in the policy process.5
Perceived Lack of Independence
The appearance of a think tank’s lack of independence from the influence
of regular consulting clients is a definite problem for think tanks that take
on such work. Even when the right to publish materials based on work
done under contract is present, there is still some question of whether
the think tank consultant is engaging in some self-censorship to ensure
continuing good relations with the client.6 Credibility can only be achieved
by a consistent record of taking policy positions that are squarely based
on the research. Inevitably, sometimes such positions will be contrary to
those of the sponsors.
Conflict of Cultures within the Think Tank
Staff at think tanks who are dedicated to the public purposes for which
the think tank was created could be seriously disturbed if the institution
were to decide to take on for-profit work.7 Charges of incompatibility of
objectives, operational styles, and “corporate behavior” are likely to be
raised.
Restive Clients or Sponsors
An institute’s traditional sponsors may not agree with the arguments for
a think tank taking on more traditional consulting work. At an extreme
they could withdraw their support.8
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Management Challenges
While think tank directors must have good management instincts to run
a successful firm, their instincts alone are frequently insufficient to guide
the enterprise when the scale of operations expands significantly, par-
ticularly when the number of projects under way simultaneously and
the number of separate sponsors rise. In short, establishing a consulting
practice often requires further development of management and financial
systems, and the size of the task can easily be underestimated.
Rewards
The foregoing list is a formidable recitation of the difficulties think tanks
face when taking on consulting assignments. These problems, however, are
balanced significantly by certain benefits from doing such work—gains
that go beyond increased revenues.
Broader Base of Experience for Policy Development
Many consultancies require researchers to delve more deeply into the
operational details of a public program or a firm’s operations than they
would do in their regular research. For example, to advise a bank about
its prospects in investing heavily in retail banking operations, researchers
would likely have to conduct consumer surveys about the current services
the consumers use and their preferences for improvements. Detailed
analysis of the current market and the extent of competitiveness would
be another critical element of the work. This is highly specific analysis.
But the experience gained would be invaluable, even if as only general
background, in working with the Ministry of Finance or the Central
Bank on policies governing retail banking.
Improved Efficiency
Some think tanks work predominantly for a restricted set of clients in the
foundation world. Foundations tend to favor work on the cutting edge
of policy development, work where some risk of low return is present.
Moreover, for at least some of these projects the work schedule is not
very intense. The contrast with the work regime involved in consulting
for businesses is stark. First, services are typically provided to businesses
on short, very intense schedules. An opportunity or problem has been
defined, and the business wants to act quickly to address it. Schedules for
work for government agencies and the donors can be nearly anywhere
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between those for foundations and business. A second difference between
work for foundations and other clients concerns the difference between
work done under grants and contracts. Contracts are more specific about
products, deadlines, and reporting. In addition, competition is generally
keener for these contracts, because for-profit as well as nonprofit entities
compete. So, think tanks that work under contract to government agen-
cies, businesses, and donors are exposed to a different and in some ways
more demanding work regime than those working exclusively for foun-
dations. Several think tank directors interviewed in the earlier think tank
study made this point about consulting work, and they saw the result on
the efficiency of their overall operations as positive (Struyk 1999).
Support for Overhead Functions
From a financial perspective, consulting contracts are usually viewed
positively because they keep the professional staff occupied on reasonably
interesting projects. But there is a second important financial dimension.
By raising the overall revenue base of the firm, consulting income reduces
the firm’s overhead rates. For example, the operation of the library,
an overhead item, is now amortized over a larger revenue base, driving
down the cost of library services associated with each hour of staff
time. True, the existence of more projects is likely to result in more
books being ordered, but for many overhead items the increases are
less than proportional. Thus, over a reasonable range of expansion, a
greater volume of work results in lower overhead costs per hour of pro-
fessional labor, provided that the array of overhead services remains
constant.9
Improved Visibility and Marketing Possibilities
By expanding the range of clients with whom and the topics on which
the think tank works, the consultancies should lead to greater exposure
of the organization’s capabilities to new market segments.
INNOVATIONS IN PRACTICE
This section discusses the innovations adopted by four think tanks in
Eastern Europe and Russia that were identified as particularly entrepre-
neurial in developing new lines of work, including commercial activities
similar to those of consulting firms, or in tapping the business community
for donations by offering seminars or other products of direct interest to
this community. The included institutions are the Center for the Study
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of Democracy in Sofia, the Institute for Urban Economics in Moscow, the
Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise in Prague, and the Center for
Social and Economic Research in Warsaw.
The firms included were identified through the interviews with think
tank leaders for the earlier study and through consultations with people
knowledgeable about think tanks in the region. It is worth emphasizing
that those who nominated think tanks consistently cited the same insti-
tutions, and the list was short—suggesting that such entrepreneurialism
is far from common. In total, only four institutes beyond the four included
were recommended. Three did not agree to participate in the project,
and the author was unable to visit the fourth.10 No claim is made that this
group is a representative sample of any sort. The goal here is to stimulate
thinking about possibilities in each think tank’s environment.
The information presented below is based on semistructured interviews
of institute leadership by the author in 1998 and 1999 and a review of
annual reports, web sites, and other materials.
Overview of Initiatives
How many and what types of initiatives did these think tanks undertake?
Why did they do it? How important are such initiatives to the institutions?
Table 7-1 and box 7-1 provide summary information; box 7-1 includes
a short description of each initiative.11
Of the four study firms, three were clearly in the second stage of devel-
opment, meaning that they had more than five full-time researchers,
had stable funding, and were well established in their markets. The other,
the Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise (CDFE), was nearly there.
The three second-stage organizations were all large by regional standards.
Each firm cited one or two initiatives that had progressed enough to
be reported upon. Initiatives were wide-ranging and included setting up
a market survey operation, a credit rating agency, customized corporate
training programs, and an in-house consulting center for working in
other transition countries.
Most initiatives had been undertaken after the think tank had been in
operation for two or three years, but there are exceptions to this rule. One
is the radio station established by the Center for the Study of Democracy
(CSD); founding the station was one of the center’s first activities, and
was meant to break the government’s monopoly on local news broadcasts
by rebroadcasting Voice of America programs. Over the years the pro-
gramming format has changed in line with evolving consumer preferences.
Another example is the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE),
which began advising other transitional countries very early in its life when
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a foundation invited one of CASE’s senior staff to work with Russian
reformers on macroeconomic policies.
The Institute for Urban Economics (IUE) was also a fast starter
because it believed that it could survive only if it aggressively diversified
its activities and client base from the initial project—a large housing and
real estate reform project supported by the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
Motivation for the initiatives varied. CDFE was facing very tough
times financially and diversified out of necessity. CASE’s “corporate
sponsors” initiative was also a straightforward attempt to diversify funding
sources. On the other hand, CSD set up its marketing research operation
primarily because it offered the chance to become engaged in new topic
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Table 7-1 Number, Timing, and Importance of Initiatives
Item CSD IUE CDFE CASE
Timing
Year institute founded 1989 1995 1991 1991
Year institute began thinking 1994 1996 1996 1992
seriously about diversification
Motivation
Reduce dependence on No Yes Yes Yes
primary funding source
Necessary to engage in Yes Yes No Yes
new type of work
Number of initiatives
Number allied to principal 1 2 1 2
activity
Number separate from 1 0 0 2
principal activity
Importance of all initiatives to 30% 10% −30 to 20% 40 to 55%
revenue of the 
main company
Size
Number of professional staff 28 36 6a 40
(full-time equivalent)
CSD = Center for the Study of Democracy
IUE = Institute for Urban Economics
CDFE = Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise
CASE = Center for Social and Economic Research
a Excludes parliamentary interns.
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Firm Initiative title and summary
CSD
IUE
CDFE
CASE
Box 7-1 Summary of Initiatives
Radio station. Began in April 1991, rebroadcasting Voice of America
programs. Received early U.S. government and other support for
equipment and otherwise establishing the station. Once the transition
began, the station tried a strong news format but soon discovered
that this was not appealing. In response to lost market share, in 1993
the station shifted to a music format with news briefs, and expanded
to three stations. Under this format, the station is profitable.
Marketing surveys. Although CSD’s first survey was conducted in
1990, Vitosha Research (VR), which conducts marketing surveys and
analysis for commercial clients, was not created until 1994. VR has a
number of international clients and specializes in more demanding
survey research tasks.
Credit rating agency. IUE created the first Russian credit agency in
1997; initially the activity focused on rating bonds issued by munici-
palities and subjects of the Federation. In summer 1998 it was spun
off as a wholly owned subsidiary (E-A Ratings Service) and signed a
strategic affiliation agreement with Standard & Poor’s. In 2001, S&P
purchased a 70 percent interest in E-A Ratings.
Municipal economic development. Established in fall 1997, a team
within IUE provides consultancy services to mid-sized cities in the
creation of their economic development plans.
Corporate training. The program provides development and manage-
ment of customized education programs for senior staff of banks and
enterprises.
Technical assistance to transitional countries. In 1992, a foundation
invited CASE staff to provide technical assistance to Russia on its
evolving macroeconomic policy. Further requests from donor orga-
nizations followed and activity expanded. In 1994–95, CASE more
actively sought support for such work.
Corporate sponsors. CASE recruited “corporate patrons” from
among Poland’s 70 largest and most respected corporations and
banks. Patrons make a fixed contribution and receive CASE’s publica-
tions, invitations to open seminars, and invitations to occasional
“patrons only” events.
areas. Similarly, CASE’s technical assistance to transitional economies
resulted from its desire to share its staff expertise. IUE was motivated by
wanting both to reduce dependency on its primary sponsor and to enter
new fields.
One key element in determining the nature of the initiative was the
institution’s initial activity base. CSD built its marketing survey operation
on its existing survey capacity, and IUE created its credit rating agency for
local government bonds around a team already doing related municipal-
finance projects. Similarly, CDFE was able to exploit its established rep-
utation for conducting training projects in preparing its custom training
packages for corporate clients. CASE’s international consulting operation
built squarely on the group’s work on similar topics in Poland.
In short, the firms generally built on the positive reputation they had
established for related activities and exploited the capabilities of existing
staff in selecting an initiative. Building on strength is a common business
strategy. However, the modest capital available to underwrite the start-up
costs of an initiative also prevented these institutes from launching an
initiative further afield from their core activities.
Identifying and Launching Initiatives
The most common pattern for the launch of an initiative was for the basic
idea to come from the president of the organization or from a staff mem-
ber (table 7-2). The idea was then discussed among the staff and a few
people outside the organization and usually with the board of trustees.
If it was agreed upon as probably feasible, then the new line of work was
marketed by word of mouth and participation in seminars, where this
specific expertise could be demonstrated and promotional material dis-
tributed. In short, these were low-tech, often rather informal processes.
Instinct played at least as large a role as analysis in making the decision
to proceed.
Preparation of a formal business plan to test the feasibility of an ini-
tiative was relatively rare, with plans prepared for only two initiatives—
CSD’s marketing survey initiative and IUE’s credit rating facility. IUE
was the only group surveyed that contracted for assistance in analyzing
its initiative. It hired an international management consulting firm to help
prepare the business plan. IUE believes this was a good investment because
the strong business plan was instrumental in inducing Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) to sign a strategic affiliation agreement with the credit rating agency
less than a year after it began operations.
Similarly, formal promotional efforts beyond seminar participation to
launch a new initiative were exceptional. IUE has been more aggressive
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
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than most think tanks in explicitly marketing an initiative. For its credit
rating initiative, for example, it sponsored presentations by the key
researcher at numerous seminars within Russia, gave the activity promi-
nence on its home page, produced a slick three-fold marketing brochure
and distributed it widely at conferences, and sponsored a session at a major
international conference in London on credit ratings in the Common-
wealth of Independent States. The affiliation with Standard & Poor’s was
announced at a splashy press conference in a five-star Moscow hotel. CASE
launched its “corporate patrons” program with a customized sophisticated
mailing to 70 of the largest corporations and banks in Poland, with tele-
phone follow-up to recruit patrons.
Common, if modest, promotional efforts included devoting space in
the institute’s newsletter and on the institute’s web site to the initiative,
where these vehicles were available. Since most projects result in reports,
these, too, were available to show to new potential clients.12
Of those interviewed, only CASE cited an example of an initiative that
had not worked. CASE attempted to obtain contracts from the Polish
government for carrying out research and policy analysis; while govern-
ment offices used the Center’s work, they resisted paying for it. This ini-
tiative was handled very informally. The practice of Polish ministries in
contracting out has changed dramatically since 2000, so by 2005 ministries
were major research clients. (See the next chapter for more on government
procurement of policy research and evaluation services.)
Rewards and Challenges
How did the pluses and minuses of introducing innovations balance for
these think tanks? Table 7-3 provides an overview using the same factors
listed above.
Rewards
Financially, the revenues generated by the initiatives have generally been
moderately important, representing 10 to 30 percent of total revenues
(table 7-1). But CASE’s assistance to transition economies was uniquely
successful, with revenues from this activity accounting for 40 to 55 percent
of total revenues in the two years before the interview.
The directors of the think tanks rated the initiatives as financially suc-
cessful. This is, however, a fairly imprecise term. While each initiative is
generating significant revenue, as seen above, the rating of financial success
is not based on revenues net of start-up costs. For many initiatives these
costs were quite modest, so the needed adjustment would be small. But
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in a few cases, such as IUE’s substantial promotional efforts and paid
assistance in business-plan development, the rating of financial success
could be affected. Unfortunately, these think tanks do not keep records
in a way that permits all the relevant costs to be readily identified.
Some respondents emphasized that the form in which the funds were
received made them especially valuable. Both CDFE and CSD reported that
the use of profits from corporate training and the radio station, respec-
tively, had no restrictions and could be used very flexibly. For example,
they could serve as matching funds for foundation grants or be used for
computer purchases or other institution-building tasks. On the other hand,
if the activity increases total operations but leaves profits unchanged, then
funds in the overhead accounts increase—but these are all dedicated to
specific purposes.
All four think tanks believed that their initiatives improved their rep-
utation and/or visibility with certain local communities, especially the
business community. IUE’s credit ratings made the young institute visible
to financial circles. CASE’s corporate patrons program helped establish
a firmer relationship with the business community. CDFE’s customized
training courses were more important in giving the Center access to other
projects than for reputation per se. Finally, CSD saw its market survey
work for major multinational firms as a recognition of its capabilities—
recognition that it could use to woo future clients.
Three of the sample think tanks also saw various aspects of their ini-
tiatives as broadening their experience base for policy development.
Working in these new areas expanded the perspective of the researchers
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Table 7-3 Summary of Responses on Challenges and Rewards
Number of firms citing 
Reward/Challenge reward/challenge
Rewards
Broader base of experience for policy development 3
Improved efficiency 2
Support for overhead functions 0
Improved visibility and marketing possibilities 4
Challenges
Agenda-setting and lack of focus 0
Restricted use of data and publications 0
Perceived lack of independence 0
Conflict of cultures within the think tank 0
Restive clients or sponsors 0
Management challenges 2
involved, and in some instances informed other policy analyses. IUE’s
ratings of municipal bonds gave analysts new insights into the actual
financial condition of local governments and the structure of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations.
Interestingly, certain unanticipated benefits were cited as an important
part of the overall success of the new ventures. First, CSD thought that its
market survey operation helped the group retain staff, by giving analysts
a change from the typical research and writing assignments. CASE also
thought that the change of pace provided by foreign travel and somewhat
different assignments made the center a generally more attractive place
to work for some staff members.
IUE and CASE cited a second unexpected benefit: the new activities
generated important staff training. For IUE, the training in the credit
rating initiative came from the classroom training provided by Standard
& Poor’s and by the IUE staff working directly with the S&P staff on bench-
marking and other tasks. The leadership at CASE stated that young staff
were challenged by working largely on their own in other countries of the
region, helping them mature quickly as researchers and policy analysts.
The training and adjustments to management (described below) can be
considered to indicate improved efficiency of operations.
None of the think tanks spoke about the benefits of expanded overhead
revenues, although this may have been implied in the positive statements
on financial success.
Challenges
Think tank leaders reported remarkably little in the way of problems
accompanying the new, more commercially oriented initiatives. The
interview included explicit questions about the half-dozen different types
of problems the institution might have encountered (listed above), so the
respondents were thoroughly prompted to recall problems.
Neither IUE nor CDFE could identify any problems. The IUE director
said she thought that this was due in part to the orientation of the orga-
nization, which from the beginning had worked on multiple demonstra-
tion projects that involved close relationships with local government
officials and banks. CDFE stated that the financial pressures were so severe
that the staff understood that the organization had to change direction
if it was to survive.
CSD reported no philosophical problems with the staff, the board of
trustees, or foundation clients. Rather, the problem was in changing
employees’ task orientation; staff shied away from doing the necessary
marketing. At CASE, the only problems encountered were managerial.
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There was a certain conflict between the demands of short-term consult-
ing jobs in other transition countries and keeping the larger home-based
projects on schedule: the major projects fell behind as staff dashed off on
short-term assignments. This conflict was finally resolved by expanding
the size of the permanent and associate staff. Both these difficulties can
be classified as management challenges.
It is important to note that none of the four institutions reported
problems with dilution of the focus of their work, perceived independence
in the policy process, or cultural conflicts within the organization. This
happy record may result from the fact that the new lines of work are
all closely aligned with each institution’s main activities and that these
are young organizations whose identities are not yet carved in stone
and hence are still able to be quite flexible in creating or responding to
opportunities.
Concluding Observations
These four case studies clearly illustrate that it is possible for think tanks
to go beyond the traditional funding sources to sustain and expand their
operations. Indeed, they almost make it look easy. As related in the
interviews, the identification and analysis of potential opportunities was
not overly demanding, nor was the set of actions needed to launch the
activity. All four think tanks reported remarkably few problems with
management, institutional identification, or staff morale from adding
the new, more commercially oriented activities—probably in part because
they are young, flexible, and dynamic organizations. All four are also
searching for more opportunities to expand into new types of work areas.
Can other think tanks count on such a smooth experience? Probably
not. The general record of NGOs in the United States, for example, that
try to generate funds for their core missions through for-profit operations
is not strong (Foster and Bradach 2005).
Two important factors must be taken into account in assessing think
tanks’ ability to emulate these examples. First, all four think tanks included
in this analysis were careful to build on existing strengths—the innova-
tions were in areas where their existing competence and reputation gave
them a running start. Working in an area close to an existing competence
increased their ability to judge the potential demand for a new service.
It also minimized start-up costs, as staff could continue to work on the
traditional tasks while the demand for the think tank’s new services
increased. For an innovation further from the core competence, one or
two new experts would have been hired, and they would have charged
most of their time to program development (overhead).
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Second, these four groups are all entrepreneurial institutions whose
leaders have good market instincts, can realistically assess possibilities,
and have demonstrated the willingness to take the initiative when
opportunity appeared. This characteristic is rare. Also, in some cases these
institutions have a culture and a system in place to encourage staff to think
creatively and to propose ideas beyond the current work program. It is
these qualities that caused the organizations to be consistently recom-
mended as innovative organizations.
ENCOURAGING INNOVATION
The business community is characterized by a constant struggle to produce
new products and services for clients. As noted, in recent years similar
pressure has been placed on the U.S. nonprofit sector, forcing NGOs to
rethink the services they provide and how they provide them, including
the incorporation of more fee-generating activities.13 This is an era of
increasing competition both among NGOs for support from foundations
and between NGOs and for-profit firms for the role of delivery agents for
social services for local governments. Nonprofits are finding it necessary
to think and organize themselves more like businesses (Letts, Ryan, and
Grossman 1999; Light 1998).
A principal challenge these NGOs—and think tanks—face is to develop
an environment and practice of innovation. Students of innovation in
nonprofit organizations in the United States say unequivocally that most
guidance available to nonprofits focuses on how single acts of innovation
were created and implemented, not on creating an environment that fosters
innovations again and again (Letts et al. 1999, 73; Light 1998, 7). Indeed,
Letts and colleagues state categorically that there are no good concepts
for nonprofits for program development (1999, 74). At the same time,
experts in the field are calling for “the relentless pursuit of opportunity”
(Kitzi 2001, 44).
The following presentation has two parts. The first addresses key
factors in a think tank’s working environment that are conducive to
generating innovations, including specific leadership attributes that
promote innovation. The second provides key points for identifying,
assessing, and piloting promising innovations. In this discussion, the
accent is on principles rather than on development of a “strategic
plan.” Focusing on a formal document may discourage think tanks
from considering how they innovate; for those who do proceed, it
could detract from the degree of creativity about the innovations
themselves when the focus is on developing a formal report.14 Indeed,
the literature on the development of strategic plans by U.S. nonprofits
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indicates that such plans are often developed in response to the require-
ments of a major funder or at a time of organizational crisis; the needs of
clients seldom receive much weight (Stone, Bigelow, and Crittendon
1999). Both sections of the following discussion are based on the liter-
ature about fostering a process of innovation at for-profit and nonprofit
organizations.
Creating a Conducive Environment
There are seven actions a think tank can take to create conditions con-
ducive to staff thinking about new directions for the organization.15
A Flat, Informal Organization Is the Most Effective
Those studying innovation have observed that the more layers between
staff and senior management, the more likely that management will
not learn about many good ideas. The corresponding lesson is to keep
the organization “thin” (i.e., with few layers). In the same vein, the more
responsibility is pushed downward in an organization, the more likely
that lower-level staff will have access to and a working relationship
with management and believe themselves important to the entity’s
success. In larger think tanks, if responsibility is concentrated on the
team leader, rather than on a combination of the team leader and the
subordinate project leaders, the project leaders are likely to have less
contact with management and be less comfortable advancing ideas. 
A concomitant point is that greater informality in an organization
increases the odds that a staffer will directly approach management
with innovative ideas.
The reality is that most think tanks are small enough that they do not
have multiple layers of managers separating a project leader from the
director of the organization. But even a single layer, if not properly man-
aged, can create a barrier to good ideas flowing upward. A positive sign,
at least for the Eastern Europe–CIS region, is the generally informal nature
of the relationships among the staff at all levels (see chapter 2).
Staff Diversity Is Helpful
Put simply, the decision process will typically be stronger when people with
different backgrounds and views are involved: what may appear a good
idea to a group with academic backgrounds may strike someone from
the business community or with a local government background as
much less sound. If a think tank has a homogeneous staff, then inviting
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trusted advisors with other perspectives to discuss possible innovations
is certainly worthwhile.
Internal Turbulence Can Stimulate Change
Sometimes a jolt is necessary to induce staff to think creatively; without
it they tend to focus on what they have been doing and on marginal
changes to this agenda. Internal turbulence, in the form of the departure
of a key staff member or a bleak funding outlook, can push staff to think
beyond their normal boundaries. Of course, the key question is how much
turbulence is too much. Beyond a certain point, shocks and uncertainty
can make the staff dysfunctional. A telltale sign of too much disruption
is staff huddled in groups talking about their possible futures rather than
doing their regular jobs.
Low Internal Barriers Help Staff Exchange Ideas
Think tanks with as few as 10 full-time researchers are likely to have
separate units for addressing different policy topics. Managerially this
certainly makes sense. But if these units become isolated islands, the
organization can lose the ideas that result from the interaction of teams
working on different subjects and for different clients. One technique
used by a number of think tanks is to have seminars devoted to ongoing
projects that are attended by staff from all groups. This informs every-
one about the substance of the projects and provides a base for further
interactions. Another technique is to hold regular joint meetings of
senior managers and team leaders to exchange notes on projects and
institutional questions.
Internal Resources Are Needed to Pursue Possible Innovations
If staff know that there are funds available to support the development of
an innovative concept, they are much more likely to advance it for dis-
cussion.16 Two distinct elements are involved here. First, the funds must
actually exist. Many think tanks fund initial work on an innovation from
a pool of fee income (essentially profit) and funds from overhead, through
a line item designated for “institutional development” or similar purposes.
Second, the staff has to know that funds actually are used to develop or
pilot-test innovations. Think tanks can make this clear by financing the
development of an innovation from time to time. Even in a large orga-
nization composed of 50 staff members, most will know the source of
the funds financing the new activity.
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Innovation Is an Ongoing Process
Staff will understand that proposing new projects and alternative direc-
tions for the organization is encouraged if there are clear indicators to this
effect. If the think tank has an annual retreat of senior staff to consider
current operations and the future of the organization—including possible
innovations in the work program—and inputs are widely solicited for
the retreat, then staff will be encouraged to be creative and expansive in
their thinking. But it would be wrong for management to signal that ideas
are welcome only at specific points. Opportunities seldom wait. Other
“markers” to indicate that staff can contribute to the store of fresh ideas are
certainly possible, especially if management supports some of those offered.
This ongoing process is in sharp contrast with the one-big-initiative
model, in which a significant change of direction is adopted once and
then the organization goes back to business as usual.
Leadership Is Key
Paul Light makes the following statement about the importance of leader-
ship for innovation:
Leaders play a central role at virtually every stage of the innovation
process, from initiation to implementation, particularly in deploy-
ing the resources that carry innovation forward. Leadership is so
important that some scholars see it as the sole factor in success.
(1998, 19)
Four leadership attributes seem particularly important for innovation.
It is worth emphasizing that the leadership role for innovation does not
have to be lodged in the leader of the think tank; it could be assigned to
someone else who has the necessary skills, if that person is fully supported
by the leader.
Vision. Leaders have to be able to imagine different roles for their
organization if they are to help innovation succeed. The leader of a
tightly focused policy research organization might see it as a training
and educational institution as well, or, as in the case of the Center for the
Study of Democracy, as having a for-profit market survey arm. Leaders
should also be able to imagine attracting different types of talent to the
organization as a means of accomplishing new objectives. Vision may
involve defining new roles, but it also suggests being able to decide how
to move the organization to these new roles, at least in general terms.
Flexible temperament. One can readily imagine the key personal
attributes in this area: being intellectually curious, having a flexible
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operating style and interests, being open to staff, being supportive of
those assigned responsibility, being action-oriented, and having the
patience to see experiments through. Some degree of entrepreneurialism
also is essential.
Communication skills. A motivated staff is informed about and under-
stands what is happening in an organization. Good leaders communicate
regularly with the staff, either directly or through subordinates who are
clearly charged with informing their coworkers about developments
within the think tank. It is especially important for staff to know what
innovations are being pursued and how the innovations fit into plans for
the long-run development of the organization. This both encourages
employees to think of additional innovations and reassures them about
the think tank’s future.
Innovation skills. Leaders must be able to nurture an idea through the
innovation process—from idea through critical examination and pilot
testing—knowing how much to invest, how fast to go, how to be fair in
judging critiques, and how to help shape adjustments to the initial idea.
The leader must also be willing to take prudent risks. These skills require
intellectual acumen, team spirit, patience, and a fine sense of judgment
and entrepreneurialism.
This list of attributes is formidable, and not all think tank leaders have
all of them. The list is nevertheless a useful guide for leaders, who can use
it to make sure that members of the key decisionmaking team together
have all the attributes and can execute the essential functions, such as
communicating well with the staff.
The Process of Innovation
The process can be divided into three phases: calling for ideas, assessing
alternatives, and piloting the strongest candidates. These are unlikely to
be clean, discrete phases, and there will probably be overlap both for phases
of a single innovation and between successive innovations. One can
imagine, for example, that the piloting of one innovation will still be under
way when a new idea is already under discussion.17
Calling for Ideas
First, staff must understand that the welcome mat is out for ideas. If a
retreat for team leaders and management is planned, team leaders should
solicit and discuss ideas from their groups. They should understand that
the retreat will be more productive if people arrive with well-articulated
ideas, but first musings should also be on the agenda.
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
It is essential for the think tank’s director to provide some early guid-
ance for the type of ideas sought. If the topic of the retreat is to identify
significantly new directions for the organization that have a good
prospect of external support, then it is not appropriate to present research
topics only marginally different from those already being addressed. This
point is made more generally in box 7-2, which is oriented to for-profit
firms but is nonetheless applicable to think tanks: staff should adopt a
market orientation, rather than a production or sales orientation. Only
by envisioning the needs of their clients and sponsors (or “effective
demand,” in the economist’s language) will think tanks’ staff succeed in
defining viable innovations.
Staff can be encouraged to think about innovations in several different
areas. Drawing on a list presented in Dees (2001b, 163–64), the topics
listed in box 7-3 could be flagged as areas to consider.
Those advancing innovative ideas should be asked to consider five
questions in testing their thinking:
• What is the need (functional requirement) and the target market
(analytic studies, consulting services, on-site technical assistance,
training, software)? How large is the potential market?
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Production orientation
Focuses on
De-emphasizes
Sales orientation
Focuses on
De-emphasizes
Market orientation
Focuses on
Requires
Results in
Source: Bacon and Butler (1998), figure 11.
Box 7-2 Alternative Business Orientations
What we can produce
Meeting customer needs
Promoting what we already do
Meeting customer needs through product 
innovation
Meeting customer needs—including customers
for newly identified services
1. Detailed understanding of customer needs
2. Precise definition of target markets
1. Business functions oriented toward serving
customers
2. Above-average long-run orders for work
• What is the basis for the competitive opening—is there an unmet
need that no one has previously identified or is in a position to
address?
• What is the basis for the think tank’s competitive advantage: superior
product, lower cost, better outreach and marketing capabilities than
other providers, greater potential for continuous product innovations
(e.g., being able to provide cutting-edge technical assistance to local
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1. Creating a new or improved product or service—one with which users
are not yet familiar or one with aspects that are new to clients.
Example: An organization with a real estate practice could consider produc-
ing a text for use in trade association or university courses.
2. Introducing a new or improved strategy or method of operating—one
that has been not been used by the organization adopting it.
Example: A think tank that has worked with municipalities in a range of areas
could offer bundled services that would be both more strategic in their per-
spective and more effective for a municipality, and that would involve some
savings to the client compared with multiple single-focus initiatives.
3. Reaching a new market, serving an unmet need—making a product, service,
or program available to a group that did not otherwise have access to it.
Example: An organization could provide credit ratings on municipal bonds
where none had existed before.
4. Framing new terms of engagement—changing the terms on which the
organization relates to clients, consumers, funders, and/or employees.
Example: Think tanks that have worked with national or local governments
on preparing reform legislation and implementing pilot projects under fund-
ing from the donor community could begin offering similar services on a fee
basis as donor support is withdrawn.
5. Developing new funding structures—exploring different options for
reducing or covering the costs of producing or delivering a product 
or service.
Example: A think tank with a large training component for local NGOs or
local governments could reduce the number of sites where training is offered
by trying to teach larger groups with smaller faculties at fewer locations.
Source: Based on Dees (2001a, 163–64).
Box 7-3 Types of Innovative Opportunities
governments in a particular sector by transferring best practices
among them)?
• Does the organization have the expertise to pursue this opportu-
nity? If not, is it likely that the expertise can be acquired at a rea-
sonable cost?
• Does the organization have the capacity to support the initiative
(e.g., classroom space, the computer hardware and software for the
creation of a sophisticated web site)?
Think tanks face a particular challenge in analyzing the potential
demand for services: the client for the services is often not the entity
providing funding for them. For example, a bilateral donor may fund
technical assistance to local governments, who are the direct client for
the services. In such cases, think tanks must try to identify programs
that will better serve the interests of both the clients and the funder. In
some cases, a think tank can advance ideas to a donor based on market
research with beneficiaries for new projects. But it is critical that the
source of effective demand be clearly identified when innovations are
being assessed. Identifying the assistance local governments need is
insufficient if the donor-client is not convinced.
Finally, guidelines that encourage bold thinking about new areas of
activity should make it clear that new directions should build on the
organization’s existing strengths. Recall that this was the pattern for the
innovations reviewed earlier in this chapter. Building on success is desir-
able because the think tank can take full advantage of its reputation in
entering the new area; marketing will be more efficient, as some of the
key actors and potential clients will be known already; and start-up costs
will be lower than they otherwise would be, as existing resources can be
directed to the new activity.
Assessing Alternatives
Bacon and Butler (1998, 60) name three attributes of a desirable oppor-
tunity (innovation) for a firm:
• an unmet need of significant value to a current or potential customer
exists;
• the firm can provide the needed services and make a suitable profit
doing so; and
• the work advances the firm toward both its tactical and strategic
goals and objectives.
A think tank must assess each idea against these attributes.
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The assessment process is critical to achieving the desired outcome. As
Dees points out, “Successful innovation is as much a matter of execution
as it is of having new ideas” (2001b, 161). The review process must be
deliberate. Of course, some ideas advanced will be clearly inappropriate
and can be turned aside without further ado. For the ideas surviving the
initial screening, the review process must be rigorous (after all, the think
tank’s scarce resources for innovation should be invested in the best ideas).
It should also be viewed as objective and fair by the staff; otherwise staff
will be discouraged from contributing to the process in the future.18
For think tanks, the final attribute is perhaps the most important: the
new work must be consistent with its mission and objectives. The orga-
nization must remain true to itself. An earlier section discussed the chal-
lenges of taking on activities sharply different from those of the past,
but it also pointed out that it is easy to overestimate the turbulence that
new activities will produce in a think tank.
The greatest emphasis must clearly be placed on assessing the market for
the innovation. A formal business plan can be produced, and it may help
map out expected costs and revenues.19 But determining the probable
market is the key task. Staff at think tanks typically have little experience
in assessing markets. Put simply, for the kind of services that think tanks
offer, they need to canvass potential clients, such as20
• major donor organizations, in the case of technical studies and
technical assistance projects;
• local governments for technical assistance with certain policy and
management reforms and training events;
• national governments for policy analysis and possibly program
evaluations; and
• trade associations and their members (banks, municipalities, hos-
pitals) for training courses and possibly technical assistance.
Besides speaking directly with clients, staff can get ideas about poten-
tial demand from other sources, such as presentations at conferences
and the direction of change set by the national government (e.g., more
responsibilities being assigned to local governments could mean an
expanded market in technical assistance and training to these entities).
Moreover, monitoring what the competition is doing can often stimulate
thinking in new directions. Determining the extent of the market is
time-consuming, demanding work, but think tanks shy away from it at
their own peril.
The team assembled to assess proposed innovations must use the five
points listed above to examine any proposals that pass the initial screening.
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In conducting this assessment, it is important to proceed briskly; spending
too much time collecting data can lead to “analysis paralysis,” a particular
danger for research organizations (Kitzi 2001, 51). The team should also
consider whether an innovation has a particular window of opportunity:
how important is timing to success? Is demand likely to be one-off or
continuing?
At this point it is important for the institute director to have an initial
discussion about the initiative with the board of trustees; after all, sig-
nificant resources are to be committed. The key point is that the board
agrees that the initiative is within the organization’s mandate, consistent
with broad institutional development, and has a reasonable chance of
success given the information then available. The executive director is
seeking permission to devote more resources to further development,
usually with a promise to return to the board before shifting to the oper-
ation or launch stage. If a board meeting is not scheduled when the inno-
vation’s development reaches this stage, the executive director should
discuss the innovation with the executive committee or with the chair-
man and one or two other board members.
Piloting Promising Innovations
A think tank will typically decide to pursue one or perhaps two innovations
in a year, reflecting the presence of two kinds of constraints: limited finan-
cial resources for discretionary spending and limited capacity to launch
and manage the initiatives.
Determining Resource Requirements
Once the think tank’s leadership has decided to implement an innovation,
plans are usually made to pilot the innovation by developing the new
offering and testing the market. At this stage, a draft budget should be
prepared. The budget will include costs for a range of expenses:
• Developing the new product, such as a training course or the exper-
tise that can be applied in the new area. This may entail hiring a new
expert and making a one- or two-year commitment to the person.
• Carrying out one or more applications in the new work areas to
develop greater expertise and to establish a track record to use in
further marketing. A think tank may need to find cooperating
clients and carry out a trial application of the new service (e.g., work-
ing with a bank to develop its mortgage lending program, helping
a municipality develop its economic development plan, or offering
a training program for NGOs). Alternatively, it may need to finance
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the writing and publication of the initial issues of a new magazine
aimed at a broad policy audience. In each of these cases, the initial
experience may need to be subsidized.
• Developing and executing a carefully conceived marketing program
tightly targeted on the specific client group. This could include
producing print materials, such as brochures, but might also involve
allowing staff to participate in conferences where the new offering
could be announced. The marketing campaign would be timed to
follow the development stage and, where appropriate, the pilot
stage so that this experience could be used as a qualification.
At this point it is critical to define the total resources that can be devoted
to piloting the innovation and the timing of their availability: how much
will be available each month for the first six months and quarterly there-
after during the trial period? Some iteration between the draft budget for
the pilot and the funds available may be necessary.
Three ideas for minimizing the cash outlays are listed below:
• Phase in the implementation, funding only one or two stages at a time.
Allocate cash on a stage-by-stage basis as the milestones are reached.
• Convert fixed costs into variable costs. Instead of hiring the new
experts needed for the program, try to engage them as part-time
consultants during the early phases. An organization establishing
an extensive training program could rent space for classes as needed
instead of acquiring a larger office and classroom space.
• Look for excess capacity and underused resources. Can staff from an
area where work is light be reassigned to help develop the innova-
tion? Can the public relations specialist work on the marketing
campaign instead of hiring outside resources?21
The think tank needs to be clear about what noncash resources will be
needed for the launch. Often these will include enlisting political support
or sponsorship for the innovation. General sponsorship might come from
the think tank’s board of trustees, but further support may be needed.
Questions to consider include the following:
• Who is being designated to contact the head of the relevant trade
association, the relevant minister, or the head of the World Bank’s
representative office?
• What are the chances that those making the contacts will success-
fully arrange the meeting and obtain support? What is the fallback
position if there is a refusal?
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• Specific activities may also need sponsorship: who can approach
the mayor to solicit his city’s participation in an economic devel-
opment pilot project?
Even after the general plan for implementation is developed, a number
of further preparatory steps can increase the odds of success. The major
tasks remaining include the following.22
Get board approval. All the information is now at hand on the actual
innovation, the results of the market analysis, how to launch it, and what
the launch will cost. This information should be presented to the board and
its general agreement to proceed secured. Some board members may have
ideas for improvement and these should be taken under advisement; but,
as discussed in chapter 6, the board should be kept away from operational
questions, such as which staff should participate. On the other hand, offers
to help promote the new activity should be greeted warmly and very care-
fully considered—they should be consistent with the overall plans and not
distort them, unless the offered actions are clear enhancements. If a board
meeting is not already conveniently scheduled, the executive director
should decide with the board chairman if a special meeting is required or
if informal consultation would provide sufficient board input.
Define performance targets for the testing period—usually one to two years.
Setting targets forces everyone to be explicit about their expectations for
the innovation. These goals should be set out in terms that are as concrete
as possible. Obviously, the expectations should be determined in light of
the resources being devoted to launching the innovation.23
Create a calendar of activities necessary for achieving the goals. This is the
monthly “to do” list. Again, being explicit about the schedule for each
component, the relation among components, and who is responsible
for each can save resources and frustration during the pilot phase.
Write down the assumptions behind the definition of the pilot’s success and
identify the most crucial ones. For example, the most crucial assumption
in an innovative technical assistance program designed to foster economic
development in municipalities might be the rate at which the munici-
palities contract for this service after the new approach has been demon-
strated in two cities. What if the assumed rate is too optimistic? How large
a margin of error can be tolerated without the innovation being a failure?
If more realistic assumptions render the margin of error too thin, the
decision to go forward may need to be reconsidered.
Design the venture with explicit milestones that reflect the points at which
the most crucial assumptions will be tested. The milestones should cover the
development stages for the product or service and should track the interest,
orders, and cash generated by the innovation at various points in time.
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Include “permission to fail” in the plan. Although a think tank should
be able to monitor the degree of success of an innovation, it must also
be prepared to admit that there is not a demand for the new product or
service when this is the case—and to do so in a timely way. It is important
for the staff to know that advancing an innovation that ultimately fails is
not necessarily a demerit on the person’s standing within the organization.24
If the innovation were assessed in the thorough manner outlined above,
then the failure, like a success, would have a “thousand fathers.” Senior
management ultimately makes the decision and bears the responsibility,
but there is little gain in assigning blame.
It is profitable, however, to try to understand which assumptions were
wrong and how the review process failed. The answer may be that only
limited useful information was available on the point. But it may be that
the organization did not conduct enough market research—an area that
could be improved in the future. The value of such careful, systematic,
ex post reviews is difficult to overstate.25
It is also important to try to assess whether the critical condition that
led to the failure of the innovation is likely to change in the near future
or could be changed with a different promotional approach. While the
odds are generally against this, there may be reason to allocate modest
additional investment to keep the innovation alive or to make a different
promotional campaign.
SUMMARY
Think tanks can be successful innovators, and the four case studies pre-
sented here suggest a range of possibilities. Many others also come to
mind—writing textbooks for trade associations, partnering with trade
associations to offer training programs, or adding a new area of expertise
to a research program. Innovative think tanks—those that consistently
have innovations to consider—are few and far between, just as innovative
firms and NGOs are rare in the for-profit and nonprofit worlds. A think
tank’s ability to innovate results from an environment that encourages
staff to think broadly and creatively and from leadership that organizes
and inspires a process for capturing the ideas and vetting them openly
and objectively.
It is critical that the organization have some discretionary funds to
support implementation of the most promising innovations. Piloting
an innovation should be structured with great care. Indeed, an objective
observer might say that the preparation for some of the case study inno-
vations was not sufficiently thorough. The fact that they nonetheless
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succeeded is a tribute to the strength of the unmet need for the new service.
But most innovations are not so robust.
In the end, innovation may be essential for the survival of most think
tanks; they must adjust to the changing policy agenda and shifting needs
of their various client groups. Think tanks will adjust with greater agility
if they consciously foster innovations through an orderly process con-
taining the elements outlined in this chapter.
N O T E S
1. Two new guides to managing innovation in nonprofit organizations
make the same decision (i.e., they do not cover how to prepare a strategic plan):
Light (1998) and Dees, Emerson, and Economy (2001). See Bryson (1995) and
Covello and Hazelgren (1995) on the preparation of a strategic plan.
2. The text concentrates on innovations to a think tank’s work program and
sponsors. Two other forms of innovation deserve mention: restructuring the
organization to achieve significant improvements in productivity, and mergers
of currently independent think tanks.
One hears little about major internal reorganizations designed to drive down
costs and make a think tank more efficient and competitive. The lack of infor-
mation likely results from the fact that such changes are wholly internal events.
Nevertheless, one can imagine the kinds of changes that could be made. For exam-
ple, a think tank that had organized its work along thematic lines (e.g., health
policy, local government finance, social assistance) may decide that this is inef-
ficient because each thematic group is involved in technical assistance projects,
evaluations, and econometric analyses. The groups are too small to permit each
to possess true expertise in each technical competency. The result is that some
work is being poorly done by nonexperts, some staff are not fully employed,
and some staff are frustrated because they are not working on their preferred
assignments. Reorganizing by type of expertise (technical assistance, econometric
analysis, evaluation) combined with much smaller thematic teams could address
these problems.
The root cause for most mergers is financial pressure to cut costs, gain
market share, and offer a broader array of capability to sponsors. This pressure
has been especially acute in Eastern Europe in the past few years as donor
support for the economic and political transition in the region has fallen very
sharply and think tanks that had relied upon donor funding are forced to
retrench and consider fundamental adjustments. Two forms of adjustment
among the several possible (LaPiana 1997) seem particularly relevant. One is
back-office consolidation, under which the costs of core administration func-
tions are shared among think tanks while each think tank maintains its own
identity. Examples of these functions are accounting, copying, public relations,
secretarial services, and, in some cases, even research assistants.
More common is the merger of near-equals or the effective acquisition of
one think tank by another. There is a growing literature on these processes for
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nonprofit organizations that gives pointers on what leaders of a think tank might
expect in such a process. A common theme is that few mergers are carefully
analyzed from a business perspective as part of the preparation. The greatest
problem in achieving agreement to merge is the relative status of the two
organizations—and their leaders—after the merger. Where mergers are hurried,
post-merger staff morale problems are common. Finally, key ingredients for
success are good leadership and honest, open communication between an orga-
nization’s leadership and the staff. For more on these points, see, for example,
LaPiana (1997), McMurtry, Netting, and Kettner (1991), Singer and Yankey
(1991), and Wernet and Jones (1992).
3. This trend has been particularly prevalent in America; see, for example,
Young and Salamon (2002).
4. Bruckner (1996) has commented on the tendency for think tanks in the
region to begin chasing contracts to survive and the problems this has engendered.
5. In the West, think tanks deal with this problem in two ways. First, they
work hard at negotiating publication and use-of-data clauses in their contracts
so that their rights in these areas are preserved. Sometimes this involves giving
the client exclusive use of the data for a period of time—often three to six months.
In other cases the clients secure the right to receive an advance copy of any pub-
lication dealing with the project with the right to comment on it within a specified
period, but they cannot block publication. Second, think tanks simply refuse to
accept contracts from some classes of customers. In the United States, one of the
requirements for think tanks to maintain their nonprofit tax status is that all the
work done by such organizations be broadly for the public good: proprietary
research and consulting is inconsistent with this requirement.
6. Think tanks in the United States and Europe employ various methods to
handle this delicate task. These include, at a minimum, notification of clients
about the policy position the think tank is taking on a particular issue and an
advance copy of articles being submitted for publication in either a popular or
scientific outlet. A more generous approach is the offer of a briefing to the client
in advance of a press conference or release or testimony before the legislature. In
either case, such actions keep the client from being caught unawares or unprepared
to respond to the think tank’s statements. These are notices and opportunities for
discussion; they are not an offer by the think tank to alter its conclusions. These
steps help maintain good relations with the clients, but they do nothing to reas-
sure others of the objectivity of the think tank’s recommendations.
7. This problem and the next two are discussed in Davies (1997, 33–44).
8. See, for example, Tschirbart (1996) on how to manage such transactions
effectively.
9. The firm can elect to take advantage of this “dividend” in two general ways:
overhead rates can be reduced, making the firm more price-competitive for
acquiring additional work, or new overhead services can be added. For example,
as the firm expands it can hire a public relations officer without undermining
its competitive position.
10. The author’s sense is that in at least two of these cases the heads of the
think tanks did not want to give away what they viewed as commercial secrets.
11. Note that not all actions cited as entrepreneurial by the respondents have
been included. Some had begun too recently at the time of the interview to be of
interest, and others were simply a somewhat different approach to marketing to
prior clients.
12. CDFE was not anxious to advertise its special corporate training activities,
because some viewed the training as not fully consistent with its primary mission,
so it used none of these tools.
13. See, for example, Bullen and colleagues (1997), Burlingame and Ilchman
(1996), Davis (1997), and Maxwell (1996).
14. Wheeler and Hunger (2000) provide a comprehensive treatment of
strategic plans.
15. Of the sources consulted, this discussion draws the most on Light (1998,
chapters 1 and 4).
16. Letts and colleagues (1999, 73), among others, stress this point.
17. This section draws generally on Bacon and Butler (1998) and Kitzi (2001).
18. Light (1998, 50) also makes this point for nonprofit organizations.
19. On the preparation of business plans, see, for example, Covello and
Hazelgren (1995).
20. Majeska (2001) gives a good review on analyzing customer requirements.
21. Dees (2001a) has additional ideas in this direction.
22. This discussion draws substantially on Dees (2001a).
23. Bacon and Butler (1998, 66) also emphasize the importance of concrete
goals.
24. Light (1998, 145) lists several ways that “permission to fail” can be trans-
mitted to the staff, including a lively “New Orleans” funeral for an innovation that
died, an awards program for the year’s most impossible dream, or even forgive-
ness coupons and permission slips from the executive director.
25. Darling, Parry, and Moore (2005) include a good discussion of how to
perform ex post reviews.
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Winning Work from
Government Agencies
8
In their early years, most think tanks are dependent on grants frominternational foundations and contracts from bilateral and inter-
national donors, such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Department for International Development in the
United Kingdom (DFID). It is important for thinks tanks, however, to
diversify their funding to include a significant share of support from local
sources. Local sponsorship lends a certain type of credibility to policy
recommendations and it helps protect a think tank’s activity level against
the “donor fatigue” common with international foundations. Because
philanthropic support from foundations or corporations remains generally
underdeveloped outside Western European and North American nations,
working with government eventually becomes very important to most
think tanks.
Most think tanks begin working with government agencies only after an
initial period, as suggested above. By this point think tanks have experience
with international foundations and donor agencies to build on. This is
particularly important in developing proposal writing, analytic, and pre-
sentation skills. But the reality is that doing business with government
agencies differs from working with international organizations.
As governments in many countries in the region have grown to
appreciate the value of external analysis, explicit budget lines have been
created for such work—and budgeted amounts have been growing. By
2005, the research and development (R&D) budgets of some national
ministries and agencies were significant. The Estonian Ministry of
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Economics and Communications had $31 million budgeted, for example
(Lee 2005). Russia’s Ministry of Economy and Trade had an $8 million
budget for external research. The comparatively small Hungarian agency,
the National Housing and Building Office, spent $150,000 on commis-
sioned studies in the same year.
This chapter provides guidance on winning work from government
agencies in a think tank’s home country. The first step is to understand
why government agencies outsource research and program evaluation and
how they are organized to contract for these services. After covering this
topic, the second section of this chapter addresses how to win government
contracts. The final section considers what think tank in countries that
have little or no outsourcing for research could do to improve the situation.
This discussion is based on information, interviews, and experience in
Russia, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United States, as well as
information gathered at conferences and additional discussions.
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES CONTRACT OUT
Why Outsource?
Three reasons for a government agency to contract out for research and
evaluation studies come readily to mind. The first is staff constraints. It
is doubtful that a government ministry will ever be permitted to hire the
volume of staff it would need to meet the reasonable requests for research
and program evaluation made by the minister and assistant ministers,
plus requests from the prime minister’s office. Given this reality, hiring
additional resources from outside the agency is a necessity. The second
reason is that it is doubtful that government agencies would be able to
attract the necessary mix of economists, policy analysts, statisticians,
sampling and survey experts, and others to serve as civil servants.
The third reason is flexibility. Practically every agency operates a range
of programs. The research and evaluations call for diverse skills and back-
grounds to address the issues of these different programs efficiently and
accurately. It makes no sense for the agency to have such a large staff when
the need for a specific skill set is episodic. A particular program, for exam-
ple, may need an impact evaluation once every several years. Hence, con-
tracting out is more efficient than building up an agency’s in-house staff.
Importantly, under the socialist system, most ministries had research
institutes attached to them. The ministry and the institute would negotiate
a work plan annually and funds to execute the plan would be allocated
from the central budget (not typically the ministry’s). In other words, there
is a tradition of contracting out for research in the Eastern Europe-
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. What has changed is
that the work is now allocated competitively and managers probably have
a stronger interest in the timeliness and usefulness of the analysis produced.
What Does Outsourcing Require?
First and foremost outsourcing requires money—that is, the agency’s
budget must contain the necessary funds. Most countries have an explicit
line item in the agency’s budget for “research and evaluation” or something
similar. Where this is not the case, and there are countries in Eastern
Europe today without explicit line items, the agency is forced to divert
funds from the delivery of services to fund this work—clearly a problem-
atic situation. (How the budget is determined is discussed below.)
Beyond money, outsourcing for research and evaluation requires the
agency is organized for this function. Table 8-1 illustrates three typical
structures that agencies adopt for this kind of contracting out.
Model A is found in many western countries but is not evident in tran-
sitional countries. The main player is a special office responsible for policy
development and research that reports directly to the minister. In this
model, the policy development function is centralized rather than assigned
to each assistant minister responsible for a program area. The model places
the small number of policy experts in the ministry in the same office, which
facilitates their work. It also addresses the reality that the policy develop-
ment workload in a single program area varies sharply over time. When the
policy staff is located in the program offices, the staff in one office can be
overwhelmed while that in the next office is underused. The model A
arrangement also collects in one place those staff with expertise in research,
writing terms of reference, and conducting competitions.
This centralized office consults with the program offices to develop its
annual research and evaluation agenda. Program office staff review terms
of reference and participate in the panels that score proposals from con-
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Table 8-1 Ways Agencies Are Organized for Contracting Out
Centralized research Procurement office 
Model Program office office in the agency in the agency
A Secondary Primary Broad oversight
B Shared NA Shared
C Exclusivea NA Broad oversight
NA = not applicable
a Typically on small contracts—that is, those below a maximum amount set in the national 
procurement regulations.
tractors, but the process is controlled and managed by the central research
office. The agency’s procurement or contracts office monitors the com-
petitions, negotiates contracts with help from the research office, and
signs them.
Model B depicts the common arrangement in the Eastern Europe-CIS
region. Responsibilities are shared between the program office and the
procurement office. There is no centralized research and policy develop-
ment office in this scheme. Tasks within the contracting process (as
described in the next section) are shared between the two.
Model C, where the program office has full responsibility, coexists with
model B in most agencies. Usually, an office can use this arrangement only
when the value of the contract is below a maximum amount—an amount
specified in the national procurement regulations. In principle, model C
should be employed rarely. The reality appears rather different, with many
offices using this model routinely to avoid the administratively complica-
tions that come with model B.1 Within model C, in some countries the
program office can simply select a firm without competitive bidding for
small value contracts. For amounts above the limit on the non-competition
contracts and below the threshold for a full competition when model B
must be used, the program office runs a limited competition—meaning
typically three firms must submit a bid. The flexibility afforded program
offices by these rules affects how think tanks market themselves to agencies
with whom they want to work, as described later.
Tasks Involved in Outsourcing
Any agency originating a contract for research undertakes a series of
actions. Each action is discussed below. Where appropriate, differences
in the way the task is executed depending on how the agency has orga-
nized such procurements (the three models) are noted. Think tanks are
well advised to understand the procurement cycle, since this is the first
step in developing a strategy on how they can operate effectively in this
environment.
Determining the annual budget. As part of regular budget preparation,
the agency determines the research budget for each office. The process
begins the year before the budget year—that is, the year the funds are spent.
In model A, the centralized research and evaluation office, after consult-
ing with the program offices, prepares its recommended budget along with
a general description of how it will be used. Its proposal is scrutinized
and possibly adjusted by the ministry before being sent to the Ministry
of Finance, which performs another round of reviews and determines the
amount included in the final budget. In the other models, the overall
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process is similar except that each program office prepares the proposed
budget and research plan. In some instances, only a budget figure is
required without a justification statement. Internal review and coordi-
nation within the ministry are typically handled by the procurement office.
Under all models, detailed research agendas for the year are developed
only when the resources available are known.
Two points should be noted. First, the program office is setting the
agenda, except in model A. If a think tank wants to influence an agency’s
future research agenda, then this office is its target. Second, staff in every
program office interviewed by this author stated that the research budget
available was far below what they needed. In other words, the process for
determining the budget systematically results in underfunding research.
This means that price may often be the paramount consideration in
deciding the winner among competing firms.
Preparing the terms of reference (TOR). In models B and C, the program
office often drafts the TOR. In model B, the TOR is then reviewed and
possibly modified by the procurement office. In some countries, the agency
creates a panel to prepare the TOR that includes staff from the program
and procurement offices and other offices in the agency with interest in
the subject matter. In model A, the TOR is drafted by the central research
office and reviewed by the program office.
Distributing the request for proposals (RFP). The standard procedure is
for a RFP to be made widely available. Often, this means it is placed on
the agency’s web site on a page where all procurements appear. In some
instances, an agency sends a notice to firms who have submitted proposals
in the past.
For procurements with values below critical thresholds, more limited
notification is the rule. As noted, in the case of a limited competition
usually three proposals are needed. For very small contracts, a single con-
tractor can be invited to submit a proposal. Many program offices are
structuring their procurements to avoid full competitions—a practice
that can afford certain firms a clear advantage.
This is typically not a matter of corruption. The general view of program
office staff is that they know the firms doing research in their area very
well; they know the relative strengths and weaknesses of each on various
topics. So they want to choose the firm to do the work. In part this reflects
the frequent reality of limited capabilities among firms and therefore
limited possibilities for true competition. But it obviously discourages
existing firms from expanding their areas of expertise, if they believe they
will not be selected for a contract when there is an established leader. It
is even more discouraging to those considering starting a new think tank
to work in an area.
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What about the research institutes that were formerly associated with
the ministry? The short answer is that they are free to compete for con-
tracts. Little funding is typically available to these institutes on a non-
competitive basis and, indeed, most have withered to shadows of their
former selves as support for the massive Soviet-era research establishment
disappeared with the collapse of the old regime. Program managers
commissioning research appear much more interested in receiving a
quality product that helps them with their work than in supporting any
particular organization.
Scoring the proposals. For a full and open competition, proposals are
formally scored using factors for award that are announced in the RFP.
Under model B, a panel consisting of staff from the program and pro-
curement offices is usually appointed for this task. In Russia, staff from
the program office score the proposals and two or three experts from
outside the agency also score them independently. Both use a standard
set of 15 factors. The two sets of scores are discussed and reconciled at a
meeting that includes those who scored the proposals along with repre-
sentatives from the procurement office and other interested offices
within the agency. In the next stage, the program office recommends a
winner and the same commission meets to review it. Technical quality and
price are both considered.
In model A, the panel scoring the proposals consists of staff from the
program and the central research office. The panel recommends the winner
to a senior official who usually makes only a pro forma review before
giving approval.
For smaller competitions, the procedures are less rigorous. In Hungary,
only the program office assesses the proposals for such procurements.
Indeed, the competition in some agencies is strictly on the basis of price.
Those interviewed in offices with this practice asserted that research pro-
posals were too subjective to use standard criteria for assessments. The
RFP requires that a bidder demonstrate it has the basic competence to do
the work, but the RFP does not require the proposal to discuss how the
contractor would carry out the work. The deliverables required are stated
in the RFP. The winner is the firm offering the lowest price among those
firms deemed qualified to do the work. Clearly, with only three firms nec-
essary for a competition and with these firms being invited by the pro-
gram office, considerable scope for collusion and favoritism exists.
Negotiating the contract. For full and open competitions, the universal
practice is that strictly contractual matters, such as the conditions stated
in the draft contract about the firm’s right to publish the results, are the
responsibility of the procurement office. Under model B, the procurement
office also negotiates with the contractor about adjustments to the scope
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of work, presumably on the advice of the program office. In model A, the
central research office has a more active role in negotiating these changes
but works closely with the procurement office.
Again, practices differ for the smaller awards. In many instances the
program office negotiates and signs the contract. In other cases the pro-
curement office executes the contract on the recommendation of the
program office.
Quality control and acceptance of deliverables. In both models B and C,
the program office is responsible for working with the contractor over the
life of the project to insure that acceptable quality work is prepared.
The same office formally accepts contract deliverables. In model A, these
are tasks of the central research office. In short, the program office or
central research office is the real client for the research.
In most countries, the responsible offices have some kind of external
review of the work being done. In Hungary, one office reported that the
oversight consists of checking the physical presence of reports and CD-
ROMs submitted for each project. In Russia’s Ministry of Economy, an
especially appointed commission reviews the products to certify that
they meet the contract’s requirements.
The foregoing outlines the workings of the research acquisition cycle
common to government agencies in many countries. The starting point
for a think tank to be successful in winning contracts is understanding
the specifics of the contracting process of the agencies with which it works.
As indicated, not all agencies have the same practices. How to market
effectively to each office depends critically on how it organizes its pro-
curement process.
HOW TO WIN CONTRACTS
Winning contracts from government agencies is only partly about writing
good proposals. Indeed, the previous section points to various ways a firm
can gain advantage in what appears to be a highly objective process. This
section is not about writing proposals. Most think tanks learn this part
of the craft early from the requirements of international foundations and
donors. Rather, this section focuses on how to cultivate relationships and
develop advantages.
Influencing the Agenda
A good way for an organization to establish itself as keenly aware of policy
developments and to help a government office organize its future research
agenda is to offer ideas for analytic projects that will support upcoming
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policy considerations. Proposed program evaluations are also good topics
in principle, although most managers in the region still do not appreciate
the constructive role evaluations can play in improving program perfor-
mance. Many think tanks use this approach, both because it is good
marketing and because they sincerely believe that the research proposal
is in the public interest.
Clearly, the think tank must prepare carefully for such meetings. This
is not easy, because it requires looking ahead a year or more to forecast
what the office’s analytic needs will be then: what policy topics will be
under active consideration? It is good practice to have a one- to two-page
summary to hand over—this leaves a record of the idea with the officials
and indicates seriousness of purpose on the think tank’s part. While the
officials will understand that this is a marketing meeting, it is important
to focus on the substance of the research. The officials will appreciate the
firm’s capabilities from the quality of the presentation and discussion. A
successful meeting concludes with the officials believing that the analysis
will genuinely meet their needs.
Meetings of this type are also good opportunities to inquire about
upcoming procurements so the organization can prepare to compete
for these contracts.
A common mistake of think tanks is to stay on the same topic too long—
that is, to keep proposing additional work on a topic on which analysis
has already been done, usually by the firm proposing more analysis.
With limited resources, program offices need to address many areas, and
continuing to invest in a particular topic is unlikely. If the think tank
continues to press, its leaders may find it harder to get appointments
with the agency staff.
Reputation
As mentioned in the previous section, officials often know what firm they
want to do a specific task and work hard to structure the procurement
so they get their choice. This means a firm’s reputation in particular
areas is critical to being invited to bid on limited competition contracts.
Past performance is obviously a factor, and if there is reason to believe
that the official (perhaps a new official) does not fully appreciate the
institute’s record, sending a well-crafted, targeted letter and brochure can
be effective.
But it is equally important from time to time to remind these officials of
the think tank’s capabilities. Common ways of doing this include send-
ing them hard copies of reports that are expected to be of special interest
to a particular office; including relevant clients and potential clients on the
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distribution list for e-mails that summarize new research and include links
to reports that can be downloaded; and inviting clients to events the
institute organizes, such as roundtable discussions or particularly relevant
staff presentations.
Being Attentive
Actions on this list go beyond those designed to keep the institute’s good
name and reputation before the relevant officials. The following are
examples of actual actions by some think tanks to promote themselves
to government clients:
• Most think tanks have annual parties of some type to which clients
can be invited. Christmas and New Year are common occasions.
Some have summer outings—picnics or boat cruises.
• Many think tanks send greeting cards on the major holidays and
remember the milestone birthdays.
• One think tank offered to brief a new deputy minister who was
unfamiliar with the subject of his new responsibilities on the gen-
eral structure and key issues in the sector. The official accepted and
spent a half-day being briefed.
• A think tank learned that a senior official liked to interact profession-
ally with young people. The institute had several staff who regularly
taught university courses and arranged for the official to give a
guest presentation to one of the classes.
• Occasionally a think tank has the chance to influence the compo-
sition of a team being sent abroad on a study tour. Including an
important client when the topic is appropriate is generally very
appreciated.
Many think tanks take the kind of initiatives listed just above and under
“Reputation.” It is important to implement these initiatives systematically
and not just as an impulse or afterthought. A junior staffer can easily be
tasked with managing such a process.
Respect
At a conference in summer 2005 on cooperation between government
agencies and policy research organizations, presentations were made on
contracting out.2 Government officials from several countries made the
point that it is critical for think tank leaders and experts to show a certain
level of respect to the officials. This is not about respect for the office.
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Rather, the problem is analysts talking down to officials, making it far
too evident that the experts are just that and that the officials are not.
This may seem like a small point, but it is not to the officials. Think tank
senior managers should be very alert to the attitudes of their staff and,
where required, do the essential coaching.
Partnering
A central point in the foregoing section is that winning awards from gov-
ernment agencies in many countries is an insiders’ game. An established
reputation in the topic area at hand is very important. One way to become
more competitive for certain contracts is to partner with another firm
with complementary skills. In other words, both organizations benefit
from adding the other’s capabilities in competing for a specific project.
Consider the example of a housing ministry interested in improving the
targeting of its housing allowance program so subsidies are concentrated
on very low income families. One firm has detailed knowledge of the
country’s housing programs but does not know much about targeting
social programs. The second firm has a strong reputation in the social
assistance area, including the targeting of benefits under cash transfer
programs to the very poor, but it knows nothing about housing programs.
The combined expertise of the two firms yields very strong credentials for
the project. Naturally, not all competitions will lend themselves to such
combinations, but it is certainly an option to consider regularly.
Forming the partnership in this case is clearly very important. But it
is equally important to make sure the client office appreciates the capa-
bilities of the combined firms. A joint meeting of the two firms with the
program office is a necessity if at all possible, particularly under a limited
competition when the program office decides which firms are invited to
submit proposals. Sending a written statement about the combination
and the intentions to work together on this type of project is probably
the next best approach. A follow-up phone call is very important.
Learning from Failed Efforts
Most think tanks lose at least as many competitions as they win.
Sometimes the reasons for losing are idiosyncratic, but there may be
systematic problems with the firm’s approach as well. The great major-
ity of think tanks (and for-profit firms for that matter) do not devote
sufficient resources to learning from lost bids.3
Institutes can undertake at least two actions to improve future pro-
posals’ chances of success. The first is to request a debriefing from the
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agency that held the competition. At such debriefings someone involved
in the selection process will inform the think tank representatives of the
strengths and weaknesses of the proposal compared with those submit-
ted by other firms. Perhaps the price was too high, insufficient time was
budgeted for the project director, or the proposed approach overlooked
a key methodological point. Usually statements will be fairly general but,
if listened to carefully, they will signal the significant problems. This infor-
mation is clearly very useful for a losing firm. Another, indirect benefit:
agency staff often take note of which firms ask for debriefings, and agencies
are often impressed by the diligence of those who make the effort to learn
for the future.
Think tank leaders participating in such debriefings must guard against
complaining and challenging statements made by the official, unless there
is clear evidence that the basic procedures governing the competition were
violated. Complaining will leave a unconstructive impression and may
negatively affect the attitude of those reviewing proposals in the future.
Not all agencies routinely provide such briefings. Whether they are
obliged to do so depends on the procurement regulations. It is difficult
to generalize on this point, as the provisions differ among countries. If
the regulations give bidders the right to a debriefing but the agency resists
giving one, the contractor will have weigh whether it is worth aggravating
the agency to get the debriefing.
The second action a think tank can take is to convene a meeting of those
who took part in preparing the proposal and systematically go through
their proposal—both technical and cost elements. The main elements to
consider in the technical proposal are the following:
• Quality of the staff proposed—did they really have the right quali-
fications for their assigned tasks?
• The project’s organizational structure—was the amount of time
proposed for each person? Was control over certain functions(for
example, a household survey) adequate? If subcontractors were
involved, were lines of authority among all parties clear? Was it clear
who would be directly answerable to the agency-customer?
• Quality of approach to the research or analysis—was what was being
proposed absolutely clear? In rereading the RFP, can any issues be
identified that were not explicitly addressed in the proposal? Was
the scheduling of the work realistic? Did the different activities log-
ically relate in time to each other?
After the review of this particular proposal, the think tank should
study the findings of similar reviews for other proposals in the past several
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months to identify patterns.4 In addition, it should examine the results of
other competitions with the same government office to detect a pattern in
what the competition offered compared with the think tank’s proposal.
A similar, detailed review of the cost proposal should be undertaken.
The analysis should be especially careful if the institute lost on price by
a wide margin. Comments from various think tanks in the region, com-
bined with discussions with government officials in program offices that
are contracting out for research, suggest that government clients often do
not really appreciate the relationship between price and the quality of the
product they receive. There seems to be a sense that contractors either
pad their budgets substantially or have some reserve funds to “top up”
the contracted amount if it is necessary to maintain quality. The reality,
of course, is that think tanks do neither. Unfortunately, it will probably
take some years before many officials contracting for research become
more discerning in terms of product quality.
WHEN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO NOT 
HAVE RESEARCH BUDGETS
Remarkable as it may seem in this era of new public management when
outsourcing by governments for all kinds of goods and services is
commonplace, some countries have not enabled government agencies
to contract out routinely for research and program evaluations. Bosnia
and Herzegovina is one such nation.5 Azerbaijan is another.6 In these
countries, the little contracting out is done is financed by funds taken from
other budget lines, usually those that fund actual program operations.
Occasionally, agencies still rely on separately funded research institutes.
The question of interest here is what can think tanks do in such cases to
promote legislation that would create a line item for research in govern-
ment agency budgets. Observing the Bosnia case, two ingredients seem
necessary for progress on this front. The first is the demonstration of the
utility of using research in the policy process. The idea is to find examples
of research conducted by think tanks with funding from international
foundations or from international donors (such as the World Bank or
UNDP) that played an important role in informing the government and
the parliament on a particular policy issue. The examples may differ for
the government and the parliament. Several examples are better than
one or two. And they should be examples where the use of the informa-
tion was quite visible. Because most transitional and developing countries
have recently developed poverty reduction strategy programs with very
substantial donor assistance, this is a good place to look for an example.
These cases are the evidence for the government and parliament that
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policy research can play an important role in developing the country’s
policies and programs.
The second ingredient is a united effort by local think tanks to lobby
key government ministers, and perhaps ultimately the prime minister,
and members of parliament to enact the necessary legislation and to
appropriate at least small funding amounts for the new research line
item. Getting cooperation among think tanks may be difficult. The
adjective best describing their relations with each other is probably
“competitive” rather than “collegial.” This is understandable, but this is
one case where the common good will have to prevail to make progress.
Combined local think tanks have the necessary contacts with government
and parliamentary leaders. With cooperation in hand, the way forward
is execution of a carefully drawn lobbying plan under which two or three
think tank leaders together visit the key political leaders and make the case
for funding research. The basic argument is clear: here are concrete exam-
ples of cases where research has served an important role in improving
legislation or program implementation; it now is only available if it is
funded externally; and to improve national policymaking and program
administration, agencies should be able to fund their own research.
It also may be useful to fortify this argument with an example from
a neighboring country that explicitly funds research in agency budgets.
Enlisting carefully targeted support from heads of the local representative
offices of the international donors should also be helpful.
N O T E S
1. In Hungary in 2005, an office could negotiate a contract with a single con-
tractor if the contract value was under HUF 2 million (∼$10,000); the maximum
contract amount for limited competitions was HUF 10 million; both maximum
amounts are exclusive of the applicable value-added tax.
2. “Beyond Analysis—The Broader Role of Policy Research Organizations
in BiH,” Jahorina (Sarajevo), Bosnia, July 14–16, 2005.
3. Darling and others (2005) include an excellent discussion about learning
from mistakes.
4. To do this, written summary notes for prior reviews should have been
prepared.
5. In 2004, with assistance from the European Union, BiH created the
Economic Policy Planning Unit in the office of the prime minister with the
tasks of monitoring the implementation of the country’s midterm development
strategy and conducting timely policy research. This was the only formally
funded research in the government at that time, although some agencies found
funds from non-dedicated sources to finance some studies.
6. Based on interviews with senior government officials in three ministries.
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Financial Management:
Sustainability and
Accountability
9
Like any economic organization, think tanks operate in a market.Discussions about think tanks tend to focus on the aspect of this
market that deals with ideas and policies: What problems and issues are
critical to society and decisionmakers? What topics are in vogue with
sponsors? But there is also an economic aspect to this market: How much
funding for research is available? What are the costs of carrying out that
research? Apart from those organizations with substantial endowments,
most think tanks are required to compete for limited funding.
Assuming a think tank has the technical qualities to be competitive
in the market for ideas and policies, being able to compete successfully for
this limited funding also requires that the organization can demonstrate
two other qualities: an understanding of its costs, and control of and
accountability for its use of sponsor funding. The first quality is necessary
to link the research it intends to carry out with the funding available from
a sponsor. An organization that consistently underestimates the real costs
of carrying out an assignment will soon either deplete its own resources or
find that sponsors are reluctant to continue supporting work that is
incomplete or requires additional funding. The second quality is necessary
to demonstrate to sponsors that the funds provided were used for the pur-
pose intended. Sponsors provide varying latitude on the use of research
funds (for example, grants often allow more discretion on the part of the
recipient than contracts), but most sponsors require an accounting of the
expenditure of funds to confirm their use for their intended purpose.
Despite the importance of these aspects of financial management to
the sustainability of think tanks, understanding and accounting for costs
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frequently pose problems for both the organizations themselves and their
sponsors as think tanks develop into more substantial organizations.
Outside highly industrialized countries, think tanks often start in
one of two ways: as a small group of professionals, often around a single
strong technical leader, or as an organization supported mainly by a single
sponsor. In both these cases, the systems of financial management usually
adopted do not readily respond to the two qualities identified above. In
the first case, the organization often operates ad hoc—staff are not salaried
(or only paid nominal salaries), but are paid on a project basis (much like
consultants) when funding is available; fixed costs (for items such as
rent, utilities, and administration) are allocated to projects unsystem-
atically; business development costs are either unpaid by the organization
(through staff providing unpaid labor) or improperly financed from
project funds; and record keeping varies with the requirements of each
project. In the second case, the other extreme often prevails—the orga-
nization’s financial management is geared to meeting the requirements
of the sponsor, not the organization. In such circumstances, sponsor
funding often covers many of the fixed costs of the organization, leading
to an underestimation of the real cost of developing and carrying out
work for other sponsors.
As a think tank develops from these initial stages into a mature orga-
nization, several situations naturally occur:
• greater formality in staffing arrangements (payment of fixed salaries,
payment of employee-related taxes and social insurance contribu-
tions, provision of paid leave, provision of support for staff training
and professional development);
• more substantial fixed costs related to facilities (rent, utilities, equip-
ment, and maintenance) and administration for the organization
(personnel administration, meeting legal requirements for taxation
and registration, internal organizational management); and
• greater costs for business development (staff time for collecting
information on new funding opportunities and writing proposals)
and fund-raising.1
These changes all result in the organization incurring costs which either
are not attributable to specific research projects or can only be attributed
to specific projects with great administrative difficulty. These costs (typ-
ically referred to as “fringe benefits” when they relate to costs associated
with staff and as “overhead” for the cost of facilities and administration;
the term “indirect costs” typically refers to all these costs in general) are
vital inputs to the long-term sustainability of the think tank:
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• If the organization cannot offer a competitive package of compen-
sation and benefits, it will be difficult to retain and motivate staff.
• Without adequate facilities and equipment, staff will not be able to
conduct their research efficiently and effectively.
• Without training and opportunities for professional development,
staff will not maintain a level of technical knowledge necessary to
remain competitive.
• Without funds to support business development and fund-raising,
the organization will be unable to continue obtaining new project
work necessary to provide continuing support to the organization
and its researchers.
Simply put, the full cost of a research project rightfully includes a
share of the overall necessary costs of the organization. Knowing the full
cost of a research project sets a baseline for financial analysis of the proj-
ect (from within the organization) and provides a basis for requesting
reimbursement from sponsors for the full costs of carrying out the
research project.
Despite the importance of these costs to the vitality and sustainability
of the think tank, sponsors are often reluctant to pay for these costs. From
the narrower perspective as the supporter of a particular piece of research
with limited funds, the sponsor naturally wishes to limit its support to
costs that can be most directly related to the research project. (Of course,
this begs the question of who is left to pay for these indirect costs.)
However, even taking a broader view of the sponsor as a supporter not
only of the research but also of the think tank carrying out the research,
the question naturally arises: in the long run, is all of this indirect cost
necessary for the think tank to carry out this work? Given limited funds,
the sponsor desires the greatest result for a given investment and therefore
wishes to be assured that indirect costs are being limited to those reason-
ably necessary for the think tank to continue to survive and develop.
Sponsors, being the ones with the funding, have the upper hand here.
One response on their part to this concern is the imposition of limitations
on the amounts of indirect cost that sponsors will pay.2 However, as will be
more fully discussed below, the definition of what constitutes an indirect
cost is subject to interpretation, depending on the nature of the organi-
zation, the activities it carries out, and the administrative ease or difficulty
of allocating costs to individual projects. The issue is further complicated
by the methods available for charging indirect costs to projects. These
methods can validly use different bases of direct project costs over which
indirect costs can be fairly allocated (usually expressed as a percentage
of the base direct project costs). Thus, any limitation on indirect cost
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that seeks to describe an overhead rate of 30 percent as “too high” runs
the danger of inadvertently penalizing organizations whose cost structures
do not match that implied by the rate limitation.
The think tank with an eye on its future sustainability should seek to
develop a way to account for its indirect costs that serves two functions:
to provide an internal management tool for identifying and tracking
costs crucial to the sustainability of the organization and to provide 
a clear and comprehensive statement of indirect cost recovery policies
that address the concerns of sponsors to pay only for a fair share of the
organization’s necessary costs. In practice, this means developing a
financial management system that segregates and tracks indirect costs
against direct project costs. Ideally, this segregation of costs is done both
prospectively (through the development of a planned budget for the
organization’s operations) and retrospectively (through a cost accounting
system). This allows the organization to estimate what costs it is likely
to incur (and thus what indirect costs it must build into its budgets for
new projects) and what costs it has incurred (and thus what indirect
costs its existing projects must bear).
Whether a think tank needs to go further in assuring its sponsors
that its recovery of indirect costs is consistent with its stated policies is
a judgment that each organization needs to make. As an organization
develops and its level of support by sponsor organizations increases,
however, so too does the argument for having an annual external
audit. The audit can confirm the consistent application of indirect cost
recovery policies and the validity of project direct costs. (Indeed, some
sponsors make such an audit of project accounts a requirement once
funding reaches a certain level. For example, the U.S. government
requires organizations receiving more than $300,000 in federal funds
to undergo such an audit.) Incorporating such an audit into the finan-
cial management policies of a think tank, while adding expense to the
organization’s operations, also demonstrates a heightened sense of
accountability for sponsor funds.
The balance of this chapter goes into greater detail about the principles
concerning the development of indirect cost recovery systems, describes
various models and approaches for the structure of such systems, dis-
cusses the role of audits in the organization’s financial management, and
highlights common problems associated with indirect costs.
DEFINING INDIRECT COSTS
Within any think tank, all costs can be divided into two different types:
direct and indirect. Direct costs are those which are clearly and easily
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attributable to a specific research project. For example, the cost of carry-
ing out a survey to collect data for research on low-income households
can clearly be related to that particular research project.
Indirect costs are those which are not easily identifiable with a specific
research project, but are (as described above) necessary to the operation
of the research project or the organization carrying out the project. These
costs are shared among projects and, in some cases, among functions
within the organization (direct research, management and general
administration, and business development and/or fund-raising). Costs
are usually classified as indirect costs when either (or both) of two con-
ditions exists: (1) the costs are of benefit to the entire organization and all
projects carried out by the organization; or (2) the costs are attributable
to specific projects, but the administrative cost of tracking and allocating
these costs to individual projects outweighs the benefit of doing so.
An example of the first case is the cost of a personnel director who
handles recruiting, develops and implements personnel policies, and
ensures compliance with employment law. These necessary services are
of benefit to the organization as a whole, rather than any particular
research project. In the second case, the cost for local telephone service
is difficult to attribute to individual projects because the costs are typically
not tied to the number of calls or the calls are not itemized. Thus, allo-
cating local telephone charges would require maintaining logs to list the
number and duration of calls and then distributing the costs across the
logged calls. Since the cost of local telephone service is small (relative to
total costs) and the cost (in staff time) of creating such logs is significant,
allocating such costs as an indirect cost across all projects is a sensible
solution.
While there is general agreement on the division between direct and
indirect costs, the specifics of what sponsors view as valid (or “allowable”)
direct and indirect costs vary widely. Two definitions in use for non-
profit organizations in the United States are provided by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and by the U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB).
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 117 requires
nonprofit organizations to report expenses by “functional classification.”
The two primary functional classifications are “program services” (direct
project costs) and “supporting activities” (management and general
administration, fund-raising, and membership development); they are
defined as follows:
Program services are activities that result in goods and services
being distributed to beneficiaries, customers, or members that
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fulfill the purposes or mission for which the organization exists.
Supporting activities are all activities of a not-for-profit organiza-
tion other than program services. Management and general activities
include oversight, business management, general recordkeeping,
budgeting, financing and related administrative activities, and all
management and administration except for direct conduct of pro-
gram services or fundraising activities. Fundraising activities
include publicizing and conducting fundraising campaigns; main-
taining donor mailing lists; conducting special fundraising events;
preparing and distributing fundraising manuals, instructions and
other materials; and conducting other activities involved with solic-
iting contributions from individuals, foundations, government
agencies and others. Membership-development activities include
soliciting for prospective members and membership dues, mem-
bership relations and similar activities. (FASB Statement No. 117,
paragraphs 27 and 28).
OMB Budget Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations,
provides the following definition of indirect costs for projects funded by
the U.S. government (Attachment A, Paragraphs C.1–C.3):
1. Indirect costs are those that have been incurred for common
or joint objectives and cannot be readily identified with a par-
ticular final cost objective. [Any direct cost of a minor amount
may be treated as an indirect cost for reasons of practicality
where the accounting treatment for such cost is consistently
applied to all final cost objectives.3] . . . After direct costs have
been determined and assigned directly to awards or other work
as appropriate, indirect costs are those remaining to be allocated
to benefiting cost objectives. A cost may not be allocated to an
award as an indirect cost if any other cost incurred for the same
purpose, in like circumstances, has been assigned to an award
as a direct cost.
2. Because of the diverse characteristics and accounting practices
of nonprofit organizations, it is not possible to specify the types
of cost that may be classified as indirect cost in all situations.
However, typical examples of indirect cost for many nonprofit
organizations may include depreciation or use allowances on
buildings and equipment, the costs of operating and main-
taining facilities, and general administration and general expenses,
such as the salaries and expenses of executive officers, personnel
administration, and accounting.
3. Indirect costs shall be classified within two broad categories:
“Facilities” and “Administration.” “Facilities” is defined as depre-
ciation and use allowances on buildings, equipment and capital
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improvement, interest on debt associated with certain buildings,
equipment and capital improvements, and operations and
maintenance expenses. “Administration” is defined as general
administration and general expenses such as the director’s office,
accounting, personnel, library expenses, and all other types of
expenditures not listed specifically under one of the subcategories
of “Facilities” (including cross allocations from other pools,
where applicable).
In addition, Attachment B to OMB Circular No. A-122 specifies cat-
egories of cost that are allowable, allowable under certain limitations or
conditions, or unallowable for funding by U.S. government grants and
contracts. Table 9-1 summarizes Attachment B.
Nonetheless, the above guidance still allows a range of differing practices
and policies for allocating expenses among the indirect and direct cost
categories. As a result, how expenses are allocated between categories
varies widely from organization to organization. For example, time
spent by the executive director developing and overseeing programs can
legitimately be considered a program expense, yet some organizations
will place the entire director’s salary into the indirect cost category.
Similarly, while rent, utilities, insurance, supplies, and other general
expenses are typically included in the indirect cost category, there may
be circumstances in which it is more appropriate for an organization
to allocate these costs directly to projects. Each organization needs to
decide which expenses are legitimately programmatic and which are
supportive in order to define its direct and indirect costs. The acceptability
of these allocations by auditors and funders will depend on how reason-
able and justifiable is the rationale for the decision.
Since the lack of standard practices in allocating indirect expenses
means there are no “standard” indirect cost rates against which an
organization can evaluate its own indirect cost rates, it makes sense
for an organization to track the trend of its indirect costs over time.
Questions to be asked in reviewing these trends include the following:
How has the relationship between direct project costs and indirect
costs changed over time? If indirect costs are changing in relation to
direct project costs, what is causing this change? If indirect costs are
increasing in relation to direct project costs, is this increase affecting
the ability of the organization to attract funding and if so, what can be
done to reverse the trend? If indirect costs are decreasing in relation
to direct project costs, are there investments in the organization (such
as training for staff or improved management systems) that can be
made without negatively affecting the ability of the organization to
attract funding?
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Table 9-1 Allowability of Costs under OMB Circular No. A-122
Allowable costs
Bid and proposal costs
Bonding
Communications
Compensation for staff
Depreciation/
use allowances
Employee morale/health/
welfare
Independent research 
and development
Insurance and 
indemnification
Labor relations costs
Maintenance and repair 
costs
Materials and supplies
Meetings and conferences
Memberships, subscrip-
tions, and professional 
activity costs
Page charges in profes-
sional journals
Participant support costs
Plant security costs
Professional service costs/
consultant fees
Rental costs
Royalties/costs for use of 
patents and copyrights
Taxes
Training and education 
for staff
Transportation costs
Allowable costs (limited)
Advertising and public
relations
Defense/prosecution of
criminal/civil
proceedings
Equipment/capital
improvements
Fringe benefits (including
pensions)
Housing and personal
living expenses
Idle facilities/idle capacity
Indirect costs associated
with donated labor
Interest on debt for capital
asset acquisition
Overtime
Patent costs
Pre-award costs
Profits/losses on disposi-
tion of depreciable
property or other 
capital assets
Publication and printing
costs
Rearrangement/alteration
costs
Reconversion costs
Recruiting costs
Relocation costs for 
staff
Selling and marketing
costs
Severance pay
Specialized facilities
Termination costs
Travel costs for staff
Travel costs for trustees
Unallowable costs
Alcoholic beverages
Bad debts
Contingency provisions
Contributions/donations
to other organizations
Entertainment
Fines and penalties
Fundraising
Goods/services for
personal use
Interest on borrowed
capital
Investment manage-
ment costs
Lobbying
Losses on other projects
Organization costs 
(in connection with
establishment/
reorganization)
METHODS FOR ALLOCATING INDIRECT COSTS
Once an organization has identified its indirect costs, the next step is to
develop a method for distributing or allocating these costs across the activ-
ities of the organization (since these indirect costs provide some benefit to
all the organization’s activities). Although there are several methods for
allocating indirect costs, this chapter will examine the two most common:
case-by-case allocation and developing an indirect cost rate.
Case-by-Case Allocation
The case-by-case method of allocating indirect costs is to determine a rate
of actual usage for each activity in the organization. In its simplest forms,
this approach can be used to account for costs that can easily be tracked.
Examples of this approach include keeping track of long distance tele-
phone calls, using a counter or log for photocopying, or using time sheets
as a means of allocating the salary cost of managers and administrative
staff (such as the executive director, financial manager, or administrative
assistant) whose work benefits more than one program or activity. As
shown by the example above, a different method can be adopted for each
type of cost.
The advantage of this method is that it creates a strong connection
between activities and the indirect costs that support them. The dis-
advantage, however, is that this approach can require a great deal of
time-intensive record keeping, even for relatively minor costs. Further,
even if complete records are kept, there will still be shared costs that
cannot be precisely allocated. (For example, office space costs can be
allocated on the basis of the work being done by those occupying the
space and the amount of space occupied. But how then should the cost of
common space, such as hallways, be allocated? Similarly, local telephone
service and Internet connections typically have fixed monthly costs,
regardless of use, and so do not easily lend themselves to being tracked.)
As a result, most organizations do not rely solely on case-by-case allo-
cation for distributing indirect costs. The choice of whether to rely on
case-by-case allocation or use of an indirect cost rate (as described below)
depends on two factors:
• Ease of record keeping. Where automated systems can track costs by
project with minimal effort (such as computerized tracking systems
for long distance telephone calls or photocopies), using case-by-case
allocation distributes costs more accurately.
• Variability of cost across projects. Where costs vary significantly
across projects, case-by-case allocation helps limit cross-subsidization
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of indirect costs. For example, if the typical project of an organization
requires only a nominal number of photocopies, but one project
requires a large number of copies (because of a requirement for
large-scale distribution of reports, for example), case-by-case allo-
cation will ensure that the typical projects do not have to bear a dis-
proportionate share of photocopy costs.
Because of the disadvantages outlined above, an indirect cost rate may
be a more appropriate way to allocate those shared costs that cannot be
easily allocated directly to specific activities or projects.
Indirect Cost Rate
An indirect cost rate is a way to distribute indirect costs proportionately
across an organization’s activities or projects. To do this, all of an orga-
nization’s costs have to be divided into two groups: direct costs (which
are typically project or program costs) and indirect costs. The indirect costs
are then aggregated into a “pool,” which is then allocated to project cost,
usually in proportion to the ratio of indirect costs (the numerator in the
ratio) to direct costs (either total direct cost or a component [such as direct
labor expense] of total direct cost; the denominator in the ratio is known
as the “base”).4
The selection of an appropriate allocation method and direct cost
base for an indirect cost rate should be based upon the commonality of
indirect costs to all direct cost expenditures. For most organizations, there
will be a strong correlation between indirect costs (which tend to be
heavily weighted toward administrative labor and support costs and
facilities costs) and direct labor costs. In most cases, a direct labor base will
produce an equitable distribution of indirect costs. However, where the
ratio of direct labor to total direct costs varies significantly from project
to project (for example, where projects have widely differing costs for
travel, consultants, subcontracts, or other direct costs), a total direct cost
base is more appropriate for allocating the benefits of indirect costs to
projects.
The balance of this chapter looks in more detail at how to develop an
indirect cost rate.
TYPES OF INDIRECT COST RATES
As described above, the calculation of indirect cost rates is based on the
ratio of indirect costs to a defined direct cost base. The actual ratio of
indirect to direct costs can be known only after the accounting period
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(typically an organization’s fiscal year) for which the rate is defined has
been completed; this is typically called a “final” rate. However, because
both the organization and funders typically cannot wait until the
accounting period is over to bill expenses and pay these bills, indirect
rate structures based on a prospective analysis of costs (“provisional” rates
or “predetermined” rates) are often used. These different kinds of rates
are described below:5
• Final rate. A final indirect cost rate is established after an organiza-
tion’s actual costs for a given accounting period (normally its fiscal
year) are known. Once established, a final indirect cost rate is used
to adjust the indirect costs initially claimed through provisional
rates (see below). The adjustment to actual costs is for the period in
which the actual costs were incurred and thus cannot be determined
until the end of the period.
• Provisional rate. A temporary indirect cost rate is established for
a future prospective period to permit budgeting and billing/payment
of expenses to/by funders until the actual indirect costs can be
determined and a final rate is established. The provisional rate is
usually based on the planned budget of an organization (based
on expected expenses and activities). A final rate for a particular
year may also be used as a provisional rate in the ensuing year, 
if anticipated changes in funding levels or costs are expected to
be small.
Because the provisional rate is based on the expected activity of
the organization (which is likely to be somewhat different than the
actual outcome), a provisional rate is subject to later adjustment by
issuance of a final indirect cost rate based on actual indirect costs
incurred. The organization may then need to either seek additional
payment from funders (if the provisional rate was too low and there
was under-recovery of indirect costs) or provide refunds to funders
(if the provisional rate was too high and indirect costs were over-
recovered) for the cost-reimbursement type of agreements between
the organization and its funders.
• Predetermined rate. A fixed rate is established for a specified current
or future period and is not subject to adjustment. A predetermined
rate may be used on contracts or grants where there is reasonable
assurance that the rate is not likely to vary significantly from a
rate based on the organization’s actual costs. This type of rate
would be used where the organization has a consistent indirect cost
rate over time (for example, because it has a very stable cost structure
and funding).6
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The use of provisional and final rates is preferable for most orga-
nizations for the following reasons:
• Actual indirect costs are allocated to projects in the period
incurred, creating accurate cost information.
• There are no prior period indirect costs carried into a future period
to burden new or continuing funding.
• All indirect costs are properly funded in the period incurred, creat-
ing no profit or loss for the organization.
• The organization’s accounting system must determine actual costs
each year, a capability that ultimately must exist to synchronize
accounting, budgeting, and cost allocation.
• The actual cost of services or programs is determined annually and is
therefore available for internal management and informed budgeting.
INDIRECT COST RATE DOCUMENTATION
To support a proposed indirect cost rate, an organization should develop
a set of documentation that it can provide to funders. This documentation
typically includes the information outlined below. Sample documents
for an Example Organization (EO) are shown as exhibits.
• Organizational information. This should include the following:
C Information on the structure of the organization that describes
the duties and/or responsibilities of all units that make up the
organization.
C Financial data, such as financial statements (certified, if appro-
priate), budgets, or other accounting reports, upon which the
proposed indirect cost rate is based.
C If the proposed indirect cost rate is recognized by other funders,
a list of contracts or grants, giving details on funders, value, period
of performance, and any limitations on indirect costs.
• Cost policy statement. The cost policy statement (CPS) states explicitly
which costs the organization will charge directly and which costs
the organization will charge indirectly. An example of a CPS for the
EO is shown in appendix G at the end of this book.
• Statement of salaries and benefits. This document should contain
the estimated/actual costs of personnel salaries and fringe benefits.
Personnel fringe benefits typically divide into two types: (1) those
which are statutorily determined (such as social insurance contri-
butions, unemployment insurance premiums, payroll taxes, and
other required employer contributions or leave allowances [such as
holidays or sick leave] on behalf of employees and other personnel);
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and (2) fringe benefits determined by the organization (such as
annual leave, non-salary compensation [for example, performance
bonuses], or health/life insurance). Organization-determined
fringe benefits are usually evaluated by funders as part of the deter-
mination of the reasonableness of total compensation to personnel.
A sample statement of salaries and fringe benefits for the EO is
shown in box 9-1.
• Statement of labor allocation and total costs. A sample of this statement
for the EO is shown in box 9-2. This statement, when used to support
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Total Leave Non-leave
annual component component
salary of salary a of salary b
Salaries
Executive director $ 60,000 $ 9,231 $ 50,769
Technical staff (5 @ $40,000 each) 200,000 30,769 169,231
Financial manager 30,000 4,615 25,385
Administrative assistant 20,000 3,077 16,923
$ 310,000 $ 47,692 $ 262,308
Fringe 
benefits cost
Fringe benefits
Social/health insurance 15.00% of total salaries $ 46,500
(employer contribution)
Retirement fund 5.00% of total salaries 15,500
(employer contribution)
Annual leave, holidays, 15.38% of total salaries 47,692
sick leave (40 days/year) $ 109,692
Fringe benefits ratec 41.818%
a Leave component of salary equals 15.385 percent of total annual salary (i.e., 40 leave days
divided by 260 paid days per year). These costs are paid as part of fringe benefits and are not
considered part of salaries for the purposes of calculating fringe benefit and indirect cost rates.
b Non-leave component of salary equals 84.615 percent of total annual salary (i.e., 220
non-leave work days divided by 260 paid days per year).
c The fringe benefits rate is calculated by dividing the fringe benefits cost by the non-leave
component of salaries ($109,692/$262,308 = 41.818%).
Box 9-1 Example Institute Statement of Salaries and 
Fringe Benefits
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a provisional indirect cost rate, is based on the planned budget of
the EO. When a final indirect cost rate is being calculated, actual
costs should be used in this statement.
The sample statement reflects the estimated/actual direct salary
costs (net of the portion of salary paid through fringe benefits)
expended on either direct or indirect activities. The percentage of
time per position should be spread under the appropriate cost cat-
egory, making sure that 100 percent is allocated for each position.7
The statement also shows (in conformance with the CPS) which
costs are allocated as indirect, direct, or excluded/unallowable costs.
The sum of these cost categories must match the total costs of the
organization.
• Indirect cost rate calculation. Box 9-3 shows the calculation of two
different types of indirect cost rates: method 1 one uses direct labor
as the direct cost base and method 2 uses total direct cost as the base.
The calculation of the indirect cost rate is done by (1) classifying
the total cost for the base period (usually the organization’s fiscal
year) as either direct or indirect (as shown in the statement of labor
and total costs); and (2) dividing the total allowable indirect costs
by an equitable distribution base.
The result of this process is an indirect cost rate, which is used to dis-
tribute indirect costs to individual projects funded by contracts or grants
and for unallowable costs that benefits from indirect cost activities. The
rate is expressed (in percent) as the ratio of the total amount of allowable
indirect costs (the numerator) to the base selected (the denominator).
This method may also be used where the organization has only one major
function encompassing a number of individual projects or activities or
where the level of federal awards to that organization is relatively small.
Note that, despite the total amount of indirect cost being the same in
each calculation, the rate varies depending on the choice of the direct
cost base. Thus, the lower rate is not “better” than the higher rate; the
different rates simply reflect the distribution of the indirect cost pool
over different direct cost bases.
FINANCIAL AUDITS
An audit is a process, usually conducted annually by an outside accountant
who meets the prevailing professional standard (in the United States,
this would be a certified public accountant), to test and assess the
completeness and accuracy of an organization’s financial information
(typically a set of financial statements). While nonprofit organizations
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such as think tanks are often required by law to obtain an audit if their
level of activity exceeds a certain threshold, the organization can and
should use the audit as a management tool. As an organization matures
and its financial structure becomes more complex through the use of
indirect cost recovery mechanisms, audits provide assurance to both
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Method 1—Base: Direct Labor Cost (Including Fringe Benefits)
Indirect costs (from box 2) $ 210,800
Cost base (from box 2)
Direct cost labor $ 165,000
Fringe benefits (41.818% of direct cost labor) 69,000
Total cost base $ 234,000
Indirect cost rate (indirect costs / total cost base) 90.085%
Reconciliation with total cost (from box 2)
Direct cost labor $ 165,000
Fringe benefits (41.818% of direct cost labor) 69,000
Indirect costs (at 90.085% of direct salaries and 210,800
fringe benefits)
Other direct costs 45,200
Unallowable costs 3,000
Excluded costs 7,000
Total cost $ 500,000
Method 2—Base: Total Direct Cost
Indirect costs (from box 2) $ 210,800
Cost base (from box 2)
Direct cost labor $ 165,000
Fringe benefits (41.818% of direct cost labor) $ 69,000
Other direct costs $ 45,200
Unallowable costsa 3,000
Total cost base $ 282,200
Indirect cost rate (indirect costs/total cost base) 74.699%
Reconciliation with total cost (from box 2)
Direct cost labor $ 165,000
Fringe benefits (41.818% of direct cost labor) 69,000
Indirect costs (at 74.699% of total direct cost) 210,800
Other direct costs 45,200
Unallowable costsa 3,000
Excluded costs 7,000
Total cost $ 500,000
a Unallowable costs are included in the cost base if they represent activities for which indirect
costs are properly allocable.
Box 9-3 Example Institute Statement of Indirect Costs 
and Rate Calculation
the organization and its sponsors that the organization’s financial
management is sound and that the financial information it presents
accurately portrays its operation at the corporate and project level. In
particular, the audit can identify some of the common indirect cost
problems discussed below and suggest measures for correcting and
avoiding such problems.
The main objectives of an audit should be to assess the following:
• Adequacy of the organization’s system of internal control over finan-
cial transactions. Internal controls are essential for ensuring the
accountability of the organization to sponsors, government regu-
lators, and the public—a think tank offering public policy prescrip-
tions has to adhere to the highest levels of legal compliance and ethical
behavior in order to maintain its credibility. In general, sound inter-
nal controls provide for procedures that ensure the organization’s
resources (cash, equipment, property, or other assets) are used
solely for authorized purposes and that the responsibility for the
documentation and approval of these uses is divided so that it does
not rest with a single person in the organization. (Although this divi-
sion may not be completely feasible in a small organization, some
measure of internal control may be established by carefully planning
the assignment of responsibility and having frequent management
review of transactions.)
• Financial records accurately reflect the operation of the organization.
An audit will review financial records and supporting documentation
to ensure that all significant financial conditions are accurately
reflected in the organization’s financial information. The audit will
also typically review a sample of transactions to ensure that there is
proper supporting documentation for the transaction and that it
was correctly entered into the financial management system. An
audit does not typically guarantee that all transactions are properly
documented or correctly entered into the financial management
system—a successful audit should not be interpreted as proof that
there are no such problems.
• Proper authority for expenditures and projects. Organizational doc-
umentation (such as actions approved by the board of directors or
organizational policies and procedures) and contracts/grant agree-
ments with sponsors will both be reviewed in an audit to ensure that
expenditures are consistent with the requirements of those autho-
rizations. In particular, the audit should confirm that expenditures
have complied with any restrictions or specific requirement included
as a condition of any contract or grant.
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• Existence of recorded assets. The existence and verification of the
organization’s assets, such as bank balances, accounts receivable, and
physical assets such as equipment, real property, securities and other
investments, will be included in an audit.
• Timely reporting and payment of public obligations. Finally, an audit
will review the filing of required reports to government regulators
and the payment of public obligations (such as license fees, corporate,
sales, value-added taxes, and payroll and other personnel-related
taxes) to ensure that these are paid accurately and on time.
In carrying out the above reviews, the auditors should pay particular
attention to the allocation of indirect costs to their appropriate internal
financial management accounts in conformance with the organization’s
cost policy statement. Where problems are identified (such as the com-
mon ones listed in the following section), the auditors and management
should work together to identify improvements to financial management
systems and internal controls to prevent future occurrences.
The choice of an auditor is usually informed by several criteria, each of
which the organization has to assess against its particular circumstances:
• Qualifications and experience. There are differences between for-
profit and nonprofit accounting, so an auditor with experience
with similar corporate entities—particularly those doing similar
kinds of work—is likely to better understand the issues and concerns
of the organization. This criterion needs to be evaluated both at
the firm level and with respect to the individual staff who will be
assigned; good results are more likely when well-qualified and
experienced audit teams remain intact and have continuity with
the organization’s audits over time.
• Quality control systems. The auditor’s record with respect to restate-
ments or corrections to previously issued audit reports, disciplinary
action by regulatory authorities or remedies imposed by the courts as
a result of legal proceedings, and policies and procedures with respect
to internal oversight should be examined to ensure the auditor has
a proven system of delivering accurate and thorough audits.
• Conflicts of interest. The auditor should be free of any conflicts of
interest between the auditor and the organization (such as existing
business relationships with members of the organization’s board of
trustees or funders of the organization’s projects).
• Resources. The auditor must be able to provide the necessary staff
and technological resources to meet the organization’s schedule for
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completing the audit (particularly where the audit is required to
meet a statutory or regulatory requirement). Additionally, the
organization and the auditor should share a clear understanding of
what resources will be required from the organization to assist the
auditor.
• Other services. The auditor may be able to help the organization with
other services that take advantage the auditor’s detailed knowledge of
the organization; these services might include assistance in filing tax
returns or monitoring regulatory requirements and assisting with
compliance. However, the organization must be aware that certain
services, such as bookkeeping or asset appraisal, are potential con-
flicts of interest with the audit function.
• References. References should be obtained (preferably from clients
that are similar to the organization) to help assess all the above cri-
teria, as well as to judge more subjective factors such as the auditor’s
communication skills, flexibility in understanding the specific
requirements of the organization, and ability to make the auditor
process work smoothly.
• Fees. Fees represent a particularly difficult criterion to evaluate.
On rare occasions, some audit firms may offer pro bono or dis-
counted fees for nonprofits, but in most cases the organization will
have to balance the services offered by the auditor with their costs.
Low fees may not be a bargain; they may be a sign that the auditor
does not fully understand the work required, lacks the experienced
resources and so takes longer to produce the audit, expects the orga-
nization to do much of the work to prepare for the audit, or is
deliberately underbidding the work in the first year, with signi-
ficantly higher fees to follow later when it is more costly for the
organization to switch auditors. The auditor should be able to pro-
vide a proposed fee and agreement with sufficient details to allow
the organization to evaluate the level of auditor staff commit-
ment and the specific products to be provided. (For example, will
the auditor merely carry out a review of the financial statements
prepared by the organization or will it provide a written manage-
ment letter that reviews the organizations financial management
policies and procedures, identifies internal control weaknesses,
and suggests remedies?)
It is not cost-effective for an organization to constantly be changing
auditors or to receive an audit that is poorly done or does not meet the
organization’s needs. All the above criteria need to be weighed to balance
all the costs and benefits of the audit.
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COMMON INDIRECT COST PROBLEMS
This section presents examples of some of the more common problems
related to indirect costs disclosed by audits of nonprofit organizations.
Timekeeping Systems
Labor costs, whether charged directly to grants and contracts or to the
indirect cost pool, must be based on accurate time records reflecting
the actual activities of personnel. The time records must account for all
activity of the personnel. The most common problems are either the
failure to use a timekeeping system to track personnel activity or using a
timekeeping system solely for the purpose of calculating payroll (i.e., only
to record time and attendance of personnel, but not activities of the per-
sonnel). Box 9-4 shows a sample time sheet that records project activities
as well as indirect labor costs such as proposal development, staff training,
and fringe benefit costs such as annual leave and sick leave time.
Consistent Treatment and Specific Identification of Costs
Costs must be treated consistently on all projects of the organization. Some
typical problems with this include directly charging particular projects
with costs specifically identifiable with other projects or charging costs
that were not treated consistently with other costs incurred for the same
purpose in similar circumstance.
Costs of “Unallowable Activities”
If unallowable costs are improperly charged as indirect costs, two problems
result. First, the inclusion of unallowable costs in the indirect cost pool
overstates the amount of indirect cost, resulting in an indirect cost rate
that is higher than appropriate for the recovery of allowable indirect
cost. Second, because not all such costs were directly charged to the
“unallowable activities” cost category, an appropriate share of indirect
costs was not allocated to these unallowable activities. As a result, direct
cost projects are allocated a disproportionate share of the organization’s
indirect costs.
Even if an organization’s own activities or certain direct cost projects
funded under contracts or grants provide for little or no reimbursement
of indirect costs, the full share of indirect costs must be allocated to such
own activities and contracts or grants (i.e., indirect costs cannot be unfairly
shifted to projects with no restrictions on indirect cost payment).
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Credits
Credits generated through project activities, such as fees for conferences
held for the benefit of a specific project, must be credited to that specific
project. Similarly, applicable credits to indirect costs, such as subletting
rental space included in the indirect cost pool, must be credited to the
indirect cost pool.
Indirect Cost Allocation Base
The direct cost base must allocate indirect costs to all direct cost projects
equitably. To ensure that objective is met, organizations must continuously
evaluate whether the direct cost base is disproportionately distributing
indirect costs among projects. For example, an organization may have
chosen a direct labor cost base because the organization originally had
projects with similar shares of labor and other direct costs. If the organi-
zation undertakes a new, very large project (relative to the total activity of
the organization) that has a much larger share of other direct costs com-
pared to direct labor, then a switch to a total cost base may be appropriate
in order to allocate the organization’s indirect costs more equitably.
Interorganizational Transfers and Related-Party Transactions
Supplies and services acquired from affiliates, related parties, and orga-
nizations under common control must be based on the actual costs of the
organizations providing the supplies and services. The “costs” of supplies
and services from these related organizations must not include profit or
other mark-ups added by the related organization.
Unsupported Costs
To be allowable, all direct costs and indirect costs must be adequately
supported by source documentation that clearly shows the purposes of
and circumstances under which the cost was incurred. For example,
canceled checks, bank transfer records, or credit card receipts alone are
insufficient as cost documentation because they do not establish the
purpose of the expense, they simply record the payment of funds.
Adequate supporting cost documentation should record the purpose
and circumstances of the expense. For example, the supporting docu-
mentation for a travel expense should identify the expense incurred, by
whom and when, and the project/activity for which the travel was
undertaken (to determine whether it is a direct/indirect and/or allowable/
unallowable cost).
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CONCLUSION
Think tanks in developing and transitional economies generally divide
into two categories with regard to their institutional development in the
area of financial management: (1) small organizations that operate in an
ad hoc fashion; and (2) larger, more well-established organizations that
receive substantial funding from international donors and foundations.
Most think tanks in the first category do not yet have financial man-
agement systems that can meet the standards outlined in this chapter. Most
of them do not have a clear understanding of indirect costs. Their project
budgets are either based solely on direct costs, which often means they
are not truly including all the costs of the organization in their requests
for funding, or they include an ad hoc factor for “overhead,” which is
usually an arbitrary mark-up applied to total costs. This “overhead” rate
is much more likely to be based on an educated guess about the level of
resources the organization needs to survive than any financial analysis
that can be defended to funders. As a result, these organizations seem to
be constantly in a state of financial crisis, living from project to project
with little financial stability for the organization or its staff.
The second group of think tanks better understands the issues related to
indirect costs, but their understanding seems to be rooted more in the
requirements of their major funders than a careful examination of the
organization’s needs. These organizations usually have an established indi-
rect cost rate, but it often has been developed years earlier as part of a major
contract or grant and has not been reviewed to see if it still corresponds to
the needs of the organization. Thus, it is unclear if many of these organiza-
tions could successfully defend their indirect cost structure to a funder that
seriously questioned the organization’s indirect cost rate.
There still remains considerable distance, then, for most research
organizations in transitional and developing economies to cover before
their current financial management practices reach a level that will allow
them to manage and assess their financial needs more clearly. Recognition
by funders that indirect costs are a necessity for any viable organization’s
continued operation and greater emphasis on the ability of an organization
to explain and defend its indirect costs, rather than implying that indi-
rect costs are unproductive, would help encourage organizations to pay
more attention to this aspect of their institutional development.
N O T E S
1. “Fund-raising” is used here to mean funds solicited by the think tank for its
own unrestricted use (as compared to “business development,” which is used
here to mean the solicitation of funds for specific research project activities).
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2. The U.S. government, for example, has a limit imposed by regulation on
the amount of overhead costs it will pay to universities carrying out work under
federal contracts and grants.
3. OMB Circular No. A-122, Attachment A, Paragraph B.2.
4. Although the base can be set in various ways (for example, the number of
hours expended by project staff, the number of persons working on or served
by a project, the size of facilities used for each project, or other methods that have
a logical basis related to the nature of the activity or project), most organizations
use direct labor cost or total direct costs as the base. Thus, there is no single “right”
way to calculate an indirect cost rate, to determine what costs to include as indirect
costs, or how much indirect cost is “fair.” Under U.S. federal government guide-
lines, allowable indirect costs range from 3 to 70 percent, varying from agency
to agency.
Although many funding organizations seem to operate from the perspective
that a lower overhead rate is better, a lower rate does not necessarily imply
a more efficient organization. For example, imagine a single organization
implementing multiple projects where each project has its own accounting
staff, purchases its own supplies, and has all its own equipment. Such an orga-
nization would have no indirect costs at all, but would be clearly less efficient
than if the programs shared accounting costs, supplies, and equipment.
5. These descriptions are based on information in the U.S. Department of
Labor Indirect Cost Rate Determination Guide for contractors and grantees on
its web site at http://www.dol.gov.
6. Another type of indirect cost rate is a “fixed rate with carry-forward.” In
this structure, a fixed rate is established for a period of time to permit budget-
ing and billing/payment of expenses to/by funders. Actual costs are determined
by the organization’s accounting system and the difference in indirect costs as
calculated by the fixed indirect cost rate and actual indirect costs is carried forward
to a future period (usually the organization’s fiscal year) in order to adjust the
fixed rate in the next period for any over- or under-recovery of indirect costs.
This structure would only be used where the structure of funding for an organi-
zation remains stable over time; otherwise, the structure could result in inappro-
priate allocation of indirect costs to funders because of the mismatch between
a changing funding structure and the shifting of indirect cost recovery out of
the period in which the costs were incurred.
7. The organization must maintain a time distribution system (such as time
sheets) for documenting how salary expenses are incurred across indirect and
direct cost activities and across projects for personnel whose time is charged to
more than one cost activity or project.
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The Information that
Senior Management Needs
10
Athink tank’s leadership needs to have timely information on howthe various parts of the organization are working. This need ranges
from information on basic finances (how do revenues and expenditures
compare so far this year?) to the think tank’s record in communicating
with the public (how many newspaper articles and op-ed pieces, speaking
engagements, press conferences, and the like?). Without such information,
leaders have trouble leading because they are more often responding to
events than anticipating them. For example, an emerging cash shortage
crisis could have been prevented with timely information on cash flows
and projected staff-utilization rates. A great deal of senior managers’
time can be consumed dealing with such crises—an obvious drain on an
organization’s effectiveness.
Traditionally, monitoring operations meant tracking finances. But
in the past 15 years for-profit firms have taken a much broader view.
Increasingly client-oriented, such firms have begun monitoring client
satisfaction because that is what substantially drives the financial
results.1 Think tanks need to take a similarly broad approach to mon-
itoring their activities. That said, the differences between the missions
of think tanks and other types of nonprofits and for-profit firms
become starkly evident when the information relevant for top man-
agers at think tanks is compared with that best for their counterparts
at other organizations.
This chapter sets forth several kinds of monitoring information that
think tanks should regularly assemble and use. Below, the broad areas
that should be monitored are defined. Subsequent sections describe the
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specific indicators for which data should be collected. Appendix H contains
examples of the kinds of reports managers could use in practice.
The chapter presents a monitoring program appropriate for a fairly
large (50+) staff with specialists in such functions as personnel and public
relations. Smaller think tanks can select the indicators best suited to their
needs. Because even moderately comprehensive monitoring appears
rather limited among think tanks in transitional and developing countries
generally—and among mid-sized and smaller ones in particular—the
practices of third stage think tanks and a few second stage think tanks
were used to prepare this chapter.2
Many contemporary texts on defining information for use by top man-
agers focus tightly on generating the data using management informa-
tion systems (MIS). The challenges are thus defined as using computing
capacity effectively to cull the information needed for critical indicators
from the masses of available data and harnessing unused information to
help monitor and improve performance. It is true that a well-designed
MIS can be used to collect valuable information that would otherwise
decay unused in nonprofits. However, in most cases, a complex MIS is
not needed to process most of the information required to construct
indicators. These data typically come from simple counts (e.g., the number
of publications produced in the past three months). The only exception
is certain accounting information.
A couple of final introductory points. First, information must be
channeled to the right person at the right time. The right person may not
always be the organization’s president. As a first step to generating per-
formance indicators, managers should decide who is in the best position to
exploit the information to improve the organization’s work. These target
people should receive the information and act on it, or, in some cases,
jointly decide with senior management on actions to take as problems
and opportunities are identified.
Care must be taken not to overwhelm senior managers with informa-
tion. Often, it will be sufficient for the head of public relations or the chief
accountant (as examples) to have the indicators on a regular basis. An insti-
tute’s leader expects these managers, at least implicitly, to systematically
track their office’s efficiency. Complete information on an operational area
can be provided to the leadership for annual reviews or for board meeting
preparation. Specific developments, with supporting indicator informa-
tion, can be brought to the chief executives’ attention as necessary.
Second, generating information for senior managers and giving it to
them in a usable form does not mean that elegant, comprehensive reports
are required. When this author was at the U.S. housing ministry, every
month big loose-leaf binders of statistical tables on all important aspects of
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ministry performance were presented to the minister and her principal
staff. These 300-page binders contained highly useful information for
managers responsible for expenditures of $10 billion a year, but required
an enormous amount of staff time to assemble. Think tank leaders must
gauge their information requirements to their organizational resources.
Even management at large third-stage think tanks get some monitoring
information piecemeal, which prevents information overload. Managers
can collate the data informally. In short, rather than becoming fixated on
presentation formats and the preparation of consolidated, comprehen-
sive reports, focus on generating fewer indicators that convey meaningful
information to managers on a timely basis.
Third, such basic financial indicators as cash flow, reserve position,
volume and “aging” of receivables are discussed only in passing. Many texts
on basic finance and accounting are readily available for this. Additionally,
some donors, including USAID, have guidance materials on financial
operations that are strong on controls, allocations of costs, and expen-
diture monitoring.
WHAT TO MONITOR: THE BIG PICTURE
A truly successful monitoring system provides senior management and
those to whom they have delegated significant responsibility with relevant,
timely information on key elements of the think tank’s operations. Widely
adopted in the private sector in recent years and often labeled “the balanced
scorecard,” this approach insists that to excel the company should score
well in all key operations, whether inventory control, customer satisfac-
tion, product innovation, or profitable investment of cash reserves.3
A similar logic applies to think tanks. What is the point of running a
financially solid operation if it does not advance the organization’s
research results in the policy process? In particular, without investing in
staff and initiating innovative research, the institution may see its cre-
ativity and policy prowess decline.
The logic of the “balanced scorecard” suggests five critical areas or
activities that senior managers at think tanks should monitor. Each also
represents a way to measure a think tank’s performance.
1. The public policy perspective. Success in communicating research
results to policymakers, other stakeholders, and the public, and in
informing the public on key issues of the day.
2. The client perspective. Success in meeting the expectations of donors
who sponsor policy work and of those contracting with the institute
for research, pilot projects, and evaluations.
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3. The internal business perspective. Success in efficiently conducting
research, communications activities, and support functions.
4. The innovation and learning perspective. Success in enhancing the
skill level and mix of the staff and in defining important policy
projects to pursue.
5. The financial perspective. Success in raising funds to support the
research program and properly managing the institute’s resources.
The public policy perspective is the only perspective not routinely used
by business. Many think tank clients care less about its primary missions
of constructively influencing policy and informing the public than about
the direct research results.4 For example, a ministry may commission a
program evaluation from a think tank to determine the reasons for the
low participation rate in a welfare program. The think tank may want to
insert the results of the evaluation into policy discussions even though
the ministry staff commissioning the work sees enriching the debate as
peripheral to its task of program improvement. Generally, the interests
of foundations and think tanks are more tightly aligned than those of
other clients and think tanks.
Table 10-1 gives some examples of performance indicators for each of
the five perspectives. The many kinds of items listed suggest the breadth
of the topics on which senior management should be kept informed.
With a narrower approach, problems are more likely to develop and fester.
Again, the objective is to identify an incipient problem and address it
before it becomes a major challenge for the organization.
Most think tanks probably monitor many of the activities listed using
indicators similar to those shown. Often, however, staff provide indi-
vidual pieces of information in response to specific, ad hoc requests from
the president. This can be a mistake. Some critical information must be
generated and used regularly, and the few most critical items need to be
tracked monthly, even though quarterly or even annual information on
some functions and areas of performance is sufficient.
In the following discussion of useful indicators, note that some indi-
cators provide useful information on more than one perspective.
Public Policy Perspective
The public policy perspective concerns the think tank’s service in the
community in terms of constructive participation in policy development
and in informing citizens about the key public issues that affect them.
Clearly, determining a think tank’s success in either task is a formidable
challenge. There is scholarly literature on this topic and some case studies
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on the importance of different types of organizations and individuals in
shaping a particular policy outcome. But monitoring impact through
what are in effect case studies is time consuming and expensive; alter-
natives, such as interviewing key policymakers, require setting up the
interviews on a regular basis, and there is no guarantee that policymakers
will be absolutely candid.
The better approach is to use indicators that record activities aimed
at exerting policy influence and educating the public—that is, outputs,
not outcomes. Unquestionably, these indicators provide very limited
information on impacts. But they do have value. At a minimum, an
organization doing little or nothing to get its policy research results
used will be made starkly aware of this fact. Using indicators to assess
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Table 10-1 A Balanced Think Tank Information Scheme
Perspective Example indicators
Public policy 
perspective
Client perspective
Internal business 
perspective
Innovation and 
learning 
perspective
Financial 
perspective
• No. of visits to the web site
• No. of web forums held; number of participants
• No. of conferences and seminars at which staff are presenters
• No. of policy briefs produced and distributed to 
policymakers
• No. of articles by staff in newspapers or popular magazines
• No. of projects not completed on time
• Distribution of evaluation scores for seminars and training
events offered
• No. of publications sold
• Trend in participation in fee-based courses
• No. of contracts/grants from old clients
• No. of projects over budget and dollar amount as 
percentage of budgets
• Staff utilization rate (% time charged to billable projects)
• Proposal spending: funds used versus projected spending
• Cost/proposal; percent of proposals won
• Volume of staff training for new roles/products and broad
staff development
• New staff hired with special skills to work on innovative 
topics or strengthen teams
• Pilot projects under way; success compared with 
benchmarks
• Cash flow
• Year-on-year growth
• Rate of return on liquid assets
• Receivables: total and by aging
the mix of communication activities may also prove critical. For example,
senior management may have decided that issuing short “policy briefs”
to a well-targeted mailing list of policymakers is the best way to influ-
ence policy outcomes. If so, a glance at a chart showing the number of
policy briefs issued over the past six months would reveal whether this
tool was being employed.
Table 10-2 lists several indicators for monitoring a think tank’s oper-
ations from the public policy perspective and suggests where to find the
information source within the organization.5 The IT and publications
experts are responsible for indicators in their domains. For several other
indicator groups, the public relations (PR) specialist will create the indi-
cators based on information provided by the various teams or departments.
At many think tanks, the public relations specialist or administrative
assistant obtains the data from monthly or bimonthly activity reports
prepared by the teams for senior management. In other cases, adminis-
trative assistants track the information and submit it regularly to the PR
specialist.
As noted earlier, a key question is which of this information senior
management needs to see regularly. Practice suggests a limited amount.
Generally, public relations specialists are charged with insuring that
information of this type is generated, and they use their judgment about
which information to forward to senior management. Strong press cov-
erage (“applause”) of the institution’s work always interests the boss. So
does information indicating worrisome or very positive trends or critical
one-time events. The PR office will use the information assembled to
prepare the annual report and data for management “retreats.” Often an
essay with separate short sections summarizing developments and trends,
based on the indicators, tells senior management more than a table of
figures does.
The indicators in table 10-2 focus on the think tank’s communications
and outreach activities. They are counts of actions completed. Some will
yield much more information when tracked over time and reveal impor-
tant trends. While many indicators in the table are self-explanatory, a
few warrant comments.
• Web site activity. These counts provide two kinds of information to
management. First, together they are one indicator how well the think
tank’s message is reaching the public. Second, they suggest the
effectiveness of the site overall: if there is little or sharply declining
activity, the site may be badly designed or poorly promoted.
• Seminars/conferences and public relations. These indicators report
on the organization’s success in getting its message to two quite
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Table 10-2 Performance Indicators from the Public Policy Perspective
Indicator Possible source a
Web site activity
• No. of visits to the site and downloads 
of documents from the siteb
• No. of web forums held; no. of 
participants in each
• No. of documents and publications 
ordered online
• No. of new papers and reports posted 
to the site
Seminars/conferences
• No. of conferences and seminars at 
which staff were presenters
• No. of different cities in which these 
events were held
• No. of participants at these events
Policy forums
• No. of roundtables or other forums 
convened by the think tank to discuss 
current policy issues
• No. of attendees and presence of senior 
policymakers or important media 
persons targeted to attendc
Public relations
• No. of newspaper articles by staff or in 
which staff are quoted or institution 
is named as source of information
• No. of calls from reporters and editors
• No. of op-ed piecesd placede
• No. of press conferences held; no. of 
newspaper and TV stories after the 
press conference
• No. of radio and TV appearances by 
staff; no. of appearances on the topics 
of the institution’s research program
Publications
• No. of policy briefs published; no. sent 
to targeted audiences
• No. of reports published; no. of copies 
distributed
Information technology (IT) or 
public relations staff
Public relations, based on 
information from research centers
Public relations staff, based 
on information from research 
centers
Public relations staff, based on 
information from research centers
Publications staff and authors
(continued)
distinct audiences—administrators and researchers in the case of
seminars and conferences, and the general public in the case of
public relations activities. Broadly speaking, the more activity, the
greater success. But not all newspapers reach the same number
of readers, much less the think tank’s preferred readership; some
TV shows are more prestigious and more widely watched by the
cognoscenti than others. So, many organizations supplement these
counts with lists—periodicals that publish specific items, TV show
appearances, and the topic, location, and number of attendees at
the conferences and seminars where staff members are presenters.
While TV and radio appearances are generally desirable, infor-
mation on appearances by think tank leaders in Eastern Europe and
the CIS indicates that often the leaders are invited because they are
broadly informed and articulate individuals, not because they are
experts on the topic at hand (Struyk 1999). Hence, the table includes
two indicators that distinguish between all appearances and those
that showcase the institute’s policy research findings.
• Policy forums. Effectiveness in this case depends greatly on who
actually attends. Management should give guidance to staff who
review the list of attendees on who qualifies as a “senior policymaker”
or “important media person.”
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• No. of books published; no. of copies 
distributed
• No. and place of published reviews of the 
institute’s publications; books by staff
• No. of desk copies requested by 
university teachers for possible course
adoptions
a Who should send the information to the person preparing the indicator and report.
b Some think tanks find it useful also to capture information on which cities and foreign countries
visitors are logging in from.
c This reporting is better done in a narrative or qualitative form than in counts.
d An “op-ed” is an opinion piece signed by the author. It is referred to as “op-ed” because in many
newspapers such pieces appear on the page opposite the page carrying the newspaper’s editorials.
e The public relations department will find it useful to track rejections of submitted op-ed pieces so
it knows how frequently it has tried a particular newspaper. The goal is not to oversubmit to any
single outlet because most newspapers wish to avoid publishing too many comments from the
same source.
Table 10-2 Performance Indicators from the Public Policy Perspective
(Continued )
Indicator Possible source a
Publications staff and authors
These indicators on outputs can and should be complemented with
information on the cost of carrying out these various activities.
Client Perspective
This perspective considers the institution as perceived by its primary
funders, whether those are the foundations providing grants or the aid
agencies and government bodies letting contracts. The indicators focus
on the basic elements of performance. (See table 10-3.)6 Broader measures
of the reasons these supporters should or should not be satisfied with the
think tank’s work are difficult to construct. The quality of policy
research is one example.
The first two indicators under “project work” speak directly to an
institution’s core performance on research projects: are the reports being
submitted on time and are project costs to the client staying within the
budget? Barring extraordinary circumstances, delivering reports late or
asking clients for additional funds to finish the defined tasks are the mortal
sins of the research business. The only thing worse is to submit techni-
cally weak or sloppy analysis and recommendations.
A clear sign of doing high-quality and relevant policy research is when
sponsors return to fund new projects at the same think tank. A caveat
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Table 10-3 Performance Indicators from the Client Perspective
Indicator Possible sourcea
Project work
• No. of reports not delivered to clients on time as 
percentage of all reports delivered
• No. of projects with cost overruns, (a) total, (b) no. of 
times additional funds were received from the sponsor, 
and (c) no. where overrun was funded internally
• No. of contracts/grants in past 12 months from old 
clients as percentage of all contracts/grants
Other
• Distribution of evaluation scores for seminars and 
training events offered
• Trend in attendees per course in fee-based courses for 
the same courses over time
• No. of publications sold; average copies per publication 
sold (applies only to publications offered for sale, i.e., 
some are sponsored and distributed for free)
a Who should send the information to the person preparing the indicator and report.
Team leaders
Head of finance
Head of finance
Team leaders
Team leaders
Publications office
here, though, is that a substantial share of all foundations has a policy
forbidding continued funding for any think tank. So two or three grants
in succession may be possible, but then not more until several years have
passed. For this reason, it makes sense to track “repeat sales” separately
for grants and contracts.
The indicators under the “other” heading measure client satisfaction in
terms of their behavior. But each of these needs to be interpreted with care.
• Seminar/training evaluation scores. Participation should be influenced
by the quality of the offerings. The trend over time is as important
as the absolute level. But the precision of the scores can be diluted
by changes over time in the topics covered and the composition of
the faculty. So it is best to track these results course by course.
• Trend in attendance of fee-based courses. This “market test” indicator
is fairly accurate because it tracks each course separately. But in
interpreting it one must remember that the market for a particular
course may become saturated or the topic no longer relevant. An
example of saturation is teaching a course for mortgage bankers in a
central Asian republic where mortgage lending volume is low. Once
the current bankers responsible for such loans have been taught,
there is little demand. An example of reduced relevance is teaching a
course on preparing annual municipal budgets in a central European
country; once most municipalities had participated, demand fell.
Training can then be done on the job at the municipalities, and city
finance officials are ready for more advanced courses.
• Publications sold. Again, these indicators provide useful information
but need to be interpreted in light of the likely appeal of the new
titles. All think tanks publish some books more to advance a policy
position, or sometimes prestige, than for sales revenue. The shift in
the mix of titles can strongly influence these figures.
The indicators in table 10-3 can help senior managers better understand
relations with clients. Even so, these same managers must still speak
directly to key clients about how well the institution is performing on a
particular project and in communicating its results generally.
Internal Business Perspective
These indicators focus on the relation between inputs and outputs,
including such items as the percentage of a project’s budget that has been
spent to date in relation to the project time elapsed and the average rev-
enue won through proposal writing compared with the cost of writing
proposals. The various indicators listed in table 10-4 give senior man-
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Table 10-4 Performance Indicators from the Internal 
Business Perspective
Indicator When a Possible source b
A. Basics
1. Project expenditure overview—spending on
each project, comparing expenditures to date
at percent of total budget versus percent of
work period used
2. Fund-raising results: funds acquired versus 
quarterly or annual goals
3. Pipeline by team: contract revenue unspent/
loaded team labor costs
4. Staff utilization by team over the past three
monthsc
5. Projected staff utilization for the next quarter
B. Proposals and development
6. Proposal funds utilization versus projected
spending over the year
7. Proposal efficiency analysis
• Proposals won versus total proposals (both
by number and by expenditures on 
proposal development)
• Cost/proposal; dollars won/all proposal cost
• Value of grants and contracts won/proposal
funds spent
8. Program development funds utilization (by 
initiative)—spending, comparing percent
expenditures of total allocated funds versus 
percent of total development time used
C. Human resources
9. Total staff/human resources (HR) staff
10. No. of new hires/HR staff
11. No. of new staff HR asked to recruit/HR staff
12. No. of departing staff/HR staff
13. No. of health insurance claims processed/HR
staffd
D. Accounting/finance
14. No. of projects unbilled more than 60 days after
the end of the billing period
15. No. of projects and amount of funds for which
cash advances were not applied for on timee
16. Vol. of receivables by age of debt
17. No. of projects under way by type of sponsor,f
total and per accounting staff
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M
M
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
S
S
S
S
S
M
M
M
Q
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Team leaders
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
HR dept
HR dept
HR dept
HR dept
HR dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
(continued)
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18. No. of projects closed, total and per accounting
staff
19. No. of staff business trips, total and per
accounting staffg
20. No. of budgets for proposals prepared, total and
per accounting staff
E. Contract management
21. No. of contracts and grants under management,
total and per contract staff
22. No. of new contracts and grants, total and per
contract staff
23. No. of contracts closed, total and per contract
staff
24. No. of subcontracts originated, total and per
contract staff
25. No. of subcontracts closed, total and per 
contract staff
F. Public relations
26. No. of newspaper articles by staff or in which
staff are quoted or institution is named as
source of information: total and per public 
relations (PR) staff
27. No. of op-ed pieces placed: total and per PR staff
28. No. of press conferences held; no. of newspaper
and TV stories after the press conference:
total and per PR staff
29. No. of radio and TV appearances by staff; no. 
of appearances on the topics of the institute’s
research program: total and per PR staff
30. No. of policy briefs published; no. sent to 
targeted audiences: total and per PR staff
a M = monthly, Q = quarterly, S = semiannually.
b Who should send the information to the person preparing the indicator and report.
c Percent time billed to projects versus overhead accounts.
d This is an example of a routine task that a HR department could have to do; others tasks could be
included as well.
e Population of projects includes only those for which such advances are possible.
f The desegregation by type of sponsor is useful when grants or contracts from a particular spon-
sor take much more time to administer than others.
g In some countries, such as Russia, per diem payments above a very low minimum are counted
as income to the traveler. This extra income must be recorded and taxes assessed, which is a 
significant burden at a think tank with a high volume of travel.
Table 10-4 Performance Indicators from the Internal 
Business Perspective (Continued )
Indicator When a Possible source b
Q
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Contracts office
Contracts office
Contracts office
Contracts office
Contracts office
PR office
PR office
PR office
PR office
PR office
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agers an idea of the efficiency of a half-dozen areas of the think tank’s
operations. (Sample tables 5 to 9 in appendix H are formats for reporting
some of these indicators.) Because labor constitutes such a large per-
centage of total think tank expenses, the indicators often use the ratio of
a given output (e.g., contracts under management, number of articles
placed in newspapers) to the number of staff assigned to the function.
An additional column in this table shows how often management should
review each indicator. The very few requiring a monthly check are those
used to monitor key aspects of the institution’s financial effectiveness—
production of research within budget and fund-raising. Most indicators
in the table need to be reviewed only semiannually.
Panels A and B of the table focus on the status and efficiency of the
research operation, including proposal writing and program development.7
While many indicators in these panels are self-explanatory, some deserve
comment.
• A.3 Pipeline by team: contracted revenue unspent/loaded team labor
costs. This is a rough indicator of the extent of a team’s future cov-
erage. Its utility is limited because the work in hand may be spread
out over a short or a long period. If it is a long period, then it may
not be sufficient to cover all current staff. Consider the following
example: the loaded team cost is $20,000 per month, and the team
has the following contracted funds remaining to be spent:
Amount of No. of months remaining Average funds 
Contract funds remaining in the contracts available per month
1 $50,000 5 $10,000
2 150,000 36 4,200
3 50,000 12 4,200
Average 18,400
In this example, if the team spends the funds evenly over the con-
tracted periods, there will be a shortfall of about $1,600 in the first
month. Of course, this problem could be met in the short run by
accelerating work on the first contract (with five months remaining)
to make up the shortfall. But there are probably hard limits to the
amount of work that can be front-loaded. The example illustrates
why this indicator needs to be interpreted with caution.
• A.4 Staff utilization over the past three months. If staff regularly
charge significant time to overhead accounts, it may signal that the
team has coverage problems. When a report points in this direc-
tion, management should follow up with the team leader. Possibly,
overhead funds are being used just to cover the time of an under-
employed analyst. A decision should be made whether this is a good
investment of such funds, which in part depends on how soon addi-
tional funding is expected. (It could also be that the overhead charges
are justified, for example, by a lot of proposal writing.)
• A.5 Projected staff utilization over the next quarter. While a standard
form can be useful in guiding the discussion, senior management
should meet with each team leader about the team’s prospects. Some
information is hard to convey in writing. For example, team leaders
often have had conversations with sponsors that give them fairly
good ideas about the potential for fund-raising with them. When
the team appears to be heading for a period of excess demand for
its work, how to acquire the additional resources to meet this peak
load needs to be discussed.
• B.6 Proposal funds utilization versus projected spending over the year.
Most think tanks experience a regular seasonal pattern in fund-
raising. Think tanks with significant work for government agencies
often find that a large share of the contracting—and therefore a good
deal of all proposal writing—is done near the end of the government’s
fiscal year. The projected spending on proposal writing should
be based on this experience so senior managers understand how
to correctly interpret figures on the rate of spending of proposal
development funds.
Panels C through F address the effectiveness of several types of support
operations: human resources, accounting/finance, contract management,
and public relations. The goal is to provide senior managers with mean-
ingful indicators on workload and productivity. Most indicators measure
productivity by output per staff member. In computing staff members,
use full-time equivalents (FTEs). In other words, if three people each
devote about half their time to personnel matters, then the FTE value is
1.5, and this is the value to use in constructing the indicators.8
While the indicators in the table are certainly useful, they are far from
sufficient by themselves. Experienced managers offer four general pieces
of advice on how to develop additional information for judging opera-
tional efficiency.
Compare your operations with those of similar organizations. In
Washington, D.C., a group of the chief financial officers for several
large think tanks meets regularly to discuss operational issues. They
share information without divulging corporate secrets (such as their
overhead rates). If possible, the chief financial officers in other cities and
countries could try to have similar conversations about, for example,
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the number of staff used in the various support functions and their wages
or salaries.
Listen to the “internal clients.” Senior management should take to
heart complaints from the staff about such things as slowness in getting
reimbursed for travel expenses, staff-reported complaints from clients
about billing delays, lack of support in placing articles in newspapers, or
delays in getting critical action on contractual matters from the contracts
manager.
Do not staff for peak periods. There is a seasonal rhythm for nearly all
support functions. The accounting staff will be especially pressed when the
think tank’s fiscal year ends and various tax filings are due. The contract
manager will be deluged at the end of the government’s fiscal year if new
contracts must get executed urgently. Those in charge of these activities
would prefer a staff large enough to make it through these peak periods
without undue stress, but this approach leads to overstaffing during the
balance of the year. Senior managers simply must place staff complaints
in the context of each department’s seasonal workload and remember that
complaints during the peak load season may have a different meaning
and call for a different response from those aired during a slacker time.
Monitor trends. For many of the indicators in panels C through F, the
absolute values are difficult to interpret. Is 65 employees per human
resource staff member a realistic figure? Alone, this number may be hard
to interpret, but it is very clear that a rise from 65 to 150 over two years
means that the HR staff is much busier now than it was two years ago.
Whether more staff is essential is less clear.
• Panel C. Human resources. Generally speaking, new hires and sep-
arations take more staff time than do continuing employees. As a
result, job turnover and staff growth drive the workload. But the ratio
of total employees to the number of human resources employees is
also a useful measure because the HR workload for health insurance,
leave monitoring, performance assessment, and salary administra-
tion increases with the number of staff.
• D.14 and D.15. These two indicators on accounts receivable are the
most important elements in the accounting/finance block. Failure
to collect amounts due from clients on time can damage an organi-
zation’s financial health. Strong senior management attention and
oversight is essential.
• Panel D. Accounting/finance, other indicators. For most of these mea-
sures, it is useful to see both the total workload as well as that per
accounting staff member. Not shown here are indicators related to
the number and complexity of filings for various taxes and contri-
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butions to social funds, since these filings should be fairly constant
over time. If not, then adding indicators to capture this labor
expenditure is appropriate.
• Panel E. Contract management. The contract manager generally
expends greater effort when a new contract is won and when a con-
tract is closed out than during the performance period. Hence, these
indicators focus on new contracts and close outs. Similarly, when the
think tank subcontracts with another organization, the substantial
effort needed must also be monitored. Still, ongoing contracts have
certain basic activities:
C transmitting reports to clients
C requesting permission to place subcontracts
C documenting that specified procedures were followed in select-
ing a subcontractor
C dealing with changes in scopes of work, key personnel, and other
terms
For this reason, tracking the total number of contracts under
management is also useful.
• Panel F. Public relations. These indicators of public policy effective-
ness concentrate on the number of events—articles placed in news-
papers, radio and TV appearances by staff, op-ed pieces placed—to
monitor the PR staff’s productivity. Because effort can be directed
at one or another of these communications vehicles, the indicators
need to be considered together. Also, senior managers should under-
stand how much the difficulty of successfully making different
kinds of placements can vary. Managers should also keep in mind
that the values of these indicators will be sensitive to the amount of
work contracted out, including desktop design work for policy briefs,
editing, mailing, and even engaging someone to make calls to place
the articles. Note that these indicators are constructed using the
same information as in table 10-2 plus the number of staff working
on public relations.
The information for preparing the indicators listed in the table
comes from many sources. It may make sense for staff in the chief
accountant’s office to compute the indicators to insure consistency
and timeliness.
Innovation and Learning Perspective
These indicators are designed to give senior managers information on
how well the organization is working to renew itself, principally through
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strengthening the quality of the staff but also through forays into new
fields or work with new groups of clients. The key here is the trends, but
an annual review of developments should be able to spot them.
Many think tanks have line items in their overhead cost schedule for
staff training and forms of institutional development such as starting
work on new topics and launching pilot projects.9 To judge whether
funds are being used optimally, senior managers should be informed
whether the funds available for the year were expended (items 3–5 and 7
in table 10-5).
The training indicators track the number and share of the staff that
received training during the year from any sources—whether the think
tank itself or various donors. It is useful to separate training activities spon-
sored to improve individuals’ qualifications for new tasks (e.g., improving
their skills in econometrics or preparing them for work on a new topic
such as health economics).
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Table 10-5 Performance Indicators from the Innovation 
and Learning Perspective
Indicator Possible source a
Training
1. No. and share of staff that received training for 
new roles/products
2. No. and share of staff that received general 
training to improve professional qualifications
3. Overhead staff training spending/total staff
4. Overhead staff training spending/staff trained 
with these fundsb
5. Percent of overhead staff training funds spent
Staff improvement
6. No. of new staff hired with special skills to work 
on innovative topics or strengthen teams
Innovation
7. Percent of overhead funds allocated for 
institutional development expended for 
innovative programs
8. For pilot projects under way, success compared 
with benchmarks
a Who should send the information to the person preparing the indicator and report.
b Excludes those trained through donor programs, for example, without charge.
c The accounting department will only have this information if it is informed when the accounts for
such activities are set up that the activity falls into this class.
Staff dept and team leaders
Staff dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Accounting dept
Team leaders
Accounting deptc
Team leaders managing the
pilot projects
Think tanks often find it more effective to hire a new person with the
needed skills than to try to retrain someone already on staff in the new
topic. Again, it is useful to keep track of such hiring decisions to under-
stand the extent to which the organization is adjusting to new demands
(item 6 in table 10-5).
Finally, table 10-5 includes two basic indicators on the use of institu-
tional support funds.10 One is simply the share of funds dedicated to this
purpose available from overhead charges that were expended in the pre-
vious year on developing innovative programs. In other words, to what
extent did the organization use the available resources for this purpose
last year? It is doubtful that the success of pilot projects can be boiled down
to a few figures. Therefore, only an explicit comparison with stated goals
is important (indicator 8).11 Senior management will need to meet with
the relevant team leader to explore progress. Good indicators of positive
developments are success in implementing the pilot project and the
interest of potential sponsors in the new topic. Actual funding received
is a solid indicator that the work is perceived to have merit.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Many indicators have been presented for tracking institutional perfor-
mance at think tanks. Very few think tanks generate such a comprehen-
sive set of indicators and even fewer compile them into reports for the
institution’s leadership. But many think tanks do have informal systems
that go a long way toward filling this need. Informality is fine, as long as
the monitoring is getting done.
Naturally, each think tank is different. Leaders at each organization
should identify operational areas for which they already have good
information and those for which they do not. Then they should weigh
the potential benefits from generating or collating additional information
for the “under-monitored areas” against the costs. Such deliberations
should probably include the most important managers.
If these managers think that more or better information is needed, the
next steps are considering the options for generating that information
on a regular basis and deciding who should receive it. The indicators
listed in this chapter’s tables and the sample tables shown in appendix H
suggest ideas on the most relevant information to develop.
It is hard to overstate the necessity for think tanks to have monitoring
systems that cover all critical aspects of their operations, as defined in the
five perspectives discussed above. With only a little imagination one can
define an array of developments that—if left undetected for too long—
could impair the institution’s operations or even threaten its existence.
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The benefits of monitoring are large and palpable, if hard to measure,
and they are a good investment.
N O T E S
The author thanks John Rogers, senior vice president; Kathleen Courrier, vice
president for communication; and Bob Planansky, vice president, for candid
discussions about monitoring practices in general and the specific practices of
the Urban Institute. Several colleagues at other think tanks, particularly Galina
Golenkova, chief financial officer at the Institute for Urban Economics, also
provided valuable advice and comments.
1. See, for example, the essays in Harvard Business Review (1998).
2. The three stages of think tank development are described in chapter 1.
3. See Kaplan and Norton (1992) for a full explanation.
4. Some corporations have defined missions that are not related to their
clients’ primary interests. For example, a number of corporations engaged in
natural resource extraction are devoting significant resources to efforts to mitigate
the impact of their activities on the environment. Of course, one can argue that
in the long run these voluntary investments by the corporations will yield lower
commodity prices to the clients because they will forestall government regula-
tion that would be costly to comply with.
5. Sample table 1 in appendix H shows a possible report format.
6. Sample tables 2–4 in appendix H show possible report formats.
7. As noted in the introduction, many indicators of financial condition have
been deliberately omitted, since they are available elsewhere. One not included
in the table that could be a priority item is a quarterly comparison of overhead
spending on a line-item basis with the projections for the year.
8. Another tool for understanding the efficiency of internal operations is
activity-based costing (i.e., determining the full cost of each activity). This can be
very demanding because the costs of many activities are scattered across various
parts of the organization, and creating an operating a system to track these
elements and assemble them into the costs of discrete activities is both complex
and expensive. For this reason, this approach is not recommended in general
for think tanks. Some examples of such costing are in chapter 5. Also see, for
example, Ness and Cucuzza (1995).
9. See chapter 4 for a discussion of how to decide on such areas.
10. Sample table 10 in appendix H shows a possible report format for some
of the indicators.
11. See chapter 7 for an extended discussion.
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Teams or Stars? 
Options for Structuring 
the Research Staff
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The effective and efficient organization of a think tank’s research andanalytic work is one of senior management’s most important tasks.
But the way in which researchers are organized to execute projects is often
more a result of historical accident than a carefully considered decision.
When think tanks begin operations, the emphasis is on winning projects,
completing them well, and having the results used in the policy process.
Worries about management and organizational decisions take a back seat
to more pressing issues. While other management issues, particularly those
of financial and staff management, are addressed later, the research orga-
nization question is often neglected because the work is getting done at
an acceptable standard.
A think tank may be producing high-quality work under its current
arrangements. But the work may also be done more efficiently and with
greater staff satisfaction if management adopted an alternative structure
for some or all of its research and policy analysis. Now may be a good
time for managers to take a step back and reconsider their operation.
This chapter has three tasks: to outline alternative ways think tanks
can structure their research operations, to present some information on
the actual practices of think tanks in different environments, and to pro-
vide some guidance to senior think tank managers for assessing whether
their current structure is best suited to their operations.
ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Perhaps not surprisingly, several distinct models for structuring analytical
and policy work have emerged among think tanks over time. These
Raymond J. Struyk
 
models are based on interviews and on-site observations at about 30 think
tanks in a half-dozen countries.1
These models result from a complex interaction of two distinct aspects
of how think tanks conduct their research. The first aspect concerns the
way research is organized. One can distinguish between the following
two models:
• The “solo star” model. Under this model, notable and influential
researchers basically work independently, with the aid of one or two
research assistants. The research they produce is more often “soft,”
in the sense that it involves limited manipulation of large data sets
and complex statistical analysis. The results are usually published
under the star’s name. In the United States, for example, institutions
that conduct solo star work have senior researchers with strong con-
nections to the government, Congress, and academia.
• The team model. Think tanks that rely on teamwork tend to conduct
large-scale research projects, program evaluations, and demon-
stration and pilot projects. The work more often includes original
data collection and other field work; statistical analysis is frequently
complex and rigorous.
The second aspect that affects models is the staff structure. Think tanks
rely either on full-time staff or on various forms of supplemental staff:
associates, who are usually some type of part-time or full-time distin-
guished visiting fellow employed for a specific project; and consultants,
who are engaged to work on specific projects, often with resident staff at
the think tank. In this context, the terms “associates” and “consultants”
are restricted to projects on which these staff have a leading role over the
life of the project; they exclude cases in which consultants or associates
provide specific, limited expert advice to a project (i.e., the classic short-
term consultant role). Several variations in these arrangements can be
distinguished:
• very dominant resident staff; some supplemental researchers may
be present but are not integral to the institute’s operations
• resident staff working with consultants
• resident staff working with associates
• blend of resident staff, associates, and consultants
A general idea of which models have been adopted by think tanks in
quite different circumstances is provided in tables 11-1 and 11-2, which
are based on information drawn from earlier studies. Table 11-1 shows
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the staffing arrangements at 10 third-stage think tanks in the United States
and Western Europe. The solo star model, chosen by 5 of the 10 think tanks,
is clearly dominant. The second most common model, chosen by three
think tanks, is the resident staff working with consultants and associates.
Under this model, work also tends to be organized according to the solo
star rather than the team model.
Table 11-2 presents information for a selected group of 37 think tanks
located in four countries in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). This discussion focuses on the 21 with at least
seven full-time researchers—a rough cut-off for second-stage institutions.
These 21 think tanks clearly favor the full-time staff model over one with
a small core staff and a large number of part-time researchers. Only two of
these think tanks—both in Bulgaria—report having more part-time than
full-time researchers.2 These two report a very large number of part-
time researchers (70 and 30); this is the cause of Bulgaria’s high average
number of part-time researchers (last column in the table). In the other
three countries, the average number of part-time researchers is about 4;
in Bulgaria, it is 18. In short, in the Eastern Europe–CIS region, think tanks
favor a model in which resident staff are dominant. No information on
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Table 11-1 Organization of the Research Staff at Selected Third-Stage
Think Tanks
Staff and Staff and 
consultants/ foreign 
Think tank Solo star Teams associates fellows
U.S. think tanks
American Enterprise Institute X
Brookings Institution X
Council on Foreign Relations X
Center for Strategic and X
International Studies
Heritage Foundation X
Hoover Institution X
Institute for International Economics X
Urban Institute X
European think tanks
Center for European Policy X
Stockholm International Peace X
Research Institute
Source: Struyk, Ueno, and Suzuki (1993), table 4.1.
Note: Information is for the early 1990s.
whether these organizations favor the solo star or the team model is
available from the study used for table 11-2. But on-site observations at
many of these think tanks suggest that the team model is dominant.
While the information just presented is helpful in describing current
practices, it understates the variety of the models that exist in practice.
In fact, think tanks combine the two sets of options for staffing research—
solo star versus team, and varying emphasis on resident staff—in a variety
of ways. Table 11-3 displays these options and presents the author’s
judgment on how frequently various models are adopted. The two most
common models are the very dominant resident staff and the resident staff
with consultants. But both of these have solo star and team variants. For
example, among the very dominant resident staff/solo star third-stage insti-
tutions is the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. But the Urban
Institute, also in Washington, D.C., employs the very dominant resident
staff/team structure. Think tanks that employ the solo star structure are
likely to have an associate or consultant only to lead his or her own project
or to collaborate on a very large project.
Many think tanks use the resident staff with consultants structure because
it gives them greater flexibility in staffing specific projects and allows them
to avoid the high fixed cost of a large permanent staff. Examples from the
West include the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Center for European Policy Studies. This model is used frequently in
Eastern Europe, with consultants often leading project teams (e.g., the
Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, a second-stage think tank).
In other cases, leadership is provided by regular staff team leaders, and
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Table 11-2 Hiring Status of Researchers at Selected Think Tanks 
in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States
Number of Think Tanks with at Least Seven Full-Time Researchers
Number of 
Number think tanks Average 
of think with more number of
tanks full-time than part-time
Country studied Total part-time staff staff
Armenia 4 1 1 5
Bulgaria 11 6 4 18
Hungary 11 5 5 3
Russia 11 9 9 8
Source: Struyk (1999), appendix E-3.
intermittent workers make up most of the other members of the team
(e.g., the Expert Institute in Moscow, a second-stage think tank).
Of course, few think tanks offer a pure example of one of these models.
The Urban Institute, which generally uses a team approach, also has senior
fellows who typically conduct their research as solo stars. Similarly, the
Brookings Institution forms research teams to execute exceptionally
large projects—but the teams tend to be disbanded when the project is
completed.
The final two models, involving the use of a significant number of
visiting scholars in residence to conduct projects, are generally used less
frequently. Matching the visitor’s interests and schedule with the funded
agenda of the think tank is consistently challenging. These models work
well when the think tank has significant core funding from a government
agency or other consistent source. They are not discussed further.
WHICH MODEL TO CHOOSE?
Managers should consider six factors when determining the best arrange-
ment for a particular think tank.
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Table 11-3 Alternative Staffing Models for Research at Think Tanks and
Their Frequency of Adoption
Use of Senior Associate Use of Consultants a
Model Solo star Teams Solo star Teams
Very dominant 
resident staffb
Resident staff 
with consultants
Resident staff with 
significant number 
of associates
Blend of resident staff 
and associates/
consultants
Source: Interviews with think tanks and author’s observations.
a Associates and consultants have major responsibility within the project and are not just providing
limited expert advice.
b Some visitors may be present, but they are not integral to the institute’s operations.
Common
Common
Occasional
Occasional
Common
Common
Infrequent
Infrequent
Separate or 
very large 
projects
Separate or 
very large 
projects
Occasional
Occasional
Occasional
Fairly common
Infrequent
Infrequent
Type and Size of Projects
The larger the share of a think tank’s workload that consists of program
evaluations, demonstration and pilot projects, technical assistance projects,
and other projects requiring significant primary data collection, the
stronger the argument for a team model. The team model normally requires
a core of resident staff to manage the projects and provide the necessary
coherence and organization. For example, consider a pilot project that
works with local governments to improve the targeting of locally admin-
istered social assistance programs. The project requires that a team design
and implement the pilot projects and then carry out rigorous implemen-
tation or process evaluations to determine whether pilots are successful.
A team of six or more professionals could be engaged on such a project
for more than two years.3
In contrast, when the think tank emphasizes policy analysis exploiting
secondary data or a limited amount of qualitative information, the solo
star model is more appropriate. When an analyst is addressing questions
involving a country’s foreign policy, typical tasks include reviewing a
substantial literature and perhaps examining a volume of internal foreign
ministry documents. Interviews with members of the policy elite may also
be involved. An able research assistant may well be sufficient support for
the senior researcher working on such a project.
While associates and consultants as well as resident staff can be solo
stars, a core cadre of resident senior staff is necessary to give a think tank
credibility. Hence, it is unusual to find a solo star model that is not mostly
based on resident staff members.
Variability of the Workload
The greater the variance (both positive and negative) in the total volume
of an institution’s activity or in the distribution of total activity among
different topics over time, the greater the challenge to the institution’s
management to maintain a consistent core staff. Managers must try to
keep full-time staff at work on appropriate projects during the troughs
and to recruit and train needed additional staff in a timely way during
expansions. Hence, the greater the variability, the stronger the case for
having a comparatively limited full-time resident staff and relying more
heavily on intermittent staff, associates, and consultants.
Flexibility of the Staff
An institute’s agenda may change substantially from year to year because
of shifts in the country’s policy priorities and interests of those funding
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the institute’s work, even though the total volume of work may be sig-
nificantly less volatile. Retaining a number of senior resident staff over
time remains desirable even under these difficult conditions. The insti-
tutional knowledge and loyalty of these analysts and the continuity they
provide are important assets.
A key question, however, is these people’s willingness and ability to work
effectively on new topics. A senior researcher’s reluctance to shift the
focus of his or her work away from a favored topic or line of analysis is
often a greater problem than his or her ability to do so. Sensitive persua-
sion and guidance by senior management may be needed to convince a
senior analyst to make the change and remain with the organization.
In general, the more flexible the senior staff in working on different
topics, the better the case for having a larger resident staff. Still, senior
management may well have to supplement their resident staff with
short-term experts to maintain high-quality analysis on the new topics.
Tax and Social Fund Consequences
In a number of countries, there are important differences in the cost to a
think tank of hiring the same person as a staff member or as a consultant.
This arises because of differences between the two types of employment
in the employer’s responsibilities for withholding the personal income
tax and/or remitting contributions to various social funds (e.g., health
insurance, pension). Typically, consultants are relatively cheaper to the
think tank in such situations. To be competitive, a think tank may have
little choice but to hire a significant share of its total research staff through
various kinds of consulting arrangements.
Institutional Reputation
A think tank’s ability to choose among resident staff, consultant, and dis-
tinguished visitor models will depend substantially on the institution’s
reputation. The more prestigious the think tank, the easier it will be to
attract a senior policy analyst or researcher to be a part-time staff member
or a visiting fellow. If the institution has yet to establish itself among the
first group of think tanks in its country, then hiring such senior people
as consultants may be the right strategy, strengthening the resident staff
and the institution’s reputation.
Generally, resident staff have strong incentives to do excellent work and
otherwise act to build the institute’s reputation. Consultants typically
act to maximize their hourly wage rate from assignments and therefore
are less likely to delivery exemplary work.
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Special Cases
Regardless of the principal model for organizing research and analysis that
a think tank’s management selects, there are sometimes good reasons for
making an exception to the rule. Consider a think tank with a strong tra-
dition of using a team organization for its research. If it had the oppor-
tunity to attract a distinguished scholar in an area of particular importance
to the think tank’s longer-term agenda, but that researcher preferred to
work in the solo star mode, it would seem reasonable for the think tank
to accommodate the scholar. In another example, a think tank that gen-
erally employs a full-time resident research model might want to hire
a part-time, or even intermittent, senior staff person when launching
work in a new area. With the volume of work over the first few months
highly uncertain, this flexibility might be necessary to keep the initiative
financially viable.
FINAL THOUGHTS
Most think tanks would do well to review their staffing and research
structure strategy every few years. Preparing careful characterizations of
the institution for each of the first five of the factors listed above would
be a useful starting point for these deliberations. Here are three further
bits of advice.
First, think not only about the institution’s current requirements but
also about the goals the organization is striving to attain in the next few
years. Is it trying to shift from being heavily concentrated on technical
assistance projects to doing more policy research? Is it striving to make
process or implementation evaluations of government programs a sub-
stantial part of its agenda? These plans should be reflected in how the
structure of the research operation evolves.
Second, be flexible. There is no need to adopt any single model as
the sole structure for conducting research. As noted, major think tanks
in the United States and Europe often employ more than one model,
depending on the task to be done. When needed, different models
should be adopted to fit particular circumstances. That said, it is probably
nonetheless useful for a think tank to use a defined general approach to
structuring its research—that is, a model that is believed to be effective
in current operating circumstances—unless there are good reasons for
changing.
Third, be creative. For example, some think tanks find that while the
resident staff/team model generally works well, each team cannot be fully
self-sufficient. One common problem is that the institution’s research
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teams need help with econometric aspects of an evaluation or analysis,
but no team needs a full-time econometrician. So think tanks employ an
econometrician who acts as an in-house consultant to the teams, as well
as carrying out his or her own projects. Sampling and survey experts can
also work across projects.
N O T E S
1. Most of this information is summarized in Struyk (1993, 1999).
2. The survey also asked about the number of “other staff,” which was intended
to record the number of workers involved in research (i.e., interviewers and con-
sultants used from time to time). The information suggests that the question was
not always understood as intended and that the answers in some instances refer
to a wider range of staff than the types of groups just mentioned. Therefore, the
information is not used in this discussion.
3. Note that while the team members could conduct elite interviews, they
would generally not carry out household or other large-scale surveys. Sampling
and survey experts, along with interviewers, would have this responsibility. The
team would, however, be responsible for managing the survey process to ensure
that it met the needs of the project.
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Creating Team Leaders
12
Team leaders—think tanks’ middle managers for research—aresecond in importance only to the think tanks’ presidents. Team
leaders, who are called many things in different think tanks—center direc-
tors, department heads, division managers—direct groups of researchers
ranging from two or three analysts to more than 20 people. In large
departments, project directors report to team leaders.1 As soon as an
organization has an analytic staff of at least 10 people, teams are usually
formed and team leaders are designated—sometimes formally, sometimes
informally.2
Team leaders are mainly responsible for carrying out projects, 
but other duties include keeping staff productively employed, main-
taining a positive work environment, ensuring the high quality of 
the reports, being active in the policy process, and acquiring new
business. The role of the team leader can be described as having four
general elements: to set objectives, manage, and coordinate the team
so that it does its best work; to provide resources to the team; to link
the team to the rest of the organization; and to be a contributing team
member.3
Ideally, team leaders at think tanks will possess a formidable array of
attributes. They should
• have solid research and policy skills in order to direct staff and be
a leader in the policy development process;
• have the strong interpersonal and leadership skills essential in get-
ting the most out of the team;
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• be good project managers—that is, know what volume of resources
is needed to carry out a project and how to schedule and organize
these resources effectively;
• have strong organizational skills to keep the team fully and produc-
tively employed, meet deadlines, and maintain product quality;
• be effective in marketing the team’s skills to existing clients; and
• be innovative in assessing the needs of existing and new clients and
identifying new policy issues and activities for the group to pursue.
It is not surprising that few team leaders excel in all these areas. What
is surprising is that almost no think tanks have programs for training or
mentoring team leaders to ensure they will be effective. In a typical sit-
uation, a good researcher who seems reasonably well organized, sufficiently
affable, and has some taste for marketing is promoted into the team leader
position. From that point on, the team leader is learning by doing, with
some support from the president or research director if the new team
leader is observed to be struggling. Most team leaders are eventually able
to perform their jobs to a reasonable standard, but a significant share
perform marginally—too well to be reassigned and too poorly to satisfy
the needs of their staff and the think tank.
Think tanks can improve the effectiveness of these essential managers
by explicitly working with would-be or new team leaders on a series of
tasks for which they will be responsible. This chapter presents steps that
senior management can take to develop the highly effective team leaders
they need, based on practices in private industry and observations of
successful team leaders.
This chapter differs from the others in that there are no examples
of the current practices of think tanks, even third-stage organizations.
There is essentially nothing to talk about because think tanks have yet to
confront the topic.
The presentation has been organized into two sections. The first briefly
discusses the qualities that senior management should look for in a team
leader and how management can help team leaders do their jobs better.
The second part addresses a series of tasks that team leaders have to carry
out, giving pointers on performing the jobs effectively and efficiently.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT
The leadership of a think tank is responsible for recruiting team leaders.
In some cases, this is easy because an obvious candidate is already on staff,
usually in the group he or she will direct. But often it is necessary to recruit
from outside the organization. In all cases, the candidates should be
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rigorously judged against a set of explicit criteria. Once the selection is
made, senior management can take several actions to increase the odds
of the new team leader succeeding.
Selecting a Team Leader
The requirements for succeeding as a team leader are demanding. Useful
criteria for assessing candidates are listed in table 12-1. These are the
generally accepted set of qualifications and cover all the key attributes
noted above. The table also shows the relative weights assigned to the var-
ious attributes. The values assigned are more subjective than the criteria
themselves, and will be explained below. The essential point, however, is
that senior management should assign weights to this or a similar set of
qualifications so they can agree among themselves in assessing candidates.
The highest weight has been assigned to the substantive knowledge and
policy acumen of the team leader. Above all, the team leader must be a
true expert in the topic for which he or she is leading the team. Without
this expertise, the team is likely to do work that is not cutting edge and
will be forced to do too much learning on the job. Thorough knowledge
is essential for providing intellectual leadership to the rest of the team.
But substantive knowledge is not enough. The candidate must also have
proven skills in the relevant policy arena. Anyone who has worked with
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Table 12-1 Weights Assigned to Desirable Attributes of Team Leaders
Weight 
assigned Attribute
26
20
16
14
12
12
100
a Assumes that all candidates have equivalent of a Ph.D. from a U.S. university or sufficient 
analytic experience to be the functional equivalent in economics or another social science.
Substantive knowledge—is extremely familiar with topic area, 
has years of experience, and has strong understanding of policy
Interpersonal skills—is a natural leader and mentor; will be a produc-
tive participant in management meetings
Initiative and vision—seeks out opportunities; thinks of ways to
strengthen staff; is good at anticipating changes in policy priorities
and client needs
Well-organized—plans ahead, keeps close track of and meets commit-
ments and deadlines
Analytic skills—has command of more sophisticated econometric and
other techniquesa
Growth potential—is intellectually creative and flexible; appears to have
strong management skills
Total points
researchers knows only too well that many researchers have great difficulty
making strong connections between their analysis and specific policy
questions. Only a few researchers develop into strong policy analysts.
Hence the need for evident policy skills—both in written products and in
the candidate’s dealings in the policy arena, in other words, in advancing
ideas skillfully with government officials, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and legislators. If possible, the candidate should be already rec-
ognized in the policy community as an expert. Even if the candidate is
not yet at such a level, his or her views on policy issues in should be cogent,
well founded, and compelling. Policy writings and public presentations
offer a good idea of what to expect.
The second greatest weight is assigned to interpersonal skills. This may
seem strange in a profession where individual qualities such as technical
facility and the ability to make effective presentations are so highly valued.
Nevertheless, the justification is clear: a team leader with poor inter-
personal skills can reduce the team’s productivity and may even destroy
a team by causing good people to leave. The author knows both second-
and third-stage think tanks where this has happened within a team
before the president decided that there was simply no alternative to reas-
signing or dismissing a technically competent, policy-effective team
leader who made life miserable for subordinates. As Bunkder, Kram, and
Ting (2002) point out, a true leader must be approachable, build team
spirit, and motivate the team.4 This requires a certain degree of emotional
maturity that is often lacking in younger analysts. At the same time, this
type of maturity is not highly correlated with age.
How can management gather information on the interpersonal skills
of candidates for a team leader position? If the candidate is already on
the think tank’s staff, there should be ample opportunity to make the
assessment. Signs of potential problems include the staffer being a loner
(i.e., preferring not to work on team projects or not volunteering to help
others); being constantly critical, especially if the criticism is done without
a clearly constructive purpose; or trying to avoid responsibility for the
quality of products or for making presentations.
Outside candidates are harder to judge. There are ways, however, to
gather information besides the candidate’s interviews with the top people
at your think tank. Some possibilities include the following:
• Ask staff or other experts in the particular field—who are known
by staff at your think tank and who have been at conferences and
policy working sessions with the candidate—about the candidate’s
style: was it cooperative and constructive, competitive, or even
destructive?
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• Check with people who have worked with the candidate about the
candidate’s working style and relations with coworkers. It is often
difficult to make inquiries of workers where the candidate is currently
employed, but experience in earlier positions is also relevant. The
best opportunity is if someone within the hiring organization can
ask a personal friend at another institution where the candidate has
worked.
• Have the candidate interview with two or three people who will be
on his or her team. Sometimes candidates will be quite aggressive in
these meetings, and other times they send a clear signal of their own
superiority. In either case, this is a worrisome sign. Get candid feed-
back from your staff.
• Invite the candidate to give a seminar on a topic in his or her area
of expertise.
The next three attributes listed in the table have been given somewhat
smaller weights, but these are nevertheless very important factors to
consider. It might seem strange that analytic skills are in this group with
smaller weights. But this analysis assumes that all candidates have grad-
uate degrees, equivalent to a Ph.D. from a U.S. university, in one of the
social sciences.5 There may be a large variance in candidates’ econometric
and other statistical competence, but many think tanks recognize that
candidates can be assisted by those with highly specialized statistical skills.
The Urban Institute, for example, has an in-house consulting econometri-
cian who can either provide advice on an econometric problem or conduct
the needed analysis. Many think tanks can assign staff with the necessary
skills to a team for a particular project or bring in a consultant. In short, it
is easy to overestimate the technical requirements of the team leader.
Although the leader must appreciate which techniques are generally appro-
priate to address different problems, he or she need not be a specialist.
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the candidate’s demon-
strated qualities. But the potential for growth is often as important as the
record to date, especially for younger candidates for the team leader posi-
tion. What can one look for as signs of this potential? This is subjective and
tricky to judge in practice. Table 12-2 lists standards for judging potential
compiled for for-profit firms (Charan, Drotter, and Noel 2001). The left-
hand column lists attributes for persons with substantial potential, while
the right-hand column lists those for a person who is likely to develop
only to a limited degree in his or her current position.
These standards should give managers a good idea of a candidate’s
potential. Clearly, it will be easier to apply them to internal candidates
than to external candidates. For internal candidates the results of past
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performance assessments and discussions with their raters are important
inputs.6 But even candidates outside the organization can be asked about
their interest in management, as well as about their skills. Candidates
might be asked, for example, how they would handle certain tasks, such
as planning the work of the team, thinking about new directions for the
team’s work, or delegating responsibility for certain jobs.
In the end, the decision about who to name as a team leader depends on
both the demonstrated skills (as defined in table 12-1) and the candidate’s
potential for growth and development. In comparing alternative candi-
dates it is useful for two or three leaders at the institute to explicitly rate
each candidate, using the same set of factors. The group should then
discuss the ratings and explore the reasons for differences. While nothing
eliminates the risk of making a poor choice, such group reviews have
proven effective.
Supporting the Team Leader
Making the transition from being a productive policy analyst to being a
team manager entails a sharp change in thinking.7 Most people want to
continue doing the things they are good at and that they enjoy. But the
new team leader must learn to reallocate his or her time—shifting it away
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Table 12-2 Standards for Judging Potential
Substantial leadership potential Limited leadership potential
• Exhibits broad and deep range of
operating, technical, and 
professional skills
• Exhibits sound managerial skills
• Demonstrates leadership skills 
consistent with the team 
leader position
• Regularly works at developing 
new skills and abilities
• Aspires to higher-level 
challenges and opportunities
• Demonstrates high interest and 
energy in the institute’s work
• Is oriented to the success of the
whole institute, not just 
this team
Source: Based on Charan, Drotter, and Noel (2001), exhibit 10.1.
• On balance, exhibits operating, technical,
and professional skills that are acceptable
for current level
• Demonstrates little effort to build new
skills but keeps current skills sharp
• Aspires to stay with the institute, but does
not demonstrate much interest in assum-
ing larger challenges
• Is motivated to do what is needed in the
current job
• Understands the current job
• Is focused primarily on technical success
from research and toward management tasks. This is often very difficult
for first-time managers, who are being asked to devote less energy to the
very work that has made them successful to date. They must also learn
to delegate responsibility, rather than trying to do too much themselves.
Table 12-3 outlines more systematically the range of changes in the
skills, time allocation, and work values inherent in moving from being
an individual contributor to being a team leader.
Given the major changes involved in becoming the new team leader,
support from the think tank’s leadership is important. Timely help with
taking up the new duties can save an enormous amount of frustration on
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Table 12-3 Work Program Changes Inherent in Moving 
from Team Member to Team Leader
Team member Team leader
Skills
• Technical or professional 
proficiency
• Team play
• Relationship-building for 
personal benefits, 
personal resultsa
• Using company tools, 
processes, and 
procedures
Time allocation
• Daily discipline
• Meet personal due dates 
for projects—usually 
short-term management 
over time
Work values
• Getting results through 
personal proficiency
• Producing high-quality 
professional work
• Accept the institution’s 
values
Source: Charan, Drotter, and Noel (2001), table 2.1.
a Items to be sharply reduced when person becomes a manager.
• Planning—projects, budget, team
• Job design
• Selection of team members
• Delegation
• Performance monitoring
• Coaching and feedback
• Rewards and motivation
• Communication and climate setting
• Relationship building up and down and with
clients for team’s benefit
• Business acquisition
• Annual and monthly planning—budgets, projects
• Make time available for subordinates—both at
team leader’s own request and theirs
• Set priorities for team
• Communication time with other parts of organi-
zation and clients
• Getting results through others
• Success of team members
• Managerial work and disciplines
• Success of unit
• Self as manager
• Visible integrity
all sides. This section briefly outlines how senior managers can facilitate
the transition to the team leader position.
Define the Job Carefully
A typical real-life scenario is for a staff member to be a policy analyst one
day and a team leader the next. The think tank’s president may meet with
the team to make the announcement and outline the team’s work program
and prospects for the coming months. But the new team leader will have
little in the way of a detailed understanding of the new responsibilities—
the specific tasks he or she must carry out. Many think tanks do not have
a written job description; where such descriptions exist, they tend to be
general. The new team leader is expected to know what to do from hav-
ing watched other team leaders in the past.
The president or second-in-command can help the new team leader by
providing a written job description and a supplementary list of concrete
tasks that are the team leader’s responsibilities. The task list should specify
how often each task needs to be done. Such tasks might include prepara-
tion of quarterly projections of staff coverage under existing and expected
grants and contracts, monthly activity reports due to certain clients,
quality control for reports produced, and monthly travel schedules for
members of the team.
Beyond this, the senior management should be clear about the expec-
tations for the team. Marketing and revenue generation by the team is
certainly one topic. A useful context for the revenue target is the monthly
billings required to maintain the team at its present size. Another topic
could be the president’s ideas about the future direction of the team’s
work—which will directly affect the team leader’s marketing and hiring
activities.
Being clear about the tasks for which the team leader is responsible
has at least two advantages. First, it keeps the new team leader from con-
stantly being surprised by new requirements. Such unexpected additional
duties can be particularly disruptive if the team leader carefully allocates
his or her time. Second, such clarity gives the president and the team leader
a common understanding about a core set of activities for which the team
leader is responsible, establishing one basis for monitoring the team
leader’s performance.
How to Help
Senior management needs to monitor the team leader’s performance
carefully during the first six to twelve months and to provide regular
feedback and coaching to help make the team leader make the transition.
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Monitoring Performance
Management can use an array of documents to monitor the team’s
activity: time sheets to check the allocation of time charged by the team
and the team leader, staff coverage projections, project-associated travel
records, and peer reviews of the team’s products. In addition, discussions
with the team leader can be used to determine how the team leader is using
team staff (changes in specialization, travel patterns) and whether he or
she is marketing the team’s and the organization’s services effectively.
Equally important is feedback from team members on working rela-
tions, the atmosphere within the team, the team’s productivity, and their
reactions to the team leader’s style. Obtaining client feedback is also key.
What kinds of problems may be encountered? They fall into two groups:
those indicated by the outputs of the team and those more directly asso-
ciated with the team leader’s style. Examples of these are listed in box 12-1.
These two types of problems differ sharply in the ease with which they
are identified and addressed.
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Problems with the team’s results
• Projects are not completed on time and/or within budget.
• Quality control problems.
• Poor forward planning means that team members are under- or over-
employed.
• Marketing results are weak.
Unproductive behaviors from the team leader
• Unfairly capitalizes on his or her personal authority to abuse people.
• Overvalues his or her capabilities, has trouble accepting other’s views,
comes across as arrogant.
• Distrusts others, micromanages, delegates poorly.
• Operates alone and communicates strategies poorly.
• Is enthusiastic one day and indifferent the next.
• Is eager to please and unwilling to challenge authority to support team
members.
• Is unwilling to try new things to keep up with changing trends.
• Obsesses about details, is carried away with rules and procedures, and is
inflexible.
• Appears to support decisions and then does what he or she wants after-
ward. Disregards requests with no explanation.
Source: Some examples in the lower panel are from Dotlich and Cairo (1999), 96.
Box 12-1 Examples of Problems Team Leaders Can Experience
Problems with the team’s results are clear red flags—the think tank’s
very integrity is at stake. Such problems require immediate attention. In
principle, management should identify most of the problems easily, with
the possible exception of those with quality control: if all the peer
reviewers are drawn from within the team and the team leader does not
take an active interest in this process, then the research product problems
could go unnoticed for some time—until a client complains or an outside
analyst criticizes a report. With the exception of the marketing problem,
this set of problems can be handled in fairly straightforward ways, mainly
by improving the organization of the work. Senior management can give
pointers on how to do this and perhaps suggest the team leader enlist a
team member to help track schedules for accomplishing various tasks.
Unproductive behaviors, on the other hand, are more difficult to
identify and to address. They may be harder for management to discover
because they could be confined within the team. Once identified, such
problems may resist easy correction, because they often have to do with
the team leader’s basic attitudes and personality attributes rather than
insufficient vigilance or energy in carrying out the basic research man-
agement functions.
Charan, Drotter, and Noel (2001) suggest several ways for senior
management to gain insights into the success of the new team leader’s tran-
sition from being a “contributor” to being a manager and leader. Three
techniques in particular look promising for the situation at hand.
• Understand how the team leader is allocating his or her time. The allo-
cation of time offers a good window on understanding the value
the team leader places on different activities. There should be sig-
nificant time devoted to planning, discussions with individual staff
members and the team as a whole, and marketing. Compared with
team members, team leaders should spend less time on direct
research and report writing.
• Listen carefully to how managers evaluate subordinates. Excessive
negative comments about staff members or fixation on a single
performance dimension are both reason for concerns.
• Look at plans that team leaders develop (in written or verbal form) from
a values standpoint. Plans often tell where the manager is placing his
or her greatest value. It may be that too much of the team’s time is
being devoted to research and analysis—the topics of greatest
interest to the team leader—and too little to marketing and coach-
ing of team members. The quality of the plan is also important. A
muddled plan signals poor thinking or a low value on planning in
general, both cause for concern.
 MANAGING THINK TANKS
Once a significant problem is identified, how can senior manage-
ment help?
Start with the Boss, Not the Team Leader
When a problem is detected, senior management should first examine
its own actions toward the team to be certain that it is not contributing
to the problem. For example, have senior managers
• micromanaged the team leader, sending the signal that they are han-
dling scheduling and planning and that the leader has little space to
try innovations in running the team?
• done a poor job of communicating expectations for the team or
shifts in the direction of the think tank?
• provided inadequate resources to the team and hence undermined
its ability to complete projects on time?
• bypassed the team leader to give assignments to individual team
members, thereby undermining the leader’s authority and reducing
the resources available to carry out the research and analysis?
Self-awareness on the part of the senior managers will prevent them
from unintentionally undercutting and discouraging the team leader, and
may prevent conflict between them and the team leader.
Coaching
Almost inevitably, the new team leader will make mistakes. Proper mon-
itoring permits identifying missteps before they lead to serious problems.
There is no substitute for one-on-one coaching from the new team leader’s
boss. “Coaching is personal help given to develop skills and improve a
person’s way of working. It is a highly practical activity concerned with
today’s task, not a future job” (Leigh and Maynard 1995, 141). The lit-
erature on coaching outlines a general process for a coach (e.g., one of the
think tank’s top people) to work with a “client” (the team leader) once
a problem is evident. This process has been organized into four steps,
and appears in the appendix to this chapter so it can serve as a general
resource.
The old saw that leaders are made, not born, sums up the discussion
presented here. Most think tank directors have learned this lesson over
time. Developing an efficient, reliable team leader usually requires a signif-
icant up-front investment in the kind of activities outlined above. Although
expensive, such investment typically carries a high rate of return.
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TEAM LEADER TASKS
This section provides pointers to team managers on executing some of
their tasks. The tasks have been divided into three groups: planning and
controlling staff utilization, project execution, and staff productivity.
Planning and Controlling Staff Utilization
For a typical research or technical assistance project executed by think
tanks, the great majority of costs are for staff inputs. Leaving aside over-
head costs, which are mostly loaded on the hourly wage of staff executing
the projects, staff costs often exceed 70 percent of total costs. It follows
that controlling staff inputs is the key for keeping projects within budget.
Similarly, making certain that work is available for team members in the
months ahead is the most important element in ensuring that the team
can continue to work at its current level. This section briefly reviews
ways for team leaders to track staff utilization during project execution
and to assess future team coverage.
Tracking Utilization
The first step to controlling time charges to a project is for the team
leader to prepare a careful plan for executing the project that budgets
specific time allocations for each person who is to work on the project.
Equally important, a task the person is to do and the amount of time avail-
able must be clearly communicated to each staff member. Thereafter,
control is a matter of monitoring staff time charges and comparing them
with progress on the task.
As simple as this sounds, projects at many think tanks, including third-
stage institutions, regularly get into trouble because of poor monitoring
of staff time. The result can be large cost overruns that are damaging,
sometimes severely, to the think tank’s financial health.
Monitoring time charges is more effective than tracking total expen-
ditures, although both are important. Total expenditures are harder to
track because there is generally a time lag between when costs are incurred
and when they are posted by the accountants and the cost reports gen-
erated. Time charges, on the other hand, can be recorded as soon as time
sheets are submitted.
If managers do not track time expenditures against budgets, staff who
find themselves unable to fulfill their assignment in the allocated time—
or perhaps have no other project to which to charge time—may simply
continue to charge time to a project. (This assumes that the staffer is aware
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that he or she is exceeding the budgeted time allocation, which is certainly
not always the case.) Because of such lapses, team leaders and senior
managers should have a system for routinely monitoring staff time
charges by project.
Tables 12-4 and 12-5 illustrate the time management system at the
Institute for Urban Economics. Each table is an excerpt from a larger
monthly report. The report illustrated in table 12-4 is organized by project
number (column 2) and shows the hours charged for everyone who has
charged time to the project. The project-based report is for team leaders
and management to use in assessing time utilization for a particular
project. The report excerpted in table 12-5, on the other hand, is organized
by staff member, showing the time charged to each project to which a
staff member is budgeted to charge time or has otherwise charged time.
The final line for each staff member shows the totals for all projects to
which this person can charge time. It is intended to help staff keep track
of their time, and the finance office uses it to do a final control of time
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Table 12-4 Control Table for Staff Time Charges: Project Based
Total  Hours  Hours  
hours spent last in the 
Employee Project spent month budget Balance
Gasyak, Vladimir 10468-702-04 4 4 346 342
Gofman, Dima 10468-702-04 448 32 778 330
Khamova, Lena 10468-702-04 145 7 346 201
Molchanov, Andrei 10468-702-04 88 0 259 171
Puzanov, Sasha 10468-702-04 60 0 86 26
Rumiantsev, Igor 10468-702-04 366 32 518 152
Sedova, Lena 10468-702-04 89 4 173 84
Tolstova, Ira 10468-702-04 11 0 173 162
Zadonsky, Georgy 10468-702-04 596 24 1,123 527
Total 10468-702-04 1,807 103 3,802 1,995
Anopochkin, Volodia 50039-000-00 76 10 90 14
Belozerskaya, Lena 50039-000-00 56 2 192 136
Elagina, Elena 50039-000-00 456 88 2,079 1,623
Golenkova, Galina 50039-000-00 4 2 96 92
Levina, Liza 50039-000-00 16 4 96 80
Makhova, Lena 50039-000-00 30 15 96 66
Tolstova, Ira 50039-000-00 18 10 48 30
Yashanin, Victor 50039-000-00 20 5 96 76
Zykova, Tatiana 50039-000-00 48 8 192 144
Total 50039-000-00 724 144 2,985 2,261
Source: Excerpt from the Institute for Urban Economics, August 2000.
charges at the end of the month. In principle, every hour charged by a
staff member should be shown in the amount of time budgeted for that
person appearing in this report.
Look at the reports more carefully. Both reports are for use in August
2000. The budget column shows the number of hours allocated to a staff
member to charge to a project. Normally, this would come from the
budget prepared to determine the cost of executing the project. The
column labeled “New Total” shows the number of hours used through
August. The column labeled Balance shows the hours remaining for the
staff member to use. So, in table 12-5, the first row for Andrei Khakhalin
shows that he was initially allocated 86 hours for project 10478-501-00,
has used 48 hours through July, and has 38 hours remaining to charge to
the project. If the team leader changes the allocation of time among staff
working on the project, he or she informs the staff person responsible
for maintaining these records.
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Table 12-5 Control Table for Staff Time Charges: Staff-Based
Total Hours  Hours
hours spent last in the 
Employee Project spent month budget Balance
Khakhalin, Andrei 10468-501-00 48 0 86 38
10468-503-00 176 28 346 170
10468-505-01 732 40 950 218
10468-703-04 40 8 69 29
10468-802-04 64 32 69 5
10468-807-04 223 16 864 641
20279-000-00 40 16 40 0
50029-000-00 209 16 208 −1
OVH-019-10 16 8 16 0
OVH-019-23 8 4 8 0
Total 1,556 168 2,656 1,100
Kutakova, Tatiana 10468-300-00 242 22 259 17
10468-300-01 1,304 96 1,382 78
10468-704-04 48 24 173 125
20019-000-00 4 4 4 0
20069-000-00 136 16 136 0
20279-000-00 24 0 40 16
OVH-018-30 8 4 12 4
OVH-019-01 8 2 4 −4
Total 1,774 168 2,010 236
Source: Table excerpt from the Institute for Urban Economics, August 2000.
The system is straightforward and eliminates uncertainty. It is updated
monthly on the basis of the previous month’s time sheets. It is certainly
not necessary for a think tank to have computer-prepared reports such
as those shown, but team leaders do need to keep some form of records
to avoid overrunning project budgets.
Forward Planning
Planning for future staff use is just as important as controlling staff uti-
lization on current projects. Neglecting this kind of planning can result
in several kinds of problems.
Insufficient Attention to Marketing
Where there are looming shortfalls in staff coverage, the team should be
especially active in generating new projects. If the team leader is not
aware of the impending fall-off in work, a serious coverage problem is
likely to ensue, possibly requiring some staff to be put on part-time work
or even let go.
Overbooking
At the opposite extreme, the team leader may accept too many assign-
ments. While this is a happier situation than coverage problems, it gen-
erates its own strains. Most obvious is the pressure on staff to work
exceptionally hard to meet all the contract or grant requirements. There
are significant possibilities of drops in quality under such stressful work
conditions.
Selective Overbooking
In some cases, one or two key team members are overcommitted. It will
usually be possible to substitute other staff for the key people to some
degree, but there are definite limits. Consistent overbooking of key staff
may force them to look for work in a less stressful environment.
Senior management would be unhappy to learn that a team leader had
encountered any of these situations through negligent planning. Some
think tanks use an explicit projection process to help team leaders do their
forward planning. Table 12-6 shows a composite form based on those
used by several think tanks. The form is completed for each staff member
for the next three months. The top part of the form shows coverage on
current projects. The lower portion is for prospective projects, usually
those for which proposals are outstanding. Based on past experience with
the client or on discussions with the client about this particular proposal,
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the team leader may be able to assign a probability to various grants or
contracts being won and adjust the projected coverage accordingly.8
Summing the staff person’s coverage over the current and expected pro-
jects provides the team leader with a realistic assessment of the coverage
situation for each staff member for the next three months.
Table 12-6 shows that the staff member, Richard Jones, has very good
coverage for the first three months, beginning in April 2001. Indeed,
for the first two months Mr. Jones is overcommitted (see the bottom
two rows). His workload is particularly acute in May, when he will have
11 more days committed than work days, should the team in fact win
the contract to provide technical assistance to NGO service deliverers. The
team leader should use this information to consider who else on the team
could work on one of Mr. Jones’s projects, should all commitments remain
in force. The team leader might also consider trying to get the client’s
permission to delay some deliverables.
Who should complete this form? Experience shows that individual
staff members often lack realistic information on proposed projects.
Frequently they are not involved in preparing the proposal nor in discus-
sions about the likelihood of winning. So they are not in a good position
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Table 12-6 Example of Forward Planning Staff Chart
Staff person name: Richard Jones
Department: Local government
For the period from: April 1, 2001 to July 1, 2001
Completed by: Andrei Suchkov
Month
Total
Project name Project number 1 2 3 days
Ongoing projects
Legislation on nonprofits 00127-00 10 8 2 20
Loc Gov housing TA 00136-00 9 9 9 27
Subtotal 19 17 11 47
Projected projects
TA to NGO service deliver — 8 8 16
Proposal preparation 3 5 — 8
Asst to MinFinance OV 2 — — 2
Subtotal 5 13 8 26
Totals
Actual/projected work 24 30 19 73
Work days in month 21 19 20 60
to complete the lower part of the form. This usually leads to inflated
estimates of coverage. It is generally easier for the team leader to com-
plete the forms for all team members. Projections should be done at least
every calendar quarter. In a particularly dynamic environment, where
new proposals are being regularly submitted and the results of others are
being announced, more frequent updating is necessary for the team
leader to have a realistic view of the situation.
Project Execution
The five tasks essential to project execution are listed in box 12-2. The
cycle begins with defining the policy objective—which may or may not
be well-articulated in the research or technical assistance contract—and
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1. Define the policy objectives and the corresponding communications
strategy.
Prepare a clear statement of the policy question(s) being addressed,
identify the persons or organizations with the greatest interest in the
issue and who are therefore those most willing to be the “champion for
change,” and define a communications strategy for reaching them.
Compare this to the explicit requirements of the contract or grant, and
reconcile differences as needed.
2. Define the analytic approach.
In a research project, this includes explicitly stating the relevant hypo-
theses, determining the source of data for testing the hypotheses, and
defining the analysis to be done. For a technical assistance project, tasks
include working with the client to define the reforms needed to accomplish
the objective; identifying needed legal changes, if any; choosing the
approach to execution-training and/or pilot projects; and assessing results.
3. Schedule the project.
Outline the time line for the project and the corresponding milestones.
Determine who will be working on the project at what points. Schedule
travel, training events, seminars, and all reports.
4. Control the quality of the work.
Schedule start-up, mid-term, or end-of-project seminars as needed.
Identify a peer reviewer and allow time in the schedule for the review.
5. Communicate the results.
Transmit results both to the client and to the primary policy audience (if
these are different and if the contract permits disclosure of results to
someone other than the client).
Box 12-2 Five Steps of Project Execution
the corresponding communications strategy (i.e., identifying the primary
policy client and how best to deliver the results effectively to this person
or group). Of these five tasks, this section focuses on the third—project
scheduling—the task with which a new team leader probably has the least
experience.
Scheduling the project is the organization in time of resource inputs into
the project. Scheduling staff input is critical: the team leader seeks both to
not waste resources by having researchers underemployed during some
periods and to insure against delays that arise because too few staff are
available to work on the project at critical points. In addition, major events,
such as surveys, seminars, and report submission dates, must be scheduled.
Elaborate project management regimes, now mostly computerized, are
used in the construction industry, for example, to schedule subcontrac-
tors, labor, and the arrival of materials on the job site. These systems are
far more elaborate than is needed for nearly all research, evaluation, and
technical assistance projects. But preparing simple charts and corre-
sponding milestones is very useful for guiding projects.
Figures 12-1 and 12-2 give an example of simple charts. They were
prepared by the Urban Institute for a training project in Poland. The
project called for the contractor to prepare case studies to be used in
the training; organize all aspects of the training, including hiring and
briefing qualified local trainers; and deliver the training in multiple sites
in two principal phases, with follow-up training to the main training in
each phase. The project was on a compressed seven-month time frame,
requiring a comparatively large contingent of trainers.
Figure 12-1 shows the timing of the execution of each of the 12 tasks
(top panel) and the schedule of report completion and submission
(lower panel). Figure 12-2 then shows the corresponding staff inputs. In
this fairly simple project, the trainers and managers are engaged full
time when they are working on the project, so the scheduling is simple
relative to the situation where staff are working part-time over an
extended period. When staff are scheduled to work on a part-time basis
over multiple weeks, team leaders should conduct more detailed planning
with each staff member as their time is needed.
Simple charts of this type are easy to construct and update. They are
an invaluable tool for team leaders in organizing their teams’ work,
especially when multiple projects are being executed simultaneously.
Maximizing Team Productivity
New team leaders face a number of concerns. The promotion is cer-
tainly welcome but it comes with challenges, especially for someone
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Figure 12-1 Activity Schedule
Months from Project Inception
Activity (work) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
A. Field Investigation and Study Items
Task 1. Project Start-Up
Task 2. Needs Assessment/
Final Work Program
Task 3. Selection of Training 
Participants
Task 4. Venue Selection
Task 5. Training Material Preparation 
Task 6. Team Training
Task 7. Case Study Preparation
Task 8. Phase 1 Training
Task 9. Phase 2 Training
Task 10. Training Follow-Up
Task 11. Study Tour
Task 12. Training Evaluation
B. Report Completion and Submission
1. Needs Assessment/Final Work X
Program (Task 2)
2. Workshop Evaluation Form X
(Tasks 8 and 9)
3. Phase 1 and Draft Phase 2 Training X
Materials (Tasks 8 and 9)
4. Phase 2 Training Materials (Final) X
(Task 9)
5. Case Studies (Task 7) X X X X
6. List of Study Tour Participants X
(Task 11)
7. Evaluation Report (Task 12) X
full-time activity
part-time activity
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Figure 12-2 Time Schedule for Professional Personnel
Reports Months Number
due/ of 
Name Position activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 days
K. Alison Trainer Training 37
M. Borkowska Trainer; Training 85
Environmental/
Economics
T. Driscoll Trainer; Water Training 35 
D. Edwards Trainer Training 35
A. Eymontt Trainer; Training 85 
Environmental
B. Ferrone Trainer; Roads/ Training 35 
Schools
G. Frelick Trainer Training 45
A. Grzybek Trainer; Training 85 
Economics/
Energy
A. Law Trainer; Training 35
Procurement 
M. Lebkowski Trainer; Finance Training 85 
R. Marcola Trainer; Finance Training 85 
B. Markiel Trainer; Training 85 
Environmental
R. Milaszewski Trainer; Water/ Training 85 
Economics
G. Mikeska Trainer; Project Training, 
Manager Mgmt.
A. Muzalewski Trainer; Training 85 
Economics/
Waste
79
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A. Pecikiewicz Trainer; Project Training, 140
Manager Mgmt.
J. Pigey Trainer Training 35 
F. Rosensweig Trainer Training, 
Mgmt.
B. Ruszkowska Trainer; Training 85 
Environmental
D. Wallgren Trainer; Training 35 
Solid Waste
T. Wojcicki Trainer; Training 85
Finance/Roads
international trainers
local trainers
Full-time: Pecikiewicz and Ruszkowska (all others are part-time)
Reports due: end of project
Activities duration: 7 months
Figure 12-2 (Continued )
Reports Months Number
due/ of 
Name Position activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 days
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promoted internally. Often the biggest worry is how to handle the people
who were previously the team leader’s peers or friends. How they will
respond to the new leader as an authority figure is an open question
and depends critically on the team leader’s conduct.9 The challenge is
to exert authority while enhancing the self-esteem of each member of
the team.
Teamwork has two dimensions: task and social. The task element
concerns the work the team is to do: to gather and analyze data, prepare
reports, prepare and deliver seminars, or, in the case of technical assis-
tance work with local officials or NGOs, implement pioneering projects.
The social dimension concerns how team members feel toward each other
and their membership in the team (Rees 2001). The team leader must
be equally concerned with both dimensions. If the social dimension is
neglected, then the team’s productivity in executing its tasks may be
impaired, perhaps severely.
This section first discusses the current context for being a team leader—
the changing relationship among bosses and workers occurring around
the world. Thereafter, the section addresses how team leaders can handle
four specific issues that are key to their overall performance.
Changing Workplace, Changing Leadership Styles
Many organizations have evolved from places where staff were generally
told what to do to places where employees are involved in figuring out
and deciding how best to accomplish key tasks. The change is especially
noticeable in the knowledge industries, where well-educated workers are
demanding an alternative to the authoritarian leadership style common
in the West until 15 or 20 years ago. Nevertheless, in Eastern Europe, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, most of Africa, and much of
Asia, authoritarian leadership styles are often found.
Table 12-7 highlights the differences between the traditional leader-
ship style and the more facilitating role being adopted by progressive
organizations. There is a striking contrast between the controlling style,
in which strong direction and problem solving by the leader are central,
and the more open, consultative, and thoughtful process, in which respon-
sibility is more widely shared.
The reason firms have pushed managers to change their style is straight-
forward: more inclusive and consultative styles result in greater staff
productivity and longer staff retention. Workers in such organizations
contribute more by making suggestions on how to do things, are happier
in their work, and are more willing to accept additional responsibility
and to work longer and harder (Leigh and Maynard 1995; Rees 1999;
Conger and Benjamin 1999).
But the basic tasks of a manager have not changed: they remain the
four listed at the beginning of the chapter. It should also be stressed that
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Table 12-7 Characteristics of Alternative Leadership Styles
Controlling style Facilitating style
• Tells
• Sells
• Directs
• Decides
• Solves problems
• Sets goals
• Uses authority to get things done
Source: Rees (1999), 55.
• Listens
• Asks questions
• Directs group process
• Coaches
• Teaches
• Builds consensus
• Shares in goal-setting
• Shares in decisionmaking
• Empowers others to get things done
a facilitating manager does not give up the ultimate responsibility for
making decisions. In other words, compared with a traditional leader, a
facilitating team leader consults more with team members, allowing
them to provide information and interpretations; but the team leader
still reserves the right to make the final decision.
Developing a team that is substantially “self-managing” can be chal-
lenging. In countries and organizations where a facilitating style is novel,
team leaders may find it hard to solicit the kind of input and cooperation
they are seeking and that is needed for this management style to be truly
effective. The best advice is to take it a step at a time. Leaders can
encourage participation by asking for opinions and ideas and by being
good listeners; more responsibility can be assigned downward. Over
time, what seems a new style will become routine and staff are likely to
participate more fully.
Experience suggest that there are several signs the team leader can look
for to confirm that the leadership style outlined above (and discussed
further below) is working and that a positive team spirit is emerging
(Leigh and Maynard 1995, 105ff). Three have particular application to the
research and analysis teams and teams implementing technical assistance
projects at think tanks.
• Supportive relationships. Staff help each other in various ways. This
includes sharing information and other resources as well as directly
assisting in completion of a task, such as volunteering to read a
draft report.
• Personal investment. Team members “take ownership” of the team’s
work. They feel directly responsible for the quality of the work and
are willing to go beyond the routine work effort to achieve the
team’s goals.
• Permissive encouragement. Team members generally react positively
to new ideas advanced by their peers on how to do the work or pro-
posals for new areas of work. It is a “yes” rather than a “no” culture;
jealousy over who has the ideas tends to be minimized.
A team exhibiting these characteristics will be effective in its work
and rewarding to the team members as a place to work.
Making Jobs in the Group Interesting
A team leader can design the positions he or she controls, particularly those
of more senior staff, in ways that make them more or less interesting.
“Interesting” means have relatively wide range of latitude along four
dimensions.10
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• Span of control refers to the resources available to the analyst. One
often thinks of a senior analyst needing a research assistant. But
there are other potentially important inputs—secretarial services,
advice from an expert econometrician, and editorial services come
readily to mind. A senior analyst having such resources on call,
perhaps after a planning session with the department head, can
remove some of the drudgery and uncertainty from a project.
• Span of accountability is the range of trade-offs used in evaluating
the person’s performance. As pointed out in chapter 2, for senior
staff raising funds, the quality and quantity of research, the degree
of success in the policy arena, and performance in managing pro-
jects (on time and within budget) are paramount. The greater the
flexibility in assessing performance across these dimensions, the
more able the staff is to pursue one area this year and another next
year, thereby maximizing both their job satisfaction and their value
to the organization.
• Span of influence concerns the role of the staff member in the group
and in the overall organization. Obviously, the greater opportunity
she has to provide input into analytic questions, policy issues, and
management decisions, the more self-satisfying the job will be.
Hence, the team leader can explicitly seek input in preparing per-
formance assessments; peer review is another obvious area to ask
staff to participate.
• Span of support refers to the amount of help an individual can
expect from the rest of the organization. When preparing a pro-
posal, does the finance department produce the budget on time
and cooperatively? Is the proposal reviewed by top management
quickly so crises are avoided? Does the accounting department
handle invoicing professionally to avoid alienating the analyst’s
client? Clearly, how these tasks are done has a substantial impact
on job satisfaction.
Goal Setting
Experts on team management stress the importance of teams having
articulated goals that transcend the completion of project-specific tasks
(Rees 1999; Leigh and Maynard 1995). The goals usually provide a uni-
fying theme for the project-based work, help orient the day-to-day work
of the team, and can be very important in generating the kind of team
cohesiveness described above. Cleverly set goals can provide a greater
meaning to successfully executing individual projects, as staff see com-
pletion of each project as building something more important. In short,
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goals make more concrete the general vision that guides a team’s work
and can even inspire a team’s efforts. A vision is the grand picture, what
the team aspires to. Goals are steps to achieving the vision.
An example will illustrate these ideas. In the late 1990s, the guiding
vision of the International Activity Center at the Urban Institute was for
the group to be the most effective provider of technical assistance and
policy advice on issues of local governance, finance, and social assistance
to transitional economies. In developing a strategy to realize this vision,
the Center understood that it had to accomplish several tasks, which it
set as goals. One such goal was to develop the capacity to win contracts
to work with national and local governments in transition economies on
key issues, including improving intergovernmental fiscal relations,
strengthening the capacity of local governments as fiscal managers and
designers and deliverers of services to their citizens, and improving the
transparency of government operations and the responsiveness of local
governments to their citizens.
It was clear, however, to realize this goal another goal had also to be
achieved: the group had to develop working partnerships with local
think tanks with whom to compete on projects and execute projects under
contract. The partnership of the Urban Institute and a local think tank
would be efficient because of the combined local and international exper-
tise, and it would be competitive because of the blending of the cost
structures of the two organizations. But in addition, partnering is good
in itself, because it increases the capacity of local institutions to work
with local governments in the future.
To achieve this goal, the Institute worked to establish and maintain
the Transition Policy Network of think tanks in Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2001, the Network consisted
of nine think tanks in the region—one in each of nine countries—plus
the Urban Institute.11
To be useful on a practical level, these goals had to be made operational.
Progress on the first goal was measured by the share of contracts for
which the team had competed that the team had won. For the second
goal, targets were set for establishing partnerships in a specific number
of countries over a two-year period.
In this example, a vision and goals give an overlying structure to
everyday activities. The leaders of most think tanks have implicit visions
and goals, but it is important for the staff to share them. Moreover, the
institution-level goals are often not sufficient to motivate or guide indi-
vidual teams. For this reason, it is important for team leaders to work
with their teams to define goals from time to time. By making it a coop-
erative exercise, leaders make it more likely that team members will
CREATING TEAM LEADERS 
understand the goals, buy into them, and be more dedicated to achiev-
ing them. The more specifically the goals are defined, the better.
In practice, not many team leaders at think tanks explicitly define goals.
Team leaders will communicate their implicit vision and goals in various
ways, but often with a significant degree of ambiguity. It is far better to
make the effort to be clear and to motivate a team by making goal-setting
a participatory event.
Guiding Team Meetings
Gatherings of a team can be opportunities for improving productivity,
sharing information, increasing knowledge, and strengthening coordi-
nation and teamwork. In short, team meetings constitute an important
management tool. In reality, most team leaders meet too infrequently
with their teams; when meetings are held, they are frequently unproductive.
Indeed, the lack of productivity probably explains the infrequency of
the meetings.
Rees (1999, 126–27) describes four prototypical types of meetings.
• “Tell ’em, sell ’em” style. At such meetings the leader comes prepared
to inform team members of decisions already made. To be certain,
there are explanations and discussion, but the purposes are to
inform and to solicit support.
• Information-dissemination style. The team leader uses the meeting
to inform everyone of what is happening in the department and in
the larger organization. There may be reports, prepared in advance
or spontaneous, from team members. Often, issues of all sorts can
be raised at such sessions, but they are seldom discussed in much
depth or resolved.
• Participative, “free-for-all” style. These loosely run events give par-
ticipants plenty of time to contribute and discuss topics tabled.
However, little progress is made on resolving issues or making
decisions, because the team leader does not have the skill to guide the
discussion to closure or does not want to. Frustration is common
among those seeking clear direction. A prime cause for the lack of
closure is the absence of a clear agenda for the meeting. This kind
of meeting provides active interaction, but to no particular end.
• Focused, participative style. The meeting is focused, since its objectives
are decided upon at the start of the event. While participation is
encouraged, the team leader keeps the discussion focused on resolv-
ing the issues on the agenda. The meeting may wander off on to other
topics from time to time, but the team leader is able to bring it back
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to the agenda and concentrate on reaching the objectives. At the
same time, it is essential for the team leader to draw people out and
get their opinions in order to generate support for the conclusions
reached. Sufficient time must be allowed for thorough discussion.
Clearly, the final model is the one that team leaders should strive to
deliver. Possibly the single most important factor driving the success of
a team meeting is having a thoughtfully developed agenda. The discipline
of preparing an agenda will make the team leader check that the meeting
is really needed and to consider who should attend it. The agenda should
be written, even if it is fairly skeletal, and it should be shaped as a series
of action items to the extent possible. Use of action verbs—plan, develop,
decide, determine, identify, recommend, list, prioritize, solve, generate—to
describe agenda items conveys a sense of purpose in addressing each item.
The actual conduct of the meeting is important. After presenting the
agenda, the team leader should ask for other agenda items and, as appro-
priate, add them or not. The leader may suggest, for example, that a
proposed item is likely to require more time to discuss than will be avail-
able at this meeting and that a separate meeting at a later date should be
devoted to this topic.
As stressed in a previous section, the team leader must draw out con-
tributions from the staff, both because staff members often have valuable
views on the topic being considered and because consulting the staff will
make them more motivated to implement the result. The team leader
needs to be a good listener, ask follow-up questions, promote discussion
among the team, summarize or rephrase arguments, and guide the dis-
cussion to closure at the right time.
Reporting and information-sharing are important elements in many
meetings. The challenge is to focus the contributions from team members
to be maximally useful to the team as a whole. The team leader should
make clear that reports on project activity should not merely convey
information (e.g., “We have done this kind of analysis and the results
are . . .”). Rather, presenters should be challenged to concentrate on the
lessons from the analysis that are most likely to be useful to other team
members. What are the general points?
Consider two options for presenting findings from field work. Take,
for example, a team that focuses on providing technical assistance to local
governments. Two analysts working with a municipality find that the
administration with whom they are working has decided to bid out con-
tracts for the delivery of certain social services instead of having municipal
agencies be the single (monopolistic) delivery agency. Clearly, this would
be a major development about which the whole team should be informed.
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It is an innovation that the team may want to consider promoting with
other cities. Phrased in this way, the topic is of strong interest to the team.
Had the work been described as a series of meetings with various officials
on the general topic of delivering social services, with the innovation
glossed over, it would not have been the least bit engaging.
At the end of the meeting, the team leader should review the conclusions
reached. This is essential. But it is equally important to follow up this
statement of findings with a short written statement of conclusions—
a page is sufficient. The written statement reinforces the message from the
meeting, creates a clear record of the decisions made, and informs those
not at the meeting of the major results. A series of bullet points, which
would take only minutes to prepare, is all that is necessary. Unfortunately,
few team leaders or senior managers follow this practice, often leading
to confusion about exactly what was decided at previous meetings.
People Issues
Leaders can get the best from a team when the team is positively motivated
by its mission and objectives and is pulling together. Achieving and
maintaining this happy state is no accident. Box 12-3 lists steps that a
team leader can take to demonstrate the value of each person’s contri-
bution to the team. Putting the rules on this list into action will go a long
way to minimizing personnel problems within the team.
Nevertheless, team leaders must be vigilant in watching for morale
problems among team members. Common personnel problems (real
or perceived) that can undermine a team’s cohesion and productivity
include
• grievances between team members;
• feelings of powerlessness;
• insufficient information-sharing;
• dissatisfaction with the allocation of work;
• competitive behavior;
• anger at decisions;
• failure to receive support;
• frustration about some past incident; and
• resentment at a lack of appreciation or recognition.
In many instances these problems will be amply evident to a team
leader. Obviously, the problem must be discussed with the person(s)
involved and a solution found. Where appropriate, the kind of coaching
described earlier can be employed.
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In some cases, the reason for a drop in team productivity will be more
difficult to identify. Long-time team members may simply be bored.
Keeping the job interesting is a constant challenge for leaders. One way
is to assign staff new jobs, perhaps cross-training people within the team
on the various team tasks. While there may be some initial staff resistance
to this because of basic fear of the unknown, the results are often highly
positive, giving individual team members renewed interest in their work
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Provide members a worthwhile role by
• giving people meaningful tasks
• confirming that what they do really matters
• delegating fully
Recognize members’ efforts by
• showing appreciation when people try hard
• regularly thanking people for their contributions
• acknowledging people’s successes
Listen to members carefully by
• giving full attention through active listening
• using responses that show the leader has listened
• encouraging people to say what they think
Show members respect by
• treating each person as important
• accepting that each person has a point of view
• not impugning a person’s motives
Discover how people are feeling by
• seeking a personal response
• asking for their instinctive reactions
• paying attention to emotions
Express concern about their welfare by
• showing that the leader cares if people have problems
• offering help in difficult times
• asking how they are getting on
Ensure employees’ work is valued by others by
• telling others what the person has done
• offering public praise and recognition
Source: Based on Leigh and Maynard (1995), 121.
Box 12-3 How Team Leaders Can Show that They Value Each
Person in a Team
and the team leader greater flexibility in staffing projects. Similarly, staff
can be given tasks that may at first seem beyond their competence, but
with proper mentoring can be executed competently. Again, the staffer’s
self-confidence and job satisfaction will be enhanced.
The team leader should be alert to possibilities and try them out as
the opportunity permits. A common failing at many think tanks is to
underestimate the level of responsibility that comparatively junior staff
can carry. Senior researchers tend to think of junior staff as the people
who do the data analysis or literature reviews, when in fact they can
often also do other tasks, such as certain kinds of field work, with the aid
of some mentoring. Such work can include conducting elite interviews,
leading focus groups, and organizing and analyzing the qualitative
information obtained from the interviews and focus groups.
Even with these efforts, there will occasionally be staff members who
are deeply unhappy in their work. In many cases the problems have
little to do with their job per se. Common problems are medical dis-
orders (or side effects from medicines taken to treat the disorder), a lack
of confidence, stress or emotional problems, or family difficulties. When
the team leader understands that the problem is deeper than he or she
can address, the leader should quickly alert senior management and the
personnel officer, if there is one. The organization will want to help
the employee return to his or her former role at the think tank. How long
and how much assistance is possible will depend on the conditions at the
think tank (e.g., whether there is someone else who can take over the
responsibilities of the staffer for some time) and, perhaps, the quality of
the medical insurance available to the staffer. The way the team leader is
perceived to deal with this problem—the degree to which he or she is
humane and compassionate—will have a strong impact on team morale
more generally.
SUMMARY
Team leaders occupy a pivotal position at think tanks: they are the first-line
managers who carry the day-to-day responsibility for project execution,
planning, and marketing, and it is their job to ensure the productivity of
their team. Given that this is the case, it is surprising that the development
and mentoring of team leaders receives so little attention from experts
on think tanks.
The senior management of most think tanks need to awaken to the fact
that the productivity of the whole organization depends on the effective-
ness of the team leaders. Ensuring that team leaders are successful in their
jobs begins with very carefully selecting those to fill these positions. After
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the hiring or promotion, senior managers should mentor and coach the
newcomers.
Team leaders in organizations with an “authority figure” management
style have an especially challenging job. Experience shows that teams are
better led and more productive under a more participatory and consul-
tative style of leadership. The inclusion of team members in setting the
direction of the team must be genuine. Team leaders need to listen
attentively, be open to differing opinions, and, where appropriate,
reshape their position according to the input received. They also strive
to make jobs interesting in the sense described above.
Goal setting is important for motivating teams and giving them a
broad sense of direction. Establishing goals can be particularly effective
if done with the team through a participatory process.
Well-conducted team meetings are another useful management tool.
If these meetings are guided by an objectives-oriented agenda and
embody a participatory style, they are particularly efficient for sharing
information and arriving at decisions.
Team leaders can take advantage of a number of aids in managing
their teams. Some of these were outlined above, such as techniques for
scheduling inputs on large projects and controlling staff utilization and
project costs. Equally important with these project management tasks,
however, are the “people tasks”: being attentive to the personal dynam-
ics within the team and working as needed with those who need coach-
ing or mentoring. A team leader with a participatory management style
and who pays attention to his team members is likely to boost the pro-
ductivity of his group above the expectations of senior managers used to
working with a more authoritarian model.
N O T E S
1. To be clear, the team leader positions discussed here are permanent man-
agement positions. In contrast, many companies today form teams to address
a specific task and disband them when the task is accomplished.
2. One type of think tank does not follow this model. This is an organization
composed of senior scholars who work substantially alone on research projects,
sometimes aided by a research assistant. These scholars may be grouped into
divisions or centers, but merely as an administrative convenience. Examples of
think tanks following this model are the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
3. Based on Rees (2001, 86).
4. On the distinction between leaders and managers, see Kellerman (2004).
5. In the European system, this is what is often called a “candidate degree”
(i.e., having completed all the requirements for the doctorate except the very
demanding doctoral dissertation).
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6. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the assessment process.
7. This section draws generally on Dotlich and Cairo (1999), Charan and
colleagues (2001), and Conger and Benjamin (1999).
8. For example, a proposal may include 30 days of a researcher’s time. The
team leader estimates the probability of success in competing for the work at 0.6.
So the expected number of days of coverage could be assessed as 18 (30 × 0.6).
9. To paraphrase Leigh and Maynard (1995, 156), leadership style is “how
the leader relates to people and influences her team.”
10. The four dimensions are listed in Simons (2005) but the context and
examples here are original.
11. Information on the network can be found at http://www.urban.org/tpn.
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APPENDICES
 

Staff Assessment and Salary
Administration at the 
Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
A
The Urban Institute is one of the largest and most respected thinktanks in the United States, with a staff of over 400. Staff work on
a wide range of issues, including pension policy, urban housing and
community development, health policy, education policy, and social
assistance and social services. The Institute works in similar areas in
countries outside the United States.
This appendix contains documents from the Urban Institute’s per-
sonnel administration system. In particular, documents from four areas
are present.
1. Form and Policy for Describing 
a Position for Recruitment Purposes
Particularly important are the description of the job’s responsibilities
on page 1 of the form and the section on page 2 where qualifications
are specified.
2. Position Descriptions for Researchers 
and Standards for Promotion
The Institute has a six-level structure for its researchers: research
assistant, research associate I, research associate II, senior research
associate, principal research associate, and senior fellow. There are
formal job descriptions for the first three levels. The qualifications
for the senior research associate, principal research associate, and
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senior fellow positions can be inferred from the standards for pro-
motion to these levels. Included here are the job descriptions and
standards for promotion for the various positions.
3. Performance Appraisal—Policy and Forms
The following pages include the Institute’s formal statement on the
staff assessment process and the form used in the process. There are
two forms: one for the most senior researchers—that is, those with
significant fundraising and management responsibilities in addition
to analytic duties—and one for all other staff. Both forms have two
parts. The first is completed by the staff member as input into the
supervisor’s rating; it covers accomplishments and goal setting for the
coming year. The second part of the form is used by the supervisor.
Both parts are the basis for the discussion between the supervisor
and staff member.
4. Salary Administration Policy
The final document is the Institute’s policy statement for salary deter-
mination. Job performance figures in salary increase recommendations
but is far from the sole determining factor.
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REQUEST FOR POSITION/JOB SPECIFICATIONS FORM
Instructions: To be completed by hiring supervisor and returned to the HR Office.
Center/Office: Supervisor:
Position Title: Budgeted Salary Range:
This Position Is:
New
Replacing: __________________
This Position Is:
Supervisory
Not Supervisory
Employment Status:
Regular
Intermittent
Temporary
Expatriate
Schedule:
Full-time
Part-time (_________%)
Casual (_________hrs/wk)
Location:
On-site
Off-site: ______________
Site name
Length of Assignment (if term): Desired Start Date:
Recruitment suggestions: ( L i s t c a n d i d a t e s r e c o m m e n d e d o r o r g a n i za t i o n s w h e r e p o t e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s m a y be f o u n d . T h e HR
O f f i c e w i l l c o n s u l t w i t h y o u r e g a r d i n g t h e I n s t i t u t e ’s a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n g o a l s f o r t h i s jo b c a t e g o r y .)
Brief summary of job responsibilities: ( i n c l u d e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s e x p e c t e d , r e s o u r c e s t o be m a n a g e d , n u m be r o f s t a f f t o be
s u p e r v i s e d , t r a v e l r e qu i r e m e n t s , o t h e r u n u s u a l a s p e c t s o f t h e jo b.)
SIGNATURES:
Hi r i n g S u p e r v i s o r :
D a t e :
C e n t e r / O f f i c e D i r e c t o r :
D a t e :
D i r e c t o r o f Hu m a n R e s o u r c e s :
D a t e :
S e n i o r Vi c e P r e s i d e n t :
D a t e :
Approval:
P o s i t i o n A u t h o r i ze d
D i s a p p r o v e d ( s t a t e r e a s o n ) :
THE URBAN INSTITUTE
Human Resources Office Project No.:______________
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Qualifications: Indicate relative important by ranking each factor on a scale of 1 to 4. (1= most 
important). 
EDUCATION 
Rank: 
Degree level preferred: 
 
Rank:  Degree field(s) preferred: 
 
Specialized training: 
 
EXPERIENCE 
Rank: 
 
Type of work: 
 
Accomplishments: 
 
Past working environment (academic, nonprofit, government, etc.): 
 
SKILLS 
Rank:  
Describe the kinds of skills the ideal candidate should possess: 
 
OTHER 
QUALITIES 
DESIRED 
Rank:  
List the special attributes necessary for successful job performance, e.g., maturity, judgment, creativity, 
organizational skills, leadership ability, self-motivation, the ability to work independently and as part of 
a team, etc.:
Personnel Policies Policy and Procedure No. 101
and Procedures Date: 2/28/03
Supersedes P.P. & P. Date: 3/31/95
Subject Authorization: ____ per RDR _________
Establishing a Position
Policy
Prior to hiring an employee, a position must first be established and a salary range and
grade assigned based on the specifications of the job to be performed. In addition, a
determination must be made about the expected duration of the position, the work
schedule, and the status of the position with respect to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).
Eligibility for participation in the Institute’s employee benefits programs is determined
in part by employment status. Attachment A summarizes benefits eligibility by
employment status. For complete benefits information and eligibility requirements,
refer to the appropriate summary plan description or the Urban Institute policy and
procedure for each benefit.
Employment Status Descriptions
Positions may be classified as regular, intermittent, temporary, intermittent fellow, or
expatriate according to the definitions listed below:
“Regular” means a position of indefinite duration or one with a set term of employ-
ment of more than 1,000 hours and having a regular, predictable, full- or part-time
work schedule as described below. Most Institute positions are regular status. Regular
positions bear full fringe, overhead and G&A burdens for pricing and billing purposes.
“Temporary” means a position authorized for fewer than 1,000 hours during any 
12-month period. Temporary employees may not work for the Institute in any other
employment status for a period of eight months from the date last worked as a tempo-
rary employee (creating, in effect, an eight-month cooling off period after a temporary
assignment). Similarly, a regular employee may not be rehired or converted to tempo-
rary status unless eight months has elapsed since the last day of employment as a regu-
lar employee. A temporary position may have a full-time, part-time, or casual work
schedule. Temporary positions bear statutory fringe and full G&A, but no overhead
for pricing and billing purposes.
“Intermittent” means a position (like a temporary position) which is of indefinite
duration and has a casual work schedule and is a position authorized for fewer than
1,000 hours in a calendar year. It is, however, used only when a regular employee is
rehired or converts to a casual work schedule before the eight-month cooling off
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period has elapsed or as an alternative to temporary status when the employing center
or office wishes to consider the employee for regular employment following the
assignment. Intermittent positions bear full fringe, overhead and G&A burdens for
pricing and billing purposes.
“Intermittent Fellow” means a position which is of indefinite duration and is autho-
rized for greater than 1,000 hours in a calendar year. It is used only at the discretion of
the president. Intermittent fellow positions bear statutory fringe, plus full overhead
and G&A burdens for pricing and billing purposes.
“Expatriate” means a position whose duty post is outside the United States, whose
assignment outside the United States is anticipated to last six months or longer, and
whose direct labor costs are covered primarily by a contract/grant to UI by an outside
funding source. Expatriate positions bear full fringe, overhead, and G&A for pricing
and billing purposes.
Work Schedule Descriptions
“Full-time” means a regular, predictable work schedule of 40 hours per week.
“Part-time” means a regular, predictable work schedule of at least 20 but fewer than
40 hours per week.
“Casual” means a work schedule on average of fewer than 20 hours per week or one
that averages fewer than 20 hours per week over the duration of the assignment.
FLSA Descriptions
The human resources office will classify each position as either exempt or non-exempt
as defined below.
“Exempt” means a position not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Employees
holding exempt positions are not eligible to receive overtime pay for hours worked in
excess of the Institute’s 40-hour work week.
“Non-exempt” means a position covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Employees
holding non-exempt positions are eligible for overtime pay for hours worked in excess
of the Institute’s 40-hour work week (see Urban Institute Policy and Procedure No.
100—Hours of Work and Overtime).
Procedures
Obtaining Authorization for a Position
To establish a new position, replace a terminating employee in an existing position, or
hire a temporary employee, the hiring supervisor completes a Request for Position/Job
Specifications Form (Attachment B) available from the human resources office. The
form requires the hiring supervisor to specify the budgeted salary range, on-site or off-
site status, employment status, supervisor, desired starting date, and whether the posi-
tion has supervisory responsibilities. The hiring supervisor also describes the position’s
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major responsibilities and duties and the qualifications and skills required to perform
the job successfully, and makes recruitment suggestions for attracting qualified appli-
cants. The center or office director must sign and approve the request.
The completed form is forwarded to the director of human resources, who reviews 
the job specifications and classifies the position according to the Institute’s job 
evaluation procedures (see Urban Institute Policy and Procedure No. 108—Salary
Administration). Once classified, requests for new positions are sent to the senior vice
president for approval. The director of human resources approves requests for
replacement positions, notifies the supervisor when new and replacement positions
are approved, and maintains a log of approved positions.
Temporary assignments allow researchers to fill short-term hiring needs quickly and
cost-effectively. As is the policy for all job offers, offers of employment regardless of
employment status may be extended only through the human resources office.
Publicizing Vacant Positions
All vacant regular positions, with the exception of senior fellow, will be posted inter-
nally in common areas and sent to appropriate external sources, except in cases
where employees are promoted or transferred within the same center or office, or
where a written request for a waiver of the job posting requirement has been
approved by the senior vice president. Senior fellows serve at the invitation of the
Institute’s president and are selected based on their nationally recognized expertise in
a specific field of study.
Exempt positions will be posted for a minimum of two weeks, non-exempt positions
for a minimum of one week. Temporary and intermittent positions are not required to
be posted.
Canceling a Vacant Position
A posted exempt position that remains vacant for longer than six months will be can-
celed unless the hiring supervisor makes a written request to the director of human
resources that the position remain open for an additional three months.
A posted non-exempt position that remains vacant for longer than three months will
be canceled unless the hiring supervisor makes a written request to the director of
human resources that the position remain open for an additional three months.
Attachment A—Employment Statuses and Benefits Eligibility (\persnnel\policies\
statuses.xls)
Attachment B—Request for Position—Job Specifications Form (persnnel\forms\
jobspecs.xls)
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Job Title: Research Assistant
Salary Grade: R01
Reports to: More experienced researcher
General Summary
Under close supervision by more experienced researchers, assists in the performance
of social science research by gathering information and helping to prepare material 
for inclusion in reports. May administer surveys and/or questionnaires and compile
results. May collect, tabulate, and process data using basic statistical methods and 
statistical analysis software.
Typical Responsibilities and Duties
1. Performs library research on specified topics and synthesizes material in the form
of bibliographies, abstracts, memoranda, and reports, according to instructions.
2. Tabulates and/or maintains collected data by means of coding or organizing data
into tables or graphs.
3. Processes data from tapes or other sources of large data sets using statistical analysis
software such as SAS or SPSS.
4. Analyzes primary and secondary data using basic statistical methods.
5. Administers structured surveys (telephone, written, computer-assisted, and in-person
interviews) for projects requiring primary data collection.
6. May assign work to junior-level administrative staff or temporary staff.
Qualifications
The academic knowledge of a discipline that is generally associated with the comple-
tion of a bachelor’s degree or an equivalent combination of education and experience
or demonstrated ability to perform beginning level research in a social science field.
Only those major job duties necessary for proper job evaluation and/or labor market
analysis have been included. Other duties may be assigned by the supervisor.
Job Number: 60000 FLSA Status: Exempt
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Job Description
Job Title: Research Associate II
Salary Grade: R02
Reports to: More senior researcher
General Summary
Responsible for conducting assigned parts of social science research projects under the
general direction of more senior staff members. Assists in the development of research
approach and data collection instruments and in the selection of statistical techniques.
Collects data and applies standard methods of statistical analysis. Reports research
findings in writing.
Typical Responsibilities and Duties
1. Reviews and writes critical summaries of research literature and/or public policy.
2. Administers surveys (telephone, written, computer-assisted, and in-person inter-
views). Makes site visits and conducts surveys and interviews with local public 
officials and/or private citizens.
3. Analyzes data using such standard statistical techniques as multiple regression and
factor analysis; draws conclusions from analyzed data; prepares statistical reports
and data presentations.
4. Writes up research results; assists in writing proposals and preparing papers for
publication. May be called upon to present results to clients.
5. Supervises and assigns work to research assistants and more junior administrative staff.
Qualifications
The academic knowledge of a discipline that is generally associated with the attainment
of a master’s degree (usually with a bachelor’s degree in a related field) or an equivalent
combination of education and progressively more responsible relevant work experience.
Only those major job duties necessary for proper job evaluation and/or labor market
analysis have been included. Other duties may be assigned by the supervisor.
Job Number: 62000 FLSA Status: Exempt
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Job Description
Job Title: Research Associate I
Salary Grade: R03
Reports to: Senior researcher
General Summary
Responsible for planning and independently executing a major segment of a social 
science research project in consultation with and under the general supervision of a
center director, senior research associate, or principal research associate. Designs the
research approach and selects the appropriate quantitative or other tools of analysis,
with consultation from more senior staff. Performs analysis, draws policy inferences,
writes and presents reports. May develop and write proposals. May function as 
principal investigator and project manager for small projects.
Typical Responsibilities and Duties
1. Develops or participates in developing research topics, proposals, and research
design.
2. Selects appropriate statistical techniques to analyze collected data.
3. Supervises and/or participates in data collection, and analysis by less senior
research staff; participates in interpreting data from a policy perspective.
4. Makes site visits, conducts interviews with public officials, and supervises field
research.
5. Maintains budget and manages resources for segments of research project under
his/her responsibility; may supervise less senior researchers.
6. Participates in writing final reports and presenting results to clients.
Qualifications
A combination of the quantitative, analytical, and writing skills, relevant substantive
knowledge, and social policy research experience needed to perform the duties
described above, or the academic knowledge of and research experience in a discipline
that is generally associated with the attainment of a Ph.D.
Only those major job duties necessary for proper job evaluation and/or labor market
analysis have been included. Other duties may be assigned by the supervisor.
Job Number: 64000 FLSA Status: Exempt
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Job Description
Those promoted to RAII must demonstrate the ability to conduct research that is
equivalent in quality and thoroughness to work done at the master’s degree level.
They should be performing at a level that exceeds the level expected of a research
assistant. Most important, they must consistently demonstrate a high level of 
independence and initiative in their work. This requirement applies whether the
research assistant’s work is largely quantitative or qualitative. In general, it takes 
a minimum of two to two and a half years of experience as a research assistant 
to achieve the level of RAII; however, given truly exceptional performance, this
standard could be met in a shorter period of time.
The research assistant should be making substantive contributions to research projects
by helping to do the following: (1) frame analytic questions; (2) identify relevant 
measures and data sources; (3) organize the process of data collection and analysis;
and (4) interpret the results.
To be promoted, a research assistant must consistently demonstrate at least three of
the following:
n Expertise in manipulating and analyzing complex data using statistical programming
software, such as SAS or STATA.
n A detailed and thorough understanding of one or more databases (e.g., CPS, SIPP,
or NSAF) or programming software. As an expert in these areas, the research assistant
serves as a resource to other researchers.
n Strong writing skills, demonstrated through high-quality contributions to reports
and articles.
n Substantive knowledge of his or her field(s), including an understanding of key 
policy issues and an ability to apply that knowledge to research.
n Effective data collection through surveys or site visits. For example, the research
assistant will have successfully led site interviews and synthesized information 
collected in a site visit, identifying key issues raised and questions for follow-up.
n Excellent communication skills and good judgment when working with internal or
external collaborators.
n Effective mentoring of new research assistants, including helping to train them.
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Standards for Promotion from 
Research Assistant to Research Associate II
A researcher promoted to RAI must demonstrate a combination of analytic and 
writing skills, relevant substantive knowledge, and social policy research experience
that is generally associated with the attainment of a Ph.D. These skills can be 
demonstrated while working under the supervision of a more senior researcher. In
general, a minimum of four years of research experience at the RAII level is required
to achieve the level of an RAI, although not all of this experience must occur at the
Urban Institute. In addition, an RAII must meet four of the following five performance
standards to be promoted:
1. Plays a significant role in the development and design of 
research projects.
n Designs the approach and methodology for at least one proposal, research 
project, or a significant component of a large project.
n Research designs and/or proposal contributions should demonstrate 
independent expertise in the concepts and methods of social science 
research (although they may involve the application of preexisting 
methodologies and a more senior researcher may participate as an advisor
and/or contributor).
2. Independently analyzes qualitative information and/or 
quantitative data.
n Primary responsibility for implementing statistical techniques and/or other
methods for analyzing data in at least one significant research project, and
n Demonstrated ability to synthesize results and draw conclusions from empirical
analysis.
n These accomplishments should be reflected in one or more written proposals,
design documents, or research reports.
3. Authors or coauthors research reports.
n Sole or coauthor of at least three project reports, journal articles, or book chap-
ters (see new UI policy on authorship).
n These publications should involve different analytic efforts (not three versions
of the same analysis) and demonstrate substantive knowledge of the field and
relevant policy issues.
n For publications where the candidate is a coauthor, he/she should have 
lead responsibility for one or more significant components of the analysis 
and writing.
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Standards for Promotion from
Research Associate II to Research Associate I
4. Manages major components of research projects.
n Takes initiative and works collaboratively with his/her supervisor in the conduct
of research projects and their management;
n Plans and manages research activities, such as data collection, database develop-
ment, or statistical analysis; and
n Manages schedule, budgets, and project coordination for at least one funded
research project.
5. Presents research methods and findings to clients and other 
outside audiences.
n At least two presentations to clients or at academic or policy conferences, or
n Assigned primary responsibility for communication with outside clients, or
other users of Urban Institute research.
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Those promoted to SRA must have demonstrated on more than one occasion their
ability to conduct research that is equivalent in thoroughness and originality to the
completion of a doctoral dissertation. Also, they generally must meet minimum
requirements in each of four performance categories:
n Publications—achieve the qualitative equivalent of being the sole author of two
articles published in selective refereed journals (e.g., Journal of Human Resources);
n Other dissemination activities—accomplish the qualitative equivalent of (a) being
the primary author of two project reports which achieve wide circulation and atten-
tion and (b) presenting six research papers at selective national conferences;
n Fund-raising—over a period of time not longer than two years, achieve the qualita-
tive equivalent of raising the funding for three professional-person-years of research
activity; and
n Management—over a period not longer than two years, accomplish the qualitative
equivalent of managing the budget, staff, schedule, substantive work, and external
relations for three professional-person-years of research activity.
Substantially exceeding the minimum requirements in one category can offset a short-
fall relative to the minimum requirements in another category. A combination of pub-
lications and other dissemination activities can be used to satisfy one of the two
dissemination requirements. Special experience (e.g., service as a program administra-
tor or as a practicing lawyer) will be considered if relevant.
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Standards for Promotion to
Senior Research Associate
The fundamental qualification for the PRA designation is a national reputation for
policy-related research/analysis. This reputation should be demonstrated through a
number of research accomplishments:
n An extensive publications record including a significant number of articles in 
top-rated journals and a body of other published work such as policy briefs, 
contributions to books, and influential project reports;
n Research leadership demonstrated through the initiation and completion of a 
number of successful, highly complex research projects, and the proven ability to
mentor junior staff; and
n A substantial fund-raising track record that contributes significantly to their
research center’s base of financial support.
It is expected that a PRA will meet most, if not all, of these criteria. PRA status 
generally will require a minimum of 15 years of research experience beyond a Ph.D. 
or equivalent. Designation of PRA status through promotion or the hiring process
only results after consideration by an Urban Institute SRA/PRA-review committee.
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Standards for Promotion to
Principal Research Associate
Senior fellows must have a broad-based national reputation for expertise on major
issues on which their views, analysis, and commentary are sought out by the broad
public policy world (including academics, political figures, journalists, and private-
sector individuals or groups). They will often have held some prominent public/
private-sector position. They will have evidenced an ability to interact competently
with that broad public policymaking world in a variety of forums and under public
pressures. For example, they will frequently engage in the following activities:
n Interactions with the media (often quoted in print, on local and national radio and
television)
n Speaking at high-quality forums and gatherings focused on broad public policy—
not just academic meetings
n Writing substantive pieces for the serious popular press such as opinion editorials
or articles for national news outlets (such as major newspapers, the Atlantic
Monthly, Harpers, etc.)
n Serving (or having served) on government and private commissions, substantive
panels, and/or advisory boards
n Testifying before Congress
Senior fellows will be responsible for raising funds to support their own activities and
those that promote the mission of the Institute. Designation of senior fellow status is
at the discretion of the Urban Institute president.
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Standards for Promotion to Senior Fellow
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Performance Appraisal
Policy
Performance appraisal is a continuous part of the management process. Throughout
the year supervisors are expected to communicate with employees concerning their
work progress, letting them know what is expected of them and by what standards
they are being judged. Any serious deficiencies in an employee’s performance should
be communicated by supervisors in face-to-face counseling meetings with the
employee before such deficiencies are documented in their annual performance
appraisal.
Once a year, usually in the fall, there is a formal review of every regular Institute
employee that consists of a written self-assessment and a written supervisor’s 
evaluation followed by a performance appraisal discussion.
The purpose of the annual review process is to assess and document the employee’s
accomplishments since the last appraisal or hire date; indicate areas where improve-
ment is possible; and define future goals, career objectives, and training needs. Since
performance appraisals affect salary adjustments, transfers, promotions, and other
personnel actions, they should be frank, objective, and specific and should refer only
to job-related criteria.
When the timing of the hire or transfer of an employee or the transfer or 
termination of a supervisor does not coincide with the annual performance 
review process, an out-of-cycle appraisal is required as described below. A 
written appraisal is also required before the end of the three-month period for 
each newly hired nonexempt employee and at the end of six months for new
exempt staff.
Procedures
Annual Performance Review
The personnel office will provide instructions, forms, and a schedule for completing
performance appraisals. The appraisal form consists of two parts: a self-assessment
for completion by the employee and a supervisor’s evaluation for completion 
by the employee’s official supervisor. Appraisal forms are distributed by the 
personnel office well in advance of the period scheduled for appraisal 
discussions. The employee signs and returns the completed self-assessment 
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form to the supervisor by the date indicated on the schedule provided by the per-
sonnel office.
The official supervisor reviews the employee’s self-assessment and writes an evaluation
of the employee’s performance for the prior twelve-month period. The supervisor
consults with other individuals to whom the employee reports for specific projects or
for day-to-day guidance or supervision and incorporates the comments of those indi-
viduals, as well as a response to any concerns noted in the employee’s self-assessment,
into the written supervisor’s evaluation. The supervisor’s evaluation is given to the
employee for review at least 24 hours prior to the performance appraisal discussion,
which is scheduled at this time.
Performance appraisal discussion topics should include both the employee’s 
concerns as expressed in the self-assessment and the appraiser’s evaluation of 
the employee’s performance. At the conclusion of the performance appraisal 
discussion, the appraisal form must be signed by the employee, the rating 
supervisor, and the center or office director (if different from the rating super-
visor). The employee must sign to acknowledge having read and discussed the 
contents of the appraisal. The employee’s signature does not necessarily constitute
agreement. The employee may express a difference of opinion with the written
appraisal by forwarding a separate memorandum, addressed through their super-
visor to the personnel office, which will become part of the employee’s personnel
file along with the written appraisal.
The completed appraisal form must be returned to the personnel office for review 
and signature by the director of personnel and, when appropriate, the senior vice 
president, before being entered into the employee’s personnel file.
Probationary Three-Month Period for Nonexempt Employees
Nonexempt employees are hired on a probationary basis for the first three months
of employment. If performance is not satisfactory during this period, the supervisor
may at any time recommend terminating employment without following the 
progressive discipline process outlined under Policy and Procedure No. 112. If 
possible, the employee should be given at least one week’s notice of termination of
employment.
Under extenuating circumstances, the center/office director may make a 
written request to the director of personnel for an extension of the probationary
period. The employee must be notified in writing about the extension and its 
conditions.
Initial Appraisal of Newly Hired Employees
New nonexempt employees will be given an initial appraisal of their performance
not earlier than two months nor later than three months from their date of employ-
ment. The initial evaluation period for new exempt employees is six months from
the date of hire.
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Performance of Transferring Employee
Before validating a transfer, the director of personnel will make certain that the
prospective supervisor knows whether an employee’s performance is satisfactory or
unsatisfactory and will require that the losing supervisor prepare a performance
appraisal if more than six months have passed since the last one.
Change of Supervisor
When a supervisor terminates employment or transfers out of a center or office, he 
or she should prepare a performance appraisal for each supervisee if more than 
six months have passed since the last appraisal.
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Annual Performance Appraisal
(Part One) Employee Self-Assessment
Employee’s Name: Job Title:
Center: Period Covered: (from/to)
(If more space is needed, attach additional sheets.)
1. List your major accomplishments during the appraisal period: Research Staff
examples include data collection and analysis, literature reviews, research
reports/publications, research proposals and other fundraising activities, special
external activities (speeches, testimony, briefings), special internal activities 
(committees, presentations, staff development). Administrative and Computer
Services examples include ways you have contributed to the efficiency and 
performance of your center/office, include special activities such as committee
participation, presentations, etc.
2. Did you achieve the objectives set by you and your supervisor during the last year?
(Please explain.)
3. During this period did you take on new major responsibilities or expanded 
supervisory responsibilities? If so, how? If research staff, has the level of your
research increased? If so, how?
4. Have you recently acquired new job-related skills or attended courses that will
prepare you for additional responsibilities in the future or enhance your skills in
your current position? If so, please specify.
5. If you have had budgetary/project management responsibilities during the past
year, have you operated within budget and on schedule? Please explain.
6. What steps have you taken to address the career development of those who report
to you? (For employees with supervisory responsibility only—others mark N/A)
7. Indicate areas in which you hope to improve your performance and goals you
wish to achieve during the coming year.
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8. Are there ways in which your supervisor(s) can assist you in improving your 
performance or achieving your goals? If so, please indicate:
M make expectations clearer
M provide more frequent feedback
M set more realistic work deadlines
M provide additional resources such as:
M other (specify): ____________________________
9. Are there other aspects of your job that you would like to discuss during the 
performance review? If so, please specify.
10. Are there other people who have directed your work during the rating period? 
If so, please list their names and give a brief description of the work done.
Note: Research Staff should attach a current resume to this assessment.
Employee’s Signature: _______________ Date: __________
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Annual Performance Appraisal
(Part Two) Supervisor’s Evaluation of Employee
Employee’s Name: Job Title:
Center: Period Covered: (from/to)
(If more space is needed, attach additional sheets.)
A. Comment on the employee’s self-assessment of job performance for the appraisal
period and note any significant omissions. If your view of employee’s performance
differs from that of employee, please explain.
B. Comment on the employee’s goals for the coming year as stated in the self-assessment
and any additional objectives you have set for the employee. If you do not concur
with the objectives stated by employee, please explain.
C. Identify the employee’s strengths. Give examples of exemplary or outstanding 
performance.
D. Note any areas of performance that need improvement and describe your plan for
correcting them.
The following question is for future planning and career development purposes and
is not part of the assessment of the prior year’s job performance. It should be used
as a basis for discussion of the employees long-term career development.
E. Make at least one suggestion that, if followed, could enhance the employee’s 
performance, strengthen skills, or improve the employee’s opportunity for
advancement or career growth.
F. General Performance Factor Ratings: Using the definitions provided below, rate
each of the following general performance factors according to the typical level of
competency demonstrated by the employee.
E EXCEPTIONAL level of performance: Employee accomplishes requirements of the 
position in an exemplary manner, adding to its depth and breadth by consistently 
working beyond its defined scope and expectations. NOTE: even the very highest-
performing employees cannot perform in an exemplary manner all the time. 
*Cite specific examples.
T H E  U R B A N  I N S T I T U T E
S SUPERIOR level of performance: Employee’s performance meets all performance criteria
and far exceeds several, but not all, other criteria. *Cite specific examples.
F FULLY SUCCESSFUL performance: Employee has accomplished all normal 
requirements and consistently meets all of the Institute’s usual high expectations of 
performance.
I IMPROVEMENT REQUIRED: The employee falls short of achieving one or more 
job requirements or goals. Improvement is required in order to fully meet the 
requirements of the job. It is expected that some new employees who are still learning
aspects of their positions will receive this rating for some factors. *Cite specific 
examples where performance needs improvement and provide a plan for achieving
improvement.
D SERIOUS DEFICIENCY in approach to or accomplishment of the job: Substantial
improvement is required to meet the requirements of the job. *This rating must be
explained fully by the supervisor and unless extraordinary circumstances exist, 
must have been the subject of a previous face-to-face counseling session with 
the employee. Such rating constitutes a written warning of a serious performance
problem as required in UI Policy 112, Addressing Performance Concerns.
CA = CANNOT ASSESS NA = NOT APPLICABLE
FOR ALL EMPLOYEES:
General Performance Factors
1. Quality of Work/content, accuracy, follow-through, thoroughness, creativity:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
2. Productivity/quantity of high-quality work:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
3. Organizational Skills & Timeliness/plans and organizes work efficiently; produces
results on a timely basis:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
4. Technical Skills/competence in performing technical work (please specify*):
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
5. Initiative/self-starter; works well without detailed instructions:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
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6. Problem Solving/anticipates or recognizes relevant problems and recommends or
applies solutions:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
7. Writing Skills/produces concise, readable written work:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
8. Oral Communication Skills/transmits or presents information articulately, 
accurately, and in a timely and professional manner:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
9. Flexibility/adapts well to changing priorities and work situations; adjusts easily to
new colleagues, ideas, and procedures:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
10. Interpersonal Skills/positive work attitude and ability to work with others to
facilitate group performance:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
11. Work Habits/attendance and punctuality:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
FOR RESEARCH STAFF ONLY:
12. Policy Understanding/knowledge of policy issues and the ability to relate them to
research and vice versa:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
13. Conceptual Ability/the ability to formulate and design research plans:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
14. Professional Involvement/presentations at professional meetings, articles in ref-
ereed professional journals, briefings, testimony, etc.:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
15. Raising Funds to Support Research:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
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FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS:
16. Supervisory Skills/makes timely and effective decisions, provides constructive
feedback, develops staff, resolves performance issues appropriately, uses staff effi-
ciently, and keeps staff apprised of Institute policies, practices, and objectives:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
17. Financial Management/uses financial resources efficiently and stays within budget:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
18. Compliance with Organizational Policies and Procedures/integrates office
objectives with those of the Institute:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
19. Compliance with the Institute’s Affirmative Action Program/meets, and ensures
that subordinates meet, program objectives; ensures good faith efforts to include
underrepresented groups in recruitment and promotion decisions:
M E* M S* M F M I* M D* M CA M NA
G. Based on all parts of the above evaluation, what is your overall assessment of this
employee’s performance?
Additional Comments:
Signatures:
Rating Supervisor: _______________________________ Date: ________________
(if different from center/office director)
Center/Office Director: ___________________________ Date: ________________
Employee’s Signature:*__________________ Date of Appraisal Discussion: ______
(*signature acknowledges that employee has read the appraisal)
Executive/Personnel Office Review:
Signature:______________________________________ Date: ________________
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Salary Administration
Policy
The goal of the Institute’s salary administration program is to enable the Institute to
attract, retain, and motivate the number and caliber of employees necessary to achieve
its objectives. In pursuing this goal, the Institute has developed a logical structure of
job levels and associated pay ranges to compensate employees appropriately for the
nature and level of work performed and to provide opportunities for growth.
The pay ranges assigned to each job level within the salary structure were designed and
are maintained to be consistent with the financial position of the Institute, internally
equitable, and competitive with those paid by other employers for comparable work.
The salary review process provides an effective method for evaluating and rewarding
individual job performance.
The salary administration policy seeks to comply with relevant federal and District of
Columbia laws and to keep employees informed of compensation matters affecting
them while protecting the confidentiality of salary information pertaining to other
Institute employees.
The Institute considers only job-related factors in making decisions on pay and does
not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, sex, sexual orientation, religion,
national origin, disability, matriculation, veteran status, marital status, personal
appearance, family responsibilities, or political affiliation.
Definitions
Position: Work consisting of responsibilities and duties assignable to one employee.
There are at least as many positions within the Institute as there are employees.
Job: A grouping of positions which are essentially the same in terms of the nature and
level of work being performed by the position incumbents. Each job has a title, classifi-
cation, and an associated grade level.
Job Description: There is a formal description of the major responsibilities, duties,
and level of work performed for each job. Such job descriptions are not exhaustive lists
of responsibilities.
Job Description Questionnaire: A questionnaire completed by an employee and
reviewed by the supervisor which describes the employee’s work assignment and lists
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the skills and abilities normally required to perform it satisfactorily. The questionnaire
provides the basis for the personnel office’s evaluation and classification of a position
and for preparing or updating a job description.
Job Evaluation: The process used to determine the level and appropriate classification
and salary grade for each job relative to all other Institute jobs.
Salary Grade: The classification level assigned to a group of similar jobs which,
although different with respect to skill and knowledge requirements and kinds of work
performed, are similar enough in level of difficulty and responsibility to warrant simi-
lar pay.
Salary Range: The minimum to maximum dollar amount payable to incumbents in
each salary grade.
Salary Structure: A hierarchy of salary grades and ranges which allows for the appro-
priate classification of each job.
Job Classification and Salary Structure
There is a job classification and salary structure for each category of Institute
employees:
Research Staff (Grades R01–R05)
Administrative Staff (Grades A01–A08)
Computer Services Staff (Grades C01–C05)
The Institute assigns each job a grade on the appropriate salary structure based on
an evaluation of the job’s relative worth to the Institute and what other organiza-
tions pay for comparable work. The personnel office uses a point-factor system to
evaluate the jobs assigned to the administrative structure. Research and computer
positions are classified according to standard industry categories at each level.
Along with a salary grade, the personnel office will assign each job an appropriate title
and will prepare a standard job description. (See Policy and Procedure No. 101:
Establishing a Position.)
Each job is also designated as either exempt or nonexempt from the overtime provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (See Policy and Procedure No. 100: Hours of
Work and Overtime.)
Annual Review of Salary Ranges
Once a year, normally in November, the personnel office will review the salary
ranges for each of the three structures in comparison to rates of pay by other
employers in the various labor markets in which the Institute competes. The direc-
tor of personnel will obtain or conduct a survey of the outside labor market and
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will recommend to the senior vice president any changes in each classification
structure necessary to remain competitive. The senior vice president will authorize
such changes, when they are feasible, on the basis of labor market conditions and
not directly on changes in the cost of living.
This process is separate from the adjustment made to individual salaries.
Annual Review of Individual Salaries
Salary Increase Budget: Each fall, the personnel office will distribute to center and
office directors historical and comparable salary data for their staffs. Prior to the fall
meeting of the Institute’s board of trustees, the senior vice president and/or director 
of personnel will meet with the center and office directors to discuss current staffing
considerations and to develop a recommended salary increase budget for the annual
review based on competitive labor market data available at the time. The senior vice
president will forward a recommendation to the president who, in consultation with
the board of trustees, will authorize a salary increase budget.
Salary Review Committee: The salary review committee consists of the senior vice
president, the vice president & controller, all center directors, two office directors
appointed by the senior vice president, and the director of personnel. The function of
the salary review committee is to ensure consistency and fairness of the salary review
process and in the salary adjustments approved for staff members. The committee
reviews the salary increase and promotion recommendations for all staff below the
center/office director level.
Salary Increase Recommendations: At least three weeks before center and office
directors make their salary increase recommendations, the senior vice president
will issue an all-staff memorandum containing guidelines for the annual review,
such as eligibility, the amount of the salary budget approved by the board of
trustees, the average percentage increase, and a schedule for submitting recommen-
dations. Center and office directors will base their recommendations on an individ-
ual’s job performance, level of responsibility, and comparative position in the
salary range. Directors will provide a brief written justification for each salary
increase recommendation significantly above or below the average increase
amount. Supervisors must not communicate to the employee the amount of the
recommended adjustment until it has been formally approved by the salary
review committee, since modifications are sometimes made to the original 
recommendations for equity and other reasons.
Salary Review Committee Decisions: Center and office directors will send 
salary increase recommendations to the salary review committee through the 
director of personnel. The personnel office will review the recommendations for
consistency with the most recent performance appraisals and with the goals of 
the Institute’s Affirmative Action Program, and will verify that they are within 
the established salary ranges. The personnel office will provide the salary review 
committee with the information it needs to make fair and equitable decisions. The
recommendations of the salary review committee shall be reviewed and approved
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by the president or designate. Approval by the board of trustees is required 
for salaries at or above the federal government ES-4 level. Since this approval 
may occur after the salary review committee meets, such increases will be made
retroactive to January 1.
Notification to Employees: The personnel office will transmit a notification, through
the appropriate center or office director, to each employee who receives a salary
increase. In addition, the director of personnel will inform the respective directors 
of the reasons for a denial or modification of their recommendations. The center or
office director will notify each employee who does not receive a salary increase of the
reason for such action.
Salary Adjustment Appeals: An employee who wishes to appeal a salary increase deci-
sion should forward the appeal through the appropriate center or office director and
the director of personnel to the salary review committee. The appeal must be in writ-
ing and must explain why the employee feels the salary review committee’s decision
should be modified. The committee must receive the appeal by the date published in
the all-staff memo regarding the annual salary review schedule. The committee will
consider the information presented in the written appeal and will make a recommen-
dation to the president for final decision. Modifications resulting from an appeal will
be made retroactive to January 1.
Midyear Review of Individual Salaries
The salary review committee meets in June of each year to consider salary increase 
recommendations for those employees whose dates of hire made them ineligible 
for consideration during the annual review or whose supervisors elected to defer 
consideration until midyear. The committee also acts on salary increase recommenda-
tions for research assistants whose dates of hire make midyear the appropriate consid-
eration time. The process for making salary increase recommendations is the same as
during the annual review, except that no all-staff memo is issued. Center and office
directors may meet individually with the director of personnel to discuss current labor
market information and internal equity prior to making midyear salary increase 
recommendations.
Starting Salaries for New Employees
Center and office directors may make recommendations to the director of 
personnel in connection with the hiring of a new employee, but only the director 
of personnel has the authority to extend an official offer of employment or to
authorize any other Institute employee to extend a verbal offer of employment.
Starting salaries will not be set below the minimum or above the maximum of the
salary range for the job.
The director of personnel will recommend all starting salaries, basing them on internal
equity and outside labor market considerations and may authorize starting salaries for
all nonexempt employees and all exempt employees at or below the Research Associate
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I (R03) level (C03 level on the Computer Staff structure; A07 level on the
Administrative Staff structure). All other starting salaries, and those in cases where 
the center or office director and the director of personnel do not concur, require 
the authorization of the senior vice president.
Timing of First Salary Review for New Employees
All Employees Except Research Assistants—In general, employees hired between
January 1 and July 31 will be eligible for salary adjustment January 1 as part of the
annual salary review process.
Employees hired between August 1 and October 31 may be eligible for a January 1
salary adjustment at the discretion of the center or office director. Alternatively, 
the center or office director may elect to defer salary consideration until midyear.
Employees hired between November 1 and December 31 are not eligible for salary
adjustment on January 1 but their starting salaries will reflect this fact. These employ-
ees will be eligible for salary adjustment the following January 1 as part of the annual
salary review process.
Salaries for regular employees on term assignments are set for the duration of the
assignment. If the term is extended or renewed, the term employee’s salary will be
considered at that time for adjustment for the duration of the new term. If the
employee continues on regular employment status but is no longer subject to a 
specified term, the salary may be adjusted at that time or deferred until the next
annual review cycle. Thereafter, the employee will receive salary consideration 
during the annual review cycle.
Research Assistants—In addition to the regular salary review cycle outlined 
above, research assistants receive a one-time six-month salary review. Since 
the salary review committee meets only at specified times during the year to 
consider salary recommendations, some recommendations may be acted 
upon after the effective date of the increase. In such instances, approved salary
increases will be made retroactive to the effective date (the first day of the first 
full pay period following six months of employment as a regular full- or part-time
research assistant).
Following the six-month increase, research assistants will receive consideration
during the next appropriate salary review period (midyear or January 1, depending
on the length of time since last review) and during the annual review cycle 
thereafter.
Out-of-Cycle Increase in Salary
There may be circumstances that justify a salary increase at times of the year other
than during the annual review period; such as promotion into a vacant position or 
the necessity of counteracting an outside offer to an Institute employee. In such cases,
associated salary increases will be effective on the date of approval.
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Decrease in Salary
Occasionally, because of work schedule requirements, the assumption of fewer or
lower levels of responsibility, organizational changes which result in the elimination of
an employee’s former position, changes in career path, or other reasons, an employee
will apply for a vacancy in a position at a lower level. The salary in such circumstances
will be set within the new position’s range at a point comparable to salaries paid to
incumbents in that grade who have similar job responsibilities and job performance
levels. An appropriate salary rate will be recommended by the director of personnel in
consultation with the appropriate center/office director and approved by the senior
vice president.
Promotion
An employee will receive a promotion when he/she fills a vacant position posted at a
higher salary grade. A salary increase associated with a promotion will be based on the
individual’s performance and relative position in the new salary range. The increase
will be effective on the first day of the pay period following the date of approval, unless
specified otherwise.
Reclassification
A reclassification will occur when an employee’s existing position is reevaluated by the
personnel office and reclassified into a higher or lower salary grade as a result of dis-
cernible and measurable changes in the level of responsibilities and skills required to
perform the work. Those reclassifications which result in a position being moved to a
higher salary grade will be considered promotions. A job reevaluation may also result
in the position’s title being changed (with no change to salary grade) or in no change
to the position’s classification. Requests for reclassification will generally be considered
during the annual salary review cycle and any salary adjustment resulting from the
reclassification will be effective January 1.
A request for reclassification may be initiated by the supervisor or by the employee
through the supervisor and must be supported by substantial evidence that there
has been a significant and sustained change in the degree of independence with
which an individual works, the level of judgment the individual must exercise, 
the degree of difficulty of the tasks performed, or the individual’s supervisory
responsibilities. A change in the number of tasks associated with a job or the 
number of individuals supervised does not alone provide sufficient justification 
for reclassifying a position.
Reclassification Procedures for Administrative and Computer Services Staff: The
employee will complete a Job Description Questionnaire form, which may be obtained
from the personnel office. The supervisor will review the employee’s responses and
complete the supervisory section before forwarding the completed questionnaire and
any other substantiating data, along with a written request for reclassification, to the
director of personnel.
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The personnel office will compare the questionnaire to existing job descriptions and
other job classification data to determine the appropriate classification for the posi-
tion. If appropriate, the director of personnel will recommend a new job title, classifi-
cation, and salary grade to the senior vice president. The employee will be notified of
the decision through the supervisor.
Reclassification Procedures for Research Staff: When a researcher has demonstrated
consistently over a period of time work at a higher level of independence and ability
than expected of others at the same grade level, the center director may recommend a
promotion. The center director must submit a Request for Promotion form (available
from the personnel office) or a written memorandum noting specific examples of 
performance which demonstrate a higher level of work than expected for the current
grade level. A current resume and samples of the individual’s most recent written 
work should accompany the memo.
Requests for promotion are generally considered during the annual salary review cycle.
The director of personnel will review the recommendation for completeness and con-
sistency with the most recent performance appraisal and forward it to the salary review
committee for a decision. The employee will be notified of the decision through the
supervisor.
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Sample Orientation Seminar
B
The following is based on a PowerPoint presentation prepared byBurton Richman of the Urban Institute for new team members at
the Institute for Urban Economics (Moscow) for a United States Agency
for International Development–sponsored technical assistance project that
worked with local governments in Russia to improve the provision of
social assistance and social services to the population. Therefore, the first
part is oriented to working with local governments. The second part
addresses more general elements of working at a think tank heavily
engaged in technical assistance projects.
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Delivering Technical Assistance 
to Municipalities for a Donor Agency
PART I: WORKING WITH CLIENTS
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n Funds for improving operations?
n Trips to training sessions or study tours?
n Clear enhancement of professional credentials or reputation?
Incentives for Participation by the Municipality
n Quality of the ideas presented
n Degree of competence projected
n Type of working style projected
n Appreciating their problems
n Do not promise the world—stick with your agenda
n Management improvements are almost never a priority
Approaching the Administration—What Is Important?
n Attitude
n Start with their problems
n Understand where in the administration your support is and 
figure out how to exploit it
n Be responsive
n Be on site enough of the time
n Provide the necessary materials—produce sample documents,
charts, etc., where needed
n Be “hands on”—keep asking until you understand the situation,
then produce concrete proposals
n Avoid one-size-fits-all approaches
(continued )
Working with Counterparts—Basic Guidelines
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n Deciding what changes to recommend:
C Do not give immediate responses to problems observed
C Talk ideas for changes over with other team members
C Make recommendations highly concrete and specific, and 
therefore useful
n Developing a relationship in which you are trusted is critical
Trusting Relationship
PART II: “DEMAND-DRIVEN” TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
n Do not include cities that are clearly not very interested,
because they are not likely to be good partners
n Start with more clients than you reasonably expect to succeed
n Assign significant tasks to counterparts, but do not get so far
away from the work that the counterparts make major decisions
without your counsel
n Be patient; do not press too hard. When appropriate, reduce the
level of work with the city but stay in contact to see if the level
of interest increases
What Are the Implications?
n Manage your time
n Keep a detailed plan
n Ask for help before you get behind
n Set priorities or know what the priorities are
n Use any tools that are available
Handling Multiple Projects
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n Know what the budget is and what activities it was based on
n Use management reports or your own notes to keep track of
what expenditures you are making and what expenditures you
will need to make
n Alert management to problems before they occur
Working within the Budget
n Don’t trust numbers from clients without having them confirmed
n Double-check everything
n Look for anomalies
n Make sure that all terms are well defined
Data Skepticism
Policy Analysis Course Outline
C
This outline is from a course development by the Urban Institute andthe Institute for Urban Economics. By 2005, the course had been
taught to municipal officials and advocacy NGO staff in 12 Russian cities,
to think tank and advocacy NGO staff and government officials in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and to government officials and advocacy NGO staff
in the Kyrgyz Republic. The textbook for the course is Policy Analysis for
Effective Development: Strengthening Transition Economies by Kristin Morse
and Raymond Struyk (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
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Workshop 1: Critical Thinking about Public Programs and Subsidies
Minutes Topic Presenter
Day 1
9:00–9:30 30 Introduction of instructors, 
participants, IUE, and UI
9:30–10:00 30 Course overview
10:00–10:30 30 Exercise 1: Types of policy actions
10:30–10:45 15 Break
10:45–11:45 60 Targeting
11:45–12:30 45 Exercise 2: Targeting
12:30–1:30 60 Lunch
1:30–2:00 30 Subsidy types
2:00–2:45 45 Exercise 3: Analyzing alternative 
subsidy forms for social assistance
2:45–3:00 15 Break
3:00–3:45 45 Subsidies: Benefit calculation
3:45–4:15 30 Exercise 4: Benefit calculation 
of various subsidies
4:15–4:30 15 Summary of day 1, preview of day 2
Day 2
9:00–9:20 20 Introduction to policy analysis
9:20–9:40 20 Stakeholder analysis
9:40–10:40 60 Exercise 5: Stakeholder analysis 
(three parts)
10:40–10:55 15 Break
10:55–12:00 65 Policy analysis: Six-step process
Perm example
Introduction to exercises
12:00–1:00 60 Exercise 6: Policy analysis—
Arzamas and military case studies
1:00–2:00 60 Lunch
2:00–2:45 45 Exercise 6: Policy analysis, continued—
Arzamas and military case studies 
(presentations/discussion)
2:45–3:30 45 Test
3:30–3:45 15 Evaluation/homework
3:45–4:00 15 Summary of workshop 1, preview 
of workshop 2
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Workshop 2: Delivering Public Services Efficiently
Minutes Topic Presenter
Day 1
9:00–9:20 20 Questions from workshop 1, 
homework collection
Introduction to workshop 2
9:20–9:40 20 Public goods/role of government 
in market economy
9:40–10:00 20 Expenditure responsibility
10:00–10:30 30 Exercise 1: Government functions 
and responsibilities
10:30–10:45 15 Break
10:45–11:05 20 Revenue authority
11:05–11:50 45 Options for carrying out 
government functions
11:50–12:30 40 Exercise 2: Appropriate options 
for government functions
12:30–1:00 30 Introduction to competitive 
procurement/recent experience
1:00–2:00 60 Lunch
2:00–2:20 20 Introduction to competitive 
procurement/recent experience, 
continued
2:20–2:50 30 Participant presentations 
(workshop 1 assignments)
2:50–3:05 15 Break
3:05–3:50 45 Successful contracting out: 
Six-step process
3:50–4:15 25 Lessons learned
4:15–4:25 10 Summary of day 1, preview of day 2
Day 2
9:00–9:20 20 Review of contracting out/
introduction to exercise
9:20–10:30 70 Exercise 3: Contracting—preparing 
the competition and presenting 
the request for proposal
10:30–10:45 15 Break
10:45–11:30 45 Contracting exercise: Preparing a 
proposal
11:30–12:30 60 Contracting exercise: 
Presentations and evaluation—
housing
12:30–1:30 60 Lunch
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(continued )
Workshop 2: (Continued)
Minutes Topic Presenter
Day 2 (continued)
1:30–2:30 60 Contracting exercise: 
Presentations and evaluation—
social services
2:30–2:45 15 Break
2:45–3:15 30 Contracting exercise: 
Monitoring (group discussion)
3:15–3:30 15 Summary of workshop 2, 
preview of workshop 3
3:30–4:15 45 Test/homework/evaluation
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Workshop 3: Program Monitoring and Evaluation
Minutes Topic Presenter
Day 1
9:00–9:15 15 Questions from workshop 2, homework 
collection
Introduction to workshop 3 Program 
9:15–9:25 10 modeling
9:25–9:50 25 Exercise 1: Program modeling
9:50–10:05 15 Monitoring
10:05–10:35 30 Exercise 2: Assessing monitoring 
indicators
10:35–10:50 15 Break
10:50–11:30 40 Implementing data collection for 
monitoring
11:30–12:00 30 Exercise 3: Creating a logical frame
12:00–12:15 15 Critical data assessment, problems/
checking data
12:15–12:30 15 Exercise 4: Checking monitoring data
12:30–1:00 30 Critical data assessment and analysis
1:00–2:00 60 Lunch
2:00–2:15 15 Critical data assessment and analysis, 
continued
2:15–2:40 25 Exercise (discussion) 5: 
Transforming data into 
useful information
2:40–3:05 25 Introduction to program evaluation
3:05–3:25 20 Implementing process evaluation
Step 1: Evaluation design
3:25–4:10 45 Exercise 6: Evaluation design for school 
lunch program in Arzamas
Day 2
9:00–9:35 35 Implementing process evaluation
Step 2: Data collection
Step 3: Data analysis
9:35–9:45 10 Implementing process evaluation
Step 4: Getting the evaluation used
9:45–10:15 30 Housing allowance evaluation example
10:15–10:45 30 Exercise 7: Evaluation example
10:45–11:00 15 Break
11:00–11:45 45 Exercise 7: Evaluation example, continued
11:45–12:05 20 Homework presentations
12:05–12:50 45 Test/homework/evaluation
12:50–1:00 10 Summary
1:00–2:00 60 Lunch
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Workshop 4: Preparing Policy Recommendations
Minutes Topic Presenter
Day 1
9:00–9:15 15 Questions from workshop 3, 
homework collection
Introduction to workshop 4
9:15–9:25 10 Strong/weak policy 
recommendations
9:25–10:25 60 Class discussion: Examples of 
policy recommendations
10:25–10:40 15 Break
10:40–11:00 20 How to write policy 
recommendations
Review of policy analysis/important 
concepts
11:00–11:15 15 Structure of policy recommendations 
types of recommendations
11:15–1:00 105 Exercises: Policy problems
Each case takes about 11⁄2 hours, 
including time for presentations. 
Complete as many as time allows.
Day 2
90+ Exercises: Policy problems
Each case takes about 11⁄2 hours, 
including time for presentations.
Complete at least one case 
(that participants write individually) 
prior to the test.
60 Test
15 Evaluations
Option: Additional time for participants 
to take any missed tests
Graduation ceremony
Celebration
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Quality Control Policy of the Institute
for Urban Economics (Moscow)
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Approved Regulations President of the Institute
for Urban Economics
05/30/00
N. B. Kosareva
On Outgoing Documents
and Publications Quality Control
General
The regulations establish the procedures for exercising control over the documents
and publications produced by the IUE personnel as part of their employment respon-
sibilities (products) and intended for external dissemination. The list of products
which should undergo quality control procedures is given in annex 1.
Head of structural unit shall bear responsibility for quality of all outgoing products of
the unit (including those that do not fall within the regulations but are disseminated as
IUE products)1 and shall ensure compliance of the products with the requirements of
these regulations.
The regulations shall envisage two types of internal reviewing (quality control): com-
plete and brief.
Control over compliance with the time schedule set forth in these Regulations shall be
assigned to director of the information and publications center.
Author, director of structural unit where author belongs, and reviewer shall bear
responsibility for final quality of the product.
Submission of the material to head of structural unit for approval following internal
reviewing procedures implies submission of products to employer.
In case there is a need of adjusting the material after it has been delivered to the
Information and Publications Center, and money has already been spent to finance
the material development and the material external dissemination, head of structural
unit shall compose a memo addressed to the president of IUE (with a copy of the
memo addressed to the finance director).
Procedure of Complete Internal Reviewing
Pursuant to procedures of organization of complete internal reviewing, a reviewer
for each particular outgoing product, to undergo a complete quality control 
procedure, shall be appointed at weekly IUE meetings of heads of structural units
in accordance with proposals made by the head of the structural unit where the
author belongs to.
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I N S T I T U T E  F O R  U R B A N  E C O N O M I C S
Author of the material shall provide it for review at least four weeks prior to the final
date for the submission of the material to the Information and Publications Center.
Responsibility for the completeness of the material shall borne by the author of the
material. The completeness of the material implies the presence of these parts of the
material:
n title page (author, name, publication year)
n back title page (abstract)
n text with table of contents
n list of references (if available)
n attachments (if available)
The reviewer shall review the material within two weeks in accordance with require-
ments set forth in these regulations, and return the material to the author together
with a review and a cover letter attached (annex 2).
If the reviewer concludes that the material shall be disseminated unchanged, the
author submits the material to the head of structural unit for approval, then submits
the material to the Information and Publications Center together with the original
copy of the review and a cover letter attached.
If the reviewer recommends that changes should be introduced in the material, the
author corrects the material within two weeks in accordance with recommendations
stated in the review, following which he/she again submits the material for revision
(with the procedures described in the previous three paragraphs to be repeated). Every
stage of the material processing should be described in a cover letter.
Procedure of Organization of Brief Internal Reviewing
Pursuant to procedures of brief internal reviewing, the head of structural unit where
the author of the material belongs shall compose a memo containing a reviewer
appointment proposal addressed to the president of IUE, general director, or executive
director (annex 3). A reviewer may also be appointed at the meeting of directors 
following the proposal by the head of structural unit where the author belongs 
(the same as described earlier).
After the memo is signed and the reviewer’s appointment is confirmed in the minutes
of the meeting of heads of structural units, the author shall submit the material to the
reviewer. The reviewer shall review the material within three days in accordance with
requirements set forth in the next section of these regulations, and return the material
to the author together with a cover letter attached (there is no need to write a review).
If the reviewer concludes that the material shall be disseminated unchanged, the author
submits the material to the head of structural unit for approval, then submits the material
to the Information and Publications Center together with a cover letter attached.
If the reviewer recommends that changes should be introduced in the material, 
the author corrects the material within two weeks in accordance with recom-
mendations stated in the review, following which he/she again submits the 
material for revision (with the procedures described in the previous three paragraphs
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to be repeated). Every stage of the material processing should be described in a
cover letter.
Reviewing
A review represents an opinion on the material including its analysis, characterization
and evaluation.
Requirements to the review:
n objective and opinions based on established principles
n evaluation based on high quality standards and conclusive opinions
n proper substantiation provided for all conclusions and recommendations
n reliability of every source data, references, and examples
n due accounting of customer’s requirements specified in agreement/contract/grant
under which the material is produced
Requirements to execution of the review:
n The review shall be written on a separate sheet of paper.
n The review shall be signed by the reviewer with indication of the date of the review.
n The length of the review shall be at least one page but not more than three pages
printed on A4 sheet with 1.5 spacing in 12th font with an exception made for prod-
ucts of more than 150 pages—then the review can be more than three pages.
The structural elements of the review:
n general evaluation of the material’s contents, its compliance with an announced
title and requirements of a target reader
n comments as regards the structure and the contents of the review (editor may com-
ment the contents of the material): it is recommended that the comments should be
made in the form of a numbered list
n conclusions and recommendations
Settlement of Disputes
In the event that author of the material disagrees with the opinion of the reviewer, the
material shall be submitted for discussion at the IUE Scientific Board.
In the event that the members of the IUE Scientific Council cannot arrive at an agreed
decision, the material is placed for the consideration of the IUE president or some
other person authorized by the IUE president.
N O T E
1. For example, articles in local press, and so on.
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Complete internal reviewing 
procedure
Brief internal reviewing procedure
Brief internal reviewing procedure
Brief internal reviewing procedure
Brief internal reviewing procedure
Brief internal reviewing procedure
A N N E X  1
Materials Subject to Quality Control Procedures 
Type of material Mandatory procedures 
Analytical/methodological/final report/
training material or a mix of those materials
with a length of over 8 pages printed on 
A4 sheet (with 1.5 spacing in 12th font),
intended for dissemination by IUE or the
customer in the form of a book, on CD-Rom,
or placed on the web sitea
Reprint of previously reviewed material with
additions and changes 
CD-Rom/compilation book/other composite
product with previously reviewed materials
with additions and changes
Policy brief, analytical digest, other analytical
materials with a length of less than 8 pages
printed on A4 sheet (with 1.5 spacing in
12th font), final electronic presentation of
the project implementation (made in
PowerPoint program or in a similar soft-
ware)
An article for a periodical 
Presentation materials (booklets presented
by a project material, folded brochures,
newsletters, and so on)
a In case presentation materials were subject to external reviewing together with a written opinion
produced by an external reviewer, brief internal reviewing is allowed.
 APPENDIX D
A N N E X  2
Title of
material:
Type of material: M BOOK M ARTICLE M POLICY BRIEF M CD-Rom
M Analytical material to be placed on the web site
M Report to customer
Author Reviewer
Director of structural unit Date of submission to reviewer
Conclusions by a reviewer:
M Material is ready for issuance without changes
M Material is ready for issuance with minor changes
M Material is ready for issuance only after major changes are introduced
M Material needs to be completely redone
Comments:
Signatures
Date of submission to reviewer Reviewer
Date of submission to author Author
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Repeated reviewing 1 (fill in if, according to conclusions made by a reviewer, 
the material cannot be printed unchanged)
Conclusions by reviewer:
M Material is ready for issuance without changes
M Material is ready for issuance with minor changes 
M Material is ready for issuance only after major changes are introduced
M Material needs to be completely redone
Comments:
Signatures:
Date of submission to reviewer Reviewer
Date of submission to author Author
Repeated reviewing 2 (fill in if, according to conclusions made by a reviewer, 
the material cannot be printed unchanged)
Conclusions by reviewer:
M Material is ready for issuance without changes
M Material is ready for issuance with minor changes
M Material is ready for issuance only after major changes are introduced
M Material needs to be completely redone
Comments:
Signatures:
Date of submission to reviewer Reviewer
Date of submission to author Author
Author Director of structural unit Reviewer
“Material is taken for reviewing”
M.Yu. Ledovskiy, Director of Information and Publications Center Date
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A N N E X  3
APPROVED 
Director General of the Institute for Urban Economics
A.S. Puzanov
Date
To Director General of the Institute for
Urban Economics 
A.S. Puzanov 
OFFICE MEMO
Pursuant to Paragraph 3.1 of the Regulations, On Outgoing Documents and
Publications Quality Control, please, appoint 
Name, patronymic and surname of the nominee
as a reviewer of 
.
Title of the material
Date
Director of structural unit
Signature Full name
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Assessing the Effectiveness of a
Dissemination Strategy:
The Urban Institute’s Assessing 
the New Federalism Program
E
Background
Assessing the New Federalism is a multiyear Urban Institute project designed
to analyze the devolution of responsibility for social programs from the
federal government to the states, focusing primarily on health care,
income security, employment and training programs, and social services.1
Researchers monitor program changes and fiscal developments. The
project aims to provide timely, nonpartisan information to inform public
debate and to help state and local decisionmakers carry out their new
responsibilities more effectively. Key components of the project include
a household survey and studies of policies in 13 states.
From the outset in 1996, Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) and its
funders considered dissemination an integral part of the overall project.
The project understood that welfare reform—and the devolution of
responsibility for policymaking that was a central tenet of the new law—
put new responsibilities in the hands of stakeholders at the state level.
The staff wanted to make sure that stakeholders’ policymaking activities
benefited from the latest research and data on cash assistance, child care,
child welfare, child support, health insurance coverage, access, and use,
Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and the health
safety net more generally.
ANF Dissemination Goals, Objectives,
and Strategies
To reach the project’s goal—integrating ANF research and data resources
into the policymaking process in the states—the communications team
established three objectives.
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• Establish ANF data and analyses as credible by all sides of the policy
debate.
• Reach a broad range of national and state stakeholders, including
elected officials, agency administrators, advocates, service providers,
and professional and trade associations.
• Incorporate ANF data and research into national and state policy
discussions. 
ANF adopted seven strategies to meet these objectives.
• Promote ANF data and analyses on an “equal opportunity” basis to
a wide variety of stakeholders on all sides of the political debate. ANF
used several tactics to implement this strategy: maintaining trans-
parency in survey methodology; eschewing value judgments when
describing data; suggesting both positive and negative outcomes from
policy choices; promoting access to and use of the data by others; and
issuing summaries—press releases in the project’s early days—for all
ANF publications.
• Make research available in a variety of formats intended to meet the
differing needs of various stakeholders. For instance, state policy-
makers have limited time and resources to review research. Publica-
tions targeted to them must be short, focus on one issue, highlight
conclusions, and link the research to policy implications. Researchers,
on the other hand, want more detail.
The project released research in four formats.
Policy briefs analyze a specific, policy-relevant issue. They use
simple statistical tools, emphasize charts and graphics rather than
tables, and are designed for stakeholders to read in about 30 minutes.
ANF issued its first policy brief in January 1997. The “A” series briefs,
of which there are currently 62, analyze many types of data. The
“B” series briefs, inaugurated in August 1999, rely exclusively on
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) data. There are 55
“B” series briefs so far.
Occasional papers are more detailed. They probe topics more
deeply, require more complex analysis of the data, or report on
qualitative data. Most papers that describe how the safety net adapted
to welfare reform, based on our site visits to the 13 focal states, were
published as occasional papers. ANF issued the first occasional paper
in July 1997. There are currently 71 in the series.
In addition to these two major publication types, ANF issued three
sets of Snapshots of America’s Families to announce the first find-
ings from each round of the National Survey of America’s Families.
Snapshots provide a first look at such topics as health insurance
coverage, poverty and work, family structure, family environment,
and child well-being.
 APPENDIX E
“Fast Facts” highlight factoids from ANF publications. Most focus
on a specific piece of information—differences in sanction policies
in each of the 50 states, changes in health insurance coverage among
low-income adults, or kin foster parents as a percentage of all foster
parents. A few provide an overview of a broader topic—highlights
from the ANF SCHIP evaluation or issues in TANF reauthorization.
“Fast Facts” exist only on the web site; they are not printed. Thus far,
ANF has issued 43 “Fast Facts.”
• Use electronic communications to promote use of the web site and
increase contact with stakeholders. When the project began in 1996,
many stakeholders had limited access to e-mail and the Internet.
Since that time, the capacity of ANF’s audiences to use electronic
communications has become universal.
Electronic communications are designed to give target audiences
immediate access to the materials they choose. Stakeholders can
access documents attached to e-mails or use hyperlinks to receive
specific documents instantly. When ANF sends hard copies via
bulk mail, delivery takes one to three weeks.
ANF recognized that the ability of stakeholders to access the
Internet is not even. To fit the capabilities of a broad range of stake-
holders, ANF makes publications available as html documents as
well as pdf documents. Html documents are easier for stakeholders
with dial-up connections to use. Those accessing reports via the web
site use both formats fairly equally.
Encouraging stakeholders to access publications via the web site
allowed ANF to reduce printing and mailing costs. This reduced
publication expenses by about two-thirds. ANF used contact-
management software to build and manage a dissemination network
with more than 1,300 contacts. The software tracked the interests of
each participant, kept a history of their involvement with the project,
and automated personalized e-mail contact with many people in
the network simultaneously. ANF uses Act!, Automated Contact
Tracking, software to manage this database.
To alert a broad range of end users about new reports, ANF estab-
lished an e-mail publication called Hot Off the Press from ANF
(HOTP) in May 1999. HOTP provides short (100–150 word) sum-
maries of new ANF publications. Unlike traditional abstracts that
describe the topics a paper covers, HOTP summaries provide specific
data highlighting the top-line findings. The reader gets something
substantive about the research by reading the blurb. A link to the
full report on the web site follows each description. To keep HOTP
short, ANF limits each issue to three items. HOTP is distributed no
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more than once a week to avoid overburdening stakeholders with
e-mail. Ninety-one editions of HOTP have been issued so far. An
independent contractor manages the listserv.
ANF created the listserv by pulling e-mail addresses from the Urban
Institute mailing list. ANF also surveyed people receiving hard
copies of our reports to see if they preferred receiving notice of reports
via e-mail. Those that did were added to the listserv. New subscribers
are added through referrals, conferences, and direct contact.
• Network with national and state organizations to educate their
members about new ANF data and analysis. Stakeholders receive
an overwhelming amount of policy-oriented materials from many
different organizations. Stakeholders belonging to national organi-
zations often give materials coming from those organizations first
priority. To encourage the use of ANF research, ANF established
relationships with the top two or three national organizations cov-
ering specific constituencies or issues. Through these relationships,
ANF researchers placed articles in stakeholder newsletters, spoke at
their conferences, and identified state and local contacts to add to
the network.
• Provide opportunities for stakeholders to use the research. To
encourage stakeholders to pay attention to ANF research, the project
developed a “commentator” strategy. The strategy involved stake-
holders in dissemination and gave them a vested interest in the research.
It created an incentive for stakeholders to become familiar with the
research. Many commentators want to speak with reporters to promote
their agenda. Since ANF does the legwork, it is easy for “commentators”
to participate. If commentators know that they may receive a call from
a reporter on ANF research, they are more likely to take the time to
read the report. Once they read the report, they are more likely to use
it in other ways.
• Encourage media coverage of ANF research to communicate broadly
about the new research. Working with the Urban Institute’s Public
Affairs office, ANF sought coverage in national media outlets. This
included general news media, trade and association publications, and
professional journals. ANF also targeted media outlets in the 13 states
the project studied intensively (Alabama, California, Colorado,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin). As the project
evolved, ANF expanded outreach to black, Hispanic, and faith-based
outlets. Most media outreach activities were directed at print out-
lets, but ANF did issue several radio news releases and appeared in
numerous television news stories.
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Media outreach activities sought to protect ANF’s reputation as
a credible, nonpartisan, objective source of data and analysis.
Working with “commentators” enabled ANF to offer a reporter a
contact that could discuss the policy implications of the research and
what the data means in terms of real people. This made it easier for
ANF researchers to focus on the research findings.
• Update the dissemination strategy in response to the changing envi-
ronment and feedback from stakeholders. ANF changed its dis-
semination priorities and updated its outreach strategies to meet new
challenges and opportunities, including growing reliance on e-mail
and the web (as described above), altering the focus from state
implementation to TANF reauthorization, and building the capacity
of stakeholders to use data sets created by the project.
Research Methodology
Based on these objectives and strategies, ANF asked six research questions.
• Do ANF research materials satisfy the needs of stakeholders? To
answer this question, ANF analyzes the different types of papers
developed, assessing their readability and analyzing end user opin-
ions about the formats and content.
• Are stakeholders satisfied with using electronic communications to
access ANF data and analysis? The report describes the structure of
the web site and the system for communicating with stakeholders
electronically, reviews trends in the number of subscribers to the ANF
listserv, reviews use of the web site, analyzes end user use of and
satisfaction with the web site, and users’ satisfaction with the listserv.
• Did ANF generate significant media coverage nationally and in
each of the 13 focal states? An analysis of press clippings examines
where stories relating to ANF research appeared, the types of stories
generated, and topics most likely to be covered.
• Did ANF successfully integrate “commentators” into our media out-
reach efforts? ANF analyzes the press clipping database to identify how
frequently reporters incorporated commentators into their stories.
• Do stakeholders consider ANF research credible and ANF analysis
objective? ANF measures credibility in three ways. First, publication
of ANF data and research in peer-reviewed journals demonstrates
that ANF data and analysis have credibility among the community of
scholars. Second, ANF reviews press clippings to see how reporters
characterize the Urban Institute. Third, the project asks end users
directly about any perceived ideological bias in ANF materials.
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• Do stakeholders use ANF research to make policy? Information on
how valuable people find ANF publications and data from a survey of
stakeholders are used to test this hypothesis. Open-ended answers
on how respondents use ANF materials are used to flesh out the
quantitative data.
Four primary sources of data are used to test these hypotheses.
• The research uses the Flesch Reading Ease score and Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level score to test the readability of ANF publications. The
Flesch Reading Ease score computes readability based on the average
number of syllables per word and average number of words per sen-
tence. It uses a 0–100 scale where higher scores indicate a document
is easier to read. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level reports the score in
the form of a grade level. Microsoft Word includes both these tests.
• The Urban Institute used WebTrends software to track usage of the
web site. WebTrends measured user sessions for the ANF web site
monthly. WebTrends also included valuable information on access
to individual publications and pages on the ANF web site.
• ANF created a press clipping database. The database tracked when and
where each article appeared, who wrote it, the type of article, the issues
covered by the article, the presence of a commentator in the article,
the prominence of ANF, and how the Urban Institute was described.
The press clipping database ran from January 1, 2001, to August
31, 2003. It included 693 articles and 1,542 clippings. Articles referred
to stories written by individual reporters. Press clippings referred
to the number of times an article appeared. For example, the project
collected 27 press clippings from a single Associated Press article by
Laura Meckler on children’s health insurance. About 10 percent of
all press clippings collected appeared on the first page (160).
• ANF surveyed the 19,150 subscribers to its listserv four times
between June 16 and July 16, 2003. About 3,310 were bad e-mail
addresses. Three invitations to participate in the survey were sent to
subscribers. ANF received 538 responses, a disappointing 3.4 percent
response rate.
Several factors may have contributed to the low response rate.
Some subscribers may have been on summer vacation. Most state
legislatures were out of session. Since ANF subscribes people to the
list before they have an opportunity to “opt in,” they may be less
willing to answer a survey.
Nonetheless, when ANF analyzed the respondents, it found that
they represented a cross-section of ANF stakeholders. To test this
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finding, ANF compared the proportion of people with various
extensions on the listserv (e.g., .gov, .org, .edu) with the proportion
of survey respondents from different end user groups.
Respondents were asked to choose a category that best described
their current position. The categories were government (elected,
appointed, or civil service—101 responses, 20.2 percent), advocate
(59 responses, 11.8 percent), service provider (28 responses, 5.6 per-
cent), trade or professional association (20 responses, 4 percent),
researcher (107 responses, 21.4 percent), reporter or media repre-
sentative (10 responses, 2 percent), university faculty or student
(104 responses, 20.8 percent), and other (71 responses, 14.2 percent).
Those responding “other” were asked to specify their position.
The government (20 percent .gov extensions on the listserv
and 21 percent of survey respondents) and university audiences
(20 percent .edu extensions on the listserv and 23 percent, respec-
tively) lined up almost exactly. While 32 percent of survey respon-
dents represented advocacy, service, or trade organizations, only
25 percent of the listserv had .org extensions. Researchers accounted
for 22 percent of those responding to the survey, but there was no
extension that matched this group. On the other hand, 34 percent
of the e-mail addresses had .com or .net extensions (5 percent are
AOL subscribers). These did not line up with specific end users.
Researchers, advocates, service providers, and trade associations
were likely to work for companies or use Internet services that used
these extensions.
While respondents probably overrepresented heavy users of
ANF material, they reflected the ANF subscriber base. The authors
concluded that the sample was sufficiently large and representative
to draw useful inferences on the ANF dissemination program.
Five stakeholder groups were created from this sample.
C Government stakeholders identified themselves as government.
C Advocates, service providers, and trade association representa-
tives (ASA) were grouped together into one stakeholder group.
The main work of these constituencies differed, but they all
operated outside government, had a self-interest in the outcome
of the policy debate, and participated in the policymaking
process.
C Researchers.
C University faculty and students.
C Media representatives.
The survey asked respondents to comment on how they used
ANF research and what ANF could do differently. These comments
APPENDIX E 
fleshed out the quantitative data and illustrate how the dissemination
strategies worked for stakeholders.
Conclusion
This evaluation shows that ANF generally met these objectives.
A wide range of state and federal stakeholders were willing to
incorporate sophisticated research in the policy process. As expected,
advocates, service providers, association representatives, and govern-
ment officials preferred shorter formats. Analysis of the language used in
both occasional papers and policy briefs shows that even shorter publica-
tions used complex language and required readers’ full attention.
Interest in shorter pieces, such as “Fast Facts” demonstrated that
stakeholders wanted materials that summarized key data and high-
lighted top-line findings. “Snapshots of America’s Families” did not fit
this model. Two factors probably contributed. First, “Snapshots” did not
build the same identity as policy briefs and “Fast Facts” because they were
issued more than two years apart. Second, “Snapshots” looked broadly
at such topics as health, income, and well-being; they were not as topical
as other ANF publications.
Stakeholders were generally satisfied with the topics of ANF
research. Government respondents tended to be less satisfied. This may
reflect the reality that policy was often made before researchers could
evaluate alternative options.
Without e-mail and the web site, ANF dissemination activities
would have cost much more and reached fewer people more slowly.
ANF coordinated distribution of the listserv, Hot Off the Press from ANF,
with the web site. Because the listserv descriptions included top findings,
end users found it useful even if they did not click through to the full
report. The format made it easy for many end users to share with others.
Given the web use spike after introducing HOTP, this strategy also built
the constituency for ANF research. Periodic reminders of new research
encouraged subscribers to use the web site. Many end users reported
frequent visits to the site.
ANF’s media outreach strategy worked. Articles appeared in all focal
states. With a few notable exceptions, the proportion of clips that
appeared in each state reflected the relative population of each state.
Articles appeared on all the issues that ANF covered. Child care and child
welfare generated greater attention than the quantity of research on each
topic would anticipate. In both cases, ANF data provided detailed analysis
available nowhere else.
More than an end in itself, ANF used media outreach as a mecha-
nism for getting end users to incorporate the research into their
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thinking. The strategy enabled ANF to maintain its objectivity while
responding to reporters’ need to place the research in a policy context.
“Commentators” appeared in both news and feature stories.
To be considered credible by all sides of the political debate, ANF
needed to maintain the Urban Institute’s reputation for objectivity.
The project worked hard at—and generally achieved—this goal. News
articles generally considered ANF nonpartisan or objective. Among end
users, an interesting pattern developed. Those considering themselves
nonpartisan were more likely to see ANF as nonpartisan. Those identify-
ing themselves as liberal or conservative were more likely to see ANF as
liberal.
The end user survey demonstrated that end users did use ANF data
and analyses in their policymaking activities. Some variation among
end users existed in how the research was used. Comments by end users
reinforced the quantitative findings in this area. Indeed, ANF also had a
long list of specific examples where stakeholder groups used specific
findings to reach their policy objectives.
The evaluation also points to areas where ANF can improve 
performance.
• Synthesize research in terms of national and state policy debates to
improve the timeliness and relevance of the materials. This can also
extend the shelf life of the research.
• Update the Urban Institute’s web site to ease navigation and
strengthen the search function. This includes cataloging the
research to simplify access.
• Evaluate the extent to which the commentator strategy increased
use of ANF research. A limited-sample telephone survey compar-
ing those who became commentators with those who did not can
answer this question.
• Evaluate the use of ANF research by government end users more
systematically. A limited-sample telephone survey could identify
variations between legislators and administrators.
• Expand the use of ANF data and analysis among government audi-
ences such as the National Governors Association, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, and the American Public Human
Services Association.
N O T E
1. This appendix has been excerpted from Liebovitz and Wherry (2004) with
permission. Detailed findings are not included here but are available in the original
document and on the UI web site at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm? ID=310983.
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Think Tanks in Eastern 
Europe–CIS Included in 
Survey of Publications 
and Media Practices
F
Armenia
1. Armenian Center for National and International Studies
2. Magistros Physicians Association
3. Center for Health Services Research
4. Transformation Society Research Institute
Bulgaria
1. Access Association
2. Agency for Social Analysis
3. Center for Liberal Strategies
4. Center for Social Practices
5. Center for Strategic Studies—XXI Century Foundation
6. Center for the Study of Democracy
7. Center for the Study of Social and Political Change—Sofia Foundation
8. Economics 2000
9. European Information Correspondents Center for Bulgaria
10. Ianko Sakazov Foundation
11. Institute for Market Economy
Hungary
1. Agroconsult Economic Consulting
2. Center for Security and Defense Studies
3. GKI Economic Research Company
4. Institute of Central European Studies
5. Research Company
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6. Foundation for Market Economy
7. Metropolitan Research Institute
8. Public Policy Institute
9. Foundation for Small Enterprise Economic Development
10. Szazadveg Political School and Policy Research Center
11. Association for Social Research and Information—TARKI
Russia
1. Center for Political Technologies
2. Center for Russian Environmental Policy
3. Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Research
4. EpiCenter: Center for Political and Economic Research
5. Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs
6. Institute of Economic Transition
7. International Fund for Economic and Social Reforms (Fund Reforma)
8. Fund of Efficient Politics
9. Institute for Urban Economics
10. St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Science Strategy
11. Institute for Strategic Analysis and Development of Entrepreneur-
ship (ISAPP)
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Model Cost Policy Statement
G
The model Cost Policy Statement in this appendix is adapted from theU.S. Department of Labor Indirect Cost Rate Determination Guide:
Cost Principles and Procedures for Non-Profit Organizations. It is provided
here as an example of the kind of documentation organizations should
develop in order to demonstrate to funders that they have a well-defined,
reasonable, and justifiable method of allocating and recovering indirect
costs. Of course, individual funders may have particular requirements for
indirect costs (such as a ceiling on the amount of indirect costs that can
be reimbursed or particular types of costs that cannot be reimbursed) that
may be in conflict with the example provided below. Each organization
must decide how to structure its indirect cost recovery to reflect its own
particular funding situation.
This model CPS assumes that the example organization (EO) uses the
direct allocation method of charging costs (i.e., in addition to direct costs),
EO has in place accounting procedures that enable it to direct charge some
costs that would otherwise be considered indirect costs (see, for example,
the description below on how the photocopy costs are charged).
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Cost Policy Statement
Example Organization
I. General Accounting Policies
A. Basis of Accounting Accrual Basis
B. Fiscal Period July 1 through June 30
C. Allocation Basis Direct Allocation Basis
D. Indirect Cost Rate Direct Salaries and Wages Including 
Allocation Base Applicable Fringe Benefits
E. Fringe Benefit Base Direct Salaries
F. Example Organization (EO) maintains adequate internal controls
to insure that no cost is charged both directly and indirectly to
contracts or grants.
G. EO accumulates all indirect costs and revenues in accounts titled
“Indirect Cost-Expense” and “Indirect Cost-Revenue,” respectively.
II. Description of Cost 
Allocation Methodology
A. Salaries and Wages
1. Direct Costs—The majority of EO’s personnel direct-charge
their salary costs since their work is specifically identifiable to
specific grants, contracts, or other activities of the organization.
The charges are supported by auditable labor distribution
reports that reflect the actual activities of employees.
2. Indirect Costs—The following personnel charge 100 percent
of their salary costs indirectly:
Financial Manager
Administrative Assistant
3. Mixed Charges—The following personnel may charge their
salary costs to both direct and indirect activities:
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Executive Director
Technical Staff
The distinction between direct and indirect is primarily based
on the functions performed. For example, when the positions
shown are performing functions that are necessary and bene-
ficial to all programs they are indirect. When functions are spe-
cific to one or more programs they are direct because they do
not benefit all programs.
Auditable labor distribution records that reflect the actual
activities of employees are maintained to support the mix of
direct/indirect charges. The time records are certified by the
executive director.
B. Fringe Benefits
Leave time costs (vacation leave earned, sick leave used, and hol-
iday pay) are considered fringe benefit costs. EO’s accounting
system records leave time as a fringe benefit cost in the same
manner that salary costs are recorded. Vacation leave earned but
not used during each fiscal period is recorded as a cost in the
period earned.
EO contributes to the following fringe benefits for its personnel:
social/health insurance (including unemployment insurance and
worker’s compensation) and matching contributions to retire-
ment fund.
C. Travel
Travel costs may be charged as either direct or indirect costs
depending on the purpose of the trip. For example, the executive
director travels to a regional office to give employees a quarterly
update. This trip is indirect in nature and should be charged as an
indirect cost. However, if the executive director travels to a regional
office to perform a specific task for a contract, the trip would be
considered a direct cost.
D. Board Expenses
Board expenses charged on an indirect basis are for travel to/from
board meetings and an annual fee of $250 paid to each board
member. Other board expenses are absorbed by EO and are not
charged either directly or indirectly to contracts or grants.
E. Supplies and Material
To the maximum extent possible, office supplies and materials
are direct-charged to the contract/grant that uses the supplies or
materials. Supplies and materials used by personnel engaged in
indirect activities will be charged on an indirect basis.
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F. Facility Expenses
EO occupies space it leases from Lessor Corporation. The lease pro-
vides for equal monthly payments during the term of the lease.
All rent is charged as an indirect cost.
EO’s lease includes the cost of all utilities except electricity.
The cost of electricity is charged as an indirect cost.
G. Communications
1. A log is maintained of all fax transmissions. The cost of 
fax services is charged either directly or indirectly based
upon whether a direct or indirect activity benefits from the
transmission.
2. Long distance telephone calls are charged either directly or
indirectly based upon whether a direct or indirect activity
benefits from the transmission.
3. Local telephone service costs treated as indirect charges.
4. EO uses a meter system for postage charges. The postage meter
has been programmed to identify the specific project or activity
to charge costs against. Express mail costs are also specifically
identified to the project or activity incurring the cost.
H. Photocopying and Printing
EO maintains a photocopy activity log. From this log, EO is able to
prorate its photocopy expenses to each project based on the specific
volume of copies made for each program. Administrative personnel
will record copies made to the benefiting project to the maximum
extent practical. In situations where the photocopies being made
by administrative personnel cannot be identified to a specific
project and the matter being copied relates to the activities of EO
in general, the cost of such copies will be charged to the “Indirect
Cost-Expense” account.
Printing expenses are charged to the benefiting activity.
I. Outside Services
EO incurs outside services costs for its annual audit, legal fees,
and for staff development specialists.
1. The cost of the annual audit is charged indirectly.
2. In general, legal fees are charged directly to the benefiting
project or activity.
3. Legal fees that are not identifiable to specific direct projects are
charged indirectly.
J. Capital Items
Capital expenditures are charged directly to projects only in cases
where a contract or grant specifically authorizes such charges. No
capital item is charged indirectly. The cost of capital items purchased
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with non-contract/grant funds is recovered through depreciation
charges. EO’s capitalization threshold is $500.
K. Depreciation
The cost of capital items purchased with non-contract/grant funds
that are used in a manner that benefits projects is recovered through
depreciation charges. EO recovers the cost of capital items using
straight line depreciation methods in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. Depreciation is charged indirectly.
L. Unallowable Costs
EO recognizes that the costs listed below are unallowable charges to
contracts/grants and has internal controls in place to insure that
such costs are not charged to contracts/grants:
C Advertising and public relations
C Entertainment/alcoholic beverages
C Capital expenditures
C Bad debts
C Interest
C Lobbying and fund-raising
________________________ ________________________
(Signature) (Date)
_________________________________
(Title)
Example Organization
(Address)
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
Sample Tables
for Conveying Key Information
to Senior Management
H
These table shells are based on actual reports produced by think tanks.The shells have been adjusted to make them useful to a wider range
of users. The tables are designed to illustrate types of indicators and pre-
sentation formats. Therefore, not all indicators listed in tables 10-2–10-5
are included in the sample tables.
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